Digested Cases for Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law 

@MLPaga

1.  BALBINA MENDOZA, recurrente, vs. PACIANO DIZON, ensu capacidad como Auditor General, recurrido.

G.R. No. L-387.October 25, 1946

BRIONES, J.:

Facts:

 

Performing the position of Auditor of the province of Ilocos Sur, Juan M. Cuevas died in Vigan, capital of said province. At the outbreak of the War on December 8, 1941, he was on active duty as such an Auditor.

In 1932 Cuevas married Florencia Cocadiz. This marriage was definitively dissolved on March 21, 1944 by virtue of a firm decree of divorce issued by the First Instance Court of Gatangas on that date. There were no offspring. 

On December 7, 1945, the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines issued Administrative Order No. 27, which under certain conditions provided for the payment of gratuities to officials and employees of the National Government who had been in active service on December 8, 1941. , whether or not they have been called to return to their posts after liberation. Said Administrative Order was issued by the President "by virtue of the authority conferred on me by the existing law (reference is made to the emergency powers) and to carry out the recommendations of the Committee created under Joint Resolution No. 5 of the Congress of Philippines approved on July 28, 1945. " 

 

the Complainant had already addressed an instance to the Auditor General, accompanied by the corresponding supporting documents, stating the circumstance of her relationship with the late Juan M. Cuevas and her relationship of its assets, including certain amounts of money held by the Government, the Philippine National Bank and the Postal Savings Bank, and consequently requesting "that she be designated as the closest relative in order to enable her to receive without delay any amount owed to your deceased child ... " 

Florencia Cocadiz, the divorced wife, has not officially appeared before the Auditor General, nor has she filed any instance.

 

The file shows that at first the Auditor General Delegate raised the matter in consultation with the Department of Justice trying to obtain an opinion, among other points, on whether "the divorced wife mentioned here has any right to the gratification or gratuity to which the deceased husband or his intestate is credited AND to Administrative Order No. 27 dated December 7, 1945, considering that said status is equivalent to their wages for the months of January and February, 1942. "

 

Issue:

 

whether the gratification (gratuity) payable to the deceased Juan Cuevas under Administrative Order No. 27 dated December 7, 1945, belongs to his lying inheritance, or whether such gratuity should be considered pertinent to the community property of the deceased and his divorced wife.

 

Ruling:

 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GRATIFICATION (GRATUITY); SIGNIFICANCE OR CONCEPT. - Administrative Order No. 27 of December 7, 1945, uses the word gratuity which has a known, categorical and strict meaning in law and jurisprudence. The authorities agree that gratuity does not equal salary, wages, or any other emolument. It means gift, prize, present, something that is given and received for a lucrative title. In the present case, the difference between the two concepts should be further emphasized if it is considered that Congress, in its Joint Resolution No. 5 approved on July 28, 1945, recommended the study of "ways and means to pay the back salaries, gratuities, bonuses or other emoluments of the loyal and deserving employees of the Commonwealth ... " The fact, then, that the President chose the term gratuity, leaving aside the other words, indicates that it is a well-calculated concession; clearly denotes the intention to strictly limit the scope of the privilege to the letter of the law.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.  CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO and PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 164789. August 27, 2009

BRION, J.:

 

Facts:

 

On April 30, 1998, CGA entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision lot⁴ (subject property) with the respondents – the registered owners and developers of a housing subdivision known as Villa Priscilla Subdivision located in Barangay Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan. Under the Contract to Sell, CGA would pay ₱2,373,000.00 for the subject property on installment basis; they were to pay a down payment of ₱1,186,500, with the balance payable within three years on equal monthly amortization payments of ₱46,593.85, inclusive of interest at 24% per annum, starting June 1998.

 

On August 5, 2000, the parties mutually agreed to amend the Contract to Sell to extend the payment period from three to five years, calculated from the date of purchase and based on the increased total consideration of ₱2,706,600, with equal monthly installments of ₱37,615.00, inclusive of interest at 24% per annum, starting September 2000.

 

CGA, it religiously paid the monthly installments until its administrative pastor discovered that the title covering the subject property suffered from fatal flaws and defects. CGA learned that the subject property was actually part of two consolidated lots (Lots 2-F and 2-G Bsd-04-000829 [OLT]) that the respondents had acquired from Nicanor Adriano (Adriano) and Ceferino Sison (Sison), respectively. Adriano and Sison were former tenant-beneficiaries of Purificacion S. Imperial (Imperial) whose property in Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan had been placed under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27’s Operation Land Transfer. According to CGA, Imperial applied for the retention of five hectares of her land under Republic Act No. 6657, which the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted in its October 2, 1997 order (DAR Order). The DAR Order authorized Imperial to retain the farm lots previously awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries, including Lot 2-F previously awarded to Adriano, and Lot 2-G Bsd-04-000829 awarded to Sison. On appeal, the Office of the President and the CAupheld the DAR Order. Through the Court’s Resolution dated January 19, 2005 in G.R. No. 165650, we affirmed the DAR Order by denying the petition for review of the appellate decision.

Understandably aggrieved after discovering these circumstances, CGA filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC on April 30, 2002. CGA claimed that the respondents fraudulently concealed the fact that the subject property was part of a property under litigation; thus, the Contract to Sell was a rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. CGA asked the trial court to rescind the contract; order the respondents to return the amounts already paid; and award actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

 

respondents filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Citing PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, the respondents claimed that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot.

CGA opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that the action is for rescission of contract, not specific performance, and is not among the actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, as specified by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344.

 

the RTC issued an order denying the respondents’ motion to dismiss.

 

Issue:

 

Whether or not an action to rescind a contract to sell a subdivision lot that the  buyer found to be under litigation falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB

 

Held:

 

The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law governing at the time the action was commenced. The jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law, not by the parties’ consent or by their waiver in favor of a court that would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of an action. Thus, the determination of whether the CGA’s cause of action falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB necessitates a closer examination of the laws defining the HLURB’s jurisdiction and authority.

 

The surge in the real estate business in the country brought with it an increasing number of cases between subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers on the issue of the extent of the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction. In the cases that reached us, we have consistently ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.

 

We view CGA’s contention – that the CA erred in applying Article 1191 of the Civil Code as basis for the contract’s rescission – to be a negligible point. Regardless of whether the rescission of contract is based on Article 1191 or 1381 of the Civil Code, the fact remains that what CGA principally wants is a refund of all payments it already made to the respondents. This intent, amply articulated in its complaint, places its action within the ambit of the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction and outside the reach of the regular courts. Accordingly, CGA has to file its complaint before the HLURB, the body with the proper jurisdiction.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3. THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
FRED L. DORR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. 1051. May 19, 1903

LADD, J.:

 

Facts:

 

The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.

The complaint is based upon section

8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, which is as follows:

The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom"... under the caption of "A few hard facts."... appointing rascally natives to important Government positions

"There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of the Islands are in a good many instances rascal.

"The Commission has exalted to the highest positions in the islands Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character.

there can be no such thing as a scurrilous libel, or any sort of a libel, upon an abstraction like the Government in the sense of the laws and institutions of a country.

 

Issue:

Whether or not the article be regarded a embraced within the description of “scrurrilous libels against the government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Island”

 

Ruling:

 

"We understand, in modern political science, * * * by the term government, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which... are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By administration, again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less... free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.

The term "government" would appear to be used here in the... abstract sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government the Houses of Congress and the Executive which are also specially mentioned.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that this is the sense in which the term is used in the enactment under consideration.

The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United States, and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system... by which the authority of the United States is enforced in these Islands.

It is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to... bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section 8.

 

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted

 

 

 

4.

CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, and Executive Secretary, respondents.

G.R. No. 81954.August 8, 1989

SARMIENTO, J.:

 

FACTS:

 

Pres. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, providing for the intention of the President to, “completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.” Subsequently, Pres. Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 127, “Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance”, where, in Sec. 59, it provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. Pursuant to the reorganization, Commissioner Mison issued separation notices to a total of 394 officials, including the petitioner, Cesar Dario, in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner.

Thus, Cesar Dario petitioned for reinstatement on the ground that the Provisional Constitution giving the power to dismiss public officials without cause ended on February 25, 1987, seeing as the public officials enjoyed security of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. However, respondent Commissioner Mison contended that Sec. 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) allows the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under E.O. No. 127 (authorizing separation without cause) to continue even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution – citing the case of Jose v. Arroyo, wherein the Court decided in favor of a similar notion. Thus, there was no violation of security of tenure. 

 

Issue:

 

Does E.O. No. 127, providing reorganization, allow the “separation” of Dario from the Bureau of Customs despite his right to security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution?

 

Ruling:

 

No. The Court held that E.O. No. 127, providing reorganization, does not allow the “separation” of Dario from the Bureau of Customs despite his right to security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution.

In line with this, the Court maintains that reorganization entails that an office is abolished, thus there actually no separation or dismissal such that these concepts imply that there is an office to be separated from. However, the Court asserts that, reorganizations abolishing an office would only be valid if it passes the test of good faith. A Reorganization carried out in good faith must have for its purpose the efficiency of both the economy and bureaucracy. In this case, there is lack of good faith such that there is no showing that legitimate structural changes were made, only that personnel were reduced. Thus, it cannot be said that it was done by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Thus, since there is lack of good faith, there is no valid reorganization that would allow the “separation” of the petitioners, in keeping with their security of tenure. The act of reorganization of the Bureau of Customs dismissing Dario is unconstitutional

 

5.  SPOUSES BERNYL BALANGAUAN & KATHERENE BALANGAUAN, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL NINETEENTH (19^TH) DIVISION, CEBU CITY & THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, LTD., Respondents.

[G.R. NO. 174350 : August 13, 2008]

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

 

Facts:

 

Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of CA w/c annulled and set aside the Resolution of DOJ in HSBC vs Balanguan which dismissed the criminal complaint for Estafa filed against the Balanguan. - In this Petition, Balanguans urge the SC to reverse and set aside the decision of CA and accordingly, dismiss the complaint against them in view of the absence of probable cause - HSBC filed an estafa case against Balanguans which was dismissed by the Prosecutor in its Resolution, finding no probable cause. HSBC appealed to the Secretary of DOJ by means of a Petition for Review which was also dismissed. MR was also denied. - HSBC then went to CA by means of Petition for Certiorari thereby annulling and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ. Balanguans filed an MR before the CA but was denied.

 

Issue:

 

 

Ruling:

 

The Prosecutor exceeded his authority and gravely abused his discretion. It must be remembered that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

 

The Court of Appeals found fault in the DOJ's failure to identify and discuss the issues raised by HSBC in its Petition for Review. And, in support thereof, HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to argue that "it was not necessary for the Secretary of Justice to have his resolution recite the facts and the law on which it was based," because courts and quasi-judicial bodies should faithfully comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by them should state clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which the decision is based.

 

It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause

 

Though some cases describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies18, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.

 

The alleged circumstances of the case at bar make up the elements of abuse of confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and damage under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code on estafa and/or qualified estafa. They give rise to the presumption or reasonable belief that the offense of estafa has been committed; and, thus, the filing of an Information against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene is warranted.

 

Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced, SC dismissed the instant petition for being the wrong remedy under the Revised Rules of Court, as well as for petitioner Bernyl and Katherene’s failure to sufficiently show that the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

 

6.

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER AND CONRADO S. REYES in their official capacity as FISCAL AGENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT et. al.,

G.R. No. 81385 February 21, 1989

GANCAYCO, J.:

 

Facts:

When the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) provided certain financing accommodations to Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI), Publisher, the voting rights over 67% of the total subscribed and outstanding voting shares of stock of the company held by the stockholders were assigned to the bank. The bank appointed some stockholders as proxies to exercise its right to vote. But when PJI defaulted, the bank cancelled the said proxies and designated as its proxies petitioner Eduardo Olaguer, Jose Mari Velez and Manuel de Leon. DBP scheduled a special stockholders meeting for the purpose of electing new set of directors. However, complaints were filed against them due to some alleged illegal acts committed by them. Among which is that Olaguer continued to exercise and retain full management and control of PJI despite of his termination of his appointment as member of the board of directors of DBP by Pres. Aquino. It was alleged that Olaguer, et. al have been acting as corporate officers and/or members of the board without their having been elected by the majority vote of stockholders and without their owning in their own right even a single qualifying share. It was also alleged in the complaint, that petitioner Reyes had been sending out notices to private respondents about an alleged stockholders meeting to be held on December 21, 1987 at the PJI building, and that in the letter written by the DBP chief legal counsel, it is stated that petitioner Olaguer and his associates who claim to be members of the board and corporate officers of PJI do not represent DBP and that they are not authorized to act in its behalf. A complaint was filed in the RTC of Manila however, Olaguer contested that he has just been designated the fiscal and team leader of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) assigned to the PJI and that all his actions are sanctioned and reported to PCGG.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding Olaguer's appointment as fiscal agent of the PCGG.

Ruling:

No. Olaguer, being a fiscal agent of the PCGG and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PJI, was acting for and in behalf of the PCGG. Under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding "the funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinate, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees," civil or criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. The regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the PCGG. The Commission should not be embroiled in and swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over the land. Otherwise, the Commission will be forced to spend valuable time defending all its actuations in such courts. This will defeat the very purpose behind the creation of the Commission.

7.

CEFERINO PADUA, Petitioner, vs. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, 

G. R. No. 141949 - October 14, 2002

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

 

Facts:

 

The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway.

 

The above Resolution approving provisional toll rate adjustments was published in the newspapers of general circulation. Tracing back the events that led to the issuance of the said Resolution, it appears that Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CITRA) filed with the TRB an application for an interim adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro Manila Skyway Project – Stage 1.CITRA moored its petition on the provisions of the "Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement" (STOA), authorizing it, as the investor, to apply for and if warranted, to be granted an interim adjustment of toll rates in the event of a "significant currency devaluation."

 

Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S. dollar had devaluated, CITRA alleged that there was a compelling need for the increase of the toll rates to meet the loan obligations of the Project and the substantial increase in debt-service burden.

Due to heavy opposition, CITRA’s petition remained unresolved. This prompted CITRA to file an "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval," this time, invoking Section 3, Rule 10 of the "Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearing Before the Toll Regulatory Board" (TRB Rules of Procedure) which provides:

 "SECTION 3. Provisional Relief. – Upon the filing of an application or petition for the approval of the initial toll rate or toll rate adjustment, or at any stage, thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or in its own initiative, the relief prayed for without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing should the Board find that the pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto and such additional evidence as may have been requested and presented, substantially support the provisional order; Provided: That the Board may, motu proprio, continue to issue orders or grant relief in the exercise of its powers of general supervision under existing laws. Provided:

Finally, that pending finality of the decision, the Board may require the Petitioner to deposit in whole or in part in escrow the provisionally approved adjustment or initial toll rates." (Emphasis supplied)

 

· CITRA moved to withdraw its "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval" without prejudice to its right to seek or be granted provisional relief under the above-quoted provisions of the TRB Rules of Procedure, obviously, referring to the power of the Board to act on its own initiative. · Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita, as toll payer assail before this Court the validity and legality of TRB Resolution No. 2001- 89.

· As a toll payer, Padua claims that: (1) Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued without the required publication and in violation of due process; (2) alone, TRB Executive Director Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr., could not authorize the provisional toll rate adjustments because the TRB is a collegial body; and (3) CITRA has no standing to apply for a toll fee increase since it is an "investor" and not a "franchisee-operator."

· Private respondent CITRA, in its comment counters that: (1) the TRB has primary administrative jurisdiction over all matters relating to toll rates; (2) prohibition is an inappropriate remedy because its function is to restrain acts about to be done and not acts already accomplished; (3) Resolution No. 2001- 89 was issued in accordance with law; (4) Section 3, Rule 10 of the TRB Rules is constitutional; and (5) private respondent and the Republic of the Philippines would suffer more irreparable damages than petitioner.

 

Issue:

 

Whether TRB has jurisdiction to issue Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway

 

Ruling:

 

We take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, is indispensable. Between the power

lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former."[24] In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,we ruled: "x x x, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court." Petitioner Padua’s "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee Increases" is DENIED and petitioner Zialcita’s "Petition for Prohibition" is DISMISSED.

 

8.  Joson vs. Executive Secretary (290 SCRA 279, 1998)

 

HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor of the Province of Nueva Ecija, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, represented by SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY MANUEL R. SANCHEZ, MR. OSCAR C. TINIO, in his capacity as Provincial Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija, and MR. LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR. CRISPULO S. ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C. SANTOS, MR. VICENTE C. PALILIO, and MR. NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in their capacity as Provincial Board Members of Nueva Ecija, Respondents.

G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998

PUNO, J.

 

Facts:

 

Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary.  The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.

 

Issue:

 

Whether or not the resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the President who is the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG.

 

Ruling:

 

No.

The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority.  What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.   As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials.  A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority.  This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time.   Each head of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.

 

 

9. Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission (242 SCRA 196, 1995)

 

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

PUNO, J.:

 

Facts:

 

Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.

Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:

“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.

 

Issue:

 

Whether the CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB

 

Ruling: 

 

NO

The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974^. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.

Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..

 

Thus, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.”

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

 

 

10. Blaquera v. Alcala (295 SCRA 411, 1989)

 

Government-owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock or non- stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly  ot through its instrumentalities  either wholly, or, where applicable, as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least 50% of its capital stock.

 

 

Facts:
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who

were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992,  pursuant to Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292.  On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President.  Section 4 of AO 29 directed “all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount

authorized under Section 1 hereof are hereby directed to immediately cause the return/refund   of the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this Order.”  In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the  amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.  To prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief.

 

The petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority, is an  association of employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority who were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant to  Republic Act   No. 6971, otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990.   Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was “prohibited under Administrative Order No. 29 dated January 19, 1993.” The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought on appeal to the Commission on Audit which denied the appeal in its Decision

of March 6, 1995 on the grounds that provisions of RA 6971 insofar as the coverage is concerned, refer to business enterprises including government owned and/or controlled corporations performing proprietary functions.

Section 1a of the Supplemental Rules Implementing RA 6971 classified such coverage as:

“All business enterprises, with or without existing duly certified labor organizations, including government owned and/or controlled corporations performing proprietary functions which are established solely for business or profit and accordingly excluding those created, maintained or acquired in pursuance of a policy of the State enunciated in the Constitution, or by law and those whose officers and employees are covered

by the Civil Service." Pursuant to Section 10 of RA 6971, the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Finance issued Supplemental Rules to Implement the said law. With the denial of its appeal, petitioner found its way here via the petition in G.R. No. 119597, to seek relief

from the aforesaid decision of COA.

 

Issue:

 

Whether or not the PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971

 

Ruling:

 

Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created.  If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary.   If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as “proprietary” are those intended for private advantage and benefit.

 

The aforecited powers and functions of PTA are predominantly governmental, principally geared towards the development and promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine archipelago.  But it is irrefutable that PTA also performs proprietary functions, as envisaged by its charter. To ascertain whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971, there is need to find out the legislative intent, and to refer to other provisions of RA 6971 and other pertinent laws, that may aid the Court in ruling on the right of officials and employees of PTA to receive bonuses under RA 6971.

Government corporations may be created by special charters or by incorporation under the general corporation law.  Those created by special charters are governed by the Civil Service Law while those incorporated under the general corporation law are governed by the Labor Code.

 

It is thus evident that PTA, being a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter subject to Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations, is already within the scope of an incentives award system under Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil Service

 

Commission (“Commission”). Since government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters do have an incentive award system, Congress enacted a law that would address the same concern of officials and employees of government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under the general corporation law. All things studiedly considered in proper perspective; the Court finds no reversible error in the finding by respondent Commission that PTA is not within the purview of RA 6971.

As regards the promulgation of implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that   the “power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the  statute  is necessarily   limited   to  what   is   provided for in the legislative enactment.” In the case under scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and provisions of RA 6971.  Consequently, not being covered by RA 6971, AO 29 applies to the petitioner.

 

 

11. Lumiqued v. Exevea (282 SCRA 125, 1997)

 

FACTS:

 

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of The Department of Agrarian Reform – Cordillera Autonomous Region.

 

Jeannette Ober Zamudio charged Lumiqued with Malversation through falsification of public documents. He allegedly falsified gasoline receipts amounting to Php 44,172.46 and made unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php 116,000.00. Zamudio also charged him with oppression and harassment after being relieved without just cause after filing the 2 cases against Lumiqued.

 

Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145, creating a committee to investigate complaints against Lumiqued.

 

Lumiqued submitted his affidavit alleging that the reason the cases were filed against him was to extort money from him. He also admitted that his average daily consumption was 108.45Li which is an aggregate consumption of the 5 service vehicle issued to him and that the receipts were turned over to him by drivers for reimbursement.

 

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted and Lumiqued was not assisted by a counsel since he was confident that he can defend himself. he was unable to attend the third hearing since he suffered a stroke on July 10.

 

Investigating Committee issued a report finding Lumiqued liable for all charges against him and Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration.

 

The Committee informed Lumiqued that the report was already forwarded to the President.

 

President Ramos issued AO No 52 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of 15 gas receipts and he was dismissed from service. Lumiqued filed a Petition for appeal which was denied. He then file a second motion for reconsideration, alleging that he was denied constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. The second motion was denied.

 

Lumiqued passed away.

 

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintained that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of a counsel.

 

Issue:

 

Whether or not the right to have a counsel during an administrative hearing is necessary.

 

Ruling:

 

NO. Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent training seminars both here and abroad. Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without the help of counsel, if the truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to attend.

 

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

 

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.

 

12. Polloso vs Gangan (355 SCRA 750, 2000)

 

DANTE M. POLLOSO, Petitioner, vs. HON. CELSO D. GANGAN, Chairman, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. RAUL C. FLORES, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON AUDIT. Respondents.

[G.R. No. 140563. July 14, 2000]

KAPUNAN, J.:

 

Facts:

In 1994, the National Power Corporation (NPC), represented by its President Dr. Francisco L. Viray entered into a service contract with Atty. Benemerito A. Satorre. Under said contract, Satorre was to perform the following services for the Leyte-Cebu and Leyte-Luzon Interconnection Projects of the NPC.

 

Accordingly, the following were held to be personally liable for the amounts due to Atty. Satorre: Dr. Francisco Viray, NPC contracting party; Manolo C. Marquez, for certifying the claim as necessary, lawful and authorized; Andrea B. Roa and Romeo Gallego, for verifying the supporting documents to be complete and proper; Jesus Alio, for reviewing the supporting documents to be complete and proper; Dante M. Polloso, Project Manager II, Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project (LCIP), National Power Corporation-Visayas Regional Center, for approving the claim; and Benemerito Satorre, as the payee.

 

only petitioner Dante Polloso submitted a letter-explanation refuting the alleged violation contained in the Notice of Disallowance and sought reconsideration thereof.⁵ This was denied by the Unit Auditor.

 

petitioner appealed the denial of the Unit Auditor to the Regional Director

 

OA Regional Office No. VII;⁷ the latter denied the same.

 

Issue:

 

DOES SECTION 38, CHAPTER 9, BOOK I OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987 APPLY TO PETITIONER FOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT MALICE AND MERELY IMPLEMENTED A VALID CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION?

 

Ruling:

 

Petitioners claim that the Circular is unconstitutional for being an invalid restriction to the practice of the law profession, is clearly bereft of any merit. The Government has its own counsel, which is the Office of the Solicitor General headed by the Solicitor General, while the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) acts as the principal law office of the government-owned or controlled corporations. It is only in special cases where these government entities may engage the services of private lawyers because of their expertise in certain fields. The questioned COA circular simply sets forth the prerequisites for a government agency instrumentality in hiring a private lawyer, which are reasonable safeguards to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. We fail to see how the restrictions contained in the COA circular can be considered as a curtailment on the practice of the legal profession.

Anent petitioners argument that he cannot be held liable for effecting payment of the disallowed amount because he is not privy to the service contract, we find the same to be unmeritorious. This is because petitioners liability arose from the fact that as project manager, he approved the said claim. In addition, his assertion that a refusal on his part to certify payment of the same would subject him to criminal and civil liabilities cannot hold water simply because it was his duty not to approve the same for payment upon finding that such was irregular and in contravention of COA Circular No. 86-255, dated 2 April 1986.

 

 

13. Cooperative Development Authority vs Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative Inc., (382 SCRA 522, 2002)

G.R. No. 137489 - May 29, 2002

DE LEON, JR., J.:

 

Facts:

 

The record shows that sometime in the later part of 1997, the CDA received from certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI for brevity), an agrarian reform cooperative that owns 8,860 hectares of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato, several complaints alleging mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then incumbent officers and members of the board of directors of the cooperative, some of whom are herein private respondents.

Acting on the complaints docketed as CDA-CO Case No. 97-011, CDA Executive Director Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. issued an order³ dated December 8, 1997 directing the private respondents to file their answer within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

Before the private respondents could file their answer, however, CDA Administrator Alberto P. Zingapan issued on December 15, 1997 an order,⁴ upon the motion of the complainants in CDA-CO Case No. 97-011, freezing the funds of DARBCI and creating a management committee to manage the affairs of the said cooperative.

On December 18, 1991, the private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari⁵ with a prayer for preliminary injunction, damages and attorney's fees against the CDA and its officers namely: Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. and Alberto P. Zingapan, including the DOLE Philippines Inc. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC for brevity) of Polomolok, South Cotabato, Branch 39. The petition which was docketed as SP Civil Case No. 25, primarily questioned the jurisdiction of the CDA to resolve the complaints against the private respondents, specifically with respect to the authority of the CDA to issue the "freeze order" and to create a management committee that would run the affairs of DARBCI.

CDA issued an order⁶ in CDA-CO Case No. 97-011 placing the private respondents under preventive suspension, hence, paving the way for the newly-created management committee⁷ to assume office on March 10, 1998.

 

Issue:

 

Whether or not CDA has the power to adjudicate intercoperative dispute.

 

Ruling:

 

It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation - there is only room for application.³² It can be gleaned from the above-quoted provision of R.A. No. 6939 that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions which consist of policy-making, registration, fiscal and technical assistance to cooperatives and implementation of cooperative laws. Nowhere in the said law can it be found any express grant to the CDA of authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes. At most, Section 8 of the same law provides that "upon request of either or both parties, the Authority shall mediate and conciliate disputes with a cooperative or between cooperatives" however, with a restriction "that if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3) months from request thereof, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper courts". Being an administrative agency, the CDA has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those which are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.

 

The decision to withhold quasi-judicial powers from the CDA is in accordance with the policy of the government granting autonomy to cooperatives. It was noted that in the past 75 years cooperativism failed to flourish in the Philippines. Of the 23,000 cooperatives organized under P.D. No. 175, only 10 to 15 percent remained operational while the rest became dormant. The dismal failure of cooperativism in the Philippines was attributed mainly to the stifling attitude of the government toward cooperatives. While the government wished to help, it invariably wanted to control.38 Also, in its anxious efforts to push cooperativism, it smothered cooperatives with so much help that they failed to develop self-reliance. As one cooperative expert put it, "The strong embrace of government ends with a kiss of death for cooperatives."39

But then, acknowledging the role of cooperatives as instruments of national development, the framers of the 1987 Constitution directed Congress under Article XII, Section 15 thereof to create a centralized agency that shall promote the viability and growth of cooperatives. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Congress approved on March 10, 1990 Republic Act No. 6939 which is the organic law creating the Cooperative Development Authority. Apparently cognizant of the errors in the past, Congress declared in an unequivocal language that the state shall "maintain the policy of non-interference in the management and operation of cooperatives."40

After ascertaining the clear legislative intent underlying R.A. No. 6939, effect should be given to it by the judiciary.41 Consequently, we hold and rule that the CDA is devoid of any quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes and more particularly disputes as regards the election of the members of the Board of Directors and officers of cooperatives. The authority to conduct hearings or inquiries and the power to hold any person in contempt may be exercised by the CDA only in the performance of its administrative functions under R.A. No. 6939.

 

 

14. In re Rodolfo U Manzano (166 SCRA 246, 1988)

 

Facts:

Judge Rodolfo Manzano sent a letter to the Supreme Court requesting to allow him to accept appointment as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committe on Justice create pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 as amended by EO No. 326. 

Issue: 

Whether or not Judge Manzano can accept appointment as a member of INPCJ.

Ruling: 

No. The committee was created by the executive branch of the government where its members discharge administrative functions. Though it may be quasi-judicial, it is still administrative in nature. Judge Manzano is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. His integrity in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. RTC Judges may only render assistance to the aforesaid committees when such assistance are reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial functions.

 

15. Montemayor vs. Bundalin (405 SCRA 264, 2003)

 

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, Petitioner, v. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary, Office of the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents.

G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003

PUNO, J.:

 

Facts:

In this petition for review, the petitioner assailed the decision of the Office of the President which ordered his dismissal as Regional Director of the DPWH for unexplained wealth, as a result of an investigation conducted by the PCAGC which arrived at the conclusion that the real property he had acquired in California, U.S. was unlawfully acquired for it was manifestly out of proportion to his salary.

 

Petitioner’s dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, addressed by private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at Los Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.

Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. And that desiring to migrate in the US, they were advised by an immigration lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not do so at that time as there was a prohibition in her mortgage contract. Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of petitioner.

Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. He attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.
The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioner’s counsel exerted more effort in filing pleadings and motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. Thus, it recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. The OP concurred with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC.

 

Issue(s):

 

1.      whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence; and,

2.      whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.

 

Ruling:

(1)               The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling: that PCAGC had authority to investigate the case despite the lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the complainant’s non-appearance at the investigation; that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; that petitioner’s active participation in every step of the investigation satisfied the due process requirement; that the findings of facts made by administrative agencies when supported by substantial evidence are respected on appeal.

 

(2)               Morevoer, the SC did not cannot sustain petitioner’s stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar.

 

16. Department of Health vs Camposario (457 SCRA 438, 2005)

 

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy.

 

Facts:

 

[Respondents] are former employees of the Department of Health National Capital Region (hereinafter DOH-NCR). They held various positions as follows: [Respondent] Priscilla B. Camposano (hereinafter Camposano) was the Finance and Management Officer II, [Respondent] Imelda Q. Agusin (hereinafter Agustin) was an Accountant I, and [Respondent] Enrique L. Perez (hereinafter Perez) was the Acting Supply Officer III.

 

some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis against Dir. IV Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.

 

"On August 6, 1996, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against [respondents] and their co-respondents.

 

"On August 8, 1996, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the [respondents] and their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. On October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298) creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (hereafter PCAGC) on October 26, 1996.

 

"On December 2, 1996, the PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. Resolution found the accused guilty and via  [Administrative Order No. 390

Respondents] filed a motion for reconsideration. Denied

 

Issue(s):

 

1.      The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) did not have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction involving respondents.

2.      The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the authority to investigate and decide was relinquished by the Secretary of Health and that the Secretary of Health merely performed a mechanical act when she ordered the dismissal of respondents from government service.

3.      The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that an exhaustive investigation was already conducted by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) which resulted in the finding that the anomalous contract for the purchase of medicines without the required public bidding is patently illegal."

 

Ruling:

 

1.      Executive Order (EO) No. 151 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate charges against presidential, not non-presidential, appointees. In its Preamble, specifically in its "Whereas" clauses, the EO "specifically tasked [the PCAGC] to x x x investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption x x x." More pointedly, Section 3 states that the "Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees x x x." We quote the pertinent provisions below:

"Section 3. Jurisdiction. - The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations." (emphasis supplied) "Section 4. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Commission shall have the following powers, functions and duties: "(a) Investigation - The Commission shall have the power to investigate administrative complaints against presidential appointees in the executive department of the government, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, charged with graft and corruption. In the exercise thereof, the Commission is (1) authorized to summon witnesses, administer oaths, or take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation by subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum, and do such other acts necessary and incidental to the discharge of its function and duty to investigate the said administrative complaints; and (2) empowered to call upon and secure the assistance of any department, bureau, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

2.      Validity of Health Secretary's Decision

The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the former's jurisdiction.16 Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents' right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.

The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual milieu.

 

17. Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission (362 SCRA 304, 2001)

[G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001.]
PUNO, J.:

 

Facts:

Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.

In a letter 3 dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as to the status of the civil service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for Teachers.  Mr. America likewise disclosed that he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher’s board examinations.

 

CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas issued an Order directing CSC Region IV Director Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona’s eligibility, after verification from the Register of Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records revealed "that Remolona’s name is not in the list of passing and failing examinees, and that the list of examinees for December 10, 1989 does not include the name of Remolona. 

 

During the preliminary investigation, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of facts regarding the issuance of the questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolon. Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together. Based on the foregoing.

 

Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona, and Atty. Hadji Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty.

 

Issue:

 

Whether Remolona’s right to due process was violated during the preliminary investigation because he was not assisted by counsel. 

 

Ruling:

 

The submission of Remolona that his alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible because he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12 paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration.

The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. 12

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution. 

 

 

18. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III (535 SCRA 265, 2007)

G.R. No. 173034. October 9, 2007

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

 

Facts:

 

Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.  One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

 

Issue:

 

W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.

 

Ruling:

 

The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. “Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.

 

 

19. Department of Agrarian Reform vs Sutton (473 SCRA 392, 2006)

G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

PUNO, J.:

 

Facts:

• The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
• On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farm used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
• On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultryraising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
• In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattleraising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
• On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattleraising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
• On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored their request.
• On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animalland ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.
• On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.
• On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
• Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should b exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattleraising. Their motion was denied.
• They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President. On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. Provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattleraising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.
• On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government.

 

 

Issue:

 

The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.

 

Ruling:

 

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.¹² They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.¹³ The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.¹⁴

In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.¹⁵

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

 

 

20. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation  (567 SCRA 354, 2005)

 

Facts:

 

On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB).  Under the Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI),[2] which would... own and operate a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating barge.  The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National Power Corporation.  At that time, GEHI's power-generating barge was 97% complete and would go... on-line by mid-September of 1994.  In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million.

