DIGEST: ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO vs. SUPERVALUE, INC

DIGEST: ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO vs. SUPERVALUE, INC
G.R. No. 172384 September 12, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

 

Facts:

·       Petitioner is doing business under the business name "Empanada Royale," a sole proprietorship engaged in the retail of empanada.

·        Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of leasing stalls and commercial store spaces located inside SM Malls.

·        On 8 March 1999, the parties executed three Contracts of Lease containing similar terms and conditions over the cart-type stalls at SM North Edsa and SM Southmall and a store space at SM Megamall. The term of each contract is for a period of four months and may be renewed upon agreement of the parties.

·        Upon the expiration of the original Contracts of Lease, the parties agreed to renew the same by extending their terms until 31 March 2000.

·         Before the expiration of the contract, petitioner received two letters from the respondent.

 

o    In the first letter, petitioner was charged with violating Section 8 of the Contracts of Lease by not opening on 16 December 1999 and 26 December 1999 and selling a new variety of empanada called "mini-embutido" and of increasing the price of her merchandise from ₱20.00 to ₱22.00, without the prior approval of the respondent.

o    frequently closing earlier than the usual mall hours, either because of non-delivery or delay in the delivery of stocks to her outlets, again in violation of the terms of the contract. A stern warning was thus given to petitioner to refrain from committing similar infractions in the future in order to avoid the termination of the lease contract.

o     In the second letter, respondent informed the petitioner that it will no longer renew the Contracts of Lease for the three outlets, upon their expiration on 31 March 2000.

o    In a letter-reply dated 11 February 2000, petitioner explained that the "mini-embutido" is not a new variety of empanada but had similar fillings, taste and ingredients as those of pork empanada; only, its size was reduced in order to make it more affordable to the buyers.

·         Respondent still refused to renew its Contracts of Lease with the petitioner. To the contrary, respondent took possession of the store space in SM Megamall and confiscated the equipment and personal belongings of the petitioner found therein after the expiration of the lease contract.

·        Petitioner demanded that the respondent release the equipment and personal belongings it seized from the SM Megamall store space and return the security deposits, in the sum of ₱192,000.00, turned over by the petitioner upon signing of the Contracts of Lease.

·        Respondent failed or refused to comply therewith.

·        Petitioner filed an action for Specific Performance, Sum of Money and Damages against the respondent before the RTC.

·        RTC rendered a Judgment in favor of the petitioner and found that the physical takeover by the respondent of the leased premises and the seizure of petitioner’s equipment and personal belongings without prior notice were illegal.

·         Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the adverse RTC Judgment to the Court of Appeals.

·         the Court of Appeals modified the RTC Judgment and found that the respondent was justified in forfeiting the security deposits and was not liable to reimburse the petitioner for the value of the improvements introduced in the leased premises and to pay for attorney’s fees

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is liable to reimburse the petitioner for the sum of the improvements she introduced in the leased premises.

Ruling:

In ruling that the respondent is liable to reimburse petitioner one half of the amount of improvements made on the leased store space should it choose to appropriate the same, the RTC relied on the provision of Article 1678 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

While it is true that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the lessor is under the obligation to pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements made should the lessor choose to appropriate the improvements, Article 1678 however should be read together with Article 448 and Article 546 of the same statute, which provide:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

x x x x

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

Thus, to be entitled to reimbursement for improvements introduced on the property, the petitioner must be considered a builder in good faith. Further, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it. In this case, the petitioner cannot claim that she was not aware of any flaw in her title or was under the belief that she is the owner of the subject premises for it is a settled fact that she is merely a lessee thereof.

In Geminiano v. Court of Appeals,this Court was emphatic in declaring that lessees are not possessors or builders in good faith, thus:

Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.

In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.

Since petitioner’s interest in the store space is merely that of the lessee under the lease contract, she cannot therefore be considered a builder in good faith. Consequently, respondent may appropriate the improvements introduced on the leased premises without any obligation to reimburse the petitioner for the sum expended.