DIGEST: BARTOLOME ORTIZ vs. HON. UNION C. KAYANAN et. al.
G.R. No. L-32974 July 30, 1979
ANTONIO, J.:
Petition
for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction to nullify the Order
of respondent Judge directing the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case
No. C-90, entitled "Bartolome Ortiz vs. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, et al.," and the Writ of Execution issued to
implement said Order, allegedly for being inconsistent with the judgment sought
to be enforced.
Civil Case No. C-90 was filed by Bartolome Ortiz who sought
the review and/or annulment of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, giving preference to the sales applications of private
respondents Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora over Lot No. 5785, PLS-45,
located at Barrio Cabuluan, Calauag, Quezon.
Facts:
·
The lot in controversy was formerly the subject of Homestead
of Martin Dolorico II, plaintiff's ward who died. plaintiff who continued the
cultivation and possession of the property, without however filing any
application to acquire title thereon. Plaintiff’s war named Martin Dolirico I as
his heir and successor in interest, so that in 1951 Martin Dolorico I executed
an affidavit relinquishing his rights over the property in favor of defendants
Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora, his grandson and son-in-law,
respectively, and requested the Director of Lands to cancel the homestead
application.
·
Defendants Comintan and Zamora filed their respective sales
applications Nos.
·
Ortiz, plaintiff filed his protest alleging that he should be
given preference to purchase the lot inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and
has been in continuous possession of the same since 1931.
·
inspite of plaintiff's opposition, "Portion A" of
the property was sold at public auction wherein defendant Comintan was the only
bidder.
·
investigation was conducted on plaintiff's protest by
Assistant Public Lands Inspector Serapion Bauzon who submitted his report to
the Regional Land Officer and who in turn rendered a decision dismissing
plaintiff's claim and giving due course to defendants' sales applications on
the ground that the relinquishment of the homestead rights of Martin Dolorico I
in favor of Comintan and Zamora is proper, the former having been designated as
successor in interest of the original homestead applicant and that because
plaintiff failed to participate in the public auction, he is forever barred to
claim the property.
·
plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision
which was denied by the Director of Lands.
·
finally, on appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
·
the decision rendered by the Regional Land Officer was
affirmed in toto.
·
Plaintiff appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals.
·
Two (2) years after the rendition of the judgment by the
court a quo, while the case was pending appeal and upon petition of
private respondents Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora, respondent Court
appointed respondent Vicente Ferro, Clerk of Court, as Receiver to collect tolls on a portion of the property used as a
diversion road.
·
private respondents filed a petition for appointment of a new
receiver with the court a quo. This petition was granted and the receiver
was reappointed.
·
Petitioner sought the annulment of this Order with the CA,
but said Court ruled that its decision had already become final.
· Not satisfied with such denial, petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction before this Court, praying for the annulment of the Order reappointing the Receiver. On July 13, 1970, the petition was dismissed by this Court
· Private respondent filed a motion officer to:
o deliver the land subject but
allowing defendants to file a bond, in lieu of the P13,632.00 required to be
paid to plaintiff, conditioned that after the accounting of the tolls collected
by plaintiff.
o Ordering further the
plaintiff to render an accounting of the tolls he collected from March of 1967
to December 31, 1968 and from September 1969 to March 31, 1970, and deliver
said tolls collected to the receiver and if judgment is already executed, then
to Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora
o to condemn plaintiff to pay
moral damages for withholding the tools which belong to your movant.
· Respondent Judge granted the motion on the grounds that The tolls collected by the plaintiff on an
unimproved portion naturally belong to the defendants, following the doctrine
on accretion and his right over the
same is ipso jure. And
that collected tolls on the diversion
road shall be deducted to the P13,632.00
of bond
· Accordingly, a Writ of Execution was issued after private respondent Quirino Comintan had filed the required bond.
· Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but denied by
the respondent judge.