 

IRC alleged that on 8 August 1994, a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent through facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange and the SEC, but that the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it.  Upon the advice of the SEC, the

IRC sent the press release on the morning of 9 August 1994

 

The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information.  On 16 August 1994, the SEC

 

Chairman issued a directive requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement with GHB. The SEC Chairman further directed all principal officers of IRC to appear at a hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges Department (BED) of the SEC to explain

 

IRC's failure to immediately disclose the information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts.[6

In compliance with the SEC Chairman's directive, the IRC sent a letter dated 16 August 1994 to the SEC, attaching thereto copies of the Memorandum of Agreement. Its directors, Manuel Recto, Rene Villarica and Pelagio Ricalde, also appeared before the SEC on 22 August 1994 to... explain IRC's alleged failure to immediately disclose material information as required under the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts.

 

On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC pronounced... that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act.[8]

Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 21 September 1994, which was superseded by an Amended Omnibus Motion, filed on 18 October 1994, alleging that the SEC had no authority to investigate the subject matter, since under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A,[9] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC.  Respondents also claimed that the SEC violated their right to due process when it ordered that the respondents appear... before the SEC and "show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them," and, thus, shifted the burden of proof to the respondents.  Lastly, they sought to have their cases tried jointly given the identical factual situations surrounding... the alleged violation committed by the respondents.

Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of Proceedings on 24 October 1994, wherein they moved for discontinuance of the investigations and the proceedings before the SEC until the undue publicity had abated and the investigating officials had become reasonably free from... prejudice and public pressure.

No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the aforementioned motions, but on 25 January 1995, the SEC issued an Omnibus Order which thus disposed of the same in this wise:

 

To recall the show cause orders dated September 19, 1994 requiring the respondents to appear and show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them.

To deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit.

 

Rhe SEC filed a Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders so that the case may be investigated by the PED in accordance with the SEC Rules and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, and not by the special body whose creation the SEC had earlier ordered.[18]

Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned law.[71]

Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to "make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has... violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act XXX."  After a finding that a person has violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution.

 

Issue:

 

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROSECUTION BEFORE THE PED AND THE SICD RULES OF PROCEDURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS/PROCEEDINGS ARE INVALID AS THEY FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987.

 

Ruling:

 

The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing general regulations for various and varying details of management.³⁰ To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know.  It is well established that administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute.  Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its implementation.

 

As a consequence, in proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the National Labor Relations Commission and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, created under laws which authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be reached on the basis of... position papers or other documentary evidence only.  They are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence.[59] In fact, the hearings before such agencies do not connote full adversarial proceedings.[60] 

Thus, it is not necessary for the rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the counsel of the adverse party.  To require otherwise would negate the summary nature of the administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings.

II. The Securities Regulations Code did not repeal Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised

      Securities Act since said provisions were reenacted in the new law.

The SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Revised Securities Act,...  reenacted in the Securities Regulations Code, despite the abolition of the PED.

 

 

 

21.

HIJO PLANTATION INC., DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, TWIN RIVERS PLANTATION, INC. and MARSMAN & CO., INC., for themselves and in behalf of other persons and entities similarly situated, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. L-34526 August 9, 1988

PARAS, J.:

 

Facts:

 

Hijo Plantation, Inc. are domestic corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, all of... which are engaged in the production and exportation of bananas in and from Mindanao.

Owing to the difficulty of determining the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar because of the floating rate and the promulgation of Central Bank Circular No. 289 which imposes an 80% retention scheme on all dollar earners, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6125... to eliminate the necessity for said circular and... to stabilize the peso. Among others, it provides as follows

"Any export product the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal years following its reaching... the said aggregate value."

 

Issue:

 

Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995.

 

Ruling:

 

In the very nature of things, in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control, and management of the work of the particular department of the government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management and control of such department (United States v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119 [19141).

Such is the case in RA 6125, which provided in its Section 6, as follows:

All rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act shall be promulgated by the Central Bank of the Philippines and shall take effect fifteen days after publication in three newspapers of general circulation throughout the Philippines, one of which shall be in the national language.

Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law. Such regulations once established and found to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding upon all the parties, as if the regulation had been written in the original law itself (29 Phil. 119, Ibid). Upon the other hand, should the regulation conflict with the law, the validity of the regulation cannot be sustained (Director of Forestry vs. Muroz 23 SCRA 1183).

 

 

22.  Beja Sr. v. Court of Appeals (207 SCRA 689,1992)

G.R. No. 97149 March 31, 1992

ROMERO, J.:

 

Facts:

 

On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 against petitioner Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges. After a preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for Region X, Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 was "considered closed for lack of merit."

On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was filed against Beja by the PPA General Manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. 

 

In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having "decided questions of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions" of this Court. ⁵ Specifically, Beja contends that the Court of Appeals failed to declare that: (a) he was denied due process; (b) the PPA general manager has no power to issue a preventive suspension order without the necessary approval of the PPA board of directors; (c) the PPA general manager has no power to refer the administrative case filed against him to the DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the administrative case against him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive suspension and the jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.

 

Issue:

 

Ruling:

 

Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated.  Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No 857. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case.

 

An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987.  Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department. 

 

 

 

23. United Residents of Dominican Hills, Inc. v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (353 SCRA 782, March 7, 2001)

 

Facts:

 

Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City, was mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).  It was eventually foreclosed and acquired later on by the said bank as the highest bidder.  On 11 April 1983, through its President Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the subject property was donated to the Republic of the Philippines.  The deed of donation stipulated that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements and economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human Settlements.

 

On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS).

 

On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its application before the PMS to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property.  In a MOA, PMS and United agreed that the latter may purchase a portion of the said property from HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATIO, acting as originator, on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter.

 

Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The deed of conditional sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be paid upon signing, with the balance to be amortized within one year from its date of execution. After UNITED made its final payment on January 31, 1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.

 

Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor.  Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an action for injunction before RTC Baguio City.  Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied. 

 

The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and annulment of the said MOA.  It was later on dismissed upon motion of United. The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals.

 

The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures.

 

To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo.  Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

 

Issue:

 

Whether COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing.

 

Ruling:

 

COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It discharges quasi-judicial functions: 

 

"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

 

However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches — the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary — each department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

 

24.  Pangasinan Transportation Company v. Manaila Railroad Company

GR. No. 41471. September 15, 1934

MALCOLM, J.:

 

 

Facts:

 

The petitioner and appellant in this case complains that the Public Service Commission erred in granting to the Manila Railroad Company a certificate of public convenience to invade the regular route adequately and efficiently served by the Pangasinan Transportation Company.

The Pangasinan Transportation Company operates an autobus service in the Province of Pangasinan and other provinces. The Manila Railroad Company operates the Benguet Auto Line from Baguio by way of Kennon Road to Sison. The railroad now desires to extend its auto line from Sison to Binalonan via Pozorrubio in the Province of Pangasinan. If this be permitted it will be a competitor of the busses of the Pangasinan Transportation Company.

 

 

Ruling:

 

In one class of cases it has oft been emphasized, and properly, that the convenience of the public must be taken into account and is a prime criterion. In another class of cases it has as appropriately been emphasized that the investments made by public service operators must be protected rather than destroyed. Here we have the two principles meeting in collision. It is our desire at once to afford all reasonable facilities to the public and to afford all reasonable safeguards for capital invested in the transportation business.

On the one hand it is shown that there are a few passengers whose convenience would be better served if the Manila Railroad Company was permitted to extend its buss service from Sison to Binalonan. However, their convenience is more fancied than real, for the busses of the Pangasinan Transportation Company and the Manila Railroad Company meet at Sison and if there is any difference in the hour of meeting this could readily be arranged. On the other side, it is disclosed that while busses of the Pangasinan Transportation Company have a capacity for thirty-two pay passengers, they are only carrying an average load of six passengers on these trips. It has further been established that from June, 1932, to May, 1933, the Pangasinan Transportation Company lost P2,733.29 on this line alone. Under these conditions, can it be said that public necessity is more compelling than what amounts to ruinous competition?

The true effect of granting the petition of the Manila Railroad Company would be to force the Pangasinan Transportation Company out of the Sison-Pozorrubio-Binalonan territory. Moreover, if the railroad company could extend its auto line to Binalonan, it requires no vast amount of imagination to visualize the company extending its line to the next municipality and so on indefinitely, to the great disadvantage of other operators and with the result that they would be deprived of substantial revenue. With all due respect to the Public Service Commission which we are the first to uphold when its decisions can be justified, we are unable to put the stamp of our approval on the principle it has invoked and sanctioned in this case.

 

 

25. Realty Exchange Venture Co. vs. Sendino, 233 SCRA 665 (1994)

Facts: Lucina Sendino filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI before the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of HLURB. REVI Cancelled the contract (entitled Reservation Agreement) for the reservation of Sendino of a 120 sqm house and lot in Paranaque. For the alleged non-compliance with the requirement of Sendino as provided in the Reservation Agreement. OAALA decided in favour of Sendino ordering to comply and continue with the sale. On Appeal of the decision was affirmed. This was further appealed to the Office of the President but the case was dismissed. MR was also denied.

Issue:

W/N the Office of the Pres committed a Serious Error in declaring that HLURB has quasi-judicial functions even though there’s not express grant by EO 90.

Decision:

NO. Section 1 of PD 1344, provides: ‘Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ‘A. Unsound real estate business practices; ‘B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and ‘C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.’ There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency’s special expertise. The constitutionality of such grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority (now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board) over cases involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v. National Housing Authority (152 SCRA 540 [1987]) and again sustained in a later decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority (153 SCRA 399 [1987]) where We restated that the National Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of said agency. HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate. 15 We fail to see how the HSRC - which possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific performance for contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers - had suddenly lost its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through E.O. 90. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of such contracts and agreements and the determination of private rights under these agreements is no longer a uniquely judicial function. 16 The absence of any provision, express or implied, in E. O. 90, repealing those quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the National Housing Authority, furthermore militates against petitioners' position on the question WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

 

26. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
ANGELES, respondent
G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996

Facts:

The Philippine International Trading Corporation, a government owned and controlled corporation issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which application to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of the Philippine Products to China carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer from PROC in an amount equivalent to the value of importation from PRC being applied for, or simply at one-to one ratio.

Two domestic corporations, Remington and Firestone, both applied for authority to import from PROC, which were granted, but later on were withheld for failure to comply with the require one to one ratio of import and export.

They filed a complaint asserting that the administrative order is unconstitutional. The RTC ruled that the order was a restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 and 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. PITC elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is valid.

Ruling:

The order was not valid.

The PITC is a line agency of the Department of Trade and Industry which was the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for the country’s trade. The PITC as an integral part of the DTI was given the task of the implementing the departments’ program. It has the authority to issue the questioned order and may legally exercise that authority under the supervision of the DTI. The grant t quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies are not unconstitutional. It has become necessary to create more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its activities. Because hey specializes in the field assigned to them, they can deal and dispatch problems with more expertise than the legislature or the courts of justice.

In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue the Administrative Orders as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation; however, it does not imply that the order was valid. First, it was never published, thus it is not effective. Second, the same is inconsistent with the declared policy of the government to then effect that it will develop and strengthen trade relations with the PROC. Since the order was a unnecessary barrier to trade, the same is not a valid exercise of its authority.

 

27. MCC Industrial Sales Corp. vs Sangyong Corpotation (536 SCRA 408, 2007)

G.R. No. 170633. October 17, 2007

NACHURA, J.:

 

Facts:

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.

 

Following the failure of MCC to open a letters of credit to facilitate the payment of imported stainless steel products, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.

 

Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

 

After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Orde and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. According to the aforesaid Order, considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.

Issue:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible in evidence.

Ruling:

R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."

In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data message."We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.

28. Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land, Inc. (600 SCRA 617, 2008)

 

Facts:

Respondents operate or lease out shopping malls that have parking facilities. The people that use said facilities are required to pay parking fees by the respondents. Senate committees conducted an investigation to determine the legality of said practice which the same found to be against the National Building Code. Respondents then received an information from various government agencies enjoining them from collecting parking fees and later a civil case against them. Respondents argued that the same constitutes undue taking of private property. OSG argues that the same is implemented in view of public welfare more specifically to ease traffic congestion. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence petition for certiorari.

Issue(s):

1.      Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are not obliged to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.

2.      Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid exercise of the police power of State.

Ruling:

1.      No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are not obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC found no merit in the OSG’s petition.

The explicit directive of the above is that respondents, as operators/lessors of neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces with the minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by respondents. In fact, the term “parking fees” cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building Code and its IRR. One rule of statutory construction is that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the collection of the same

 

The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State “to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control”; but totally ignores the second part of said provision, which reads, “and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.” While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all-encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of life, health, property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are complied with.

 

Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.

2.      No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid exercise of the police power of State.

It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.

Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.

Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover therefor.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.

Thus, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.

 

29. BPI Leasing Corporation vs Court of Appeals (416 SCRA 4, 2003)

 

Facts:

BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties. For the calendar year 1986, BLC paid the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4% contractors percentage tax then imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

the CIR issued Revenue Regulation 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided that finance and leasing companies registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that companies registered under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for contractors percentage tax under Section 205 but are, instead, subject to gross receipts tax under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since BLC had earlier paid the aforementioned contractors percentage tax, it re-computed its tax liabilities under the gross receipts tax and arrived at the amount of P361,924.44.

BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the amount of P777,117.05, representing the difference between the P1,139,041.49 it had paid as contractors percentage tax and P361,924.44 it should have paid for gross receipts tax. Four days later, to stop the running of the prescriptive period for refunds, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA. CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim of refund. The CTA held that Revenue Regulation 19-86, as amended, may only be applied prospectively such that it only covers all leases written on or after January 1, 1987. The CTA ruled that, since BLCs rental income was all received prior to 1986, it follows that this was derived from lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not covered by the revenue regulation.

Issue:

1.      Whether or not Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative rather than interpretative in character

2.      Whether or not its application should be prospective or retroactive. PROSPECTIVE

Ruling:

1.       The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be legislative in nature. Section 1 of Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277 (now Section 244) is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. The Court recognized that the application of Section 277 calls for none other than the exercise of quasi-legislative or rule-making authority. Verily, it cannot be disputed that Revenue Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC.

2.      The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication. In the present case, there is no indication that the revenue regulation may operate retroactively. Furthermore, there is an express provision stating that it shall take effect on January 1, 1987, and that it shall be applicable to all leases written on or after the said date. Being clear on its prospective application, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without further interpretation. Thus, BLC is not in a position to invoke the provisions of Revenue Regulation 19-86 for lease rentals it received prior to January 1, 1987.

 

30. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (261 SCRA 236, 1991)

 

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

31. Peralta v. Civil Service Commisssion (211 SCRA 425, 1992)

Facts:

Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) which conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, the Commission interpreted provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 amending the Revised Administrative Code and adopted a policy that when an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, he is also considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday. Petitioner Peralta, affected by the said policy, questioned the said administrative interpretation.

Issue:

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission’s interpretative construction is valid and constitutional.

Ruling:

NO. The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to leaves of absence with full pay exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays. The law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they cannot be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.

Administrative construction, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:

. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate; and particular conduct, private and official.

To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and local governments considering the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice and equity to all affected government employees.

 

32. Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. (482 SCRA 673)

Facts: This is a petition to annul the decision of a RTC of Olongapo declaring unconstitutional the EO 156 Art. 2 Sec. 3.1. The said executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions. CA upheld the ruling of the RTC on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is void. The petitioners argue that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that its application should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of RA 7227 on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from customs duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.

Issue: Whether or not the EO is valid?

Ruling: Partially Yes. It is valid insofar as it is outside the Freeport zone, but void if the vehicles are within the Freeport zone. According to the SC, Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy.17 To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following requisites:

1.      Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

2.      It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

3.      It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and

4.      It must be reasonable.

First requisite Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution through Congress’ delegation by law. The relevant statutes to execute this provision are: 1) The Tariff and Customs Code which authorizes the President, in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, to, inter alia, prohibit the importation of any commodity. 2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines that empowers the President to approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of any equipment or raw materials or finished products 3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the "Safeguard Measures Act" (SMA), ," Second requisite: The general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires previous notice and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation. This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative rules. An interpretative rule, however, give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed; and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation. The SC adds that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases the burden of those governed, the agency must let those who are going to be affected be heard and informed, before the issuance is given the force and effect of law. In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product. Third requisite According to the petitioners, the purpose of the EO is for the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227.  Fourth requisite: This brings us to the fourth requisite. Rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. The SC found no logic in the all encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport which is outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise.

33. Dagan v Philippine Racing Commission (211 SCRA 425, 1992)

Ruling:The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites:

1.     Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

2.     It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

3.     It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;

4.     It must be reasonable.

All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances. Philracom’s authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420.  The delegation made in the presidential decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority.  And the issuances are fair and reasonable.  Xxx

P.D. No. 420 hurdles the tests of completeness and standards sufficiency.

Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in Section 1 which is “to promote and direct the accelerated development and continued growth of horse racing not only in pursuance of the sports development program but also in order to insure the full exploitation of the sport as a source of revenue and employment.” Furthermore, Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races, the construction and safety of race tracks, and the security of racing.  P.D. No. 420 is already complete in itself.

Clearly, there is a proper legislative delegation of rule-making power to Philracom.  Clearly too, for its part Philracom has exercised its rule-making power in a proper and reasonable manner.  More specifically, its discretion to rid the facilities of MJCI and PRCI of horses afflicted with EIA is aimed at preserving the security and integrity of horse races.

Petitioners also question the supposed delegation by Philracom of its rule-making powers to MJCI and PRCI.

There is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as the delegator and MJCI and PRCI as delegates.  The Philracom directive is merely instructive in character.  Philracom had instructed PRCI and MJCI to “immediately come up with Club’s House Rule to address the problem and rid their facilities of horses infected with EIA.”  PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they ordered the racehorse owners to submit blood samples and subject their race horses to blood testing.  Compliance with the Philracom’s directive is part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI under Sections 11 of R.A. No. 7953 and Sections 1 and 2 of 8407.

As correctly proferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated authority of Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to them by Congress allowing MJCI “to do and carry out all such acts, deeds and things as may be necessary to give effect to the foregoing.” As justified by PRCI, “obeying the terms of the franchise and abiding by whatever rules enacted by Philracom is its duty.”

As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to Philracom’s guidelines. They question the supposed belated issuance of the guidelines, that is, only after the collection of blood samples for the Coggins Test was ordered.  While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a month after Philracom’s directive, this circumstance does not render the directive nor the guidelines void.  The directive’s validity and effectivity are not dependent on any supplemental guidelines.  Philracom has every right to issue directives to MJCI and PRCI with respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without implementing guidelines.  

 

 

On publication: Petitioners also argue that Philracom’s guidelines have no force and effect for lack of publication and failure to file copies with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by law.

 

As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice and hearing,  In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained.

 

The third requisite for the validity of an administrative issuance is that it must be within the limits of the powers granted to it.  The administrative body may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.

 

The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for monitoring and eradicating EIA.  These guidelines are in accord with Philracom’s mandate under the law to regulate the conduct of horse racing in the country.

 

Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be unreasonable or discriminatory.  In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and PRCI’s premises underwent the same procedure.  The guidelines implemented were undoubtedly reasonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be accomplished, i.e., the complete riddance of horses infected with EIA.

 

It also appears from the records that MJCI properly notified the racehorse owners before the test was conducted. Those who failed to comply were repeatedly warned of certain consequences and sanctions.

 

Furthermore, extant from the records are circumstances which allow respondents to determine from time to time the eligibility of horses as race entries. The lease contract executed between petitioner and MJC contains a proviso reserving the right of the lessor, MJCI in this case, the right to determine whether a particular horse is a qualified horse.  In addition, Philracom’s rules and regulations on horse racing provide that horses must be free from any contagious disease or illness in order to be eligible as race entries.

 

All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom in issuing the contested guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with Philracom’s directive.

 

34. Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (492 SCRA 638, 2006)

Facts:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, under delivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.

The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.

On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33.

LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary tolaw. The Department of Energy (DOE), however, denied the request for lack of merit.

LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court. After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law. The court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under the law.

The Petitioner, DOE, moved for a motion for reconsideration, however this was denied by the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not B.P Blg. 33, RA No. 8479 and RA 7638 penalizes the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular.

Ruling:

For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law:(1) The violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) The penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself

35. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. International Communication Corporation (481 SCRA  163, 2006)

Ruling:

Undoubtedly, the CSC like any other agency has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them with its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves.

x x x It must be remembered that Lands Administrative Order No. 6 is in the nature of procedural rules promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the power bestowed on said administrative agency to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the proper discharge and management of the functions imposed by law upon said office. x x x x Recognizing the existence of such rule-making authority, what is the weight of an interpretation given by an administrative agency to its own rules or regulations? Authorities sustain the doctrine that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the Court construing such rule or regulation, and such interpretation will be followed unless it appears to be clearly unreasonable or arbitrary

The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer (underscoring supplied).

 

36. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) v. PICOP Resources

G.R. NO. 164314 : September 26, 2008

REYES, R.T., J.:

 

Facts:

PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) filed with petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) an application for amendment of its Articles of Incorporation (AOI) extending its corporate existence for another fifty (50) years. PICOP paid the filing fee of P210.00 based on SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 (1994 Circular).

 

 SEC, however, informed PICOP of the appropriate filing fee of P12 Million, or 1/5 of 1% of its authorized capital stock of P6 Billion.³ PICOP sought clarification of the applicable filing fee and the reduction of the amount of P12 Million prescribed by the SEC.⁴ What followed were several exchanges of correspondence on the applicable filing fee for amended AOI extending the corporate term of PICOP

 

Issue:

 

Ruling:

 

We resolve the question in the affirmative. The 1986 Circular is the proper basis of the computation since it specifically provided for filing fees in cases of extension of corporate term. A proviso of the same nature is wanting in the other circulars relied on by the SEC at the time PICOP filed its request for extension.

The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the courts construing such rule or regulation. While this Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to such doctrine, it will not hesitate to set aside an executive interpretation if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.

In Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. International Communication Corporation, the Court laid the guidelines in resolving disputes concerning the interpretation by an agency of its own rules and regulations, to wit: (1) Whether the delegation of power was valid; (2) Whether the regulation was within that delegation; (3) Whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process test.

In the case under review, there is an evident violation of the due process requirement. It is admitted that the SEC failed to satisfy the requirements for promulgation when it filed the required copies of the said regulation at the UP Law Center only fourteen (14) years after it was supposed to have taken effect.

The SEC violated the due process clause insofar as it denied the public prior notice of the regulations that were supposed to govern them. The SEC cannot wield the provisions of the 1990 Circular against PICOP and expect its outright compliance. The circular was not yet effective during the time PICOP filed its request to extend its corporate existence in 2002. In fact, it was only discovered in 2004, fifteen (15) days before the SEC filed its second motion for reconsideration.

 

37. Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (550 SCRA 680, 2008)

Facts:

 Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities.

The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office of the President. The Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the Government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.

Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.

Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to fluctuation in foreign exchange rates to assure adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products at reasonable prices.

Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the Energy Regulatory Board) to review and reset prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect the prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum. The prices were regulated by adjusting the OPSF impost, increasing or decreasing this price component as necessary to maintain the balance between revenues and claims on the OPSF.

Issue:

THE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN AFFIRMED BY E.O. NO. 137 HAVING RECEIVED VITALITY FROM A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT, MOF CIRCULAR NO. 1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF A LAW REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF THE MOF CIRCULAR WITH THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL REGISTER

Ruling:

This petition is without merit.

As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect, to wit:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Emphasis provided.)

Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera, the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 - filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center - for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.

Applying the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court has previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative issuances: (1) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; (2) Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government; (3) Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; (4) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People's Republic of China; (5) Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees; and (6) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders.

In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register. On the other hand, in Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc, the Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of the National Telecommunications Commission had not become effective despite the fact that it was filed with the National Administrative Register because the same had not been published at the time. The Court emphasized therein that "publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect."

 

38. GMA Network, Inc. v. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (514 SCRA 191, 2007)

CORONA, J.:

 

Facts:

GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.

The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998⁴ which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order

Issue:

Whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner.

Ruling:

MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.

Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be effective. It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR. Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder.

39. Abella Jr. vs CSC ( 442 SCRA 507, 2004)

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility for said position.

Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999.

 

Ruling:

Approval Required for Permanent Appointment

A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with the provisions of law, the rules and the standards promulgated pursuant thereto.It implies the civil service eligibility of the appointee. Thus, while the appointing authority has the discretion to choose whom to appoint, the choice is subject to the caveat that the appointee possesses the required qualifications.

 To make it fully effective, an appointment to a civil service position must comply with all legal requirements. Thus, the law requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were observed. The applicable provision of the Civil Service Law reads:

“SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

 “(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jail guards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter.”

 

40. Yu vs. Orchard Golf and Country Club, Inc.

G.R. NO. 150335: March 1, 2007

CORONA, J.:

 

Facts:

petitioners Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico went to the Orchard Golf & Country Club to play a round of golf with another member of the club. At the last minute, however, that other member informed them that he could not play with them.⁴ Due to the "no twosome" policy of the Orchard contained in the membership handbook prohibiting groups of less than three players from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1:00 p.m.,⁵ petitioners requested management to look for another player to join them.

Because petitioners were unable to find their third player, petitioner Yu tried to convince Francis Montallana, Orchard's assistant golf director, to allow them to play twosome, even if they had to tee off from hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course. Montallana refused, stating that the flights which started from the first nine holes might be disrupted. Petitioner Yu then shouted invectives at Montallana, at which point he told petitioner Yuhico that they should just tee off anyway, regardless of what management's reaction would be.⁶ Petitioners then teed off, without permission from Montallana. They were thus able to play, although they did so without securing a tee time control slip before teeing off, again in disregard of a rule in the handbook.⁷ As a result of petitioners' actions, Montallana filed a report on the same day with the board of directors (the board).⁸

Issue:

Whether or not the regulation is valid for it was not published.

Ruling:

Yes. Ironically, in attempting to demonstrate the nullity of the guidelines, petitioners themselves gave the very reason why their effectivity was unaffected by their lack of publication. Petitioners attached, as an annex to their petition, a letter from then SEC general counsel Eugenio Reyes explaining that "said guidelines was (sic) not published as it (sic) was primarily intended only for the guidance of and compliance by the hearing officers concerned."²⁸ Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public need not be published.²⁹

 

41. Manila Public School v. Garcia ( 841 SCRA 352, October 2, 2017)

Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision² rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 105797. The CA issued a writ of Prohibition against the immediate and retroactive application of the Premium-Based Policy (PBP), Automatic Policy Loan and Policy Lapse (APL) and Claims and Loans Interdependency Policy (CLIP) to the teacher­-petitioners' claims, without or prior to a complete determination and reconciliation of the employer-share liabilities of the Department of Education (DepEd).³

Issue:

Whether or not Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146 is required to be published to make it valid.

Issue: Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

After Tañada, the Administrative Code of 1987⁴⁰ was enacted, with Section 3(1) of Chapter 2, Book VII, specifically providing that:

Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

In Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.,⁴¹ this Court held that the requirements of publication and filing must be strictly complied with, as these were designed to safeguard against abuses on the part of lawmakers and to guarantee the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern. Even in cases where the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments, strict compliance with the requirement of publication cannot be dispensed with.⁴²

While GSIS filed copies of the subject resolutions with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), it only did so after the claims of the retirees and beneficiaries had already been lodged.⁴³ The resolutions were not published in either the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation in the country.

 

TOPIC: III. G QUASI JUDICIAL POWER

42. METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, INC.,   vs. NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION and REGIONAL TRIPARTITE WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY BOARD - REGION II

G.R. NO. 144322 . February 6, 2007

 

Facts: On October 17, 1995, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, Region II, Tuguegarao, Cagayan (RTWPB), by virtue of Republic Act No. 6727 (R.A. No. 6727), otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act, issued Wage Order No. R02-03 (Wage Order), as follows: Section 1. Upon effectivity of this Wage Order, all employees/workers in the private sector throughout Region II, regardless of the status of employment are granted an across-the-board increase of P15.00 daily.

The Wage Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation on December 2, 1995 and took effect on January 1, 1996. Its Implementing Rules were approved on February 14, 1996. Per Section 13 of the Wage Order, any party aggrieved by the Wage Order may file an appeal with the National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC) through the RTWPB within 10 calendar days from the publication of the Wage Order.

Banker’s Council in a letter inquiry to NWPC requested for ruling to seek exemption from coverage of the wage order since the members bank are paying more than the regular wage. NWPC replied that the member banks are covered by the wage order and does not fall with the exemptible categories.

In another letter inquiry, Metrobank asked for the interpretation of the applicability of the wage order. NWPC referred it to RTWPB. RTWPB in return clarified that establishments in Region 2 are covered by the wage order. Petitioner filed a petition with the CA and denied the petition.

Issue(s):

(1)   whether Wage Order No. R02-03 is void and of no legal effect

(2)   whether the respondent is exercising quasi or judicial functions in the issuance of the assailed wage order ?

Held:

1. As to the second issue, petitioner submits that ultra vires acts of administrative agencies are correctible by way of a writ of certiorari and prohibition; that even assuming that it did not observe the proper remedial procedure in challenging the Wage Order, the remedy of certiorari and prohibition remains available to it by way of an exception, on grounds of justice and equity; that its failure to observe procedural rules could not have validated the manner by which the disputed Wage Order was issued.
   
   Respondents counter that the present petition is fatally defective from inception since no appeal from the Wage Order was filed by petitioner; that the letter-query to the NWPC did not constitute the appeal contemplated by law; that the validity of the Wage Order was never raised before the respondents; that the implementation of the Wage Order had long become fait accompli for prohibition to prosper. Respondents insist that, even if petitioner's procedural lapses are disregarded, the Wage Order was issued pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 6727 and in accordance with the Court's pronouncements in the ECOP case;^[23] that the Wage Order is not an intrusion on property rights since it was issued after the required public hearings; that the Wage Order does not undermine but in fact recognizes the right to collective bargaining; that the Wage Order did not result in wage distortion.
   
   The Court shall first dispose of the procedural matter relating to the propriety of petitioner's recourse to the CA before proceeding with the substantive issue involving the validity of the Wage Order.
   
   Certiorari as a special civil action is available only if the following essential requisites concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.^[24]
   
   On the other hand, prohibition as a special civil action is available only if the following essential requisites concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.^[25]
   
   A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.^[26] Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.^[27] Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.^[28]
   
   In the issuance of the assailed Wage Order, respondent RTWPB did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial capacity, or ministerial capacity. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power under R.A. No. 6727. It was issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative power. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government.

 

43. G.R. No. 189571. January 21, 2015

THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD
vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK,

 

Facts:  Respondent established a pension loan product for bona fide veterans or their surviving spouses, as well as salary loan product for teachers and low-salaried employees pursuant to its mandate under Republic Act (RA) Nos. 3518³ and 7169⁴ to provide financial assistance to veterans and teachers.

As its clientele usually do not have real estate or security to cover their pension or salary loan, other than their continuing good health and/or employment, respondent devised a program by charging a premium in the form of a higher fee known as Credit Redemption Fund(CRF) from said borrowers. Resultantly, Special Trust Funds were established by respondent for the pension loans of the veteran-borrowers, salary loans of teachers and low-salaried employees. These trust funds were, in turn, managed by respondent’s Trust and Investment Department, with respondent as beneficiary. The fees charged against the borrowers were credited to the respective trust funds, which would be used to fully pay the outstanding obligation of the borrowers in case of death.

An examination was conducted by the Supervision and Examination Department (SED) II of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). It found, among other things, that respondent’s collection of premiums from the proceeds of various salary and pension loans of borrowers to guarantee payment of outstanding loans violated Section 54 of RA No. 8791⁵ which states that banks shall not directly engage in insurance business as insurer.

Subsequently, respondent wrote a letter to petitioners justifying the existence of the CRF.

Thus, respondent was requested to discontinue the collection of said fees.

On February 24, 2004, respondent complied with the BSP’s directive and discontinued the collection of fees for CRF.

On September 16, 2005, petitioners issued Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 1139 directing respondent’s Trust and Investment Department to return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF in the amount of ₱144,713,224.54 as of August31, 2004, and to preserve the records of borrowers who were deducted CRFs from their loan proceeds pending resolution or ruling of the Office of the General Counsel of the BSP.

Thus, respondent requested reconsideration However denied in a letter dated December 5, 2006.  The RTC granted respondent’s petition for declaratory relief

when it collected additional fees known as "Credit Redemption Fund (CRF)" from its loan borrowers was not directly engaged in insurance business as insurer; hence, it did not violate Sec. 54, R.A. 8791, otherwise known as the "General Banking Law of 2000."

The Monetary Board Resolution No. 1139 dated August 26, 2005 is hereby DECLARED null and void.

Issue: whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.

Held:  We rule in the negative.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governs petitions for declaratory relief, viz.:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute.⁹ Ergo, the Court, in CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,¹⁰ held that in the same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory relief, decisions of quasijudicial agencies cannot be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court.

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board inthe exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions.

The authority of the petitioners to issue the questioned MB Resolution emanated from its powers under Section 37¹¹ of RA No. 7653¹² and Section 66¹³ of RA No. 8791¹⁴ to impose, at its discretion, administrative sanctions, upon any bank for violation of any banking law.

The nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a quasi-judicial agency, and the character of its determination of whether or not appropriate sanctions may be imposed upon erring banks, as anexercise of quasi-judicial function, have been recognized by this Court in the case of United Coconut Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon, Inc.,¹⁵ to wit:

A perusal of Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reveals that the BSP Monetary Board is not included among the quasi-judicial agencies explicitly named therein, whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards are appea lable to the Court of Appeals. Such omission, however, does not necessarily mean that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over the judgments, orders, resolutions, or awards of the BSP Monetary Board.

It bears stressing that Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, on the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, generally refers to quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions. The use of the word "including" in the said provision, prior to the naming of several quasi-judicial agencies, necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way of example only.

Similarly, Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions several quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in the phraseology. The enumeration of the agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive. The introductory phrase "[a]mong these agencies are" preceding the enumeration of specific quasi-judicial agencies only highlights the fact that the list is not meant to be exclusive or conclusive. Further, the overture stresses and acknowledges the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies not included inthe enumeration but should be deemed included.

A quasi-judicial agency or body isan organ of government other than a court and other thana legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. The very definition of an administrative agency includes itsbeing vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. A "quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-,judicial agency exercising quasi-,judicial powers or functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an independent central monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated to provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It has the power to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records and others, needed in its examination, to impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in determining whether administrative sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must conduct some form of investigation or hearing regarding the same.¹⁶

A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a quasi-judicial body exercising quasi-judicial functions, then its decision in MB Resolution No. 1139 cannot be the proper subject of declaratory relief.

TOPIC: III.H LICENSING AND RATE FIXING POWER

44.  PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.

G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987

GANCAYCO, J.:

 

This is an original Petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

 

Petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The herein respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.

 

On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988 —

(1) Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school fees by not more than 15 per cent to 20 per cent without the need for the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that wish to increase school fees beyond the ceiling would be subject to the discretion of the DECS;

(2) Any private school may increase its total school fees in excess of the ceiling, provided that the total schools fees will not exceed P1,000.00 for the schoolyear in the elementary and secondary levels, and P50.00 per academic unit on a semestral basis for the collegiate level. 

through the respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground that the increases were too high. ² Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. ³ Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases.

 

In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees. ⁵

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.

 

Held:

We disagree.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. ⁹a

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

45. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

G.R. No. 141314.November 15, 2002

PUNO, J.:

 

46. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, 
vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ

G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989

REGALADO, J.:

 

Facts:

The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue:

Whether Executive Order 546 is unconstitutional.


Held:

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

47.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. and JOSE MA. O. HIZON, Petitioners, vs.TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, MANILA NORTH TOLLWAYS CORPORATION, BENPRES HOLDINGS CORPORATION, FIRST PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TOLLWAY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS CORPORATION and HOPEWELL CROWN INFRASTRUCTURE, INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 166910. October 19, 2010

Velasco, Jr. J.

 

Respondent: Toll Regulatory Board, Philippine National Construction Corporation, Manila North Tollways Corporation, Benpres Holdings Corporation, First Philippine Infrastructure Development Corporation, Tollway Management Corporation, PNCC Skyway Corporation, Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation, and Hopewell Crown Infrastructure, Inc.

Facts:

President Marcos issued PD 1112 authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on public improvements. It acknowledged the huge financial requirements and the need to tap the resources of the private sector to implement the government’s infrastructure programs. PD 1112 allowed the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments. The same decree created the Toll Regulatory Board, vesting it with the power to enter into contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation of tollways, grant authority to operate a toll facility, issue the necessary Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) and fix initial toll rates, and adjust it from time to time after due notice and hearing. PD 1113 was issued granting the Philippine National Construction Corporation for a period of 30 years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the North Luzon and South Luzon Expressways. Subsequently, PD 1894 was issued further granting the PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway and the expanded delineated NLEX and SLEX.

Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1993, the Government Corporate

Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a joint venture agreement with private entities without going into public bidding. On February 1994, the DPWH together with other private entities executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private capital in the Subic and Clark extension projects. PNCC entered into a financial and technical JVAs with entities for the toll operation of its franchised areas. Several Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the South Metro Manila Skyway, NLEX Expansion, and South Luzon Expressway Projects.

 Petitioners seek to nullify the various STOAs and assail the constitutionality of Sections 3(a and d) of PD 1112 in relation to Section 8(b) of PD 1894. Insofar as they vested the TRB the power to issue, modify, and promulgate toll rate changes while given the ability to collect tolls.

Issue:

Whether or not the TRB may be empowered to grant authority to operate the toll facility/system.

Ruling:

The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to operate the toll facility/system. By explicit provisions of the PDs, the TRB was given power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 11, Section 11 of the Constitution on the grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to operate public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some administrative agencies.

Dispositive:

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 166910 173630, and 169917 are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The petition in G.R. No. 183599 is GRANTED.

 

TOPIC: IV.A SEPARATION OF ADMIN POWERS AND OTHER POWERS

(A. DOCTRINE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS)

 

48. G.R. No. L-16812            October 31, 1963

KISHU DALAMAL, Petitioner, vs. DEPORTATION BOARD,

 

Facts:

Kishu Dalamal, a British subject, was charged, together with other aliens, with having committed certain irregularities in violation of the Central Bank Rules and Regulations before the Deportation Board in a complaint filed by a Special Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.  

Acting on the complaint, the Chairman of the Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest against Dalamal pursuant to the authority given to said Board by Section 1-(b) of Executive Order No. 398. On August 5, 1958, Dalamal was accordingly arrested, but he was subsequently released upon filing a bond.

 

Considering that the warrant for his arrest issued by the Deportation Board is illegal because it was issued in violation of Section l-(3), Article III, of our Constitution, Dalamal interposed the present petition for habeas corpus seeking the annulment of the warrant of arrest as well as the cancellation of the bond filed by him for his provisional liberty.  

The grounds on which the illegality of the warrant of arrest are predicated may be itemized as follows: (a) Section 1-(b) of Executive Order No. 398 under which the warrant of arrest was issued by the Deportation Board is repugnant to Section 1-(3), Article III, of our Constitution, under which only judges are empowered to issue warrants, either of arrest or of search, and only upon probable cause, to be determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce; and (b) assuming arguendo that the President has the power to order the arrest of an alien as an incident of his power of investigation with a view to his deportation, the delegation of such power to the Deportation Board is unlawful it being in violation of the principle that a power that has been delegated by congress cannot in turn be delegated.  

 

Issue:

 

Whether Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it authorizes the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest against aliens is null and void.

 

Held:

 

Yes.

During the American regime it was the Governor General who exercised the power to deport aliens upon the authority of Section 69 of Act 2711, known as the Administrative Code of 1917. Pursuant thereto, the Governor General designates an agent for the purpose of investigating the charges preferred against him, and upon the report he may later submit, the alien's deportation is either ordered or denied. The investigation is conducted in the manner and form prescribed in said Section 69 (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).  

Section 69 provides:

SEC. 69. Deportation of subject to foreign power. - A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, on the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.

In re McCulloch Dick, supra, this Court stated:

xxx           xxx           xxx

... deportation of aliens by the Governor-General, as an act of state, upon prior investigation conducted in the manner and form prescribed in section 69 of the Administrative Code may properly be regarded as made "under the combined powers" of the Governor-General and the Philippine Legislature; authority for such deportations having been conferred upon the Governor-General, so far as that may be necessary, by the provisions of that section.  

... the Supreme Court of the United States has held, in the case of Tiaco v. Forbes (supra), not only that Congress has the power so to do, but that it did in fact delegate full power to the Philippine Government to deport aliens as an act of state; and, further, that when the Governor-General does in fact deport an alien, by authority of an Act of the Philippine Legislature, the deportation may properly be treated as an act of state, done "under the combined powers" of the Philippine Legislature and the Governor-General. (38 Phil., pp. 71, 98-99.)

Whenever, therefore, the President exercises his power of deporting an alien upon prior investigation conducted in the manner and form prescribed in Section 69 of the Administrative Code of 1917, he does so, not only as an act of state, but also "under the combined powers" of the President and the Legislature. As an act of state, the President has the inherent power to order the deportation of an alien and as incident thereof, his arrest, while at the same time that power may be deemed vested in him thru delegation by the Legislature thru the enactment of an appropriate statute (Section 69, Revised Administrative Code.) But insofar as his power to order the arrest of an alien is concerned, either as a measure to insure his appearance at the investigation proceedings to determine if he is liable to deportation, or an incident of his inherent power to deport to make effective his deportation order, assuming only arguendo that he has such incidental power, that power cannot be delegated either under the principle of delegata potesta non potest delegare,¹or upon the theory that it is non-delegable because it involves the exercise of judgment or discretion.  

Thus, in a case we recently decided, we made, thru Mr. Justice Barrera, the following observation:

Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve as a curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberties of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation. (Qua Chee Gan, et al. v. The Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-10280, September 30, 1963.)

Our conclusion, therefore, is that Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it authorizes the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest against aliens complained of is null and void, it being a power that cannot be delegated, nor is authorized by Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.  

50.

EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) represented by the HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), represented by HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, respondents.

G.R. No. 152214. September 19, 2006

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:

OFW Manny dela Rosa Razon died of ied of acute cardiac arrest while asleep at the dormitory of the Samsong Textile Processing Factory in South Korea. As a result thereof, the OWWA requested petitioner Equi-Asia, the agency responsible for Razon’s recruitment and deployment, to provide for Prepaid Ticket Advice (PTA) and assistance for the repatriation of Razon’s remains. Equi-Asia denied responsibility for providing such assistance arguing that Razon violated his employment contract by unlawfully escaping from his company assignment without prior authorization. In lieu of such assistance, it suggested that Razon’s relatives can avail of the benefits provided for by OWWA in cases involving undocumented/illegal Filipino workers abroad. OWWA, in response to petitioner’s denials, invoked Sections  52 to 55 of the Implementing Rules Governing RA 8042^[1] provding that “the repatriation of OFW, his/her remains and transport of his personal effects is the primary responsibility of the principal or agency and to immediately advance the cost of plane farewithout prior determination of the cause of worker's repatriation”. In consequence thereof, Equi-Asia filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the legality and constitutionality of said provisions in the implementing rules on the ground that it expanded Section 15 of RA 8042. It contends thus - Sec. 15^[2] of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior notice and hearing before responsibility thereunder could be established against the agency that sets up the defense of sole fault in avoidance of said responsibility -.Besides, the sections in question unduly grant the powers to require advance payment of the plane fare, to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension in case of non-compliance therewith, within 48 hours and to recover said advance payment from the dead worker's estate upon the return of his remains to the country before the NLRC, when the law itself does not expressly provide for the grant of such powers.

 

Issue:

Whether or not Sections 52, 53, 54 and 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8042, issued by DFA and POEA, is illegal and/or violative of due process such that POEA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or in grave abuse of discretion in issuing said order to pay said expenses.

 

Held:

The petition of the petitioner should be dismissed on the following grounds:

(1)   [Procedural] For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the writ must be directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the Court prefatorily defined and distinguished between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers exercised by administrative agencies. In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, must be observed. Other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the Omnibus Rules. However, these rules were clearly promulgated by respondents Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment in the exercise of their quasi-legislative powers or the authority to promulgate rules and regulations. Because of this, petitioner was, thus, mistaken in availing himself of the remedy of an original action for certiorari as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper subjects thereof.

(2)   [Delegation of Administrative functions; Rationale] It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the face of increasing complexity of modern life. Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the members of today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

(3)   [Compliance with test of delegation] Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules is not invalid for contravening Section 15 of the law which states that a placement agency shall not be responsible for a worker's repatriation should the termination of the employer-employee relationship be due to the fault of the OFW. The statute merely states the general principle that in case the severance of the employment was because of the OFW's own undoing, it is only fair that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not preclude a placement agency from establishing the circumstances surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate proceeding. As such determination would most likely take some time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at the soonest possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that recruitment agency contests its liability for repatriation. Repatriation is in effect an unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that cannot be delayed by an investigation of why the worker was terminated from employment. To be left stranded in a foreign land without the financial means to return home and being at the mercy of unscrupulous individuals is a violation of the OFW's dignity and his human rights. These are the same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect.

51. G.R. No. L-23825      December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Facts:

 

The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”

Issues:

Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:

Yes.

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.

It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

52.

ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), Petitioners, vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), Respondents.

G.R. No. 159796.July 17, 2007

NACHURA, J.:

Facts:

Petitioners filed an original petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court praying that Section 34^[3] of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge. It mainly challenges the said provisions on the ground that the universal charge provided for and sought to be implemented under said provisions is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.

Issue:

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.

Ruling:

(1)   [Delegation of Powers] Potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. + Reiteration of Equi-Asia ruling on rationale of delegation of administrative functions.

(2)   [Compliance with test of delegation] The EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself.  Sec. 43(b)(ii) of the EPIRA provides that the ERC shall promulgate and enforce  “Financial capability standards fo rthe generating companies, the TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and function of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further, That such standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the minimum financial standards to protect the public interest.”

            Moreover, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the EPIRA clearly provides that the ERC, in the performance of its functions, shall have the power to calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of NPC which shall form the basis for ERC in the determination of the universal charge.

            When police power is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take a more active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. There should be exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of power outages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.

 

TOPIC: IV.C SUFFICIENCY OF STANDARDS

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

G.R. No. L-14078            March 7, 1919

MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS:

The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.

The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

Issue:

Whether section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?

Ruling:

No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

 

WEEK 3 TOPIC: V. A ADMIN PROCEEDINGS

A. CHARACTER OF ADMIN PROCEEDINGS

54.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 157043             February 2, 2007

CORONA, J.:

Facts:

In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor.

Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. 

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. 

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial. 

Issue(s): 

1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.

2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?

3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?

4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.

2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. 

3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.

4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition (Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007).

 

TOPIC: V.B JURISDICTION IN ADMIN PROCEEDINGS

55. GLOBE WIRELESS LTD., petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and ANTONIO B. ARNAIZ, respondents.

G.R. No. L-27520 January 21, 1987

Facts:

G.R. No. 27520 [Globe Wireless Ltd., vs. Public Service Commission and Antonio B. Arnaiz]. — Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the jurisdiction of the defunct Public Service Commission [PSC] under Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, to discipline and impose a fine upon petitioner, Globe Wireless, Ltd., a duly organized Philippines corporation engaged in ;international telecommunication business under a franchise granted by Public Acts Nos. 3495, 3692 and 4150 as amended by Republic Act No. 4630.

A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.

After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz, sent to then Public Service Commissioner Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. The complaint was docketed as PSC Case No. 65-39-OC and petitioner was required to answer the same. Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the message to the addressee.

Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and ordering it "to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended." petitioner was likewise required to refund the sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the undelivered message. [Annex "C", petition, . 23, Rollo].

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner instituted the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not PSC has the power to fine the petitioner

Ruling:

The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby granted and the order of respondent Public Service Commission in PSC Case No. 65-39-OC is set aside for being null and void.

56.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN, SPS. ANGEL and ROSARIO CRUZ, RUFINO LAAN, RUFINO LAAN SANTOS, ANDRES NEPOMUCENO, SPS. ALBERTO and HERMINIA HAGOS, LEON GUILALAS, SPS. OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO, Respondents.

[G.R. NO. 142601 : October 23, 2006]

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

 

The undisputed facts are:

Since 1968, there has been an existing boundary dispute between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (one of herein respondents) and the City of Caloocan. In order to resolve the long-challenged conflict, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte passed and approved Resolution No. 20-02-94³ on February 10, 1994. This resolution recognizes the official boundary of respondent municipality and the City of Caloocan, described as follows:

ON JOINT MOTION of all members present;

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved to recognize the official boundary of the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and the City of Caloocan, Metro Manila as the true and correct line marking between the two Local Government Units as shown by the attached certified true copy of the geographic position and plain grid coordinates of Caloocan, Rizal per CAD-267 specifically from MBM (Municipal Boundary Monument) 22 to MBM 33;

x x x

On August 8, 1995, another Resolution⁴ was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte recognizing the geographic position and plane coordinates of Tala Estate, Caloocan City contained in BM No. 11-24 as the "lot lines" delineating the boundary between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City. This prompted the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region III to conduct a relocation survey.

On September 15, 1995, the survey team submitted a Comprehensive Report,⁵ some excerpts of which provide:

ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS

1. The geographic positions of MBM Nos. 22 to 33, Cad 267, Caloocan Cadastre was the basis for the establishment of the true and correct boundary between the municipality and Caloocan City. However, during the dialogue with concerned government agencies on May 12, 1995, the municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, emphasized that the boundary between the two local government units is the imaginary straight line between two boundary monuments, starting from MBM Nos. 22 to 33.

2. The FNSP-G surveying team plotted/drafted in a topographic map all pertinent records affecting boundary disputes of the two locality, such as the geographic positions and coordinates of MBM Nos. 22 to 33 Cad 267 Caloocan Cadastre, BM Nos. 11 to 23 of Tala Estate lot lines. Tala Estate lot lines were plotted approximately by scale, because there were no records on its geographic coordinates and incomplete cadastral maps. The findings are the following:

a) The plotted positions of MBM Nos. 23 to 30, 32 and 33 Cad 267 Caloocan Cadastre are almost identical or equivalent to BM Nos. 12 to 16, 18 to 20, 22 and 23 of Tala Estate.

b) The lot lines of Tala Estate traverses thru Marilao River.

c) The northern portion of the lot lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3 SWO-41615 Tala Estate indicated that it traverses thru Marilao River.

3. In Municipal Resolution No. 06-08-95 dated August 8, 1995, it is requested that the geographic positions of BM Nos. 11 to 24, Tala Estate shall be recognized as the official lots lines which delineates the boundaries of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and Caloocan City. Moreover, the resolution is opposed to the delineation of Marilao River as the boundary of two localities, as embodied in SWO-41615.

4. If the lot lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3, SWO-41615 will be the basis for the boundaries of the two LGUs, Marilao River will be the natural boundary between the two LGUs; if BM 11 to 24, Tala Estate shall be the basis for the boundaries, some northern portions of Parcels 1, 2 and 3, SWO-41615, portions of Bankers Village and Pangarap Village belongs to the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan."

The Comprehensive Report states that the San Jose del Monte Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions contradict the delineation embodied in SWO-41615 of the Tala Estate, a 598-hectare property allotted by the government mainly for housing and resettlement site under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA), pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971.

Unsatisfied with the report of the DENR, respondent municipality filed a complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),⁶ against petitioner NHA. Several residents of San Jose del Monte, namely: spouses Angel and Rosario Cruz, Rufino Laan, Rufina Laan Santos, Andres Nepomuceno, spouses Alberto and Herminia Hagos, Leon Guilalas, spouses Oscar and Haydee Badillo, and Leoncio Laan (herein private respondents) joined the municipality as complainants in the said case. They alleged that their properties are within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte; that Presidential Proclamation No. 843 does not cover their properties; and that the NHA's Bagong Silang Resettlement Project encroaches on their landholdings. They prayed that the NHA be ordered to award them damages. Incidentally, the City of Caloocan was not impleaded as a party in their complaint.

On June 22, 1998, the COSLAP rendered its Resolution ruling that the correct boundary between respondents San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City is that specified in the twin Resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan of said respondents. The COSLAP likewise held that all other issues, such as those raised by respondents, are mere incidents of such ruling. In effect, the COSLAP ruled that the land covered by the NHA project, being within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, encroaches upon respondents' properties.

On January 14, 1999, petitioner NHA, upon invitation of the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (Bureau), attended a meeting held on January 26, 1999 between the local officials of respondent municipality and Caloocan City. The purpose of the meeting was to provide an avenue for the discussion of the territorial boundary between the two local government units. During the meeting, petitioner NHA posed strong opposition to the COSLAP Resolution, contending that the latter has no jurisdiction over the boundary dispute. Subsequently, the Bureau directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 30 days.

Instead of submitting a position paper, respondent municipality filed with the COSLAP a motion for execution of its Resolution dated June 22, 1998. On May 17, 1999, the COSLAP granted the motion and issued a writ of execution.

Petitioner NHA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging that in issuing the June 22, 1998 Resolution and the writ of execution, COSLAP acted without jurisdiction.

On November 16, 1999, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time and for petitioner's failure to avail of the remedy of appeal.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari .

At the threshold, let it be stated that a judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It can never become final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question.⁷

The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between respondent municipality and Caloocan City.

COSLAP was created by Executive Order No. 561 issued on September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The Commission is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems to avoid social unrest. Its objective is to settle land conflicts among small settlers, landowners and members of cultural minorities.

The powers and functions of the COSLAP are laid down in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 561, thus:

Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x

2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivisions of lands of the public domain; andcralawlibrary

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

x x x

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes.⁸ In acting on a land dispute, the COSLAP may either assume jurisdiction if the matter falls under paragraph 2(a) to (e) or refer the matter to an agency having appropriate jurisdiction.

There is no provision in Executive Order No. 561 that COSLAP has jurisdiction over boundary dispute between two local government units. Under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the respective legislative councils of the contending local government units have jurisdiction over their boundary disputes. Sections 118 and 119 provide:

Section 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute.

x x x

(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.

(e) In the event the Sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.

Section 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the Sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.

Rule III implementing the above provisions states:

Rule III

SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Art. 15. Definition and Policy. - There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably.

Art. 16. Jurisdictional Responsibility. - Boundary disputes shall be referred for settlement to the following:

(a) Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan for disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality, as the case may be;

(b) Sangguniang panlalawigan for those involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province;

(c) Jointly, to the sanggunians of provinces concerned, for those involving component cities or municipalities of different provinces; or

(d) Jointly, to the respective sanggunians, for those involving a component city or municipality and a highly urbanized city or two (2) or more highly-urbanized cities. x x x

Thus, instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case, the COSLAP should have referred respondents' complaint to the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Caloocan City and the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte. Their decision may be appealed to the proper Regional Trial Court.

Consequently, we rule that the COSLAP does not have jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City. We have consistently ruled that a judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.⁹ Such nullity is correctable only by certiorari .¹⁰ And certiorari cannot be dismissed for timeliness inasmuch as a void judgment never acquires finality and any action to declare its nullity does not prescribe.¹¹ Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they were in before the trial.¹²

Clearly, the Court of Appeals erred in disposing NHA's petition for certiorari . It should have dismissed the petition, not on the grounds that it was filed late and that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, but solely on the ground that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject boundary dispute.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54495 are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

TOPIC : V.C PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN ADMIN PROCEEDINGS

Since petitioner did not rescind the Contract to Sell it executed with the respondents by a notarial act, the said Contract still stands. Both parties must comply with their obligations under the said Contract. As ruled by the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals, the respondents must first pay the balance of the purchase price of the subject property, after which, the petitioner must execute and deliver the necessary Deed of Sale and TCT of said property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

57. Valencia vs. CA (401 SCRA 666, 2003). G.R. No. 122363. April 29, 2003. BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioner contends that an appeal to the Office of the President from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is proper under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. On the other hand, it is the contention of public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General, that an exception to this well-settled principle is the doctrine of qualified political agency. Where the respondent is a Department Secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless the President actually disapproves them, administrative remedies have already been exhausted. Recourse to the court may be made at that point, according to private respondents, a view that was sustained by the Court of Appeals. In this case, the appellate court ruled that the appeal before it was filed beyond the reglementary period as petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, and not to the Court of Appeals, where it should have been brought. In Tan v. Director of Forestry this Court ruled that even if the respondent was a Department Secretary, an appeal to the President was proper where the law expressly provided for exhaustion.²⁰cräläwvirtualibräry

As a valid exercise of the Secretarys rule-making power to issue internal rules of procedure, DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, expressly provides for an appeal to the Office of the President. Thus, petitioner Valencia filed on 24 November 1993 a timely appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Office of the President, which was received on 11 November 1993, well within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period.

An administrative decision must first be appealed to administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. The power of judicial review may therefore be exercised only if an appeal is first made by the highest administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive branch of government.

58. Ponce v. National Labor Relations Commission (466 SCRA 348)

[A] party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

. . . [I]t was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. . . And in Littleton v. Burges, 16 Wyo, 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

59. Anillo v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (534 SCRA 228, 2007)

G.R. NO. 157856 : September 27, 2007.

TINGA, J.:

 

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

 

60. Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil 635, 1940)

G.R. No. L-46496             February 27, 1940

LAUREL, J.:

 

Facts:

 

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while  no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

 

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

 

Issue: 

 

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

 

Ruling:

 

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

 

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

ü  The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

ü  Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

ü  While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

ü  Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

ü  The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

ü  The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

ü  The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

 

61. Cruz v. Minister of Labor and Employment (120 SCRA 15, 1983)

Facts: On November 21, 1979, respondent bank Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of its remittance clerk, Ma. Lourdes Cruz, for gross negligence which was opposed by the latter by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. On February 11, 1980, the Regional Director resolved the case by lifting petitioners preventive suspension and directing the bank to reinstate her with full back-wages. In support of his order, the Director held that the record is bereft of any substantial proof tending to show that Lourdes Cruz has committed act of gross negligence as imputed to her. RCBC appeal on the ground of abuse discretion.

Ruling: Petitioner's claim that she was denied due process is likewise without basis. She was given the chance to explain and exonerate herself of the charges during the investigation. It was incumbent upon her to prove her innocence but she failed to do so. Her allegation in her complaint that she acted only in obedience to her superior's order is an obvious after thought which should not be given credence. She failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support her allegation.

62. Var-orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso (161 SCRA 732). G.R. No. 81805 May 31, 1988. GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Facts: petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the private respondents Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.

After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. Only the private respondents submitted a position paper.

Issue:  they were denied due process of law because the respondent Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing

Ruling: Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard (Bermejo vs. Banjos, 31 SCRA 764), or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438; Gas Corporation of the Phil. vs. Hon. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653; Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA 257), or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388).

63. Garcia v. Pajaro  (384 SCRA 122, 2002). [G.R. No. 141149. July 5, 2002.] PANGANIBAN, J.:

The city treasurer of Dagupan has the authority to institute disciplinary actions against subordinate officers or employees. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain one’s side, whether written or verbal. The constitutional mandate is satisfied when a petitioner complaining about an action or a ruling is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration.

Facts:  Evidence for the petitioner tends to show that petitioner SEBASTIAN GARCIA, 61, married, employee at the City Treasurer’s Office, Dagupan City and resident of Lucao, Dagupan City, has been employee thereat since June 15, 1974 as Revenue Collector appointed to that position by then City Mayor Cipriano Manaois. He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro from June 1, 1990 to March 15, 1992 and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal Charge filed against him. He resumed work on March 16, 1992 as Local Treasury Officer III. When he was suspended, his position was Local Treasury Officer and Revenue Officer with a salary of P6,800.00 a month. When he resumed work, his salary was already P7,615.00 monthly. From June 1, 1990 up to March 15, 1992, he had been reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant, investigator and judge and there was no complaint against him from the Office of the City Mayor. He did not believe in the Order; he did not submit himself for investigation. He was not paid his salary because of the suspension order which caused his sleepless nights, his two (2) children stopped schooling, he has to beg from his relatives. He has a wife with four (4) children in college, one in Commerce, another taking up Dentistry. During the 1990 earthquake, there was calamity loan granted to employees but he could not avail of it because the City Treasurer would not approve the loan. He is asking P1,000,000.00 for his mental anguish and sufferings. From July to October, 1987 the City Treasurer refused to give him his COLA, differential, cash gift, salary and mid-year bonus amounting to P6,800.00 up to the present. His salary now is P13,715.00 as Treasury Officer III. Contrary to the charges of the City Treasurer, he has been doing his duties and obligations; that for the acts of charging him in the Department of Finance and for charging him for neglect of duties, he felt deeply hurt and is asking P250,000.00 for that; his agreement with his counsel is P25% of what will be awarded to him.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s right to due process was violated

Ruling: Petitioner argues that his right to due process was violated, because he was not heard during the administrative proceedings. 40 We are not convinced.

In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. 41 Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. 42 One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also — and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably — through pleadings. 43 So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. 44 Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.

64. Adamson and Adamson v. Amores (152 SCRA 237, 1987)

While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them.²⁰ However, the standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.²¹ Hence, there is no denial of due process where records show that hearings were held with prior notice to adverse parties.²² But even in the absence of previous notice, there is no denial of procedural due process as long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard.²³

Based on the foregoing, We rule that petitioner was not deprived of its right to procedural due process in the BOI. In the first place, it was notified of the May 14, 1980 hearing. The notice specified that the hearing was on the petition although it also stated therein with particularity, petitioner's prayer for a stop and desist order. Necessarily, it is immaterial that said notice was sent before Johnson filed its answer to the petition and there was yet no joinder of issues considering that the proceeding was before an administrative tribunal where technicalities that should be observed in a regular court may be dispensed with.

Secondly, during the hearing, petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case, including its prayer for a stop and desist order. As clearly enunciated in the minutes of the hearing which We have painstakingly studied and set forth herein to determine if any irregularity attended the questioned BOI proceeding, it was conducted for the purpose of hearing the arguments and receiving evidence of the parties "to resolve the case expeditiously." Having been given the opportunity to put forth its case, petitioner has only itself, or, better still, its counsel and officers who were present therein, to blame for its failure to do so.²⁴

Petitioner's right to procedural due process was not violated when the hearing was conducted before a director of the BOI and not before the members of the board themselves who decided the case. The requirements of a fair hearing do not mandate that the actual taking of testimony or the presentation of evidence be before the same officer who will make the decision on the case.²⁵ 1avvphi1

Neither does the absence of stenographers during the hearing affect petitioner's right to due process. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 5186, which provides for the powers and duties of the BOI, does not specify that said board is a board of record. The first paragraph of said section merely mentions minutes" in connection with proceedings of the board. Therefore, the absence of a transcript of stenographic notes taken during the BOI hearing cannot be claimed to have deprived petitioner of due process of law.²⁶

65. Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman (322 SCRA 17, 2000)

Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration.

On March 21, 1988, K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) Mote a letter to NIACONSULT requesting a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation development.³

On November 17, 1988, petitioner as the training coordinator of the NIACONSULT, sent a letter-proposal requested by ABDN.⁴ Another letter was sent by petitioner on January 31, 1989 to Dr. Peiter Roeloffs of ADBN confirming the availability of NIACONSULT to conduct the training program and formally requesting advance payment of thirty (30%) percent of the training fee⁵ in the amount of US $9,600.00 or P204,960.00.

On April 1, 1991, NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner personally received.⁸ Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust.⁹

Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the respondent OMBUDSMAN, on February 17, 1992, issued an order¹⁰ requiring petitioner to file his counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt with a caveat that failure to file the same would be deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence. Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the said order.

A year later, or on March 17, 1993, respondent OMBUDSMAN issued another order¹¹ giving petitioner another chance to file his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence. Again, petitioner failed. Thus, on April 14, 1993, private respondent was required to appear before the OMBUDSMAN to present evidence to support its complaint.¹²

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to due process was violated

Ruling: The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.²⁰

Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the complaint against him. In fact, petitioner was given considerable length of time to submit his counter-affidavit. It took more than one year from February 17, 1992 before petitioner was considered to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and the formal presentation of the complainant's evidence was set. The March 17, 1993 order was issued to give the petitioner a last chance to present his defense, despite the private respondent's objections. But petitioner failed to comply with the second order.1âwphi1.nêt

Thus, petitioner's failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot escape his own remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator. While the respondent OMBUDSMAN has shown forbearance, petitioner has not displayed corresponding vigilance. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated. We need only to reiterate that a party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of due process

66. Lastimoso v. Asoyo (539 SCRA 381, 2007)

G.R. No. 154243 . December 22, 2007

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

 

Facts: Before the Court is respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision promulgated on March 6, 2007. In said Decision, the Court granted the petition, holding that the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civilian complaint against respondent and that the latter was accorded due process during the summary hearing.

 

Respondent insists that the summary hearing officer did not conduct any hearing at all but only relied on the affidavits and pleadings submitted to him, without propounding further questions to complainant's witnesses, or calling in other witnesses such as PO2 Villarama. It should, however, be borne in mind that the fact that there was no full-blown trial before the summary hearing officer does not invalidate said proceedings

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioners right to due process was violated.

 

Ruling: In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,¹ the Court reiterated the time-honored principle that:

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.² (Emphasis supplied)

 

67. Sarapat v. Salonga (538 SCRA 324, 2007). [G.R. NO. 154110 : November 23, 2007] AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Facts: Felizardo B. Sarapat, Amelita Durian and Fermin G. Castillo (petitioners) are President, Treasurer and Director, respectively, of the Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-National Union of Bank Employees (PVBEU-NUBE). Sylvia Salanga and Liwayway Silapan (respondents) are members of PVBEU-NUBE.

Sometime in 1985, the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) went bankrupt and was placed under receivership/liquidation by the Central Bank. As a result, the services of PVB employees were terminated. When PVB re-opened in 1992, the PVB employees were not re-hired. Thus, PVBEU-NUBE filed a notice of strike and cases of unfair labor practice against PVB before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

PVB and PVBEU-NUBE entered into a Compromise Agreement for the amicable settlement of all their cases and claims then pending with the NLRC and other tribunals. T

respondents, in their behalf and in behalf of 43 other PVBEU-NUBE members, filed with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a petition³ requesting an audit of the finances of the PVBEU-NUBE.

Pre-audit conferences were called. However, despite notices and directives served upon petitioners for them to appear and submit pertinent documents for the audit, they failed to do so.

Petitioners filed an appeal with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) questioning the Order calling for the conduct of a general membership meeting. LR issued an Order⁷ taking cognizance of the requested audit and accounting of the litigation expenses incurred by the union in the prosecution of its labor cases. e parties and PVBEU-NUBE were summoned to appear before the BLR. At said conference, Jose P. Umali, representing PVBEU-NUBE, denied participation in the preparation and execution of the Compromise Agreement relative to the PVBEU-NUBE cases with the NLRC. October 5, 2000, the BLR issued a Resolution⁹ declaring the Statement of Receipts and Disbursements as insufficient to prove the actual litigation expenses incurred in the prosecution of labor cases or to justify the 5% special assessment fee since no official receipts, disbursement vouchers, checks, acknowledgment receipts and such other documents which would show actual disbursement of funds and the purpose thereof were submitted.

Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit for the following reasons.

Firstly, petitioners cannot maintain that they were denied due process. Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.²² Not all cases require a trial-type hearing. The requirement of due process in labor cases is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would prove their respective claims.²³ Thus, in Samalio v. Court of Appeals,²⁴ the Court held:

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony

68. Saunar v. Ermita (848 SCRA 351, 2017). G.R. No. 186502, December 13, 2017. MARTIRES, J.:

 

Facts:

 

Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which he joined as an agent in 1988. Through the years, he rose from the ranks and eventually became the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division. During his time as chief of the said division, Saunar conducted an official investigation regarding the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes and involving then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President Joseph E. Estrada (President Estrada), and former Senator Jinggoy Estrada. President Estrada's assailed involvement in the tobacco excise tax issue became one of the predicate crimes included in his indictment for plunder.

Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC).

OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and dismissed him from service.

Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the OP in its 12 June 2007 resolution.¹¹ Undeterred, he appealed before the CA.