· Petitioner thus filed the
instant petition, contending that judgment declared the he is a a possessor
in good faith, he is entitled to the payment of the value of the improvements
introduced by him on the whole property, with right to retain the land until he
has been fully paid such value. Hence,
that all the fruits of the property, including the tolls collected by him from
the passing vehicles, which according to the trial court amounts to P25,000.00,
belongs to him.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is still entitled to retain for his
own exclusive benefit all the fruits of the property.
Ruling:
We find this contention untenable.
There is no question that a possessor in good faith is
entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted. Possession in good faith ceases or is legally
interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor, by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the
true owner for the recovery of the property. Hence, all the fruits that
the possessor may receive from the time he is summoned in court, or when he
answers the complaint, must be delivered and paid by him to the owner or lawful
possessor.
However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor in
fact can still retain the property, pursuant to Article 546 of the New Civil
Code, until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and useful
expenses made by him on the property. This right of retention has been
considered as one of the conglomerate of measures devised by the law for the
protection of the possessor in good faith. Its object is to guarantee the
reimbursement of the expenses, such as those for the preservation of the
property, or for the enhancement of its utility or productivity. It
permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been
reimbursed by the person who defeated him in the possession for those necessary
expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. The
principal characteristic of the right of retention is its accessory character.
It is accessory to a principal obligation. Considering that the right of the
possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his good faith ceases, it is
necessary, in order that this right to retain may be useful, to concede to the
creditor the right to secure reimbursement from the fruits of the property by
utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as the principal
of the debt while he remains in possession. This right of retention of the
property by the creditor, according to Scaevola, in the light of the provisions
of Article 502 of the Spanish Civil Code, is considered not a coercive
measure to oblige the debtor to pay, depriving him temporarily of the enjoyment
of the fruits of his property, but as a means of obtaining compensation for the
debt. The right of retention in this case is analogous to a contract of
antichresis and it can be considered as a means of extinguishing the
obligation, inasmuch as the right to retain the thing lasts only for the period
necessary to enable the creditor to be reimbursed from the fruits for the
necessary and useful expenses.
According to Manresa, the right of retention is, therefore,
analogous to that of a pledge, if the property retained is a movable, and to
that of antichresis, if the property held is immovable. This construction
appears to be in harmony with similar provisions of the civil law which employs
the right of retention as a means or device by which a creditor is able to
obtain the payment of a debt. Thus, under Article 1731 of the New Civil Code,
any person who has performed work upon a movable has a right to retain it by
way of pledge until he is paid. Similarly, under Article 1914 of the same Code,
the agent may retain in pledge the things which are the object of the agency
until the principal effects reimbursement of the funds advanced by the former
for the execution of the agency, or he is indemnified for all damages which he
may have suffered as a consequence of the execution of the agency, provided he
is free from fault. To the same effect, the depositary, under Article 1994 of
the same Code, may retain the thing in pledge until the full payment of what
may be due him by reason of the deposit. The usufructuary, pursuant to Article
612 of the same Code, may retain the property until he is reimbursed for the
amount paid for taxes levied on the capital (Article 597) and tor extraordinary
repairs (Article 594).
In all of these cases, the right of retention is used as a
means of extinguishing the obligation. As amply observed by Manresa: "El derecho de retencion, lo hemos
dicho, es el derecho de prenda o el de anticresis constituido por la ley con
independencia de las partes." In a pledge, if the thing pledged earns or produces fruits,
income, dividends or interests, the creditor shall compensate what he receives
with those which are owing him. In the same manner, in a contract of
antichresis, the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable of his debtor with the obligation to apply them to payment of the
interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit. The
debtor can not reacquire enjoyment of the immovable until he has actually paid
what he owes the creditor.
Applying the afore-cited principles to the case at bar,
petitioner cannot appropriate for his own exclusive benefit the tolls which he
collected from the property retained by him. It was his duty under the law,
after deducting the necessary expenses for his administration, to apply such
amount collected to the payment of the interest, and the balance to the payment
of the obligation.
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