Issue: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS 

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.:

In Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission (Arboleda),³⁰ the Court expounded that administrative due process does not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, to wit:

The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decided by this Court. Actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is a procedural right which the employee must ask for since it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted thereon.³¹ (

Thus, while the Court in Arboleda recognized that the lack of a formal hearing does not necessarily transgress the due process guarantee, it did not however regard the formal hearing as a mere superfluity. It continued that it is a procedural right that may be invoked by the party. It is true that in subsequent cases,³² the Court reiterated that a formal hearing is not obligatory in administrative proceedings because the due process requirement is satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to explain their respective sides through position papers or pleadings. Nonetheless, the idea that a formal hearing is not indispensable should not be hastily thrown around by administrative bodies.

In fact, the seminal words of Ang Tibay manifest a desire for administrative bodies to exhaust all possible means to ensure that the decision rendered be based on the accurate appreciation of facts. The Court reminded that administrative bodies have the active duty to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. As such, it would be more in keeping with administrative due process that the conduct of a hearing be the general rule rather than the exception.

The observance of a formal hearing in administrative tribunal or bodies other than judicial is not novel. In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company,³³ the Court opined that in illegal dismissal cases, a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory when requested by the employee in writing, or substantial evidentiary disputes exists, or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it

Thus, administrative bodies should not simply brush aside the conduct of formal hearings and claim that due process was observed by merely relying on position papers and/or affidavits. Besides, the Court in Joson recognized the inherent limitations of relying on position papers alone as the veracity of its contents cannot be readily ascertained. Through the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, administrative bodies would be in a better position to ferret out the truth and in turn, render a more accurate decision.

In any case, the PAGC violated Saunar's right to due process because it failed to observe fairness in handling the case against him. Its unfairness and unreasonableness is readily apparent with its disregard of its own rules of procedure.

69. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. NLRC (276 SCRA 1, 1997) G.R. No. 99030. July 31, 1997.

Facts:

Private respondent was employed as Facility Man JG-5 at the Lexal Office of petitioner. One of his duties was to assign telephone lines to telephone applicants. This includes conducting field surveys and preparing the necessary documents for the installation of telephone facilities.

In February 1986, Mr. Tomas Enriquez, a resident of Sambahayan Condominium Building No. 5 in Makaturing Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, filed a complaint to petitioner that his application for a telephone line was by-passed when DJ Sambahayan Fastfood which was also located in the same building was provided with a telephone line on February 23, 1986, thus violating the company’s first-come-first-serve policy.

After investigating on the complaint, petitioner discovered that: (1) Mr. Enriquez’s application (numbered RA-75-1984) enjoyed higher priority than that of DJ Sambahayan Fastfood (numbered RA-76-17797); (2) there were three other telephone applications in the same building having higher priority than that of DJ Sambahayan Fastfood and they were also by-passed when a telephone line was installed at DJ Sambahayan Fastfood; (3) Sambahayan Condominium Building No. 5 had no entrance cable facility; and (4) DJ Sambahayan Fastfood was provided with a telephone line using the entrance cable facilities of Sambahayan Condominium Building No. 3. Petitioner also found that it was private respondent who processed and assigned telephone facilities to DJ Sambahayan Fastfood.

Issue: Whether or not it is the burden of proof is upon the employer.

Ruling: An employer can terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. 7 The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was indeed for a valid and just cause. 8

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to establish private respondent’s culpability by clear and convincing evidence

An employer can terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was indeed for a valid and just cause

70. Go v. Colegio de San Letran (683 SCRA 385, 2012)

Facts; In October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of Letran’s Auxiliary Services Department, received information that certain fraternities were recruiting new members among Letran’s high school students, together with the list of allegedly involved students.

The school conducted medical examinations on the students involved and on November 20, 2002, Dr. Emmanuel Asuncion, the school physician, reported that six (6) students bore injuries on the posterior portions of their thighs. Mr. Rosarda, the Assistant Prefect for Discipline, conferred with the students and asked for their explanations in writing.

Four (4) students, admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau Gamma Fraternity and were present in a hazing rite held in Tondo, Manila. They also identified the senior members of the fraternity present at their hazing. These included Kim, then a fourth year high school student.

In the meantime, the school’s security officer, prepared an incident report that the Tau Gamma Fraternity has been recruiting members from Letran’s high school department. He had spoken to one of the fraternity neophytes and obtained a list of eighteen (18) members of the fraternity currently enrolled at the high school department. Kim’s name was also in the list.

Mr. Rosarda has informed Kim’s mother, Mrs. Go, that her son is a fraternity member whereas she expressed her disbelief stating that her son has always been in constant supervision.

Mr. Rosarda thereafter spoke to Kim and asked him to explain his side. Kim responded through a written statement dated December 19, 2001; he denied that he was a fraternity member.

In time, the respondents found that twenty-nine (29) of their students, including Kim, were fraternity members. The respondents found substantial basis in the neophytes’ statements that Kim was a senior fraternity member. Based on their disciplinary rules, the Father Prefect for Discipline (respondent Rev. Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez) recommended the fraternity members’ dismissal from the high school department rolls

On January, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Caloocan City claiming that the respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim. They refused to accept the respondents’ finding that Kim was a fraternity member. They likewise insisted that due process had not been observed. Mr. and Mrs. Go also sought compensation for the “business opportunity losses” they suffered while personally attending to Kim’s disciplinary case.

In ruling for the petitioners, the RTC ruled that Kim was dismissed without due process, his membership in the fraternity was not duly proven, and the the school had no authority to dismiss KIM from school.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the RTC and reversed the decision, thereby prompting the petitioners to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not due process was violated.

Ruling No. `On the issue of due process, the petitioners insist that the question be resolved under the guidelines for administrative due process in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.⁴⁷ They argue that the respondents violated due process (a) by not conducting a formal inquiry into the charge against Kim; (b) by not giving them any written notice of the charge; and (c) by not providing them with the opportunity to cross-examine the neophytes who had positively identified Kim as a senior member of their fraternity. The petitioners also fault the respondents for not showing them the neophytes’ written statements, which they claim to be unverified, unsworn, and hearsay.

These arguments deserve scant attention.

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,⁴⁸ the Court held that Guzman v. National University,⁴⁹ not Ang Tibay, is the authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases. In Guzman, we laid down the minimum standards in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, as follows:

It bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and crossexamination is not, contrary to petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.⁵

 

 

71. Samalio v. Court of Appeals (454 SCRA 462, 2005).

 G.R. No. 140079.March 31, 2005

CORONA, J.:

 

Before proceeding to the merits of the instant Petition, this Court deems it necessary to first address the allegation of Bungubung that he was denied due process by the Ombudsman.  The fact that no formal hearing took place is not sufficient ground to say that due process was not afforded Bungubung. It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, including those before the Ombudsman, cases may be submitted for resolution on the basis of affidavits and pleadings. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies. [Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140079, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 462, 473, citing CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 362 Phil. 439, 450 (1999)]Undoubtedly, due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, [Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 210, 227-228, citing Velasquez v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 150732, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 357, 368; Adiong v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 713, 720 (2001); Vda. de Dela Cruz v. Abille, 405 Phil. 357, 366 (2001)] which requirement was afforded Bungubung.

In Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. National Labor Relations Commission, [G.R. No. 90964, 10 February 1992, 206 SCRA 109, 115] this Court held that:

[A]ctual adversarial proceeding becomes necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to unclear witnesses.  This is a procedural right which the employee must, however, ask for it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted.  This is to correct the common but mistaken perception that procedural due process entails lengthy oral arguments.  Hearings in administrative proceedings and before quasi-judicial agencies are neither oratorical contests nor debating skirmishes where cross examination skills are displayed.  Non-verbal devices such as written explanations, affidavits, positions papers or other pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely aggrieved parties’ predicament or defense.  What is essential is ample opportunity to be heard, meaning, every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to prepare adequately for his defense.

 

72. Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna (550 SCRA 613, 2008)

It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.

The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied.³⁴ In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3) The decision must have something to support itself.

4) The evidence must be substantial.

5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.³⁵

As can be seen above, among these rights are "the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;" and that the decision be rendered "in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered." Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.

 

73. San Luis v. Court of Appeals (174 SCRA 258, 1989) G.R. No. L-80160 June 26, 1989 CORTES, J.:

The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial] evidence. . . . [Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987,152 SCRA

74. People vs. Neri

The land in question was allegedly bought by Encarnacion Lamorena from Bonifacio Baldomera (or Palmera) and Lucas Lamonte. In 1938, Lamorena filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao "Expediente No. 291, G.L.R.O. No. 53114," a petition for registration of the said 81-hectare land

Lamorena and one Mariano Lamorena, who appears to be the former’s brother, executed a "deed of sale with right to repurchase" the same tract of land within one year from November 8, 1938 in consideration of the amount of P4,112.00 in favor of Baldomera G. Caburian. The parties stipulated in the contract that if the vendors should fail to exercise the right to repurchase, such right would be forfeited and the contract, without executing another document therefore, would be considered as an absolute sale and the vendor would abandon and vacate the premises. The parties also agreed that the vendor would pay the vendee an "annual rental" of P150.00 "payable on or before November, 8, 1939."

Lamorena filed in "Expediente No. 291" a petition praying for the dismissal of her application for registration and for a declaration that the land subject of the petition or application for registration is part of the public domain. 

the court rendered a decision declaring the area applied for as public land; recognized Lamorena as the owner and possessor of all the improvements thereon, and recommended that she be given preference by the Director of Lands in the acquisition of the said land in accordance with law 

Caburian, exercising her alleged acquired right of ownership over the land, demanded from Neri and the others working on the land, the share of the Lamorenas in its produce. Some complied with the demand but the rest who refused to do so, were ordered by Caburian to vacate the premises. Hence, on August 25, 1947, Justo Charmen, Adriano Archi (Archie or Arche). Paterno Madanlo, Fernando Mansilagan, Gervacio Valenteros, Agapito Gurnot (Gornot), Federico Vargas, Heirs of Francisco Magundag and Gabriel Palmera, represented by Leopoldo Lopez, petitioned the President to intervene in their behalf in the controversy.

In the decisions all dated October 23, 1951, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans dismissed the claim of the homestead applicants on the basis of his finding that they were either tenants of the Lamorenas or mere intruders. 6 On the other hand, in B.L. Conflict No. 58 (N), the Director of Lands considered the homestead application of Rufo Neri and rejected the free patent applications of the Lamorenas on the ground that "Baldomera Caburian has been subrogated to the ownership of the improvements existing on the land described in Psu-46022 and to whatever rights the respondents Lamorenas have acquired to the land in question."

Director of Lands: 

claims of Rufo Neri to the portion which is outside of his Homestead Application No. 183913 (E-99319) should be, as hereby it is dismissed. The Free Patent Applications (all new) of Encarnacion, Mariano, Carmen and Gloria all surnamed Lamorena, are hereby rejected.

The homestead applicants and the Lamorenas appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources: appeals were dismissed.

Lamorenas elevated the case to the Office of the President on the sole issue of whether the contract between then and Caburian was a deed of sale with right to repurchase or an equitable mortgage.

Executive Secretary Juan A. Pajo, acting on the strength of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, deemed the contract as one of equitable mortgage and therefore reversed the decision appealed from and The decision of the Office of the President having become final and executory

Undaunted, Caburian (now represented by her heir and special administratrix Guillermina Garcia Vda. de Mitre) elevated the case to the Court of Appeals

Issue:

Whether the nature of the contract between Caburian and the Lamorenas may be a subject of res juridicata?

Ruling:

No. Res judicata also may not apply with respect to the decision of the Office of the President finding that the transaction between Lamorena and Caburian was an equitable mortgage, but for another reason. The decision was solely based on the appeal of Lamorena but unfortunately, the issue raised therein, i.e., the nature of the contract between Caburian and the Lamorenas, was a judicial one, over which the Executive Branch has no jurisdiction. The instant cadastral proceeding, therefore, cannot be barred by the final and executory decision of the Office of the President in the absence of a requisite in the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata: the Office of the President had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal. [The requisites of res judicata are the following: (a) the presence of a final former judgment; (b) the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (d) there is between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action 

 

75. RUCILLO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 159876.June 26, 2007

 

Facts:

• The instant case turns on the charge filed by the respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against the then board members/officers of both Phil-Asia Food Industries Corporation (PAFICO) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) for corrupt practices arising from the alleged "behest" loan DBP extended to PAFICO to finance the latter’s soybeans processing plant project.
• petitioner Crucillo was the Manager of the DBP’s Agricultural Projects Department I (APD I). Petitioner Tengco, on the other hand, sat as member of DBP’s Board of Governors. 
• Sandiganbayan to which the case was docketed ordered the OOMB to conduct a preliminary investigation, whereby it recommends that charges against them be dismissed, the same having been previously resolved with finality on by the Office in DBP v. Phil-Asia Food Industries Corporation (PAFICO)
• MR Was Partially Granted finding probable cause
• Hence the petition, Petitioners argument: It is the petitioners’ common contention that the instant case is barred by res judicata, petitioner Tengco submitting, in addition, that his liability, if there be any, was extinguished by the compromise agreement entered into by and between the Republic of the Philippines (RP), through the PCGG, and Benedicto wherein the latter ceded the PAFICO complex to the PCGG which then sold it to the General Milling Corporation, through the Asset Privatization Trust, for Php 330 million.²⁰ This sale, petitioner Tengco would claim, argues against the idea of the government incurring damages or placed at a disadvantage as a consequence to the alleged behest loan grant.

Issue:

Whether Res judicata applies in admin cases

Ruling:

YES.  The suggestion that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman and other quasi-judicial bodies cannot attain the force of res judicata is simply specious. For, as jurisprudence teaches, public policy demands that, even at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts as well as administrative decisions should become final at some definite time fixed by law and that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issues over again.⁴⁵ This is the raison d’etre upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests.⁴⁶ The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what was already terminated should not be disturbed or altered at every step. And as we articulated in Macailing v. Andrada,⁴⁷ citing a host of cases, the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority "applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction."

 

76. WINNIE C. LUCENTE and ALICIA G. DOMINGO, complainants, vs. ATTY. CLETO L. EVANGELISTA, JR., respondent.

A.C. No. 5957. February 4, 2003

 

Facts:

In a sworn letter-complaint filed with the (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, Winnie C. Lucente and Alicia G. Domingo charged Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. with gross misconduct, deceit, malpractice and crimes involving moral turpitude for falsification of public documents.

 

• alleged that respondent is the son of the late Atty. Cleto Evangelista, who during his lifetime notarized a Deed of Quitclaim executed by Pedro et. Al all surnamed Tan, and one Sabina Mascareas, in favor of Asuncion T. Yared and Cynthia Yared Estudillo, involving a Lot; and a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Wenceslao Magallanes et al. in favor of Salvador Estudillo and Cynthia Yared Estudillo, involving a Lot located in Poblacion, Ormoc City. On January 30, 1990, respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. issued certified true copies of the said instruments. On the basis of the certified true copies of the subject deeds, the Register of Deeds issued s Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23889 in favor of Asuncion T. Yared.
• Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint interposing res adjudicata, arguing that the allegations in the complaint raise the same issues as those in the criminal case for falsification of public document filed against him before the Ormoc City Prosecution Office

 

Issue:

WON the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Courts administrative powers

Ruling:

YES.

Neither does res adjudicata lie against the complainants. Similarly, the doctrine applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Courts administrative powers,¹⁰ as in this case. Neither can it be argued that the instant disbarment case has been adjudicated in the criminal case for falsification of public documents. Respondent was proceeded against as a private individual in said case. In the present disbarment action, Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary authority over members of the legal profession.

 

77. MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
PARKWAY REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.

GR. No. 136492. February 13, 2004

 

FACTS:

 

• Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner Maxima Realty Management and Development Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement to buy and sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 in consideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos.⁴ It was further agreed that failure to pay any of the installments on their due dates shall entitle Parkway to forfeit the amounts paid by way of liquidated damages.
• Maxima defaulted in the payment of the installments due but was granted several grace periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00, leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00.
• Parkway, with the consent of Segovia, executed a Deed of Assignment transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in favor of Maxima. 
• This Deed was intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in its name and use the same as security for P1,820,000.00 loan with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), which amount will be used by Maxima to pay its obligation to Parkway. 
• On the other hand, Segovia and Maxima agreed to transfer title to the condominium unit directly in Maxima’s name subject to the condition that the latter shall pay Segovia
• RCBC granted maxima’s loan
• Maxima failed to pay Segovia. Parkway cancelled its agreement with maxima
• Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), a complaint for specific performance.
• Office of Appeals granted though HURB in a separate judgment on December 17, 1992  modified the decision of the Appeals
• On May 10, 1994, Maxima appealed¹⁷ to the Office of the President which dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time.
• Maxima filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On October 1, 1998.  Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the Office of the President.

ISSUE: Was petitioner’s appeal before the Office of the President filed within the reglementary period?

HELD: NO. t was settled that the period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 15²¹ of Presidential Decree No. 957 (otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protection Decree) and Section 2²² of Presidential Decree No. 1344.²³ The Court ruled that the thirty (30) day period to appeal to the Office of the President from decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure,²⁴ is not applicable, because special laws providing for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President, such as Presidential Decree No. 597 and Presidential Decree No. 1344, must prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure. X XX X X X

such thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law.

78. Amadore v. Romulo (466 SCRA 397, 2005)

Finally, petitioner argues that he will be placed in double jeopardy if the administrative case against him will not be dismissed because of the decision of the Ombudsman finding no probable cause to indict him before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(g) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.

We are not convinced. As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent.⁴⁸

In the case before us, all the elements necessary to invoke double jeopardy are absent. Moreover, the fact that the administrative case and the case filed before the Ombudsman are based on the same subject matter is of no moment. It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that the administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge.

79. In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. S. Datumanong (497 SCRA 626, 2006)

Petitioner was charged administratively before the Office of the Ombudsman. Accordingly, the provisions of the Ombudsman Act and its Rules of Procedure should apply in his case. It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.

In fine, Secretary Datumanong cannot be held in contempt of court for issuing the Memorandum Order in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in issuing it. The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction.

However, two events supervened since the filing of this petition that would support its dismissal. First, on March 28, 2005, the Court in G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed from the service for dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.

In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office. 

80. Republic v. Canastillo (524 SCRA 546, 2007).

G.R. No. 172729.June 8, 2007

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: Respondent was found guilty for respondents guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty

Issue: Whether or not decisions of Ombudsman is appealable in court

Ruling: it is also settled that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings

81. Matienzo v. Abellera (162 SCRA 7, 1988) G.R. No. L-45839 June 1, 1988

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

 

Thus, the respondents correctly argue that "as the need of the public changes and oscillates with the trends of modern life, so must the Memo Orders issued by respondent jibe with the dynamic and flexible standards of public needs. ... Respondent Board is not supposed to 'tie its hands' on its issued Memo Orders should public interest demand otherwise" (Answer of private respondents, p. 121, Rollo).

The fate of the private respondent's petitions is initially for the Board to determine. From the records of the case, acceptance of the respondent's applications appears to be a question correctly within the discretion of the respondent Board to decide. As a rule, where the jurisdiction of the BOT to take cognizance of an application for legalization is settled, the Court enjoins the exercise thereof only when there is fraud, abuse of discretion or error of law. Furthermore, the court does not interfere, as a rule, with administrative action prior to its completion or finality . It is only after judicial review is no longer premature that we ascertain in proper cases whether the administrative findings are not in violation of law, whether they are free from fraud or imposition and whether they find substantial support from the evidence.

 

83. Philippine Air Lines vs Civil Aeronautic Board

G.R. No. L-24219.June 13, 1968

Facts:

• Pursuant to Republic Act No. 4147, granting thereto "a franchise to establish, operate and maintain transport services for the carriage of passengers, mail, industrial flights and cargo by air in and between any and all points and places throughout the Philippines and other countries",
• Fairways filed with CAB the corresponding application for a "certificate of public convenience and necessity"
• CAB hearing officer began to receive evidence on said application.
• Fairways filed an "urgent petition for provisional authority to operate" under a detailed "program of implementation. GRANTED despites PAL’s opposition.
• Reconsideration of this resolution having been denied, PAL filed the present civil action against CAB for excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion

ISSUE: WON (2) CAB had no evidence before it that could have justified the granting of the provisional authority complained of;

HELD: Such presumption is particularly strong as regards administrative agencies, like the CAB, vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said field, obtaining in the nation.³ The consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.⁴ This, in turn, is but a recognition of the necessity of permitting the executive department to adjust law enforcement to changing conditions, without being unduly hampered by the rigidity and the delays often attending ordinary court proceedings or the enactment of new or amendatory legislations. In the case at bar, petitioner has not satisfactorily shown that the aforementioned findings of the CAB are lacking in the necessary evidentiary support.

 

84. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL) vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSI

G.R. No. 151908     August 12, 2003

 

FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars on the billing of telecommunications services and on measures in minimizing, if not eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone unit.  Isla Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel) filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods as stated in the subject memorandum circulars.  Such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Acts of the Philippines.  Soon thereafter, Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint motion for leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-intervention.  This was granted by the trial court.

The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the MCs. NTC filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.  The defendant's MD is denied for lack of merit.  NTC filed a MR but was later on denied by the trial court.  The CA, upon NTC's filing of a special action for certiorari and prohibition, reversed the decision of the lower court.  Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the private respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies?

RULING: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

 

85. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and NESTLE WATERS PHILIPPINES, INC. v UNIWIDE SALES, INC.,

G.R. No. 174674 : October 20, 2010

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

Respondents filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for declaration of suspension of payment, formation and appointment of rehabilitation receiver, and approval of rehabilitation plan.

The newly appointed Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the SEC. The plan was anchored on return to core business of retailing; debt reduction via cash settlement and dacion en pago; loan restructuring; waiver of penalties and charges; freezing of interest payments; and restructuring of credit of suppliers, contractors, and private lenders.

 

The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC an Amended Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). The ARP took into account the planned entry of Casino Guichard Perrachon, envisioned to infuse P3.57 billion in fresh capital. SEC approved the ARP.

The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC a Second Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichard Perrachon's withdrawal. SEC approved the SARP.

Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC praying that the Order approving the SARP be set aside and a new one be issued directing the Interim Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to improve the terms and conditions of the SARP.

 

SEC denied petitioners' appeal for lack of merit. Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the petition for review filed by petitioners. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was also denied.

 

Issue:

Whether or not the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated?

Ruling: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative law; doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction

In light of supervening events that have emerged from the time the SEC approved the SARP on 23 December 2002 and from the time the present petition was filed on 3 November 2006, any determination by this Court as to whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated, would be premature.

Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of this case. The Court thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given the supervening events in this case, the SARP is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence.

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.

Petition for review is DISMISSED.

 

86.  REPUBLIC vs. CARLITO LACAP

G.R. No. 158253             March 2, 2007

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

 

Facts:

• District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid"  Carwin Construction was pre-qualified was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.
• Office of the District Engineer issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance( 100% Completed)
• Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.
• However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract
• respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.
• OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
• RTC Denied the MD as well as MR. though OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State.
• RTC decide in favor of the contractor and CA affirmed with modification.

ISSUES:

1. RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND
2. IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE RESPONDENT’S MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

HELD:

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes.²⁹ The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;³² (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;³³ (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.³⁴ Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present case.

Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a contractor with an expired contractor’s license is proper, respondent remained unpaid for the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent.

Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its contract is entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.³⁶ The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.

X x x x the administrative remedy available to respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by the District Auditor to the COA itself, the Court holds that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above,

 

NB: Not part of Admin issue but somehow related: Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury) states:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

 

87. A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017 . June 19, 2008

LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG v.  JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA

Facts:

The Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

inspected the container vans. The team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers and consignees.

crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products.

DENR Forest Protection Officer posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled. Nobody appeared, hence, confiscated in favor of the government.

A complaint had been filed by Edma before Judge Paderanga. Judge issued a writ of replevin⁸ ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest products

The motion to quash the writ had been denied.

Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavit-complaint¹² dated 8 July 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge.

OCA found that Judge Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; 

 

Issue:

WON Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and unbecoming as a judge?

Ruling:

YES. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s natural resources. Further, Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.

In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.

Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,²⁰ the Court held that:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. (Emphasis ours)

In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

D. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Agencies.

88. MONTANEZ v (PARAD)

[G.R. NO. 183142 : September 17, 2009]

 

Facts:

Petitioner was the owner of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 35.5998 hectares, both located at Negros Occidental. In October 1999, the DAR caused the publication of a Notice of Land Coverage for Negros Occidental, and later, the DAR notified petitioner that her property, to the extent of 32.4257 hectares, has been placed under CARP and offered to compensate herthe amount of PhP 5,592,3001.60 based on the valuation of the LBP, subject to price adjustment to conform to the actual area coverage. Albeit petitioner rejected the offer, LBP later issued in her favor a certification of deposit, in cash and in bonds, corresponding to the amount aforestated. DAR secured from the Negros Occidental Registry the cancellation of petitioner’s titles and the issuance, in lieu thereof, titles in the name of the Republic. Later on the same day, CLOAs were issued. Evidently, such notations on the

CLOAs were erroneous, the aggregate land area stated in the CLOAs being larger than what was reflected in the titles whence the CLOAs emanate.  In any event, said CLOAs were registered in the name of, and delivered to, individual respondents as CARP beneficiaries. Petitioner forthwith filed a Petition PARAB for the annulment/cancellation of titles in view of the CLOAs on the ground of irregular and anomalous issuance thereof. However, said petition was denied. Therefrom, petitioner went straight to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Section 54of RA 6657. Public respondents sought the dismissal of this recourse on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. CA, on the holding that the petitioner is entitled to the rectification of the technical error referred to above, but that the DAR is the proper office to effect the correction, rendered a decision.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ruling: 

Following the lessons of Paatand Asia International Auctioneers, Inc., the denial of the instant petition is clearly indicated. It bears to stress at the outset that, as aptly observed by the CA, there is no challenge from either of the parties to the jurisdiction of the PARAB or the provincial agrarian adjudicator to take cognizance of the basic petition of petitioner for annulment/cancellation of titles.  Just as well. For, the DARAB and its regional and provincial adjudication boards have jurisdiction to adjudicate all agrarian disputes and controversies or incidents involving the implementation of CARP under RA 6657 and other agrarian law and their implementing rules and regulations. Such jurisdiction of DARAB includes cases involving the issuance, correction, and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.

 

For the purpose of applying the rule on exhaustion, the remedies available to the petitioner are clearly set out in the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure, which took effect on January 17, 2004.²⁸ Under Section 1.6, Rule II, the "adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate x x x cases x x x involving the correction, x x x cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of [CLOAs] and [EPs] which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.

The proper remedy from an adverse final resolution, order, or resolution on the merits of the adjudicator is an appeal to the DARAB Proper which, among others, require the filing of a notice of appeal and payment of an appeal fee. And from the decision of the DARAB Proper, an appeal may be taken to the CA pursuant to Rule XV

Given the above perspective, the CA acted correctly and certainly within its sound discretion when it denied, in its amended decision, petitioner's petition for certiorari to nullify the PARAD's decision. Under the grievance procedure set forth in the DARAB Rules of Procedure, PARAD Alegario's decision was appealable to the DARAB Proper. The CA's appellate task comes later to review the case disposition of the DARAB Proper when properly challenged.

89. ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG CIVIC & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, INC.,Petitioner,v. MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES & HOLDINGS, INC., WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL, in his capacity as Director, NCR, and HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 175039: April 18, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts:

MEGAWORLD was the registered owner of a parcel of land located along Lee Street, Barangay Addition Hills, Mandaluyong City. It conceptualized the construction of a residential condominium complex on the said parcel of land called the Wack-Wack Heights Condominium consisting of a cluster of six (6) four-storey buildings and one (1) seventeen (17) storey tower. MEGAWORLD thereafter secured the necessary clearances, licenses and permits for the condominium project

Thereafter, construction of the condominium project began, but on June 30, 1995, the plaintiff-appellee AHMCSO filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, to annul the Building Permit, CLV, ECC and Development Permit granted to MEGAWORLD; to prohibit the issuance to MEGAWORLD of Certificate of Registration and License to Sell Condominium Units; and to permanently enjoin local and national building officials from issuing licenses and permits to MEGAWORLD.

MEGAWORLD filed a Motion to Dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and that jurisdiction over the case was with the public respondent HLURB and not with the regular courts.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court decision. Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies

Ruling:

 Yes. CA Decision Affirmed.

Political Law- doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; doctrine of primary jurisdiction

The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.

In the case of Republic v. Lacap, the SC held that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

What is apparent, however, is that petitioner unjustifiably failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before seeking recourse with the trial court. Under the rules of the HLURB which were then in effect.

DENIED

90.  [G.R. No. 146382. August 7, 2003.]
SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE OF CALOOCAN CITY v. CALOOCAN CITY

Facts: Petitioner Systems Plus Computer College is a non-stock and non-profit educational institution. As such, it enjoys property tax exemption from the local government on its buildings but not on the parcels of land which petitioner is renting for P5,000 monthly from its sister companies, (Consolidated Assembly) and (Pair Management)

Petitioner requested respondent city government of Caloocan, through respondent Manahan, City Assessor and Administrator, to extend tax exemption to the parcels of land claiming that the same were being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes in pursuant to the Constitution and Local Gov’t Code.  (DENIED)

Twice debunked, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the respondent Regional Trial Court which, however, dismissed it for being premature. Its timely motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari when ruled that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether exhausted all available remedies?

Ruling:  NO. Under Section 226 of RA 7160, 12 the remedy of appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals is available from an adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of property.

X

The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.

 

91. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:

• seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region in Makati, Metro Manila, to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested" under the administrative order.

• The trial court issued a temporary restraining order 

• PCA issued RV. 018 -93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards

Issue:

Whether RN 018-93 is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by an administrative body

 

Ruling:

Petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.

The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete 4 and it is clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of the desiccated coconut industry became effective.

 

92. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. v. G.G. Sportswear           Manufacturing Corporation (489 SCRA 578, 2006)

CORONA, J.:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.

Facts:

G.G. Sportswear (G.G.) filed a petition with the SEC for a "Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments, for Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan and for Appointment of Management Committee.”

The SEC hearing panel issued an order directing the suspension of all actions, claims and proceedings against G.G. pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body and/or commission. The SEC hearing panel likewise enjoined G.G. from disposing of any of its properties in any manner except in the ordinary course of business and from making any payment outside the legitimate and ordinary expenses of its business operation during the pendency of the proceedings. The hearing panel also scheduled a creditors’ meeting on October 29, 1997 and directed the publication of a notice to this effect in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive week

Three of respondent’s creditors, Philippine Commercial and International Bank (PCIB), Dao Heng Bank and Standard Chartered Bank filed an urgent motion for the immediate constitution of a management committee. Another creditor, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation, on the other hand, filed a motion for exclusion with manifestation. Despite notice, respondent’s representatives failed to appear at the hearings, as well as at the scheduled creditors’ meeting.

The hearing panel issued an order dated October 30, 1997 dismissing respondent’s petition and lifting the suspension order.

Respondent filed a motion to withdraw its amended petition with a view to filing another one to include its sister corporation, Magic Apparel Corporation (MAC), as co-petitioner

The SEC hearing panel in SEC Case No. 17-99-6374 dismissed the joint petition filed by respondent G.G. and its sister company MAC.

Respondent filed a "petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order/injunction" with the Court of Appeals.

On May 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision reversing the SEC hearing panel and, on December 14, 2000, the assailed resolution denying reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is excepted in exhausting administrative remedies.

Ruling: The exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as enumerated in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals ²⁸ are: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the

respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

From among these exceptions, respondent claims denial of due process by the hearing panel and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the hearing panel amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The facts on record, however, do not bear out respondent’s allegations. Respondent did not dispute that the hearing panel extended the suspension order in its favor three times for a total period of almost eight months. During this time, the panel provided respondent more than ample opportunity to present its evidence. Neither did respondent dispute the fact that the cross-examination of its witness, external auditor Mainrado M. Laygo, was suspended during the hearing due to its own failure to attach the requisite financial documents and records to its petition, in violation of the SEC Policy Guidelines. When the cross-examination was terminated, if anyone was deprived of due process, it was the creditors who were unable to propound searching questions to respondent’s witness.

Legal and Practical Reasons for Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

93. Merida Water District v. Bacarro (567 SCRA 203, 2008)

G.R. NO. 165993 : September 30, 2008

PUNO, C.J.:

Facts: Merida Water District, a government-owned and controlled corporation4 that operates the water utility services in the municipality of Merida, Leyte conducted a public hearing for the purpose of increasing the water rate

March 7, 2002: Merida Water District received a letter from the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) that on March 5, 2002, the LWUA Board of Trustees, per Board Resolution No. 63, series of 2002, confirmed Merida Water District’s proposed water rates.

September 3, 2002: Merida implemented a water rate increase of P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption.

February 13, 2003: consumers of Merida Water District, filed a Petition for Injunction, etc. because the rates are contrary to the rate increase agreed upon during the public hearing

Merida filed a motion to dismiss (then later motion for reconsideration) with the RTC due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended by P.D. Nos. 768 and 1479 - denied

Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CA (then later motion for reconsideration) - denied

Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC

Issue: Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction with the RTC since the primary jurisdiction should belong to the NWRB under P.D. No. 1067. 

Ruling: Yes.

Petitioners failed to cite any law which impliedly grants the NWRB original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve a dispute regarding the increase of water rates. A grant of exclusive jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of a statute in the absence of a clear legislative intent to that effect. An administrative agency with quasi-judicial power is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction should be interpreted in strictissimi juris."

The doctrine of exhaustion does not apply when jurisdiction is exclusive. An administrative agency’s exclusive jurisdiction over a certain dispute renders the courts without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same at that stage. The doctrine of exhaustion applies "where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial intervention is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. To cite Abe-Abe v. Manta as the authority to support the allegation that the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a water rate increase is a strained construction of this Court’s pronouncements. Thus, petitioners’ contention that the RTC has no jurisdiction because the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the increase of water rates is clearly without merit.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so… It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.  

Although the doctrine of exhaustion does not preclude in all cases a party from seeking judicial relief, cases where its observance has been disregarded require a strong showing of the inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending harm.  Respondents justify their failure to observe the administrative process on the following exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: (1) patent illegality; and (2) a denial of due process. However, respondents fail to show that the instant case merits the application of these exceptions.

Jurisprudence affirming the failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion due to a denial of due process involves instances when the party seeking outright judicial intervention was denied the opportunity to be heard.  Here, respondents admit that Merida Water District conducted a public hearing. . The existence of a hearing for this purpose renders the allegation of a denial of due process without merit.  The failure of the respondents to show that the instant case falls within the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion necessitates in the due observance of exhausting the proper administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention.

94. Dimson (Manila), Inc. v. Local Water Utilities Administration (631 SCRA 59, 2010)

G.R. No. 168656 : September 22, 2010

PERALTA, J.:

 

Facts:

 

Petitioners Dimson (Manila), Inc. and PHESCO, Inc. are duly organized domestic corporations that had entered into a joint venture agreement¹ for the specific purpose of placing their bid to execute the Urdaneta Water Supply Improvement Project (the Urdaneta Project) of respondent LWUA. LWUA is the lead government agency vested by Presidential Decree No. 198with the principal function of facilitating the improvement and development of provincial water utilities.

 

On December 10 and 18, 2004, LWUA had caused the publication of an invitation to bid on the Urdaneta Project.

 

Sixteen contractors, including petitioners' joint venture, responded to the invitation and eight of them submitted bid proposals. Petitioners submitted to LWUA's Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) their proposal in two (2) sealed envelopes each containing their compliance with eligibility requirements as a joint venture and their financial proposal as such to undertake the project. Petitioners passed the eligibility requirements and were found to have placed the lowest calculated bid.

 

However, on April 19, 2005, petitioners were informed by LWUA Administrator Lorenzo Jamora that following the post-qualification stage of the evaluation process, the joint venture would have to be disqualified by the BAC on the finding that Dimson (Manila), Inc.'s joint venture with another contractor.

 

 petitioners' request for reconsideration was declined. To prevent the execution of the project by R-II Builders, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of LWUA when it post-disqualified their joint venture from taking part in the project

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioner exhausted all available administrative remedies?

 

Ruling:

 

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before judicial intervention may be availed of. No recourse can be had until all such remedies have been exhausted, and the special civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if there are superior administrative officers who could grant relief. Carale v. Abarintos²⁴ explains the reason for the rule, thus:

Observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice and policy. It ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary sifting process, particularly with respect to matters within the competence of the administrative agency, avoidance of interference with functions of the administrative agency by withholding judicial action until the administrative process had run its course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a resort to them in the first instance. The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for this principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and [speedier] solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain the case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.

Accordingly, the party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

One final note. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a judicial recognition of certain matters that are peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency to address. It operates as a shield that prevents the overarching use of judicial power and thus hinders courts from intervening in matters of policy infused with administrative character. The Court has always adhered to this precept, and it has no reason to depart from it now.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.

 

Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

 

95. Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Chinese General Hospital andMedical Center (456 SCRA 459, 2005)  

G.R. NO. 163123. April 15, 2005

CORONA, J.:

 

Facts:

 

The facts, as culled by the Court of Appeals, follow.

On February 14, 1995, Republic Act No. 7875, otherwise known as "An Act Instituting a National Health Insurance Program for all Filipinos and Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation For the Purpose," was approved and signed into law. As its guiding principle, it is provided in Section 2 thereof, thus:

 

Prior to the enactment of R.A. 7875. CGHhad been an accredited health care provider under the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC), more popularly known as Medicare.

 

As such, petitioner filed its Medicare claims with the Social Security System (SSS), which, together with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), administered the Health Insurance Fund of the PMMC. Thus, petitioner filed its claim from 1989 to 1992 with the SSS, amounting to EIGHT MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO and 10/100 (P8,102,782.10). Its application for the payment of its claim with the SSS was overtaken by the passage of R.A. 7875, which in Section 51 and 52.

 

If the delay in the filing is due to natural calamities or other fortuitous events, the health care provider shall be accorded an extension period of sixty (60) calendar days.

If the delay in the filing of the claim is caused by the health care provider, and the Medicare benefits had already been deducted, the claim will not be paid. If the claim is not yet deducted, it will be paid to the member chargeable to the future claims of the health care provider.

 

Instead of giving due course to petitioner's claims totaling to EIGHT MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO and 10/100 (P8,102,782.10), only ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX and 32/100 Pesos (1,365,556.32) was paid to petitioner, representing its claims from 1989 to 1992 (sic).

 

Petitioner again filed its claims representing services rendered to its patients from 1998 to 1999, amounting to SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO and 93/100 Pesos (P7,554,342.93). For being allegedly filed beyond the sixty (60) day period allowed by the implementing rules and regulations, Section 52 thereof, petitioner's claims were denied by the Claims Review Unit of Philhealth

 

Petitioner's claim was denied with finality by PHILHEALTH in its assailed decision 

 

Issue: Whether the petitioner is exempted to exhaust administrative remedies?

 

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner likewise contends that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to judicial intervention. We disagree.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an administrative decision must first be appealed to the administrative superiors at the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.

This doctrine, however, is a relative one and its flexibility is conditioned on the peculiar circumstances of a case. There are a number of instances when the doctrine has been held to be inapplicable. Among the established exceptions are:

1) when the question raised is purely legal;

2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;

3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;

4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;

5) when the claim involved is small;

6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;

7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

8) when strong public interest is involved;

9) when the subject of the controversy is private land;

10) in quo warranto proceedings.

As explained by the appellate court:

It is Our view that the instant case falls as one of the exceptions, concerning as it does public interest. As mentioned earlier, although they were not made parties to the instant case, the rights of millions of Filipinos who are members of PHILHEALTH and who obviously rely on it for their health care, are considered, nonetheless, parties to the present case. This Court is mandated herein to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of the interests of the state, the health care giver and the members. With these in mind, We hold that the greater interest of the greater number of people, mostly members of PHILHEALTH, is paramount.

 

96. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celoada (479 SCRA 495, 2006)

G.R. No. 164876. January 23, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

 

Facts: Respondent Leonila P. Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land of which 14.1939 hectares was identified in 1998 by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The matter was then indorsed to petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for field investigation and land valuation.

 

In due course, LBP valued respondent's land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of P299,569.61.  The DAR offered the same amount to respondent as just compensation, but it was rejected. Nonetheless, on August 27, 1999, LBP deposited the said sum in cash and bonds in the name of respondent. 

 

Pursuant to Section 16(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the matter was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region VII-Cebu City, for summary administrative hearing on determination of just compensation. The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. VII-4767-B-990.

 

While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, on February 10, 2000, a petition  for judicial determination of just compensation against LBP, the DAR and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Carmen, Bohol, before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.

 

Issue:  Whether or not exhaust administrative remedies applies in the case at bar

 

Ruling: In the same vein, there is no merit to petitioner's contention that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she directly filed the petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC even before the DARAB case could be resolved. The issue is now moot considering that the valuation made by petitioner had long been affirmed by the DARAB in its order dated April 12, 2000. As held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[25] the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable when the issue is rendered moot and academic, as in the instant case.

 

97. Republic v. Lacap (517 SCRA 255, 2007)

G.R. No. 158253             March 2, 2007

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

 

Facts: The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid" dated January 27, 1992. Respondent, doing business under the name and style Carwin Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin Construction), was pre-qualified together with two other contractors. A Contract Agreement was executed by respondent and petitioner. On September 25, 1992, District Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.⁵ Accordingly, respondent undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs.

 

Office of the District Engineer conducted a final inspection of the project and found it 100% completed in accordance with the approved plans and specifications. Accordingly, the Office of the District Engineer issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance.

 

Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.⁸ The DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner.⁹ However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract.

 

The District Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal Department on whether the contracts of Carwin Construction for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were valid and effective although its contractor’s license had already expired when the projects were contracted.¹⁰

 

In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal Department opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the Contractor’s License Law, does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, without prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability action that may be imposed on the contractor and the government officials or employees concerned.

 

In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer requested clarification from the DPWH Legal Department on whether Carwin Construction should be paid for works accomplished despite an expired contractor’s license at the time the contracts were executed.¹²

 

Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department, recommended that payment should be made to Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal opinion.¹³ Despite such recommendation for payment, no payment was made to respondent.

 

Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.

 

Issue: Whether or not exhaust administrative remedies applies in the case at bar

 

Ruling: No.  The present petition is bereft of merit.

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present case.

 

Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a contractor with an expired contractor’s license is proper, respondent remained unpaid for the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent.

 

 

98.  Corpus v. Cuaderno, Sr. (4 SCRA 749, 1962)

G.R. No. L-17860             March 30, 1962

DE LEON, J.:

 

Facts: While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines — a position declared by the President of the Philippines as "highly technical in nature and placed in the exempt class" (Appendix "D", Exhibit "VV"), he was, on or about March 7, 1958, charged in an administrative case, for alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc. preferred against him by employees of the Bank, resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3-man committee to investigate him. The committee was composed of representatives of the Bank, Bureau of Civil Service and the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After receiving the answer of the respondent therein, the committee heard the case, receiving testimonies of witnesses on both sides. he committee submitted its Final Report.

 

Unable to agree with the committee report, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 957 on July 20, 1959 which considered "the respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension."

 

Three days after, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995, dated July 23, 1959, approving the appointment of herein respondent Mario Marcos to the position involved in place of petitioner R. Marino Corpus.

 

On August 18, 1959, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, against the herein respondents.

 

Issue: Whether or not exhaust administrative remedies applies in the case at bar

 

Ruling: Yes

On the other hand, the doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted (42 Am. Jur. 583).

 

The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period. As emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 O.G. 3683, public interest requires that the right to a public office should be determined as speedily as practicable.

 

Upon the foregoing, we have to disagree with the legal opinion of the trial judge and hold that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable and does not bar the present proceedings.

Considering the two views we have taken in the case, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the second and third assignments of error which partially involve the evaluation of facts. The court below has started to receive the evidence, and it is better equipped and should be given the chance to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses who testified before it (Veraguth vs. Isabela Sugar Co., 57 Phil. 266).

 

 

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine and Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine Distinguished

 

99. Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (443 SCRA 56,2005)

G.R. NO. 156109 : November 18, 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:

 

Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students agree to abide by the standards of academic performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in the form of manuals that are distributed to the enrollees at the start of the school term. Further, the school informs them of the itemized fees they are expected to pay. Consequently, it cannot, after the enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot require fees other than those it specified upon enrolment.

 

Facts:

Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.

 

In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.

 

Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets.

Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad - - allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests

 

petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. 

 

respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).

 

Issue: whether or not doctrine of administrative remedies is applicable in the case.

 

 

Ruling: No. CHED cannot award damages.

Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCST's academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to "protect, foster and promote the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure that education is accessible to all."

Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she is praying for damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the courts.

Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine:

"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. x x x. "

Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified.

Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.

Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.  Petitioner's action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

 

 

Relation between Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Due Process Concept

 

100. Ruvivar v. Office of the Ombudsman (565 SCRA 324, 2008)

G.R. NO. 165012 : September 16, 2008

BRION, J.:

 

Facts:

the private respondent filed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the petitioner before the Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a public official, abuse of authority, and violations of the Revised Penal Code and of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.⁶ The private respondent stated in her complaint that she is the President of the Association of Drug Testing Centers (Association) that conducts drug testing and medical examination of applicants for driver's license. In this capacity, she went to the Land Transportation Office (LTO) on May 17, 2002 to meet with representatives from the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and to file a copy of the Association's request to lift the moratorium imposed by the LTO on the accreditation of drug testing clinics. Before proceeding to the office of the LTO Commissioner for these purposes, she passed by the office of the petitioner to conduct a follow up on the status of her company's application for accreditation. While there, the petitioner -- without provocation or any justifiable reason and in the presence of other LTO employees and visitors -- shouted at her in a very arrogant and insulting manner, hurled invectives upon her person, and prevented her from entering the office of the LTO Commissioner. The petitioner also accused the private respondent of causing intrigues against her at the DOTC. To prove her allegations, the private respondent presented the affidavits of three witnesses.⁷

 

Ombudsman rendered the November 4, 2002 Decision based on the pleadings and the submitted affidavits. It found the petitioner administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions and imposed on her the penalty of reprimand.

 

Issue:

 

 

Ruling:

 

 

 

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

 

We deny the Petition.

While we find that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the appropriate mode of review the petitioner should take, we also find that the appellate court effectively ruled on the due process issue raised - the failure to provide the petitioner the affidavits of witnesses - although its ruling was not directly expressed in due process terms. The CA's finding that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies (when she failed to act on the affidavits that were belatedly furnished her) effectively embodied a ruling on the due process issue at the same time that it determined the propriety of the petition for certiorari that the CA assumed arguendo to be the correct remedy.

Under this situation, the error in the appellate court's ruling relates to a technical matter - the mode of review that the petitioner correctly took but which the CA thought was erroneous. Despite this erroneous conclusion, the CA nevertheless fully reviewed the petition and, assuming it arguendo to be the correct mode of review, also ruled on its merits. Thus, while it erred on the mode of review aspect, it correctly ruled on the exhaustion of administrative remedy issue and on the due process issue that the exhaustion issue implicitly carried. In these lights, the present petition essentially has no merit so that its denial is in order.

 

Due Process Concept.

 

The CA Decision dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies available to her before the Ombudsman. This ruling is legally correct as exhaustion of administrative remedies is a requisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari.³⁴ Other than this legal significance, however, the ruling necessarily carries the direct and immediate implication that the petitioner has been granted the opportunity to be heard and has refused to avail of this opportunity; hence, she cannot claim denial of due process. In the words of the CA ruling itself: "Petitioner was given the opportunity by public respondent to rebut the affidavits submitted by private respondent. . . and had a speedy and adequate administrative remedy but she failed to avail thereof for reasons only known to her."

For a fuller appreciation of our above conclusion, we clarify that although they are separate and distinct concepts, exhaustion of administrative remedies and due process embody linked and related principles. The "exhaustion" principle applies when the ruling court or tribunal is not given the opportunity to re-examine its findings and conclusions because of an available opportunity that a party seeking recourse against the court or the tribunal's ruling omitted to take.³⁵ Under the concept of "due process," on the other hand, a violation occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without giving him or her the opportunity to be heard.³⁶ Thus, the exhaustion principle is based on the perspective of the ruling court or tribunal, while due process is considered from the point of view of the litigating party against whom a ruling was made. The commonality they share is in the same "opportunity" that underlies both. In the context of the present case, the available opportunity to consider and appreciate the petitioner's counter-statement of facts was denied the Ombudsman; hence, the petitioner is barred from seeking recourse at the CA because the ground she would invoke was not considered at all at the Ombudsman level. At the same time, the petitioner - who had the same opportunity to rebut the belatedly-furnished affidavits of the private respondent's witnesses - was not denied and cannot now claim denial of due process because she did not take advantage of the opportunity opened to her at the Ombudsman level.

 

Under these circumstances, we cannot help but recognize that the petitioner's cause is a lost one, not only for her failure to exhaust her available administrative remedy, but also on due process grounds. The law can no longer help one who had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance.

 

 

Scope and Extent of Judicial Review

101. Akbayan Youth v. Commission on Elections (355 SCRA 318, 2001)

G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001

BUENA, J.:

Facts:

Invoking this right, herein petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. 

 

Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and Peoples Participation, through a Letter dated January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to register before the COMELEC deadline. 

 

Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate Committee headed by Senator Roco.

 

Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects regarding this request with directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive Director for Operations (DEDO) for the estimated costs of additional two days of registration.

 

On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584, the decretal portion of which reads:

Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.

 

Issue:

 

Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

 

Ruling:

 

It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possibly do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.

Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done.  The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible.  In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligato est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally, coincidentally , it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view that the stand-by power of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.

 

Further, petitioners bare allegation that they were disenfranchised when respondent COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of January 13, 2001 the day before the period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections commences is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from filing his application for registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the Firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different manner, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands.

In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.

Applying the foregoing, this court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC did not commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same in some patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No. 3584 which, in respondents own terms, resolved to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.

 

On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of laws. 

 

we rule that the COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter --Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,  inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Questions Open to Review - Questions of Law

102.  Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (463 SCRA 222, 2005)

G.R. NO. 161882 July 8, 2005

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

 

Facts:

 

Herein petitioner loaned a money amounting to P25 M from respondent as a security it mortgaged 6 parcels of land located in Bukidnon. Upon default in the payment of the loan, the said parcels of land were extrajucially foreclosed and put in a public auction and were sold to the repondent bank.

In order to continue its business the petitioner proposed that It would lease the land where its hospital is erected in 3 years for 100,000 a month. Respondent bank agreed to the proposal however increasing the rental to 200,000 a month with the contract subject to a review every 6 months. The parties were able to agree with a monthly rental of 150,000 and that the contract shall take effect in November 2001.

Approximately 1 year and 8 months, respodent ordered the petitioner to vacate the premises within 15 days.

The latter refused. MBTC filed for Ex Parte Motion for a Writ of Possession. RTC granted the motion.

 

Issue: Whether or not the controversy is a question of law.

 

Ruling: Yes.  Realizing that the remaining issue was a pure question of law, it withdrew its Notice of Appeal stating that it was appealing the 28 January 2002 Order on both questions of law and fact. Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that prior to the transmittal of the original record, the court may allow withdrawal of the appeal.

Nothing in the Rules prevents a party from filing a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court after seasonably withdrawing the Notice of Appeal as long as it is done within the reglementary period and the issue involved is purely one of law. In this case it was before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal that the petitioner withdrew its Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals and filed with us a motion for extension of time to file a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. And the petition was filed within the extended period we granted, raising only one question of law.

Nor is there a violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court categorically provides that in all cases where only questions of law are raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the Regional Trial Court shall be to the Supreme Court by Petition for Review on Certiorariin accordance with Rule 45. Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –

 

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by Petition for Review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari . 'In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by Petition for Review on Certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

 

Section 1 of Rule 45 provides:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. 'A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified Petition for Review on Certiorari . The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

 

As earlier stated, the only issue raised in this petition is "whether [or] not the court a quo correctly ruled that respondent, a former mortgagee-buyer, was still entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right as provided under act 3135, as amended, despite a lease agreement between itself and the former mortgagor-seller executed after respondent became the absolute owner of the foreclosed properties."

This question is undoubtedly one of law. The existence of a lease agreement between the parties, which is a question of fact, ceased to be an issue in view of the admission thereof by both the petitioner and the respondent. Thus, with only a question of law raised in this petition, direct resort to this Court is proper.

 

Questions Open to Review - Questions of Fact

103. Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Goodyear Philippines, Inc. (651 SCRA 551, 2011) 

G.R. No. 182148 : June 08, 2011

MENDOZA, J.:

 

Facts: Sime Darby leased a billboard owned by Macgraphics for a term of four years.

Subsequently, Sime Darby executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Goodyear, whereby it agreed to sell its tire manufacturing plants and other assets to the latter and thereafter executed a “Deed of Assignment” (the deed) through which Sime Darby assigned, among others, its leasehold rights and deposits made to Macgraphics pursuant to its lease contract over the said billboard.

Goodyear stated that it intended to honor the P120,000.00 monthly rental rate given by Macgraphics to Sime Darby.

Macgraphics said that it could not give its consent to the assignment of lease to Goodyear.

Macgraphics advised Goodyear that any advertising service it intended to get from them would have to wait until after the expiration or valid pre-termination of the lease then existing with Sime Darby.

Due to Macgraphics’ refusal to honor the deed, Goodyear, demanded partial rescission of the deed and the refund of P1,239,000.00, the pro-rata value of Sime Darby’s leasehold rights over the billboard.

As Sime Darby refused to accede to Goodyear’s demand for partial rescission, the latter commenced a case with the RTC.

The RTC rendered its decision declaring the Deed of Assignment of Receivables partially rescinded and directed defendant Sime Darby to pay Goodyear the amount of P1,239,000.00 with legal interest thereon.

 

On the other hand, both Goodyear and Macgraphics pray for the affirmance of the decisions of the courts below that rescission is proper.  In addition, Goodyear assails the petition of Sime Darby claiming that it raises only questions of fact since the petition essentially revolves around the truth or falsity of the findings of the courts below that Macgraphics never consented to the assignment of Sime Darby's leasehold rights. Goodyear also insists that it is entitled to attorneys' fees due to the unjustified refusal of Sime Darby to rescind the Deed of Assignment.

 

Issue: Whether or not the controversy is a question of facts.

 

Ruling: Yes. Well-settled is the rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should only include questions of law since     questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by any of the litigants. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides under a given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, then the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court resolve the question raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. ^[22]

Likewise well-settled is the principle that absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not disturb the factual findings of the CA.  The Court will only exercise its power of review in known exceptions such as gross misappreciation of evidence or a total void of evidence. ^[23]

Whether Macgraphics gave its consent to the assignment of leasehold rights of Sime Darby is a question of fact. It is not reviewable. On this score alone, the petition of Sime Darby fails.

 

Grounds which would warrant Reversal of Administrative Findings

104) Wooden v. Civil Service Commission (471 SCRA 512, 2005)

G.R. NO. 152884. September 30, 2005

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

 

Facts:  Sometime in the School Year 1990-1991, petitioner, who was then a fourth year student in Bachelor of Secondary Education (BSED) at Saint Louis University (SLU), applied for graduation. His application was approved subject to completion of a two-course, six-unit deficiency in the summer term of 1991 or by May 1991. Later, he was appointed as Staff Coordinator of "Louisian Educator '91", the annual of the College of Education, SLU

 

petitioner joined the graduation rites of the College of Education, SLU. Thereafter, he enrolled and completed his two-course, six-unit deficiency in the summer term of 1991 or by May 1991.  On June 11, 1991, he was employed as Substitute Teacher at the SLU Laboratory High School. He was a member of the teaching staff until the end of school year 1991-1992, or April 30, 1992

 

petitioner filed his application for the Professional Board Examinations for Teachers (PBET), stating therein that he graduated in March 1991. His application was approved on September 20, 1991

 

upon petitioner's application for his transcript of records, SLU informed him that a reevaluation of his scholastic records revealed that he needed to complete a three-unit English subject.

 

petitioner took the scheduled PBET. Subsequently, petitioner enrolled in SLU, under protest, and completed the three-unit subject deficiency in the second semester of school year 1991-1992.

On June 8, 1992, the results of the PBET were released. Petitioner passed the PBET with a rating of 76.38%

 

petitioner submitted his duly accomplished Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in connection with his appointment as Teacher I of Guinzadan National High School, Bauko, Mountain Province. He indicated in Item No. 17 of the PDS that he finished his BSED from SLU with inclusive dates of attendance from 1987 to 1991; and in Item No. 18, he indicated the PBET date of examination as 1992

 

On September 25, 1997, the CSC - Cordillera Administrative Region filed against petitioner a Formal Charge for Dishonesty and Falsification, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-69

 

petitioner was declared guilty of dishonesty thru falsification of public document and dismissed from service with the accessory penalties thereof. 

 

Issue: whether or not factual finding of an administrative agencies are nor revieawable by SC.

 

Ruling: As a general rule, factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the CSC, that are affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon and generally not reviewable by this Court.

 

However, this Court has recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Exceptions (4) and (11) find application here.

 

 

Hierarchy of Evidentiary Rules

105) Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals (357 SCRA 30, 2001)

G.R. No. 113079 - April 20, 2001

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

 

Facts:

Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged in the business of importing crude oil, refining the same and selling various petroleum products through a network of service stations throughout the country.

Private respondent Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and operates a Caltex service station at the corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City.

On June 30,1983, Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila, to Imelda Marcos Avenue of the same municipality.

PDSC filed an opposition to the application.

BEU dismissed the application on jurisdictional grounds and for lack of "full title" of the lessor over the proposed site.  However, on May 7, 1984, the BEU reinstated the same application and thereafter conducted a hearing thereon.

            BEU rendered a decision denying Shell's application 

            Executive Order No. 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU.

            EA rendered a decision denying the appeal of Shell and affirming the BEU decision. Shell moved for reconsideration and prayed for a new hearing or the remand of the case for further proceedings. In a supplement to said motion, Shell submitted a new feasibility study to justify its application.

            the ERB rendered a Decision allowing Shell to establish the service station 

            PDSC filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision. Denied

            Aggrieved, PDSC elevated to the Court of Appeals.

 

Issue: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACTS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD WHOSE FINDINGS WERE BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

 

Ruling: The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the ERB, which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.⁸ A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.⁹ More explicitly -

Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.¹⁰ The reason behind this rule was explained in Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,¹¹ in this wise:

'The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute. In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, ¹² the Court stressed that executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact that they frequently are drafters of the law they interpret."

 

As a general rule, contemporaneous construction is resorted to for certainty and predictability in the laws,¹³ especially those involving specific terms having technical meanings.

However, courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the rule,¹⁴ or when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to any ordinary reader.¹⁵

Stated differently, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.¹⁶ Thus, an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.¹⁷

However, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of the ERB conform to, rather than conflict with, the governing statutes and controlling case law on the matter.

xxxx

 

Time and again this Court has ruled that in reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence; that the administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.²⁶ Petitioner ERB is in a better position to resolve petitioner Shell's application, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether the building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit public interest and the oil industry lies with the ERB not the appellate courts.

 

In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order.²⁷ A litany of cases has consistently held that substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact.²⁸ It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.²⁹

 

Suffice it to state in this regard that the factual landscape, measured within the context of such an evidentiary matrix, is strewn with well-nigh overwhelming proof of the necessity to build such a gasoline retail outlet in the vicinity subject of the application.

 

In denying Shell's application, the Court of Appeals next pointed to the alleged 'staleness' of Shell's feasibility study because it was submitted in evidence about two (2) years after it was prepared in early 1988.

 

When Substantial Evidence Rule not Applicable

106) Rubio v. Munar, Jr. (534 SCRA 597, 2007)

G.R. No. 155952. October 4, 2007

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

 

Facts: The present petition stemmed from a complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official document and oppression filed by Pio L. Munar, Jr. (respondent) against Juanito A. Rubio (petitioner) together with Virginia C. Laudencia (Laudencia) and Clarence C. Morales (Morales) with the Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) at San Fernando, La Union.

 

Prior to the filing of the said complaint, respondent was a Utility Foreman of the Department of Health and assigned to the Ilocos Regional Hospital in San Fernando, La Union, where petitioner, Laudencia and Morales were serving as Chief of Hospital, Acting Personnel Officer and Payroll Master, respectively.

 

Committee) of the Ilocos Regional Hospital conducted a meeting for the purpose of assessing the performance of the hospital personnel. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Committee recommended that respondent be demoted from his position as Utility Foreman to Utility Worker I.

 

The recommendation of the Committee was then forwarded to petitioner who, acting thereon, issued an appointment to respondent demoting him to the lower position of Utility Worker I with corresponding reduction in pay.

 

This prompted respondent to file the above-mentioned complaint against petitioner, Laudencia and Morales.

 

CSC Regional Office found that there exists a prima facie case against petitioner, Laudencia and Morales

 

CSC Hearing Officer Atty. Elvira L. Lomboy found that respondent failed to establish by sufficient evidence that petitioner and Laudencia were guilty of the infractions of which they had been charged. The Investigation Report was approved by Imelda G. Abueg, Director IV of CSC Regional Office No.

 

Investigation Report was forwarded to the CSC Central Office. Central Office issued a Resolution finding petitioner guilty of simple misconduct and was meted the penalty of three-month suspension.

 

Aggrieved by the Resolution of the CSC Central Office, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA. On August 30, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

 

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is exempted from the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the CSC, that are affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon and generally not reviewable by this Court

 

Ruling: No. In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CSC Central Office that petitioner is guilty of simple misconduct for having imposed upon respondent the penalty of demotion as a form of disciplinary sanction, in the absence of any formal charge and without the benefit of due process.

 

Settled is the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the CSC, that are affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon and generally not reviewable by this Court.

 

There are recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.⁷ The Court finds that none of these exceptions is present in the instant case.

 

A review of the records of the present case reveals that there is no evidence to show that respondent was formally charged, and that he was given a chance to show cause why he should not be demoted. In fact, petitioner failed to refute the findings of the CSC Central Office regarding this matter.

 

 

Liability of Administrative Agencies and Officers

107) Department of Health v. Philippine Pharmawealth, Inc. (518 SCRA 240, 2006)

G.R. NO. 169304 : March 13, 2007

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

 

Facts:  Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines.

 

On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27, Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products.

 

respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products. petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids⁹ for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract).

 

Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent's request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract.

 

Respondent thus filed a complaint.

 

Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion (motion to dismiss) praying for the outright dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity.

 

Issue: Whether or not motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of state immunity will prosper.

 

Ruling: The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party.

 

In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.

 

Moreover, part of the reliefs prayed for by respondent is the enjoinment of the implementation, as well as the nullification of the award to YSS, the grant of which may not be enforced against individual petitioners and their successors except in their official capacities as officials of the DOH.

 

As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus . Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.

 

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of the land.

 

While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.²⁶ The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them

 

The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. Shauf v. Court of Appeals²⁸ elucidates:

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. v. Aligaen, etc., et al.,²⁹ - Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position

 

 

Public Officers: DEFINITIONS, DISTINCTIONS, CLASSIFICATIONS

Meaning of Public Office

 

108) Aparri v. Court of Appeals (127 SCRA 231, 1984)

G.R. No. L-30057 January 31, 1984

MAKASIAR, J.:

 

Facts: On January 15, 1960, the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) approved resolution no. 13 (series of 1960), which appointed Appari as a general manager of the said company which will take effect on January 16, 1960. However on March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) which states that the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors the desire of the office of the Philippines to fix the term of Aparri, the general manager up to the closing time of the office on March 31, 1962 in accordance with paragraph 2, section 8 of R.A. 1160:

Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. — The Board of Directors shall have the following powers and duties:

2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager …, subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines, …. The Board, by a majority vote of all members, may, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and with the approval of the President of the Philippines, suspend and/or remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).

 

Issue: whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.

 

Ruling: WE affirm. WE hold that the term of office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

 

By "appointment" is meant the act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office (Mechem op. cit., Sec. 102). When the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the Commission can issue or the appointment is complete only when such assent or condition is obtained (People vs. Bissell, 49 Cal. 407). To constitute an "appointment" to office, there must be some open, unequivocal act of appointment on the part of the appointing authority empowered to make it, and it may be said that an appointment to office is made and is complete when the last act required of the appointing authority has been performed (Molnar vs. City of Aurora, 348 N.E. 2d 262, 38 III App. 3d 580). In either case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed (State vs. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76, 55 Am. Rep. 65).

 

The petitioner was appointed as general manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13 (series of 1960 — approved on January 15, 1960) of the Board of Directors. A careful perusal of the resolution points out the fact that the appointment is by itself incomplete because of the lack of approval of the President of the Philippines to such appointment.

 

Presumably, the Board of Directors of the NARRA expected that such appointment be given approval by the then President. Lacking such approval by the President as required by the law (par. 2, Sec. 8 of R.A. 1160), the appointment of petitioner was not complete.  The petitioner can, at best, be classified as a de facto officer because he assumed office "under color of a known appointment or election, void because the officer was not eligible or because there was a want of power in the electing body, or by reasons of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public" (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9Am. Rep. 409).

 

However, such appointment was made complete upon approval of Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962-approved March 15, 1962) wherein the President submitted to the Board his "desire" to fix the term of office of the petitioner up to the close of office hours on March 31, 1962.

 

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office (Sueppel vs. City Council of Iowa City, 136 N.W. 2D 523, quoting 67 CJS OFFICERS, secs. 42, 54[1]). According to Mochem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon the expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to hold over, his rights, duties and authority as a pubic officer must ipso facto cease (Mechem, op. cit., Secs. 396-397). In the law on Public Officers, the most natural and frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the term for which he was elected or appointed. The question of when this event has occurred depends upon a number of considerations, the most prominent of which, perhaps, are whether he was originally elected or appointed for a definite term or for a term dependent upon some act or event ... (Mechem op. cit., Sec. 384).

 

It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term" with the purview of statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination (Barber vs. Blue, 417 P.2D 401, 51 Cal. Rptr. 865, 65 C.2d N5). In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is vested in the Board of Directors subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. 

 

 

Public Office as a Public Trust

109) Court Personnel, etc. v. Llamas (447 SCRA 60, 2004)

A.M. No. P-04-1925 : December 16, 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:

 

Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, government employees must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

 

Facts: In a letter addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. dated January 25, 2000, herein complainants, all of whom are employed in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, labeled respondent as a "troublesome and arrogant court employee."

 

Respondent Oscar Llamas is a brother of Judge Victor T. Llamas, who used to preside over Branch 56 of the San Carlos RTC. Animosity between Judge Llamas and the OCC personnel started when the latter, headed by Atty. Omega L. Moises, testified in an immorality case filed against the former. Respondent sympathized with his brother and showed hostility towards his co-employees.

 

Atty. Moises repeatedly warned respondent about his unprofessional attitude in no less than three Memoranda. The first Memorandum called his attention to his drinking sessions during office hours and his highly hostile attitude. She would always request a member of her staff to call him whenever he was drinking outside the Justice Hall.

 

The second Memorandum, dated December 2000, called the attention of respondent to his tardiness and frequent absences.

 

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the acts attributed to respondent supported by substantial evidence. It opined that "[a] cash clerk, being a judicial employee, is expected to act with prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. Deviation from these salutary norms undeniably constitutes misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service."⁹ The OCA asked the Court to adopt the recommendation of Investigating Judge Crispin C. Laron that respondent be dismissed from service.

 

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty.

 

Ruling: Yes. Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

 

Neither did respondent deny his brash behavior bordering on discourtesy and disrespect for Atty. Moises. By banging doors and windows, slamming office supplies, and staring at everyone with belligerence, he displayed conduct unbecoming a court employee; it degraded the dignity of the judiciary and undermined the people's faith and confidence in it. At all times, employees of the judiciary are expected to accord respect to the person and the rights of another, even a co-employee. Their every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. Government service is people-oriented; high-strung and belligerent behavior has no place therein.

 

Rude and hostile behavior often translates a personal conflict into a potent pollutant of an otherwise peaceful work environment; ultimately, it affects the quality of service that the office renders to the public. Letting personal hatred affect public performance is a violation of the principle enshrined in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, a principle that demands that public interest be upheld over personal ones.

 

Improper behavior especially during office hours exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace, but also great disrespect for the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee. Thus, the Court looks "with great disfavor upon any display of animosity by any court employee" and exhorts every court personnel to act with strict propriety and proper decorum to earn public trust for the judiciary. Colleagues in the judiciary, including those occupying the lowliest position, are entitled to basic courtesy and respect.

 

In discharging its constitutional duty of supervising lower courts and their personnel, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the judiciary is composed essentially of human beings who have differing personalities, outlooks and attitudes; and who are naturally vulnerable to human weaknesses. Nevertheless, the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that court personnel must not only be, but also be perceived to be, free from any impropriety - - with respect not only to their duties in the judicial branch, but also to their behavior anywhere else.

 

Sufficiently proven were the following charges: 1) frequent unauthorized absences, loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours and 2) gross discourtesy in the course of official duties. Under Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the first carries with it, upon its first commission, the minimum penalty of suspension for six months and one day; the second, the minimum penalty of suspension for one month and one day.

 

Public Office, not Property

110) Monteclaros v. Commission on Elections (384 SCRA 269, 2002)

G.R. No. 152295 - July 9, 2002

CARPIO, J.:

 

Facts: The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential Decree No. 684 as the Kabataang Barangay ("KB" for brevity). The KB was composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years old, without specifying the minimum age. The KB was organized to provide its members with the opportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.

 

The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SK membership to those youths "at least 15 but not more than 21 years of age.

 

Comelec on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution Nos. 4713⁶ and 4714⁷ to govern the SK elections on May 6, 2002.

 

On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros ("Montesclaros" for brevity) sent a letter⁸ to the Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.

 

Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763¹¹ dated February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.

 

On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. 

 

On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.

 

Issue: Whether SK membership is a property right.

 

Ruling: No. The only semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous, that petitioners raise is their claim that SK membership is a "property right within the meaning of the Constitution."²⁸ Since certain public offices are "reserved" for SK officers, petitioners also claim a constitutionally protected "opportunity" to occupy these public offices. In petitioners' own words, they and others similarly situated stand to "lose their opportunity to work in the government positions reserved for SK members or officers."²⁹ Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the president of the federation of SK organizations in a municipality, city or province is an ex-officio member of the municipal council, city council or provincial board, respectively.³⁰ The chairperson of the SK in the barangay is an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay.³¹ The president of the national federation of SK organizations is an ex-officio member of the National Youth Commission, with rank of a Department Assistant Secretary.³²

 

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.

 

A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a "[P]ublic office is a public trust."³³ No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,³⁴ decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:

"Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a "property." It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents." (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing "equal access to opportunities for public service"³⁵ cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.

 

 

Public Office, not Contract

111) Abanilla v. Commission on Audit (468 SCRA 87, 2005)

G.R. NO. 142347 : August 25, 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

 

Facts:  Pursuant to Presidential Decree 198 or the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD), a local water district was organized as a government-owned corporation with original charter.

 

Subsequently, MCWD, through its Board of Directors, issued the following Resolutions giving benefits and privileges to its personnel, one of whom is Dulce M. Abanilla, MCWD's General Manager, Petitionerherein: (1) Board Resolution No. 054-83 dated May 23, 1983 granting hospitalization privileges; (2) Board Resolution Nos. 091-83 and 0203-85 dated October 21, 1983 and November 20, 1985, respectively, allowing the monetization of leave credits; (3) Board Resolution No. 0161-86 dated November 29, 1986 granting Christmas bonus; and (4) Board Resolution No. 083-88 granting longevity allowance.

 

MCWD and Metropolitan Cebu Water District Employees Union, petitioner-in-intervention, executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) providing for the continuous grant to all its regular rank and file employees of existing benefits, such as cash advances, thirteenth month pay, mid-year bonus, Christmas bonus, vacation and sick leave credits, hospitalization, medicare, uniform privileges, and water allowance.

 

On January 1, 1992, the parties renewed their CBA.

 

On November 13, 1995, an audit team of the COA, one of the herein Respondents, conducted an audit of the accounts and transactions of MCWD.

 

Thereafter, the Regional Director of COA Regional Office No. VII, also a Respondent, sent MCWD several notices disallowing the amount of P12,221,120.86 representing hospitalization benefits, mid-year bonus, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus and longevity pay.

 

Aggrieved, petitioner interposed an appeal to respondent COA at Quezon City. She cited COA Memorandum Circular No. 002-94 providing that "all benefits provided under the duly existing CBAs entered into prior to March 12, 1992, the date of official entry of judgment of the Supreme Court ruling in Davao City Water District, et al. v. CSC and COA, shall continue up to the respective expiry dates of the benefits or CBA whichever comes earlier.

 

COA Denied. respondent COA cited this Court's ruling in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission that "a water district is a corporation created pursuant to a special law - P.D. No. 198, as amended, and as such, its officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service Law."

 

Petitioner contends that respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the above benefits and privileges and contravened the Labor Code provision on non-diminution of benefits.

 

Issue: Whether or not the disallowance of COA is valid despite the provision in the CBA

 

Ruling: Yes. In light of this Court's ruling in Davao City Water District that the officers and employees of a water district are covered by the Civil Service Law, petitioner’s invocation of the CBA, in justifying the receipt by the MCWD personnel of benefits and privileges, is utterly misplaced. Thus, we sustain the disallowance by respondent COA.

In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, this Court held:

"Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements."

 

While we sustain the disallowance of the above benefits by respondent COA, however, we find that the MCWD affected personnel who received the above-mentioned benefits and privileges acted in good faith under the honest belief that the CBA authorized such payment. Consequently, they need not refund them.

 

 

ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATIONS

Eligibility

112) Aguila v. Genato (103 SCRA 380, 1981)

G.R. No. L-55151 March 17, 1981

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

 

Facts: Petitioners David Aguila and Edita Bueno are the Deputy Administrator and Director for Cooperative Development, respectively, of the National Electrification Administration (NEA).

 

Petitioner Evelito Elento is the Acting General Manager of MOELCI II, while petitioners Ressurrection Inting, Antonio Lim and Wilfredo Cabardo, are members of its Board of Directors.

 

Private respondent Dominador B. Borje, representing the North District of Ozamiz City, was elected Director of MOELCI II, to hold office as such for three years starting March 25, 1979.

 

Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 269 (second paragraph) and Section 3, Article IV of the By-laws of MOELCI II also explicitly states: Section 3. Qualifications. ... No person shall be eligible to become or to remain a Board member of the Cooperative who

xxx xxx xxx

(c) holds an elective office in the government above the level of a Barangay Captain

xxx xxx xxx

(emphasis supplied)

 

On 4 January 1980, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City in the 30 January 1980 local elections.

 

On January 1980, the NEA Deputy Administrator sent a telegram to the Acting General Manager of MOELCI II stating that should private respondent Borje be elected to the Sangguniang Bayan, he shall be considered resigned from his position as Director.

 

Private respondent moved reconsideration and requested that he be allowed to serve the unexpired term of his office in accordance with PD No. 269. Reconsideration was denied by NEA on 7 February 1980.

 

On 3 March 1980, private respondent filed a Petition for "Prohibition, mandamus & Construction of Legal Provisions with Preliminary Injunction and Damages" against petitioners before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II (Spec. Case No. 0511), seeking a declaration of entitlement to remain and to serve his unexpired term as Director of MOELCI II until March, 1982.

 

On 3 March 1980, having won the election, private respondent assumed office and began discharging his functions.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent my continue to hold office as a Director.

 

Ruling: No. Private respondent's argument that PD 269 (sec. 21) does not prohibit Board members of a cooperatives from continuing in their position prior to their election, and that pursuant to section 24 of PD No. 269 he is entitled, as Director, to hold office for the term for which he is erected and until his successor is elected and qualified," is untenable. Eligibility to an office should be construed as of a continuing nature and must exist at the commencement of the term and during occupancy of the office. The fact that private respondent may have been qualified at the time he assumed the Directorship is not sufficient to entitle him to continue holding office, if during the continuance of his incumbency he ceases to be qualified. Private respondent was qualified to become a director of MOELCI II at the time of the commencement of his term, but his election as member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City, and his subsequent assumption of office, disqualified him to continue as such.

 

 

Time of Possession of Qualifications

113) Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (257 SCRA 727, 1996)

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

PANGANIBAN, J.:

 

Facts: On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections.

COMELEC 1^st Division. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95­028 praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines, and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled.

The COMELEC 2^nd Division promulgated a Resolution granting the petition. MR of Frivaldo unacted upon.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued, and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. Frivaldo got the highest number of votes.

(1) Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
(b) Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
(c) Raul R. Lee 53,304
(d) Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

COMELEC en banc. On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied the MR of Frivaldo and affirmed the 2^nd Division’s decision to cancel Frivaldo’s COC.

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95­028, a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the duly- elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an order dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition only on June 29, 1995, the Comelec en banc directed the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995.

Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

COMELEC 1^st Division. On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, docketed as SPC No. 95­317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation.

He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted.

As such, when the said order dated June 21, 1995 was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o’clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation of Frivaldo as governor.

In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice Governor—not Lee—should occupy said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, not having garnered the highest number of votes, was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly elected governor; and that Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon

COMELEC en banc. On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc.

Supreme Court. Both Frivaldo (in SPC 95-028) and Lee (in SPC 95-217) appealed to the SC. Their two petitions were consolidated.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo is qualified to hold the office.

 

Ruling: Yes. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age. Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of Qualifications of Elective Officials not of candidates.’

 

The SC ruled that citizenship is required only during the time when an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions. Thus it starts upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re­assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.

 

Qualifications Usually Required of Public Officers

114) Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245, 1989)

G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

CRUZ, J.:

 

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo

 

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos

 

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.

 

Issue: The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.

 

Ruling: The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

 

 

115) Gaspar v. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 774, 1990)

 

Facts: Gaspar was the Chief of the Security Section of the Parks Development Office of the City of Manila when Executive Order No. 81-01 was issued by the Governor of the Metro Manila Commission on May 24, 1981. The Executive Order established a comprehensive position classification and pay plan for MMC officers and employees, and contained a provision reclassifying Gaspar's position of Chief, Security Section, to Administrative Officer II. On April 25, 1983, Gaspar was appointed to that position of Administrative Officer II, effective on October 1, 1982.

 

Zenaida F. Lanting, then Senior Accounting Clerk in the same Parks Development Office, filed with the Merit Systems Board a protest against Gaspar's appointment as Administrative Officer II, contending that she was better qualified for, and should have been named to, the office.

 

After due proceedings, the Merit Systems Board (MSB) revoked Gaspar's appointment and directed Lanting's appointment to the office of Administrative Officer II, in a decision rendered on November 28, 1984. Gaspar appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) .

 

After initially sustaining Gaspar (in Resolution No. 85-177, May 21, 1985), the CSC ultimately affirmed the judgment of the MSB by Resolution numbered 85-291 promulgated on July 19, 1985 and, as the MSB had done, directed "the appointment of ... Lanting to the position of Administrative Officer II in the Parks Development Office.

 

Ruling: The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that both the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing authority.

The doctrine has since been subsequently applied, in Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989, and Maximo Gabriel v. Hon. Eufemio Domingo, et al., etc., G.R. No. 87420, September 17, 1990. ²

The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests of the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the Head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied. The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard.

In the case at bar, therefore, the respondent Commission acted beyond the scope of its authority and with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the petitioner's appointment and directing the appointment in his stead of the private respondent.

 

Qualifications Prescribed by Law for Certain Officer

 

116. Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections (337 SCRA 574, 2000)

G.R. No. 137329. August 9, 2000

PANGANIBAN, J.:

 

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has registered as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or newcomer" when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally construed to give effect to the popular mandate.

 

Facts: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran for mayor.

 

Issue: Whether respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement.

 

Ruling: Yes. Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:

"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community." Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain." Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."

Facts Showing Change of Residence

 

In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v. Comelec, this Court ruled that private respondent therein, now Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of the Third District of Cagayan, had duly proven his change of residence from Gattaran, Cagayan (part of the First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (part of the Third District in which he sought election as congressman). He proved it with the following facts: (1) in July 1990, he leased and lived in a residential apartment in Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (2) in July 1995, he leased another residential apartment in Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (3) the January 18, 1998 Certificate of Marriage between Aguinaldo and his second wife, Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the Certificate of Live Birth of his second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to him and his family showed that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at least one year immediately preceding the May 1998 elections. The Court also stated that it was not "of much importance that in his [Aguinaldo's] certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran.

 

In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.

 

 

ACQUISITION OF RIGHT OR TITLE TO OFFICE

Meaning of Appointment

117) Borromeo v. Mariano (41 Phil 322, 1921)

G.R. No. 16808. January 3, 1921.

MALCOLM, J. :

 

Facts: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge. he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.

 

Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, secs. 65, 66, 148.) One Judge of First Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the ninth. (Sec. 154.) The oath of office of the judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to which the affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty in a district other than their own for the purpose of trying land registration cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to which particular attention is addressed by the Attorney-General, is, "but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district." A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-General only if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious misconduct or inefficiency in office. (Sec. 173.)

 

Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of section 155 of the Administrative Code, the provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They are not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions of judges of first instance of definite districts until they resign, retire, or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.

 

Issue: Whether or not judge borromeo of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other district than that for which he is commissioned.

 

Ruling: The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the office. (22 R. C. L., 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to another district. No other person could be placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be made to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc., 1373.) In our judgment, the language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, interpreted with reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district an appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing him from his district.

 

Elements of a Valid Appointment

118) Velicaria-Gerafil v. Office of the President (758 SCRA 414, 2015)

G.R. No. 203372. June 16, 2015

CARPIO, J.:

 

The concurrence of all the elements of a valid appointment should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.

 

Facts: Prior to the May 2010 elections, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments including the petitioners in several government offices. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for a ban on midnight appointments. For purposes of the 2010 elections, March 10, 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban. An exception is provided under such provision which allows temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban. The officers and employees who were affected by EO 2 were informed that they were terminated from service effective the next day. Several petitions were filed seeking to declare the executive order as unconstitutional and for the declaration of their appointment as legal.

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioners' appointments are valid.

 

Ruling: No. The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step.

 

Power to Appoint is Discretionary

119) Civil Service Commission v. de la Cruz (437 SCRA 403, 2004)

G.R. NO. 158737 : August 31, 2004

CORONA, J.:

 

Facts: Respondent Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office, DOTC, presently holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division.

Respondent was promotionally appointed to the said position on November 28, 1994, duly attested by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). But prior thereto, he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office (ATO).

 

Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) her protest against the promotional appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, claiming among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said position.

 

then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia rendered a decision finding the protest without merit.

 

dissatisfied, Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Secretary to the CSC-NCR.

 

On November 18, 1997, the CSC-NCR rendered its decision upholding the protest of Calamba and recalling the approval of respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer.

 

ATO Director Gilo wrote the CSC-NCR asking for the suspension of the order recalling respondent's appointment, citing several reasons in support thereof.

 

Strangely, in a letter dated January 13, 1998, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo granted Director Gilo's request and affirmed the approval of respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer.

 

Motion for Reconsideration. Granted

 

respondent filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals granted the petition by setting aside CSC Resolution Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451 and approving respondent's appointment as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office.

 

Issue(s): Whether or not respondnet is qualified.

                Whether or not power to appoint is discretionary.

 

Ruling: 1. Yes. Contrary to petitioner's contention, respondent has sufficiently complied with the required experience standards. the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his appointment.

2.  Yes. In Rapisora v. Civil Service Commission, this Court held that the rule that appointees must possess the prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so strictly interpreted as to curtail an agency's discretionary power to appoint, as long as the appointee possesses other qualifications required by law. The appellate court was therefore correct in setting aside the assailed CSC resolutions and considering the respondent's total work experience as sufficient to meet the supervisory standards under the second clause, thereby finding respondent qualified for appointment to the contested position.

 

It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority. In Salles v. Francisco, et al., we had occasion to rule that, in the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority.

 

In the appointment of division chiefs, as in this case, the power to appoint rests on the head of the department. Sufficient if not plenary discretion should be granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the offices concerned. They are in a position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the office vacated. Not only is the appointing authority the officer primarily responsible for the administration of the office, he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the position.

 

"Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied."

 

 

 

Necessity of Written Appointment

120) SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority (769 SCRA 310, 2015)

G.R. No. 203655, September 07, 2015

VELASCO JR., J.:

 

Facts: Once again, respondent-movants Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) and Arnel Paciano D. Casanova, Esq. (Casanova) urge this Court to reconsider its August 13, 2014 Decision¹ in the case at bar. In their Motion for Leave to file Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit the Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration (With Motion for the Court en banc to Take Cognizance of this Case and/to Set the Case for Oral Argument Before the Court en banc),² respondent-movants remain adamant in claiming that the assailed rulings of the Court would cause unwarranted and irremediable injury to the government, specifically to its major beneficiaries, the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).³

 

Issue: Whether or not Oral Appointment is null and void.

 

Ruling: Respondent-movants' interpretation of the antiquated 1953 doctrine in Ykalina is highly distorted. In the said case, the Court, finding for respondent Ananias Oricio (Oricio), sustained his appointment in spite of having been merely verbally made. As held:

While the appointment of an officer is usually evidenced by a Commission, as a general rule it is not essential to the validity of an appointment that a commission issue, and an appointment may be made by an oral announcement of his determination by the appointing power.³¹ (emphasis added, citation omitted)

Based on the Court's reasoning, the presidential order that "may either be in a written memorandum or merely verbal " adverted to in Ykalina should therefore be understood as limited specifically to those pertaining to appointments. Current jurisprudence, however, no longer recognizes the validity of oral appointments and, in fact, requires the transmission and receipt of the necessary appointment papers for their completion.³²

To further distinguish Ykalina with the extant case, it was observed in the former that Oricio's verbal appointment was established in evidence by a communication duly signed by the then Acting Executive Secretary "by order of the President." Applied in modern day scenarios, the limited application of the Ykalina doctrine should only govern those that were similarly verbally given by the president but were, nevertheless, attested to by the Executive Secretary. This is in hew with Section 27 (10) of Book III, Title III, Chapter 9-B of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292),³⁴ otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which empowers the Executive Secretary to attest executive orders and other presidential issuances "by authority of the President." These "executive orders and presidential issuances," in turn, relate to the enumeration under Book III, Title I, Chapter 2 of EO 292.

 

 

Here, it is well to recall that the President did not issue any said executive order or presidential issuance in intimating to the BCDA that he wishes for the competitive challenge to be cancelled. There was no document offered that was signed by either the Chief Executive or the Executive Secretary, for the President, to that effect. The situation, therefore, does not involve a presidential order or instruction within the contemplation of Sec. 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, and, consequently, does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc. Given the glaring differences in context, the doctrine in Ykalina cannot find application herein, and cannot operate to divest the Court's division of its jurisdiction over the instant case.

 

 

Revocation of Appointment

121) The General Manager, PPA v. Monserate (381 SCRA 200, 2002)

G.R. No. 129616.April 17, 2002

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

 

Facts: ulieta Monserate, respondent, started her government service in 1977 as Bookkeeper II in the Port Management Office, PPA, Iloilo City. Barely a year later, she was promoted to the position of Cashier II and then as Finance Officer (SG-16) in 1980.

In the early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a reorganization, respondent applied for the permanent position of Manager II (SG-19) of the Resource Management Division, same office. The Comparative Data Sheet accomplished by the PPA Reorganization Task Force shows the ranking of the six (6) aspirants to the said position.

 

Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of the PPA, appointed⁵ respondent to the position of Manager II (Resource Management Division). On even date, respondent assumed office and discharged the functions thereof. On July 8, 1988, the CSC, through Guillermo R. Silva (Assistant Director of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA) approved her appointment.

 

Petitioner Ramon Anino, who ranked second to respondent per the Comparative Data Sheet earlier quoted, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting against respondent's appointment. 

 

The PPA Appeals Board, in a Resolution, sustained the protest and rendered ineffective respondent's appointment based on "(1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3; (2) CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B; and (3) Civil Service Eligibility." These grounds were not explained or discussed in the Resolution.

 

On January 16, 1989, respondent filed with the CSC an appeal formally protesting against petitioner Anino's appointment and at the same time questioning the propriety of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board. This appeal remained pending with the CSC for more than six (6) years despite respondent's requests for early resolution. CSC dismissed her appeal. MR Denied.

 

CA nullified the twin resolutions of the CSC.

 

Thereupon, Ramon Anino and the PPA General Manager filed on August 14, 1997 the present petition

 

Issue: Whether or not an appointment once approved can no longer be revoked

 

 

Ruling: From all indications, it is indubitable that substantial and procedural irregularities attended respondent's demotion from the position of Manager II, Resource Management Division, to the lower position of Administrative Officer. Indeed, her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and due process. In Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission, this Court emphasized that "once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing."

 

Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the revocation of respondent's appointment by demoting her. Respondent's security of tenure guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, par. (3)] should not be placed at the mercy of abusive exercise of the appointing power.

 

 

Ad Interim Appointments

122) Aytona v. Castillo (4 SCRA 1, 1962)

G.R. No. L-19313. January 19, 1962

BENGZON, C.J.:

 

Facts: On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo  as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.

 

Issue: Whether or not the midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

 

Ruling: No. Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December 30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a "care-taker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions¹ irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

 

Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he has benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. Where, however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the appointment² and where the names are to be submitted by successor, who may not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such "double care" which was required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the contention that these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.

Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.

 

Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation³ and if any circumstances justify revocation, those described herein should fit the exception.

 

 

Temporary or Acting Appointments

123) Erasmo v. Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (388 SCRA 112, 2002)

G.R. No. 139251. August 29, 2002

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

 

Facts: Petitioner started working with respondent Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) in 1982 as a consultant on the Project Evaluation Department, and held various positions therein, including Manager of Project Evaluation Department (April 1, 1982 to December 31, 1985), Manager of Accounts Management (January 1, 1986 to April 1987), Assistant Vice-President of Accounts Management (May 1987 to July 1988), Manager II of Guaranty and Credit Insurance Department (August 1988 to March 15, 1992), and Officer-in-Charge of Technical Service/Guaranty and Credit Insurance Group (TS/GCIG) (March 16 to June 14, 1992), until finally, she was promoted to Vice-President of TS/GCIG on June 15, 1992. The nature of her appointment was "promotion" and her employment status was "temporary," since the position is a Career Executive Service Office (CESO) and petitioner lacks the required CES eligibility.

On February 24, 1993 petitioner was administratively charged with: (1) neglect of duty, (2) incompetence in the performance of official duties, (3) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (4) directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of her office.

petitioner appealed the status of her temporary appointment to the Civil Service Commission. CSC holding that a CES eligibility is required to a CES position, and even if one possesses such eligibility, still the appointment cannot be considered permanent unless an appointment to the rank has been granted by the President of the Philippines.

 

Respondent, through its President, Fernando M. Miranda, Jr., wrote petitioner, informing her that "by operation of law, your appointment shall be deemed terminated and shall automatically cease to have further force and effect at the close of office hours on the expiration of your appointment." She was also advised that the pendency of the administrative case against her precludes any renewal of her appointment.

 

Issue:  whether or not petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position of Vice-President of TS/GCIG of respondent HIGC.

 

Ruling: In the recent case of Matibag v. Benipayo, we reiterated the long standing ruling that a person who is issued a temporary appointment does not enjoy security of tenure, thus:

"As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. As held in Achacoso v. Macaraig:

‘It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a moment’s notice," conformably to established jurisprudence …’

‘The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place, or as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated …’" 

 

 

Designations

124) Tapispisan v. Court of Appeals (459 SCRA 695, 2005)

G.R. NO. 157950 : June 8, 2005

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

 

Facts: Petitioner Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has been occupying the position of Teacher III since September 1, 1992. She has been teaching for the last thirty (30) years and is currently assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City.

On May 30, 1995, respondent Atty. Ricardo T. Sibug (Schools Division Superintendent, Pasay City) issued Division Memorandum No. 33 designating respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School and respondent Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School, both schools are in Pasay City. Feeling that she had been unduly by-passed, petitioner Tapispisan filed with respondent Sibug a protest contesting such designation. The latter, however, denied the protest. The petitioner then brought the matter to respondent Dr. Nilo L. Rosas, Regional Director of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for National Capital Region (NCR) who, likewise, denied the protest.

 

Issue: Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious error when it upheld the findings of the Civil Service Commission that protest will not lie in absence of appointment/promotion.

 

Ruling: Yes. Indeed, there is a marked difference between an appointment and a designation. The Court had the occasion to expound the distinction in this wise:

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties of an incumbent official - . It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it, likewise, involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Kinds of Appointment in the Career Service

 

126) Torio v. Civil Service Commission (209 SCRA 677, 1992)

G.R. No. 99336. June 9, 1992

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

 

Facts: These two consolidated petitions assail the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) revoking the appointment of herein petitioners on the ground that they lacked the necessary civil service eligibility at the time of the issuance of their appointments.

 

Executive Order No. 285 issued on July 25, 1987 abolished the General Services Administration (GSA) including all offices and agencies under it. The General Printing Office (GPO) which was under the GSA was merged with the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) and out of the merger arose the National Printing Office (NPO) which was placed under the control and supervision of the Office of the Press Secretary (OPS). A new plantilla of personnel for the NPO was prepared and approved and the affected officers and employees continued to perform their respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity pending the implementation of the reorganization.

 

The petitioner in G.R. No. 99336, Melanio Torio, was the Chief of the Production Staff of the Printing Division, PIA, while the petitioner in G.R. No. 100178, Jaime Espanola, was a Bindery Foreman at the PIA. They continued discharging their functions in a hold-over capacity after the PIA was merged with the GSA. On March 1, 1988, in accordance with the new staffing pattern of the NPO, petitioner Torio was temporarily appointed as Assistant Operations Superintendent of Printing while petitioner Espanola was appointed as Temporary Supervising Book-binder. Both appointments lapsed on February 28, 1989. So on March 1, 1989, petitioner Torio was extended a renewal appointment which was likewise in a temporary capacity while petitioner Espanola was issued another appointment as Supervising Bookbinder with a permanent status. On the same date, Espanola was granted a testimonial eligibility.

 

the positions of both petitioners were upgraded—the Assistant Operations Superintendent of Printing was changed to Assistant Superintendent of Printing and the Supervising Bookbinder to Bookbinder IV. This time, another appointment was issued to Torio for the upgraded position together with his change of status from temporary to permanent. Espanola.

 

Prior to the appointments of the petitioners to the permanent items, protests were lodged with the CSC.

 

he CSC issued a resolution revoking the appointment of Torio and ordering those qualified, including Camacho, to be evaluated for the position. Subsequently, cancelling Espanola’s appointment and ordering the reappointment of Cangayda to the position. 

 

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are qualified to be permanent

 

Ruling: Yes. The foregoing pronouncements of the CSC hold true only in-concerned. However, it must be noted that under Section 25 Presidential Decree 807 otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, an appointee with a temporary status need not possess the civil service eligibility required by the position provided he meets the following qualifications: (1) it is necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy; (2) there are no appropriate eligibles; (3) the temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months; and (4) he may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

 

A permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment—these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority. The fact that the appointees in the two appointments are one and the same person is purely incidental. Any irregularities in the former appointment are not to be automatically carried over to the latter. If the protest is directed against the temporary appointment, it would be illogical to carry-over the merits of the protest to the subsequent permanent appointment.

 

The preceding ruling should not be construed to mean, however, that by the mere expedient of appointing the temporary appointee to a permanent status, the appointing authority can deprive the protestant of an opportunity to question the appointment. First, the protestant is not precluded from filing another protest directed against the permanent appointment. Second, if it can be shown that the appointment was purposely done to moot the protest or is characterized by malice, then corrective action can be taken and, moreover, the erring officials can be proceeded against administratively.

 

It must be emphasized that if a protest filed against a temporary appointment is carried over to the subsequent permanent appointment to the same position of the same person, an anomalous situation will arise wherein the permanent appointee’s security to his position would be jeopardized by considerations outside of his permanent appointment.

 

 

127) Dimayuga v. Benedicto II (373 SCRA 652, 2002)

G.R. No. 144153 - January 16, 2002

DE LEON, JR., J.:

 

Facts: On October 26, 1992, then Secretary of Public Works and Highways Jose P. de Jesus issued a permanent appointment in favor of petitioner Chona M. Dimayuga as Executive Director II of the Toll Regulatory Board ("Board"). At the time, the position of Executive Director II was not deemed part of the career executive service, that is, until June 4, 1993, when it was included therein.

 

On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21.³ Section 4 of the Memorandum states:

xxx - xxx - xxx

4. Status of Appointment of Incumbents of Positions Included Under the Coverage of the CES. Incumbents of positions which are declared to be Career Executive Service positions for the first time pursuant to this Resolution who hold permanent appointment thereto shall remain under permanent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion or transfer to other Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary status in said positions until they qualify.

xxx - xxx - xxx

In the meantime, responding to a letter dated December 1, 1998⁹ from petitioner requesting a clarification on her status, the Career Executive Service Board ("CESB")

 

xxx - xxx - xxx

It has always been the stand of the CES Board, even before the issuance of MC 21 by the CSC, to respect or honor the appointment status of an official appointed to a position which is subsequently included in the CES, such that if the appointment was of a permanent status or nature, the inclusion of the position in the CES is not deemed to have changed the status of the appointee to the position. xxx

petitioner received a letter dated September 22, 1998 from respondent Vigilar informing her that then President Joseph E. Estrada had appointed respondent Mariano E. Benedicto II in her stead as Executive Director II of the Board. The letter cited a Memorandum dated June 30, 1998.

 

petitioner filed on September 6, 1999 a petition for quo warranto before the Court of Appeals

 

Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER HAS NO VESTED RIGHT TO THE POSITION IN QUESTION.

 

Ruling: No. In that case of Bacal this Court emphasized two (2) salient points, to wit:

First, in order to qualify an appointment as permanent, the appointee must possess the rank appropriate to the position. Failure in this respect will render the appointment merely temporary. In Atty. Bacal's case, it was ruled that she did not acquire tenure since she had only a CESO III rank; and that she was not appointed CESO I which was the requisite eligibility for the position of Chief Public Attorney.

Second, security of tenure in the career executive service ("CES") is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The guaranty of security of tenure to members of the career executive service does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed - a concept which is applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil service - but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President.

 

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

 

128) Cuevas v. Bacal (347 SCRA 338, 2000)

G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000.

MENDOZA, J.:

 

Facts: This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers (CESOs). More specifically, it concerns the "appointment" of respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a CES Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made without her consent, to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO.

Respondent Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career Executive Service Examinations in 1989.

she was conferred CES eligibility and appointed Regional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office

he was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos to the rank of CESO III.

she was designated by the Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public Attorney, her appointment was confirmed by President Ramos so that, on February 20, 1998, she took her oath and assumed office.

 

petitioner Carina J. Demaisip was appointed "CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER" by President Joseph Estrada. Apparently because the position was held by respondent, another appointment paper was issued by the President on July 6, 1998 designating petitioner Demaisip as "CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER (formerly chief public attorney), PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE vice ATTY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL, effective July 1, 1998." 2 On the other hand, respondent was appointed "Regional Director, Public Defender’s Office" by the President.

 

respondent filed a petition for quo warranto questioning her replacement as Chief Public Attorney. 

 

Issue:

 

Ruling: It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a moment’s notice," conformably to established jurisprudence. . . .

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. . . .

 

As a general rule, a CES eligible will be recommended for appointment to the rank equivalent of the level of his managerial responsibility if his performance rating is Satisfactory or higher. If the performance rating is Outstanding, he will be recommended one rank higher than his level of managerial responsibility.

Security of tenure in the career executive service is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed — a concept which is applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil service — but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President. Accordingly, respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as required by the rules of the CES Board.

 

129) Paloma v. Mora (479 SCRA 711, 2005)

G.R. NO. 157783. September 23, 2005

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

 

Facts: Petitioner Nilo Paloma was appointed General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water District by its Board of Directors in 1993. His services were subsequently terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 8-95³ dated 29 December 1995, which was passed by respondents as Chairman and members of the Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water District, namely: Danilo Mora, Hilario Festejo, Bryn Bongbong and Maxima Salvino, respectively. The Board, in the same Resolution, designated respondent Valentino Sevilla as Officer-in-Charge.

 

Status of his appointment is co-terminus

 

Issue: Whether or not replacement was valid.

 

Ruling: Yes, as a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law as provided in Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.  As exception to this, P.D. No. 198, which we held in Feliciano v. Commission On Audit ²⁸ to be the special enabling charter of Local Water Districts, categorically provides that the General Manager shall serve "at the pleasure of the board."

Correlatively, the nature of appointment of General Managers of Water Districts under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 falls under Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose entrance and continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the duration of project or subject to the availability of funds.

The co-terminous status may thus be classified as follows:

(1) Co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;

(2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;

(3) Co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; andcralawlibrary

(4) Co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished; . . . (Underscoring supplied.)

 

petitioner nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment contract. 

 

           

Approval/Recall of Appointment by the Civil Service Commission

130) Occidental Mindoro National College v. Macaraeg (419 SCRA 708, 2004)

Facts: Virginia Sicat was appointed Secondary Assistant Principal of San Jose National High School upon recommendation of the Division Superintendent of Schools for Occidental Mindoro. This was duly approved by the Secretary of Education and Culture and attested to by the Civil Service Commission on April 3, 1976 as a regular (permanent) appointment.

 

On May 13, 1975, respondent Virginia Macaraig and four others contested the said appointment on the ground that as next in rank they had a preferential right to be appointed to the vacancy.

 

However, the Department of Education and Culture (DEC) held that "all the protestants are not employees next-in-rank and therefore cannot claim promotional preference to the contested vacancy."

 

petitioner assumed the position of Assistant Principal of San Jose National High School. But School Principal Bernabe Macaraig, Virginia Macaraigs husband, refused to honor Sicats appointment and sought its revocation by citing irregularities which allegedly attended the appointment.

 

the CSC cancelled Sicats appointment. Thereafter, a permanent appointment was extended to Virginia Macaraig who assumed and began discharging the duties and functions of Assistant Principal on May 23, 1977.

 

In view of the foregoing, a new appointment should now be issued in favor of the original appointee, Virginia Sicat, after rectifying the errors found in the original appointment.

 

Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT MACARAIG IS NO LONGER AN EMPLOYEE OF OMNC.

 

Ruling: Whether the appointment involved would have been a promotional one or an appointment to a converted/reclassified position would not have really mattered because in either situation, respondent would not have qualified. In both cases, respondents employment with OMNC was severed; or putting it mildly, she was separated from the service.

Granting again, for the sake of argument, that the January 1, 1984 "appointment" was a regular and valid one, the same fell short of a substantive requirement under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations¹³ before it could become valid and effective. Notably, while the alleged appointment was issued on January 1, 1984, the same was submitted to the Civil Service Commission only on January 12, 1986, or after two (2) years and 12 days after its issuance. The much-delayed submission to the Civil Service Commission was a blatant violation of the mandatory provision of Sec. 11, Rule V of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which clearly provides:

Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing on the face of the appointment, shall be ineffective. The appointing authority shall be liable for the salaries of the appointee whose appointment became ineffective. The appointing authority shall likewise be liable for the payment of the salary of the appointee if the appointment is disapproved because the appointing authority has issued it in violation of existing laws or rules, making the appointment unlawful. (Underscoring supplied)

Verily, the failure to submit the alleged appointment of respondent to the Civil Service Commission way beyond the 30-day prescribed period was a patent violation of the aforequoted provision. Over two years had actually elapsed already. The appointment became stale, ineffective. It died a natural death, so to speak, from sheer delay and neglect. In fact, the Civil Service Commission returned the questioned appointment without action.

From the very beginning, respondents alleged appointment was made under anomalous and suspicious circumstances. When respondents husband, Mr. Bernabe Macaraig (then President of OMNC), issued the alleged appointment in favor of his respondent-wife on January 1, 1984, the former had no authority whatsoever to make such appointment for, it was only on November 20, 1984 when the OMNC Board of Trustees came out with a resolution¹⁴ authorizing the issuance of the said appointment to his wife. Thus, too, while the other employees-appointees were able to comply with the CSC mandatory requirement for an appointment to become valid and effective, only respondent Virginia Macaraig failed to do so.

Indubitably, respondents separation from the service had long been resolved by reason of the following:

First: In Sicat v. Manuel, the Courts Resolution¹⁵ dated December 3, 1984, declared Sicat as the rightful occupant of the contested position and correspondingly dislodged herein respondent from the said position.

Second: The alleged appointment was illegally issued on January 1, 1984 or ten (10) months before the Board of Trustees of OMNC issued an authority¹⁶ to appoint on November 20, 1984. The alleged appointment was spurious since there was no authority for its issuance.

Third: The questioned appointment was submitted to the Civil Service Commission way beyond the 30-day required mandatory period prescribed under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations for approval and effectivity of the same. It took respondent two (2) years and 12 days before her alleged appointment was submitted to the Commission.

Fourth: The administrative case against respondent (MSPB Case No. 1574 (1651) ¹⁷ was still pending when the questioned appointment was issued on January 1, 1984. It should be emphasized that the above case was initially decided by the MSP Board only on June 3, 1988. And after two motions for reconsideration, the Board in an Order dated July 6, 1990 ruled with finality on the illegality of respondents appointment. We quote the pertinent portions of the final Order¹⁸, thus:

 

131) De Rama v. Court of Appeals (353 SCRA 94, 2001)

G.R. No. 131136. February 28, 2001

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.

 

Issue: whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.

 

Ruling: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.

 

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

 

Vacancy - Appointment to a Non-vacant Position

132) Costin v. Quimbo (120 SCRA 159, 1983)

G.R. No. L-32271. January 27, 1983.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

 

Facts:  Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of municipal treasurer. Lajer and other eight members of police force was found to be illegally the municipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte since January 1, 1949. He was extended a promotional appointment as sergeant of police on October 15, 1958. On November 25, 1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded Lajer another promotional appointment as chief of police. This last appointment was not attested and approved as required by law. On January 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and eight other members of the police department. On the same day, the municipal mayor extended to respondent Higinio Verra a permanent appointment as Chief of Police of Abuyog. Verra immediately took over the position. His appointment was eventually approved as permanent one. On January 19,1960, Lajer and eight other members of the police force filed an action for mandamus against the municipal mayor, municipal treasurer and the municipal council of Abuyog, contesting their separation from the service. While the petition was pending, there was again a change in the municipal administration, as a result of the 1963 elections.

The newly elected municipal mayor dismissed

Verra. Verra was replaced by Victoriano SIlleza, officer-in-charge when petitioner Marcial Costin was appointed as chief of police. Verra filed a case against Costin, the municipal mayor and dismissed. Lajer was reinstated as chief of police. Verra filed an amended petition. The respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of the reinstatement of Verra.

 

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of respondent Verra appointment in the position of Chief of Police was valid and consequently his removal therefrom illegal.

 

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that when respondent Verra was appointed chief of police on January 14, 1960, Lajer had just been dismissed from office with several other members of the police force. The validity of Verra’s appointment, therefore hinges on the legality of Lajer’s removal. It is elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position, may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment validly terminated.

 

 

IX. Qualifying to Office/Qualification (as an act) to an office

133) Quiatchon v. Villanueva (101 Phil. 989, 1957)

G.R. No. L-9903. July 31, 1957

CONCEPCION, J.

 

Facts: This is an action for mandamus to compel respondent Manuel M. Villanueva, "in his capacity as Acting Mayor of the City of Bacolod," to reinstate petitioners Jesus Quiatchon, Jose T. Real, Manuel Cabiles and Alfredo T. Schwab, as members of the police force of the City of Bacolod, as well as to recover their salaries during the period of their ouster, in addition to moral and exemplary damages.

There is no dispute about the facts, the case having been submitted for decision upon an agreed stipulation of facts. It appears that Ignacio or Engracio Manguin, Melanio Quizon, Democrito Nanta and Bonifacio Ormeo, none of whom is a civil service eligible, were temporarily appointed" as members of the police force of the City of Bacolod.  Owing to the criminal action filed against them these members of the police force were suspended from the service pursuant to section 4 of Republic Act No. 557.

 

September, 1954, said Acting City Mayor appointed petitioners herein, who are civil service eligible. and soon thereafter, said petitioners assumed their respective offices and discharged the duties thereof. On or about December 20, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment in the aforementioned criminal case, acquitting the defendants therein. Villanueva, removed the petitioners from their respective offices and appointed thereto the aforementioned Engracio Manguin, Melanio Quizon, Democrito Nanta and Bonifacio Ormeo.

 

Although the latter still lack civil service qualifications, and no administrative investigation had been conducted, or administrative charges filed, against said petitioners. Hence, the present action for mandamus against Manuel M. Villanueva, in his capacity as Acting Mayor of the City of Bacolod. 

 

Issue: Whether or not the replacement of temporary appointment without CSC Eligibility by an appointee who has CSC eligibility is valid.

 

 

Ruling: Yes.  "Temporary appointment without examination and certification by the Commissioner of Civil Service or his local representatives shall not be made to a competitive position in any case, except when the public interests so require, and then only upon the prior authorization of the Commissioner of Civil Service; and any temporary appointment so authorized shall continue only for such period not exceeding three months as may be necessary to make appointment through certification of eligibles, and in no case shall extend beyond thirty days from receipt by the chief of the bureau or office of the Commissioner’s certification of eligibles; . . .

"Appointments made under the section are temporary, when the public interests so require and only upon the prior authorization of the commissioner of civil service, not to exceed three months and in no case shall extend beyond thirty days from receipt by the chief of the bureau or office of the commissioner’s certification of eligibles. The fact that the petitioners held the positions for more than three months does not make them civil service eligibles. 

 

Also the fact that the acting commissioner of civil service authorized their appointments ‘under section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code to continue only until replaced by an eligible’ does not make them eligibles. The holding of a position by a temporary appointee until replaced by an eligible in disregard of the time limitation of three months is unauthorized and illegal. The temporary appointment of other non-eligibles to replace those whose term have expired is not prohibited. Hence the replacement of Teodulo T. Orais, David Lim, Lomingo Saligo and Eulalio Bernades, who are non-eligibles, by Isidro Magallanes, Pedro Flores, Francisco Tavera and Narciso Ravago, who are eligibles, is in accordance with law. The replacement of non-eligibles by non-eligibles is lawful under and pursuant to section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code." (Italics ours.)

 

 

IX. N. Necessity of Oath of Office

134) Mendoza v. Laxina, Jr. (406 SCRA 156, 2003)

GR No. 146875, Jul 14, 2003

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

 

Facts: On May 27, 1997, respondent took his oath and thereafter assumed office as the duly proclaimed and elected barangay captain of Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay Elections. Meanwhile, Roque Fermo, his rival candidate, filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. On January 18, 1999, Fermo was declared as the winner in the Barangay Elections. Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC while Fermo filed a motion for execution pending appeal.

 

On January 20, 1999, an order was issued by the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal. Hence, respondent vacated the position and relinquished the same to Fermo. Thereafter, respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC questioning the January 20, 1999 order of the trial court. On September 16, 1999, the COMELEC issued a resolution^[2] annulling the order which granted the execution of the decision pending appeal on the ground that there existed no good reasons to justify execution.

 

COMELEC issued a writ of execution directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman. COMELEC, acting on respondent's motion to cite Fermo for contempt. Barangay Council of Batasan Hills issued Resolutions .

 

However, the appointees of Roque Fermo to the same position registered objections to the said Resolutions. In order to accommodate these appointees, respondent agreed to grant them allowances and renumerations for the period of November 1- 7, 1999.

 

Sometime in January 2000, petitioner barangay councilors filed with the Quezon City Council a complaint.

 

In their joint counter-affidavit,^[19] defendants claimed that the taking anew of the oath of office as barangay chairman was a mere formality and was not a requirement before respondent can validly discharge the duties of his office.

 

 

Issue: Is the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective official a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office where the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) orders the relinquishment of the contested position?

 

Ruling: Yes. To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. It is only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete.^[33] However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions.^[34] Unless his election is annulled by a final and executory decision,^[35] or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been elected.

 

 

IX.O De Facto Officer Defined

135) Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan (764 SCRA 110, 2015)

G.R. No. 185224. July 29, 2015

BRION, J.:

 

Facts: The case stemmed from an anonymous complaint filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian, and Sheryll Desiree Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) for participating in the scheme of questionable grants and donations to fictitious entities using provincial funds. As a result of this complaint, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit in Sarangani Province. Among the irregularities discovered by the Special Audit Team was a ₱20,000.00 financial assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a cooperative whose members were mostly government personnel or relatives of the officials of Sarangani Province.

 

On arraignment, the petitioner, Vice-Governor Constantino and Bahilidad pleaded "not guilty." Diaz and Camanay, on the other hand, remained at large. the Sandiganbayan found the petitioner and Bahilidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

 

In the present petition, the petitioner argued that: (a) the Sandiganbayan’s November 5, 2008 decision in Criminal Case No. 28326 was void because one of its signatories, Justice Gregory Ong, was not a natural-born Filipino citizen per Kilosbayan Foundation v. Exec. Sec. Ermita, and hence not qualified to be a Sandiganbayan justice; (b) the totality of evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to overcome the petitioner’s presumption of innocence; and (c) the Sandiganbayan denied her due process when it issued its Order dated April 5, 2006, amending certain portions of the pre-trial order without any hearing.

 

In its Comment, the People countered that Kilosbayan merely required Justice Ong to complete "all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship." It added that Kilosbayan did not categorically rule that Justice Ong was not a natural-born Filipino who was disqualified from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of this Court. The People further pointed out that the Court in Topacio v. Ong already acknowledged Justice Ong’s actual physical possession and exercise of the functions of the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.

 

Issue: Whether or not decision of Sandiganbayan should be invalidated because justice ong is a de facto officer.

 

Ruling: No. Even without this ruling, we hold that Justice Ong was a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency as a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular. It is likewise defined as one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

 

IX. P. Instances of De Facto Officers

136) Rodriguez v. Tan (91 Phil. 725, 1952)

 

Facts. Plaintiff claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines, and from that date until December 1949, he continously collected the salaries, emoluments and privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18,400; that protest having been filed by plaintiff against defendant, the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949, rendered judgment declaring plaintiff to have been duly elected to the office; and that by reason of such usurpation, plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of P35,524.55 for expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest. Plaintiff claims that, as defendant was found and by final judgment not to have been entitled to the office of Senator, and, as such, he was during the time he discharged that office a mere de facto officer, he should reimbursed to the plaintiff the salaries and emoluments he has received on the following grounds; (1) because the salaries and emoluments follow and are inseparable from legal title to the office and do not depend on whether the duties of the office are discharged or not; and (2) because such a rule tends to curb election frauds and lessens the danger and frequency of usurpation or instrusion into the office.

 

 

Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the rule invoked by plaintiff, while sound and plausible cannot be invoked in the present case, since it runs counter to the principle and rule long observed in this jurisdiction to the effect that one who has been elected to an office, and has been proclaimed by the corresponding authority, has a right to assume the office and discharge its functions notwithstanding the protest filed against his election, and as a necessary consequence he has likewise the right to collect and received the salaries and emoluments thereunto appertaining as a compensation for the salaries he has rendered.

 

Issue: whether defendant, who has been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and discharged the duties of Senator, can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbency to the plaintiff who has been legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal

 

Ruling: There is no question that the defendant acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position.

Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be disputed that defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution provides for the position (article VI, section 14). This is as it should be. This is in keeping with the ordinary course of events. This is simple justice. The emolument must go to the person who rendered service unless the contrary is provided. There is no averment in the complaint that he is linked with any irregularity vitiating his election. This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction in connection with the provisions held by persons who had been elected thereto but were later ousted as a result of an election protest. The right of the persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has always been recognized. We cannot recall of any precedent wherein the contrary rule has been upheld.

 

137) Tuanda et. al. v. Sandiganbayan (249 SCRA 242, 1995)

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.:

 

Facts: Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.

 

Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office on February 16 and 17, 1989.

 

Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives. Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.

 

The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan.

 

Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant representation.

 

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents have rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the slaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries because of the period they acted as representatives has made them a de facto officers.

 

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of the appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the arraignment.

 

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:

A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case

B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved

C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process.

 

Issue: whether private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives is legal and is entitle to compensation.

 

Ruling: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.

 

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.

 

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

 

IX.Q Q. De Jure Officer Defined

138) Topacio v. Ong (574 SCRA 817, 2008)  G.R. No. 179895 . December 18, 2008.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

 

Facts: Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

 

It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, the Court, by Decision of July 3, 2007, enjoined Ong "from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.

 

Issue: Whether or not Ong is a de jure officer.

 

Ruling: Suffice it to mention that a de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. If a person appointed to an office is subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer.

x x x A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to the attack of the sovereign power alone. Accordingly, it is a well-established principle, dating back from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

If only to protect the sanctity of dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State, and without ruling on the conditions for the interplay of the de facto doctrine, the Court declares that Ong may turn out to be either a de jure officer who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired, or a de facto officer who enjoys certain rights, among which is that his title to said office may not be contested except directly by writ of quo warranto, which contingencies all depend on the final outcome of the RTC case.

 

 

IX.R Officer De Facto and De Jure Distinguished

139) Tayko v. Capistrano (53 Phil. 866, 1928)

Facts: The petitioners allege that the respondent judge, previous to this date, was appointed judge of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, to hold office during good behavior and until he should reach the age of 65 years; that he now has reached that age and, therefore, under the provisions of section 148 of the Administrative Code as amended, is disqualified from acting as a judge of the Court of First Instance.

 

The petitioners further allege that in view of the many election protests and criminal cases for violation of the election law filed in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros arising in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros arising from the last election of June 5, 1928, the Honorable Sixto de la Costa was duly designated and acted as auxiliary judge of the Province of Oriental Negros; that between the auxiliary judge and the respondent judge herein there was an understanding, and the assignment of the said auxiliary judge was made with this understanding, that the said auxiliary judge so designated would hear and take cognizance of all election protests and criminal actions then pending or to filed arising from the said last general election, and that the respondent Honorable Nicolas Capistrano would try and hear the ordinary cases pending in the said court, but, notwithstanding this understanding or agreement, the respondent judge tried and is still trying to take cognizance of the election protests an criminal actions in said court; that said respondent is neither a judge de jure nor de facto, but that, notwithstanding this fact, he continues to hold the office of judge of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros and pretends to be duly qualified and acting judge of the said province; and that he has tried, and continues to try, to act as such judge and that there is reasonable ground to believe that he will take cognizance of the cases in question unless he be restrained by order of this court.

 

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is a de facto judge

 

Ruling: The court ruled that the respondent is a de facto judge

Briefly defined, a de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the other hand, from a judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired.

 

Apart from any constitutional or statutory regulation on the subject there seems to be a general rule of law that an incumbent of an office will hold over after the conclusion of his term until the election and qualification of a successor.

When a judge in good faith remains in office after his title has ended, he is a de facto officer.

 

Applying the principles stated to the facts set forth in the petition before us, we cannot escape

 

the conclusion that, on the assumption that said facts are true, the respondent judge must be considered a judge de facto. His term of office may have expired, but his successor has not been appointed, and as good faith is presumed, he must be regarded as holding over in good faith.

The contention of counsel for the petitioners that the auxiliary judge present in the district must be considered the regular judge seems obviously erroneous.

 

In these circumstances the remedy prayed for cannot be granted. "The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial function, cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor, nor by any other, excepting in the form especially provided by law. A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to the attack of the sovereign power alone. Accordingly, it is a well established principle, dating from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

 

IX.S Officer De Facto and Usurper Distinguished

140) Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr. (429 SCRA 77, 2004)

G.R. No. 154674. May 27, 2004

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

 

Facts: July 1, 1995, Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr., then Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) appointed Priscilla Ong as Executive Assistant IV in his office under a contractual status.  

 

The appointment was made after the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) thru Director Miguel B. Doctor^] approved his request for the creation of a contractual position of Executive Assistant IV at the Office of the POEA Administrator, effective not earlier than July 1, 1995.

 

Subsequently, respondent Joson wrote the CSC requesting exemption from the rule requiring appointees to confidential staff positions to meet the prescribed educational qualification. The educational requirement for the position of Executive Assistant is a “Bachelor’s degree relevant to the job” and Priscilla Ong was not a college degree holder.

 

Acting upon this request, the petitioner CSC issued a resolution, approving the appointment of Ong under a Coterminous Temporary status:

 

In this case, it is clear that Ong does not meet the educational qualification for the position of Executive Assistant IV.  However, considering that Ong has to her credit 65 units leading to a Bachelor’s degree and that the said position is coterminous with the appointing authority and belongs to his confidential/personal staff, the proposed appointment of Ong may be allowed under Coterminous Temporary status.

 

Issue:  Whether or not Ong be considered a de jure or de facto public officer?

 

Ruling: SC held that Ong is a de jure public offier. The inaction of certain officials led to the non-compliance with the CSC requirement that appointments should be included in the monthly report of personnel action (ROPA), which must be submitted in turn to the CSC. The Court held that legitimate justifications excused the delayed observance of or the non-compliance with the requirement.

 A de facto officer is:

1. One who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. By color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.  
2. The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation.  It may be likened to the difference between character and reputation.  One is the truth of a man, the other is what is thought of him.” It is the color of authority, not the color of title that distinguishes an officer de facto  from a usurper.

The submission of the appointment beyond the prescribed period is not an impediment to its validity. An appointment remains valid despite the non-compliance of the proper officials with the pertinent CSC rules

 

 

IX.T Right to Compensations of a De Facto Officer

141) Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317, 1991)

G.R. No. 83896. February 22, 1991

FERNAN, C.J.:

 

Facts; Two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other public officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as Annex "C" in G.R. No.83815 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 83896 from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive

 

Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions. Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8,

 

paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days before Congress

convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated Executive Order No. 284.Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB.

 

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No.284 was unconstitutional.

Ruling: On the strength of the foregoing constitutional provision, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 which, in effect, allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the government albeit subject to the limitations imposed therein.

Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived

 

from a department head’s ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other government offices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle.

 

142) Dimaandal v. Commission on Audit (291 SCRA 322, 1998) 

G.R. No. MARTINEZ, J.:

122197 June 26, 1998

 

Facts: Zosimo Dimaandal, then holding the position of Supply Officer III, was designated Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by Governor Vicente A. Mayo of Batangas. Pursuant to the designation, on November 23, 1992 petitioner filed a claim for the difference in salary and Representation and Transportation Allowance or the RATA of Assistant Provincial Treasurer and Supply Officer III for the whole year of 1993 in the total amount of P61,308.00. However, the Provincial Auditor disallowed the claim. Governor Mayo wrote to the Provincial Auditor requesting reconsideration of the subject disallowance but still the Provincial Auditor denied the request. Petitioner appealed to the respondent Commission on Audit which sustained the stand of the Provincial Auditor of Batangas as valid and proper, and on the grounds that: 1) Petitioner was merely designated as an Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration in addition to his regular duties, 2) The Governor of Batangas had no authority to designate him to the said position. As such, he is not entitled to receive an additional salary.

 

Issue: Whether or not an employee who is designated in an acting capacity is entitled to the difference in salary between his regular position and the higher position to which he is designated.

 

Ruling: No. First, Sec. 471 of Local Government Code provides that “An Assistant treasurer may be appointed by the Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three (3) ranking eligible recommendees of the governor or mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations”. As stated by the law it does not authorize the Provincial Governor to appoint nor even designate one temporarily in cases of temporary absence or disability or a vacancy in a provincial office. That power resides in the President of the Philippines or the Secretary of Finance. Second, the right to the salary of an Assistant Provincial Treasurer is based on the assumption that the appointment or designation thereof was made in accordance with law. Considering that petitioner's designation was without color of authority, the right to the salary or an allowance due from said office never existed. Lastly, there is a great difference between an appointment and designation. While an appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office, designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. It does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position.

 

POWERS, DUTIES, AND NORMS OF CONDUCT

X.A Classification of Powers and Duties

 

A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.

 

DUTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; MANDAMUS. — Duties of public officers are of two kinds: (1) Those of a political or legislative character, in the discharge of which their discretion is generally uncontrollable by mandamus; (2) those administrative, judicial, and quasi-judicial duties imposed by law which, under certain circumstances, are controllable by mandamus.

MINISTERIAL AND DISCRETIONARY DUTIES. — Broadly speaking, public officers in the performance of all their official duties use discretion. Such discretion is one of degree and not of kind.

DISCRETION DEFINED. — Where anything is left to any person to be done according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with a sound discretion, and according to law. The discretion conferred upon officers by law is not a capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion, guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles. It is not a mental discretion to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.

The only discretion which public officers can use is legal discretion conferred upon them by law.

DISCRETION CONTROLLED BY MANDAMUS. — Where it is alleged and shown that the officer has grossly abused the legal discretion conferred upon him by law or has manifestly misinterpreted the law to the prejudice of the rights of citizens, the courts will then control the acts of the officer and direct him to go forward in accordance with the law and the principles of justice.

 

143) Lamb v. Phipps (22 Phil. 456, 1912)

G.R. No. 7806. July 12, 1912. ]

JOHNSON, J. :

Facts: Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on Dec. 31, 1911 due to ill health. Before that he was assigned as provincial treasurer for Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. He requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for all property and funds under his custody) in order that Lamb may be allowed to leave the Philippines without incurring criminal liability.

Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has settled his accounts, refuses to issue the certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a civil suit against the government. However the records also show that Fernandez signed the receipt acknowledging payment from the government.

The petition for mandamus, asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the certificate was demurred to by the auditor because it is a suit against the government and the petition states no cause of action.

The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did not do so hence the SC decided the case upon the facts Lamb intended to make.

 

Issue: Whether or not mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to issue the certificate of clearance of Lamb.

 

Ruling: No, the certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded government employees and there is no averment that Lamb is a bonded employee other than having custody of government property and funds, however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a bonded officer.

 

We cannot believe that the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of this court in mandamus to the cases where there was no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. It is our duty, therefore, to give the statute a sensible construction; such as will effectuate the legislative intention and, if possible, avoid an injustice or an absurd conclusion. Clerical errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, will not vitiate the act; they will be corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided the true meaning is obvious, and the real meaning of the legislature is apparent of the face of the whole enactment.

 

It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to accept a mere paper accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of Government employees and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He may, it is true, if he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he has any doubt about the correctness of such accounts, make an actual examination of the funds and property represented by such paper accounts or balances.

 

144) Heirs of Sps. Luciano & Consolacion Venturillo v. Quitain (506 SCRA 102,2006)

G.R. NO. 157972 : October 30, 2006

TINGA, J.:

 

Facts: The Heirs of Spouses Luciano and Consolacion Venturillo (Heirs of Venturillo), represented by Rowena B. Venturillo-Sucaldito, assail for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the Order¹ dated April 22, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, which dismissed their petition for mandamus and denied their prayer for injunctive relief.

 

Issue: Whether or not a mandamus lies to compel a ministerial duty

 

Ruling: Yes .Regional Trial Courts are fully clothed with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. Moreover, the question of whether it should have first ruled on the admissibility of the tardy formal offer of exhibits filed by the Heirs of Venturillo, and waited for respondent's comment or objection to said formal offer and answer in the mandamus case, were not raised and passed upon by the trial court precisely because the Heirs of Venturillo failed to file a motion for reconsideration. Had they done so, the trial court would have been given the opportunity to correct any factual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.

 

These procedural errors, notwithstanding, and in the interest of finally disposing of this case, we reviewed its merits and found that indeed grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the assailed Order of the trial court.

 

The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretionary act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.

Incumbent upon respondent City Engineer to issue the building permit applied for. His refusal to perform an act which the law enjoins him to do, upon the full compliance by the Heirs of Venturillo of the conditions provided under the law, entitles the latter to the writ of mandamus prayed for.

 

 

145) Bito-Onon v. Fernandez (350 SCRA 732, 2001)

G.R. No. 139813. January 31, 2001

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

 

Facts: Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997.

 

Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC).

 

RTC denied Onon's motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC ratiocinated that the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government² is vested with the power "to establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units.s

 

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED PROVISION IN MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 97-193 WAS ISSUED BY THE DILG SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY.

 

Ruling: Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to the power of general supervision of the President over all local government units which was delegated to the DILG Secretary by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992.¹³ The President's power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution.¹⁴ The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law."¹⁵ This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."¹⁶

On many occasions in the past, this court has had the opportunity to distinguish the power of supervision from the power of control. In Taule vs. Santos,¹⁷ we held that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether a local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. He cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.¹⁸ Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act.¹⁹

 

 

X.B Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees

146) Marasigan v. Buena (284 SCRA 1, 1998)

A.M. No. 95-1-01-MTCC January 5, 1998

PER CURIAM.:

 

Facts: This administrative case arose from a letter-recommendation dated June 9, 1994 of Francisco L. Marasigan, Director IV, Commission on Audit, Regional Office No. V, Legaspi City, addressed to the court administrator recommending that, on the basis of a report and documents pertaining to the examination of the cash and accounts of Lilia S. Buena, clerk of court and ex oficio sheriff, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), Naga City, which found respondent short in her accountabilities in the amount of P81,650.00, appropriate administrative action be instituted against her. State Auditor Francisco T. Dela Viña of the City Auditor's Office in Naga City, who had conducted the examination of the cash and accounts of respondents, further executed a sworn affidavit² on June 20, 1994, charging Mrs. Buena with the crime of malversation penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

 

Issue: whether or not Buena is liable

 

Ruling: That "public office is a public trust" cannot be imprudently undermined for it is constitutionally enshrined. Public officers and employees are at all times accountable to the people; must serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; and must lead modest lives.  The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713) additionally provides that every public servant shall uphold public interest over his or her personal interest at all times.  Court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, are further required to conduct themselves always beyond reproach, circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to free them from any suspicion that may taint the good image of the judiciary. As this Court has recently pronounced, "(t)he nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the 1987 Constitution and oft-repeated in our case law are not mere rhetorical words. Not to be taken as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds."

With these time-honored principles and the substantiated findings of the Deputy Court Administrator, we are constrained to conclude that respondent is administratively guilty of the offense charged.

 

X.B.1 Duty to Act with Civility

147) Chiong v. Baloloy (505 SCRA 528, 2006)

A.M. NO. P-01-1523 : October 27, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

 

Facts: This administrative matter stems from a sworn affidavit-complaint dated November 14, 2000 by Carmelita P. Chiong of No. 198, F. Roxas Street, Caloocan City, charging Process Server Sherwin M. Baloloy of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 130, with Grave Misconduct

 

Issue: whether or not the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.

 

Ruling: Respondent must always bear in mind that government service is people-oriented. Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where employees are bound by the rules of proper and ethical behavior and are expected to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.

In Pablejan v. Calleja, the Court emphasized that employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of their official duties, but also in their personal and private dealings with other people, so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of courts in the community. Any scandalous behavior or any act that may erode the people's high esteem for the judiciary unbecomes an employee.

 

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Right to Compensation

XI.A.1 Forms of Compensation Defined and Distinguished

148) Domingo v. Commission on Audit (297 SCRA 163, 1998)

G.R. No. 112371 October 7, 1998

PURISIMA, J.:

 

Facts: An original petition for certiorari seeks to nullify a COA decision preventing reimbursement for transportation expenses of DSWD Director Aida where transportation vehicle is already provided.

 

Issue: whether or not a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a government vehicle for the days official did not actually use the vehicle?

 

Ruling: As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there are two instances when transportation allowance cannot be granted to a government official, as when a government official is assigned a vehicle, and when a government official uses government transportation facilities. It is undeniable that several government vehicles were issued to the Regional Office of DSWD in Region V. That the vehicles thereat were issued not to petitioner herself, as Regional Director, but to the Regional Office itself, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that such vehicles were intended primarily for the official use of subject office and its officials and employees. As maintained by the Solicitor General, whether or not the herein petitioner used the vehicle assigned to her office, is not an issue, as it is undeniable that she could have used the said vehicle whenever she wanted to since it was assigned to her office.

 

149) Belicena v. Secretary of Finance (367 SCRA 504, 2001)

G.R. No. 143190. October 17, 2001

PARDO, J.:

 

Facts: Belicena was appointed Acting Undersecretary in the Department of Finance and forthwith assumed office. While acting as such, the President designated him as Acting Secretary of Finance while the Secretary of Finance was in Hongkong on official business for the government. Belicena took his oath of office and Acting Executive Secretary Liwanag confirmed the designation. The President extended his service as Acting Undersecretary of Finance and in anticipation of his impending compulsory retirement, Belicena filed an application for termination leave. His application was not acted upon by the Secretary. When a new Secretary of Finance assumed office, he approved the application. The voucher for his pay was not signed because in computation of Belicena’s terminal leave pay, it was alleged that his one-day salary as Acting Secretary of Finance should not be considered as his last month salary.

 

Issue: Whether the monetary value of Belicena’s terminal leave credits should be computed based on his 1-day salary as Acting Secretary of Finance?

 

Ruling: No. When the President designated the petitioner as Acting Secretary on May 22, 1997, he did so under a well considered opinion that the absence of Secretary de Ocampo was of such an extent that the latter would be unable to perform his duties and, by reason of such opinion, the President extended a temporary designation to petitioner under Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1987.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Commission on Audit, the Constitutional office tasked with the duty to "examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue, and receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to the government or any of its subdivisions . . ." (Article IX-D, Section 2[1], 1987 Constitution), has held that a government official appointed or designated in an acting capacity pursuant to Section 17, Chapter 5, Title 1, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code is entitled to salary differential and that his highest monthly salary for purposes of computing his terminal leave pay shall include such salary differential.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The well-settled rule is that the money value of the terminal leave of a retiring government official shall be computed at the retiree’s highest monthly salary. In Paredes v. Acting Chairman, 10 the Court had occasion to interpret Subsection (c), Section 12, Commonwealth Act No. 186, the law authorizing the grant of terminal leave pay, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The foregoing legal provision requires the computation of the money value of the terminal leave to be based on the retiree’s "highest rate received." And a reading of the entire provision shows that "highest rate received" refers to the retirees’ highest "monthly salary."c

 

150) Civil Service Commission v. Pobre (438 SCRA 334, 2004)

G.R. No. 160568. September 15, 2004

CORONA, J.:

 

Facts: Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former government official who retired from the government service three times. Respondent first retired as commissioner of the Commission on Audit (COA) on March 31, 1986. He reentered the government and retired as chairman of the Board of Accountancy on October 31, 1990. He was then appointed as associate commissioner of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of which he retired eventually as chairman on February 17, 2001. The first two times he retired, respondent Pobre received his terminal leave pay amounting to ₱310,522.60 and ₱55,000, respectively.

 

On his third retirement, respondent Pobre claimed payment of his terminal leave based on his highest monthly salary as PRC chairman but to be reckoned from the date he first entered the government service as budget examiner in the defunct Budget Commission in 1958. He invoked Section 13 of Commonwealth Act 186.

 

petitioner CSC promulgated CSC Resolution stating that all respondent Pobre was entitled to were his terminal leave benefits based only on his accrued leave credits from the date of his assumption to office as PRC chairman and not his total terminal leave credits, including those earned in other government agencies from the beginning of his government service.

 

Issue: whether or not a retired employee who had served a string of government agencies in his career was entitled to have his terminal leaves computed from the time of his original appointment to the first agency in the manner retirement annuities are computed under Section 13 of Commonwealth Act 186

 

Ruling: This Court’s ruling in Borromeo vs. Civil Service Commission has already settled this issue. When petitioner Borromeo retired as chairman of the CSC, he wrote a letter to the COA, coursed through the CSC chairman, requesting the inclusion of allowances received at the time of his retirement in the computation of his terminal leave benefits. The COA did not oppose Borromeo’s claim. The CSC, on the other hand and upon the advice of DBM, denied it, arguing that it had exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim because the determination of the legality of leave credit claims was within its province as the central personnel agency of the government. We ruled that:

The respondent CSC’s stance, however, that it is the body empowered to determine the legality of claims on leave matters, to the exclusion of COA, is not well-taken. While the implementation and enforcement of leave benefits are matters within the functions of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government, the duty to examine accounts and expenditures relating to leave benefits properly pertains to the COA. Where government expenditures or use of funds is involved, the CSC cannot claim an exclusive domain simply because leave matters are also involved.

The COA, the CSC and the Commission on Elections are equally pre-eminent in their respective spheres. Neither one may claim dominance over the others. In case of conflicting rulings, it is the Judiciary which interprets the meaning of the law and ascertains which view shall prevail.

Here, there is no conflicting ruling to speak of because the COA is yet to render its opinion on PRC’s query regarding respondent Pobre’s claim for terminal leave benefits. We therefore find it prudent to abstain from any pronouncement on this issue and to wait for COA to rule on respondent’s claim.

 

 

151) Sison v. Tablang (588 SCRA 727, 2009)

Facts: Petitioners are seeking reconsideration of the Notices of Disallowances. They contend that the grant of honoraria which does not exceed 25% of the monthly basic salaries of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) members was justified. Since the applicable law was R.A. 9184, and the payments were made in accordance with the said law, and it did not exceed the 25% limit. They contend that it would be unjust if they were not paid their honoraria just because no guidelines were promulgated yet by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)

 

Issue: Whether or not payment of honoraria is justified?

 

Held: The payment of honoraria to the members of the BAC and the TWG must be circumscribed by applicable rules and guidelines prescribed by the DBM, as provided by law. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9185 is explicit as it states: "For this purpose, the DBM shall promulgate the necessary guidelines." The word "shall" has always been deemed mandatory, and not merely directory. Thus, in this case, petitioners should have first waited for the rules and guidelines of the DBM before payment of the honoraria. As the rules and guidelines were still forthcoming, petitioners could not just award themselves the straight amount of 25% of their monthly basic salaries as honoraria. This is not the intendment of the law. An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money.16 Section 15 of R.A. No. 9184 uses the word "may" which signifies that the honorarium cannot be demanded as a matter of right . The chairs and members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) and the Technical Working Group (TWG) may be paid honoraria only for successfully completed procurement projects. In accordance with Section 7 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations Part A (IRR-A) of RA No. 9184, a procurement project refers to the entire project identified, described, detailed, scheduled and budgeted for in the Project Procurement Management Plan prepared by the agency.

 

A procurement project shall be considered successfully completed once the contract has been awarded to the winning bidder.

 

No interpretation is needed for a law that is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. Now, the DBM has already set the guidelines for the payment of honoraria as required by law. Since the payment of honoraria to petitioners did not comply with the law and the applicable rules and guidelines of the DBM, the notices of disallowance are hereby upheld.

 

 

 

XI.A.2 Basis of Right to Compensation

152) Acosta v. Court of Appeals (354 SCRA 486, 2000)

Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila did not report for work since they participated in mass actions and refused to comply with the return-to-work order. They were administratively charged and were found guilty. They were suspended for six (6) months without pay. Petitioners admit that they did not go to work since it is one of their forms of protest, and that such participation in mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional rights. Petitioner contends that the mass actions done was not a strike since they never sought to modify the conditions of their employment. Therefore, they ask that they be paid their backwages, since they invoke the Bangalisan case wherein it states that  payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and if his suspension is unjustified. In this case, since they contend that no evidence was presented that they participated in a strike, making them innocent of the charges filed against them.

 

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to backwages.

 

Held:  No. As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service.  While there are recognized instances when backwages may be awarded to a suspended or dismissed public official who is later ordered reinstated, as pointed by petitioners in citing Bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the case is different.  The mass actions were a strike since it constituted an unauthorize stoppage of work.  Their absences produced adverse effects upon their students. The teachers could have made a non-disruptive measure in asking the government for a solution to their woes. Furthermore, the petitioners admitted that they participated in mass actions, thus, the deficiency of evidence was cured.

 

153) Cruz v. Commission on Audit (368 SCRA 85, 2001)

 Facts: Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) grants payment of social amelioration benefits (SAB) to all its employees. R.A. 6758 was enacted and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, which contains the implementing rules and regulations of the law. The Resident Auditor questioned the legality of the payment of SAB to all employees of SRA. The DBM found that grants of SAB had no legal basis in was in violation of R.A. 6758. The Auditor suspended the payment of SAB to SRA employees. The COA denied the request to lift the suspension of payment of SAB since the effectivity of R.A No. 6785, the grant of SAB was not allowed anymore unless it is authorized. The Office of the President granted a ratification of the SAB to SRA employees. The COA allowed payment of SAB to SRA employees but it was only to those who were hired before October 31, 1989.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent COA gravely abused its discretion in denying social amelioration benefits to SRA employees hired after October 31, 1989.

 

Held: Yes. The classification of COA as to who were entitled to the SAB and excluding therefrom those employees hired after October 31, 1989, has no legal basis.

 

The date of hiring of an employee cannot be considered as a substantial distinction. The employees, based on the title or position they were holding, were exposed to the same type of work, regardless of the date they were hired. The date of hiring is not among the factors that shall be taken into consideration in fixing compensation or granting of benefits. R. A. No. 6758 and CCC No. 10 did not make any distinction between those hired before and after October 31, 1989. Neither did the 1st Indorsement of the Office of the President make any such distinction. The legal maxim that "when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court" apply in this case.

 

154) Bitonio, Jr. v. Commission on Audit (425 SCRA 437, 2004)

 Facts: Petitioner Bitonio was designated to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). He was receiving per diem for every board meeting that he attended. Pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, the COA disallowed payment of per diems. Petitioner contends that he is still entitled payment of per diems since R.A. 7916 was enacted four years after the said Supreme Court ruling. R.A 7916 provides that a payment of per diem is to be given for the attendance of the members of the Board of Directors.

 

Issue: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

 

Held: Yes. The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary where the Court declared Executive Order No. 2848 allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government, unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides.

 

It must be noted that the petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no separate or special appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 7916 is untenable since the said law was amended. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748.

 

XI.A.3 Prohibition against Diminution of Salary

155) Social Security System v. Commission on Audit (384 SCRA 548, 2002)

 Facts: The Department of Budget and Management declared the contract signing bonus in the collective negotiation agreement (CNA) between the Social Security Commission and Alert and Concerned Employees for Better SSS (ACCESS). The SSS Corporate Auditor disallowed fund releases for the signing bonus since it was considered as an additional compensation which is prohibited by the Constitution. COA avers that the signing bonus had no legal basis since the authority of the SSC to fix the compensation of its personnel was repealed by Sections 12 and 16 of R.A. 6758.

 

Issue:  Whether or not the signing bonus is legal

 

Held: No. RA 6758 modified, if not repealed, Sec. 3, par. (c), of RA 1161 as amended, at least insofar as it concerned the authority of SSC to fix the compensation of SSS employees and officers. This means that whatever salaries and other financial and non-financial inducements that the SSC was minded to fix for them, the compensation must comply with the terms of RA 6758. Consequently, only the remuneration which was being offered as of 1 July 1989, and which was then being enjoyed by incumbent SSS employees and officers, could be availed of exclusively by the same employees and officers separate from and independent of the prescribed standardized salary rates. Unfortunately, however, the signing bonus in question did not qualify under Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758. It was non-existent as of 1 July 1989 as it accrued only in 1996 when the CNA was entered into by and between SSC and ACCESS. The signing bonus therefore could not have been included in the salutary provisions of the statute nor would it be legal to disburse to the intended recipients.

XI.A.4 Prohibition against Receiving Additional, Double, or Indirect Compensation

156) De la Cruz v. Commission on Audit (371 SCRA 157, 2001)

 Facts: Petitioners are the members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority (NHA) from 1991 to 1996. Commission on Audit (COA) issued a memorandum directing all unit heads of the national government agencies to refund those additional compensation given to their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions. The COA Memorandum also stated that Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants are not allowed to hold other offices in addition to their primary offices and to receive compensation. NHA Resident Auditor issued a notice of disallowance which disallowed the payment of representation allowances of cabinet members who were ex-officio members of the NHA Board of Directors and their respective alternates who received the payments. Petitioners contend that the ban against multiple positions does not cover the appointive officials with equivalent rank or lower than the position of Assistant Secretary since it only applies to Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants. They further contend that the NHA Directors are occupying positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.

 

Issue: Whether or not the disallowance of the compensation for the alternates of the ex-officio members of the NHA Board is valid?

 

Held: Yes. Petitioners are not among the officers mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA, however, they are “alternates” of the said officers, whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

XI.B.1 (Week 7)

157) Duty Free Philippines v. Mojica (471 SCRA 776, 2005)

 Facts: Stock Clerk Rossano A. Mojica was found guilty of Neglect of Duty by the Discipline Committee of Duty Free Philippines (DFP). Mojica was forcibly resigned, all of her benefits were forfeited except his salary and his accrued leave credits. Mojica filed for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter ruled that Mojica was illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Labor Arbiter and reversed the ruling of the NLRC. DFP avers that jurisdiction does not lie with the NLRC but with the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

 

Issue: Whether or not Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction?

 

Held: Yes. The DFP being under the exclusive authority of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), it follows that its officials and employees are likewise subject to the Civil Service rules and regulations. PD No. 807 or The Civil Service Decree of the Philippines declared that the Civil Service Commission shall be the central personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws governing the discipline of civil servants. It categorically described the scope of Civil Service as embracing every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation whether performing governmental or proprietary function. It construed an agency to mean any bureau, office, commission, administration, board, committee, institute, corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary function, or any other unit of the National Government, as well as provincial, city or municipal government, except as otherwise provided. EO No. 292 provided that civil service employees have the right to present their complaints or grievances to management and have them adjudicated as expeditiously as possible in the best interest of the agency, the government as a whole, and the employee concerned. Such complaint or grievances shall be resolved at the lowest possible level in the department or agency, as the case may be, and the employee shall have the right to appeal such decision to higher authorities. In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedure, the parties may jointly refer the dispute in the Public Sector Labor Management Council for appropriate action.

 

 

XI.B.2

158) Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. Court of Appeals (412           SCRA 263, 2003)

Facts: Felicitas B. Sipe remitted to her sister-in-law, Lolita Sipe Escara, two (2) telegraphic money orders through Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T). No money was received by Lolita, thus, she went to the PT&T Office to inquire about the remittance, however, Louie Cabalit, the branch cashier, was not around, Lolita was asked to return the next day. After several days, plaintiff was able to receive the checks. Because of the numerous delays, Lolita filed a complaint for damages against PT&T and Louie Cabalit.

 

Issue: Whether or not Louie Cabalit should be solidarily liable with PT&T?

 

Held: No. There is not enough factual or adequate legal basis to hold petitioner Louie Cabalit, PT&T’s branch cashier, to be solidarily liable with petitioner corporation. However, PT&T was negligent when it did not take steps to ensure the prompt delivery of the money to plaintiff from the time the checks were issued in her favor. It is quite clear that PT&T did not act with any sense of urgency but with indifference and nonchalance with respect to plaintiff’s case. First of all, after Louie Cabalit endorsed the two checks to the dispatch section of PT&T and subsequently took an emergency leave, the personnel at the Cubao branch did not exert enough effort to effect the delivery of the money. In fact, the Cubao branch wired its Marbel branch only on August 3, 1990 to request for the complete address of the recipient from the sender. Apparently, it took them eighteen days to realize that the address of the recipient was insufficient.

 

159) Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commission (400 SCRA 557, 2003)

 Facts:  15 cases for illegal dismissal were filed against Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO) for underpayment of wages against complainants. Complainants were contracted as service meter readers from October 8, 1990 to October 31, 1990. The complainants were allowed to work until January 2, 1991. On the next day, they were served with a notice of termination wherein it states that they are terminated since there was a need to retrench for BENECO was already overstaffed. The complainants contend that they were regular employees, not apprentices. BENECO invokes Article 283 of the Labor Code as its defense. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints. The complainants then filed an appeal to NLRC. The NLRC reinstated the complainants to their position as meter readers but as probationary, and not as a regular employee.

 

Issue: Whether or not the complainants shall be reinstated as regular employees?

 

Held:  Yes. Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. In case of probationary employment, Article 281 of the Labor Code requires the employer to make known to his employee at the time of the latters engagement of the reasonable standards under which he may qualify as a regular employee.

 

A review of the records shows that petitioners have never been probationary employees. There is nothing in the letter of appointment, to indicate that their employment as meter readers was on a probationary basis. It was not shown that petitioners were informed by the private respondent, at the time of the latters employment, of the reasonable standards under which they could qualify as regular employees. Instead, petitioners were initially engaged to perform their job for a limited duration, their employment being fixed for a definite period, from October 8 to 31, 1990. There are two separate instances whereby it can be determined that an employment is regular: (1) The particular activity performed by the employee is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; or (2) if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year.

 

Herein petitioners fall under the first category. They were engaged to perform activities that are necessary to the usual business of private respondent. We agree with the labor arbiters pronouncement that the job of a meter reader is necessary to the business of private respondent because unless a meter reader records the electric consumption of the subscribing public, there could not be a valid basis for billing the customers of private respondent. The fact that the petitioners were allowed to continue working after the expiration of their employment contract is evidence of the necessity and desirability of their service to private respondents business. In addition, during the preliminary hearing of the case on February 4, 1991, private respondent even offered to enter into another temporary employment contract with petitioners. This only proves private respondents need for the services of herein petitioners. With the continuation of their employment beyond the original term, petitioners have become full-fledged regular employees. The fact alone that petitioners have rendered service for a period of less than six months does not make their employment status as probationary.

 

Since petitioners are already regular employees at the time of their illegal dismissal from employment, they are entitled to be reinstated to their former position as regular employees, not merely probationary.

 

160) Domingo v. Carague (456 SCRA 450, 2005)

Facts: Petitioners are incumbent officers or employees, retired Chairmen and retired Commissioners of COA. The retirees claim to have a deep-seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA, especially in its Organizational Restructuring Plan. The incumbent officers or employees claim that they were unceremoniously divested of their designations/ranks without just cause or due process when the Organizational Restructuring Plan took effect. Petitioners questions the legality of the Organizational Restructuring Plan. Respondents counters that petitioners have no legal standing.

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

 

Held:  No. Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. In fact, they admitted that "they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain." Clearly, they do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit.

 

The averments of some petitioners that they were demoted and unceremoniously divested of their previous designations as Unit Head, Team Supervisor, or Team Leader; that they were deprived of their RATA; that they were relegated to being mere Team Members, entitled to only a reimbursable transportation allowance; and that they were denied due process.

 

Such averments lack merit. Actually, they were not demoted. Under Section 11, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, a demotion is the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, or rank which may or may not involve reduction in salary. A demotion by assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service which has a lower rate of compensation is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it.

 

Here, there have been no new appointments issued to the affected petitioners under the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. Thus, their contention that they have been demoted is baseless.

 

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- Other Rights

161) Government Service Insurance v. Montesclaros (434 SCRA 441, 2004)

 

Facts:

At the age of 72, Nicolas Montesclaros, being a widower, married Milagros Orbiso who is then 43 years old on July 10, 1983. Less than a year after their wedding, Nicolas then filed for his GSIS retirement benefit with Milagros as his beneficiary. His application was approved effective February 17, 1984. In 1992, Nicolas died. Subsequently, Milagros filed for survivorship pension under PD 1146. Unfortunately, the survivorship application was denied based on 18 of PD 1146 which says, a surviving espouse is not eligible for survivorship pension if they were married within three years before the pensioner was qualified for the pension.

 

The trial court decided in favor of Milagros citing the Family Code Articles 115 and 117 saying that the pension benefits are onerous acquisitions.  It is considered as conjugal property. The court also held that, Sec 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed by the Family Code which has a retroactive effect if it does not prejudice any vested rights.

 

GSIS appealed to the CA. While the case was on appeal, Milagros expressed in a letter not to pursue the case. But the court resolved the case despite the manifestation of Milagros. CA affirmed the RTC saying that the retirement benefits is onerous because it is deducted from the salary of the deceased.

 

Issue:

Whether or not sec 18 of PD 1146 is valid?

 

Held:
No. The court held that the provision in sec. 18 of PD 1146 is discriminatory which denies due process of law. The court held that by prohibiting dependent espouse from receiving survivorship benefits due to its condition the if marriage between the member and the espouse happened less than three years before the member’s qualification for pension, it contravenes Sec. 1, Art III of the Constitution which says that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. The law in question is oppressive but denying surviving espouse the opportunity to be heard. It also defeats the purpose of the PD 1146 which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security benefits to government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, or retirement of the employee.

 

The court cited the test of reasonable classification to consider a statute to be constitutional: 1. It must rest on substantial distinction; 2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3.  It must not be limited to the existing conditions only; and 4. It must apply to all members of the same class.

 

The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent "deathbed marriages," then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that "the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension." The Government Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.

 

 

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- Other Rights

162) Government Service Insurance System v. Commission on Audit (441 SCRA 532, 2004)

 

Facts:

Court promulgated a decisin on the consolidated cases ordering the refund of amounts representing fringe benefits granted to GSIS employees; It also affirmed the disallowance in excess of amount approved by the COA which was later on deducted by GSIS from the employees’ retirement benefits.

 

For amendatory and clarificatory judgment, GSIS retirees then filed a motion asking   the   court   whether   the   GSIS   may lawfully   deduct   any   amount   from   their retirement benefits in light of Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291. The court then ruled that the said provision provides the Exemption of Retirement benefits from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. As settled in several cases, retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied   to   his   indebtedness   to   the   government.   Hence, GSIS   employees   retained   their retirement benefits including those which were properly disallowed by the COA

 

Issue:

Whether or not GSIS employees are obliged to return the benefits which were erroneously granted to and received by them which were justifiably disallowed by the COA?

 

 

Held:
Yes. The GSIS employees resultantly retained benefits to which they were not legally entitled which, in turn, gave rise to an obligation on their part to return the amounts under the principle of solutio indebiti. Under Article 2154 of the Civil Code, if something is received and unduly delivered through mistake when there is no right to demand it, the obligation to return the thing arises.

The last paragraph of Section 39, RA 8291 specifically provides SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien which says, ‘the funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.’

It is clear from the above provision that COA disallowances cannot be deducted from benefits under RA 8291, as the same are explicitly made exempt by law from such deductions. Retirement benefits cannot be diminished by COA disallowances in view of the clear mandate of the foregoing provision. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This is what is known as plain-meaning rule or verba legis.

 

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the April 16, 2002 Decision in G.R. NOS. 138381 and 141625 is AMENDED. In addition to the refund of amounts corresponding to benefits allowed in G.R. No. 138381, the GSIS is ordered to REFUND all deductions from retirement benefits EXCEPT amounts representing monetary liability of the respondents to the GSIS as well as all other amounts mutually agreed upon by the parties.

 

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- Other Rights

163) Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Commission on Audit (479 SCRA 544, 2005)

 

Facts:

Recarredo S. Valenzuela is an employee of BSP. in his capacity as Administrative Services Officer II/Property Supply Officer, he assumed the responsibility of the outgoing Chief Aircraft Maintenance Officer/PSO by executing a certification to that effect. Upon his retirement, BSP refused to give the P291,555.00 as his retirement benefit due to his failure to settle his accountabilities which is amounting to P1,007,263.59. Valenzuela filed a complaint before HRMD of BSP but the same was denied. Hence, he appealed to the COA whose decision favored the Valenzuela on the ground that retirement gratuities cannot be withheld, deducted, or applied to the indebtedness of an employee of the government without his consent. In its motion, BSP averred the Valenzuela assumed responsibility of all properties under his custody and affixed his signature in the list of unaccounted properties. The COA denied the motion.

  

Issue:

Whether or not BSP may validly withhold respondent's retirement benefits and unilaterally apply the same to his indebtedness to the government.

Held:
The Court rules in the negative. It held that retirement benefits accruing to a public officer may not, without his consent, be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government. It explained that the exemption should be liberally construed in favor of the pensioner. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family.

Section 21, Chapter 4, Subtitle-B (Commission on Audit), Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 which originated from Section 624 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 in the same vein with Section 265 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual explicitly limits the power of COA to retain the retirement benefits of a government employee for the purpose of satisfying his indebtedness only to instances where (1) the employee admits his indebtedness and consents to such retention; or (2) a competent court so directs.  

The amount allegedly owed by respondent to BSP are contestable and inconclusive. It cannot thus qualify as a "debt" for compensation or set off to be operative under Article 1279 of the Civil Code. At best, said amount is a mere "claim" that would not make one a creditor of the other. A debt is a claim which has been formally passed upon by the highest authority to which it can in law be submitted and has been declared to be a debt. A claim, on the other hand, is a debt in embryo. It is mere evidence of a debt and must pass thru the process prescribed by law before it develops into what is properly called a debt.

BSP can seek restoration of its claim by means of a proper court action for its recovery. Verily, there is no prohibition against enforcing a final monetary judgment against respondent's other assets and properties. Section 5, Article IV of the Rules and Regulations Governing The Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Provident Fund provides, the Bank shall have a first and paramount lien upon the amount to which the erring member is entitled as stated in the preceding Section to cover all losses, costs, and expenses which the Bank may sustain through his dishonesty, defalcation, theft, embezzlement or falsification and other similar offenses.

In the instant case, respondent was neither found guilty of any offense nor conclusively established to be indebted to BSP.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The December 29, 2003 Judgment of the Commission on Audit in Decision No. 2003-163 which allowed the release of respondent Recarredo S. Valenzuela's retirement benefits; and its July 21, 2005 Resolution denying petitioner Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas' motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- Other Rights

164) Aldovino v. Alunan III (230 SCRA 825, 1994)

 

Facts:

The Ministry of Tourisn now Department of Tourism was reorganized by virtue of Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120, which took effect upon its approval on 30 January 1987. Based on such law, different office orders and memoranda were issued declaring all positions thereat vacant. In effect, many employees were separated. Hence, several cases were decided by the court where terminated employees were reinstated.

 

In this case, petitioners together with the intervenors in this case, prayed the same, to be reinstated in the work without losing their benefits and seniority in the office. The Solicitor General argued that petitioners were laches has set it having the petition made after 4 years.

 

Issue:

Whether or not latches is applicable in this case?

 

Held:
No. The court held that in the case at bar, equity, if ever invoked, must lean in favor of petitioners and intervenors who were unjustly injured by public respondents' unlawful acts. The prejudice from the high-handed violation of the rights of petitioners and intervenors resulting in their loss of employment is far more serious than the inconvenience to public respondents in rectifying their own mistakes.  We reiterate our pronouncement in Fernandez v. Grolier International, Inc., that "[i]t is true that there are exceptions to the rule that an action will not be declared to have prescribed if prescription is not expressly invoked (Garcia vs. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250). However, where considerations of substantial justice come in (as in this case when the very employment, and therefore the lifeblood, of each petitioner/intervenor is involved), it is better to resolve the issues on the basic merits of the case instead of applying the rule on prescription which the private respondent waived when it was not pleaded." Anyhow, it was public respondents who created the problem of petitioners and intervenors by illegally abolishing their positions and terminating their services in outrageous disregard of the basic protection accorded civil servants, hence our repeated pronouncement that it was unconstitutional.

 

An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all.

 

The requirement of prior resort to administrative remedies is not an absolute rule and this did not bar direct access to this Court in the analogous cases of Dario v. Mison, ²¹ and Mandani v. Gonzalez

On the argument that existing organizational set-up would be disrupted if reinstatement be directed, we need only reiterate our 18 October 1990 Resolution in Mandani that —The basic principle to be applied whenever the Court declares an administrative official to have acted in an unlawful manner is for that official to undo the harmful effects of his illegal act and to accord to the aggrieved parties restoration or restitution in good faith to make up for the deprivations which may have been suffered because of his act.

In the final analysis, the dissent admits that petitioners and intervenors truly deserve the reliefs they pray for except that their cause of action has allegedly prescribed. Shall we now frustrate their rightful claims on a ground that was never raised, nor even hinted at, by public respondents in the entire proceeding? That would be antithetic to our concept of social justice; at the very least, it is subversive of the rudiments of fairplay.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

 

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- Other Rights

165) Brugada v. Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports (450 SCRA 224, 2005)

 

Facts:

Petitioners Brugada et al are teachers in NCR. They conducted a teachers’ strike calling for the payment of 13^th month differentials and clothing allowance, as well as the recall of DECS Order No. 39, s. 1990 and the passage of debt-cap bill etc. These caused them to incur unauthorized absences. Subsequently, DECS Secretary issued a memorandum for the striking teachers directing them to return to service otherwise they will be dismissed. An order was also given to the regional directors and Schools Division Superintendent to file administrative action against petitioners. DECS Secretary eventually dismissed the petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the CSC which reduced their penalty to six months’ suspension without pay. A motion was submitted but denied.

 

The case was raised to CA but dismissed for lack of merit. CA ruled, first, Article XIII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution, the right to strike is not extended to government employees under the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807). Republic Act 875 allows workers including those in government-owned and controlled-corporations to organize associations but are prohibited from striking.

 

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled for backwages?

Held:
The court sees the petition without merit. This Court has also resolved the issue of whether back wages may be awarded to the teachers who were ordered reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario were commuted by the Civil Service Commission to six (6) months' suspension. The issue was resolved in the negative in Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals on the ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended. The Bangalisan case also ruled that the immediate implementation of the dismissal orders, being clearly sanctioned by law, was not unjustified. The Court held that as regards the payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, the payment of back wages may be decreed if 'he is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified.

Citing the Bangalisan ruling, this Court in Jacinto v. Court of Appeals held that when the teachers have given cause for their suspension ' i.e., the unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of their students - they were not fully innocent of the charges against them although they were eventually found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and not grave misconduct or other offense warranting their dismissal from the service; 'being found liable for a lesser offense is not equivalent to exoneration.

The facts in this case are substantially the same as those in Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals,  De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, Alipat v. Court of Appeals  and Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals. In these cases, the Court categorically declared that the payment of back wages during the period of suspension of a civil servant who is subsequently reinstated is proper if he is found innocent of the charges and the suspension is unjustified. These two circumstances are absent in the present case. When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 31 July 1996 and Resolution dated 29 February 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 37794-99 and SP Nos. 37800-05. Costs against petitioners.

 

 

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- Other Rights

166) Balitaosan v. Secreatary of Education, Culture, and Sports (410 SCRA 233, 2003)

 

Facts:

Petitioner is among the teachers who were dismissed by DECS Secretary for ignoring the return to work order while participating in teachers’ strike. Based on records, petitioner, together with Sarmiento and Rafer, were charged with administrative complaints and found guilty with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law and Rules of Reasonable Office Regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service and absence without leave.

 

Petitioner refused to give his letter of explanation on said charges. Thus, he was first meted with 90 days preventive suspension. Subsequently, he was dismissed. He appealed to the Merit System Protection Board, the CSC, and the CA but they all dismissed the petition. For CA, the petition was given due course by reducing penalty from dismissal from service to 6 months suspension without pay considering the he is already 7 years in the service.

 

Issue:

Whether or not, petitioner is entitled for back wages for the period which he was not allowed to work?

 

Held:
No. In the petitioner’s contention, citing the case of Fabella v. CA where the court held that failure to include a representative of the teachers organization made the findings void. This rendered a decision to pay backwages among other during the preventive suspension and dismissal from service. The court held, petitioner’s contention was misplaced. In this case, petitioner never questioned the jurisdiction of the CA by the fact that he raised his case to it.

 

The fact is that petitioner participated in the mass action which in turn resulted in the filing of charges against him and his subsequent dismissal later on. His reinstatement was not the result of exoneration but an act of liberality by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, petitioner’s claim for backwages for the period during which he was not allowed to work must be denied.

The general rule is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. No work, no pay. Since petitioner did not render any service during the period for which he is now claiming his salaries, there is no legal or equitable basis to order the payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 15, 1999 denying petitioner’s claim for backwages is AFFIRMED.

 

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- Other Rights

167) Civil Service Commission v. Sebastian (472 SCRA 364, 2005)

 

Facts:

Sebastian was appointed as Municipal Secretary in 1988. He was diagnosed in 1992 with acute gastric ulcer. He was advised for several months of rest. His attending physician also advised the vice-mayor for his condition. Hence, his 44 days’ vacation leave and 88 days’ sick leave were approved by the acting vice-mayor Jose Cayon with the condition that his sick leave is without pay. But those applications were not submitted to the mayor and petitioner has not secured clearance for the mayor.

 

In 1992, Freddie Chu and Catalino Genito, Jr. were the elected Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Chu directed Sebastian to report to office but failed to comply the order. As a result, he was drop from the municipal government’s plantilla of personnel effective October 30, 1992. Six member of the Sanggunian Bayan requested vice mayor Genito to retain Sebastian as Secretary of Sangguniang Bayan. The matter was brought to the CSC who endorsed reinstatement of Sebastian to the vice mayor considering his authority to decide on it. The vice mayor ignored the endorsement.

 

Almost 4 years after his dismissal, Sebastian filed a case against the mayor and the vice mayor for his illegal dismissal. It appeared that Sebastian was appointed as municipal secretary and not secretary of the sangguniang bayan. The CSC eventually dismissed the complaint of Sebastian on the grounds that he failed to submit medical certificates required for his claim and he was barred by laches.

 

The CA reversed the decision of the CSC contending the respondent was deprived of due process, he was on approved sick leave, and was not barred by laches from seeking his reinstatement because he waited for the outcome of the well-meaning representations of some members of the Sangguniang Bayan who took up the cudgels for him when they referred the matter to the CSC Regional Office. 

 

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Sebastian had been illegally dismissed by petitioner Mayor Freddie Chu as Municipal Secretary?

 

Held:
No. The court agrees with the contention of the petitioners that the real party-in-interest as party-respondent in the CA was Municipal Mayor Freddie Chu who was the respondent in the CSC. The ruling of the appellate court is barren of factual basis. It was clear that respondent failed to report to office when directed to do so.

 

The court held that if an employee was illegally dismissed, he may, by his inaction or by sleeping on his right, in law, be considered as having abandoned the office to which he was entitled to be reinstated. A person illegally dismissed from the office is not thereby exonerated from the obligation to take steps for his own protection and may not, for an unreasonable length of time, acquiesce to the order of removal and then seek for his reinstatement. In case of unreasonable delay, he may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to recover its emoluments. 

 

The respondent failed to do so for a period of almost four years, and in the meantime, public service has been prejudiced by his absence. Case law has it that one is barred from asserting a right if he fails to do so for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time which by the exercise of diligence, he could have or should have done earlier. The laws aid the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.

 

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61776 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions of the CSC are REINSTATED.

 

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- Other Rights

168) Batangas State University v. Bonifacio (478 SCTA 142 (2005)

 

Facts:

Respondent was one among those who held protest rallies against the University President, De Chavez for an alleged graft and corruption. This issue was raised to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption.

 

As a consequence, respondent was detailed to the office of the University President. With the permission of the University President, respondent suspend to report to his new assignment but he continued to discharge his duties as teacher and coach of the university basketball team. However, when respondent submits his DTRs, it was not received by the personnel office due to the failure of the immediate head to affix his initial. As a result, the respondent appeared to have been absent for 30 days. This resulted to the dismissal of respondent on the ground of Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL). The CSC affirmed the dismissal of the respondent based on the unsigned DTRs. However, the CA reversed the decision of the CA claiming that CSC focused on the forms but failed to consider the substantive issue, which is the bad faith of the petitioners.

 

Issue:

Whether or not, petitioner has illegally dismissed respondent from service for an alleged Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL)?

 

Held:
Yes.  The court sees the findings of the Civil Service Commission and its conclusion based on the said findings contradict those of the appellate court. However, upon careful review of the records, we find no grounds to grant the petition. it affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides the prohibition is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process and that the burden of proof is upon the employer to show the validity of the dismissal and not upon the employee to prove otherwise.

 

Petitioner dropped respondent from the rolls based on Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which pertinently provides that if an employee continuously absent without approved leave for at least 30 calendar days may be dropped from the rolls without prior notice.

 

As held in Bentain v. Court of Appeals, ‘While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation.’ Neither are the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar constitute abandonment. 

 

The court affirmed the CA and held the award of backwages and other monetary benefits should not be limited to 5 years and must therefore be modified in line with the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan. It was said that an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time of her reinstatement.

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 11, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49444 setting aside CSC Resolution Nos. 981443 and 982540 which upheld the dismissal of respondent from the service is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled to full backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

 

 

XI. RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- Other Rights

169) Galang v. Land Bank of the Philippines (649 SCRA 574, 2011)

 

Facts:

Galang was a branch manager of Land Bank. He was charged with administrative cases. Allegely, he demanded money from four of his clients in return of reducing interest for a loan and condonation of penalty charged on their overdue loans. The charge also accused Galang for unauthorized disbursement for the company car repair. The hearing officer of land bank dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The general counsel of land bank recommended the dismissal of Galang. The board of directors approved the recommendation but modified it to a forced resignation. The case was raised to the CSC but dismissed the same. Galang filed petition for certiorari to the SC but was remanded to the CA nullified CSC’s resolution. CA directed LBP to reinstate Galang and to pay him back salaries not exceeding 5 years.

 

Galang was reinstated. But he complained that he has not receive Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA), Representation and Travel Allowance (RATA), Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy. Also, he insisted the his back salary be computed based on the current rate. LBP express willingness to pay but said, it was only allowed to pay RATA and PERA only in 1997. Also, his salary was computed based on the days when he was not able to work.

 

Issue:

Whether or not, Galang is entitled for the benefits he is claiming?

 

Held:
Yes. The court held that it is settled that an illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement. Hence, in Galang's case, he is entitled to back salaries from July 1990 to June 1995.  This is not disputed by the parties.  Rather, the uncertainty centers on when he should be reinstated.

 

Well-entrenched is that a judgment or order becomes final upon the lapse of the period to appeal, without an appeal being perfected or a motion for reconsideration being filed.

 

Concomitant with reinstatement is the payment of back salaries. Section 59(e) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service on the effect of exoneration on certain penalties provides that in case the penalty imposed is dismissal, he shall immediately be reinstated without loss of seniority rights with payment of back salaries. It was enunciated in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Salas that: when an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held.

 

Being an incumbent at the time, Galang would have continued to receive RATA, Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy, separate from his salary, had he not been illegally dismissed from service.

 

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 25, 2006 and Resolution dated October 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91910 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Land Bank of the Philippines is ordered to pay Isabelo L. Galang: (a) back salaries for five (5) years from the time of his unlawful dismissal in July 1990 to June 1995 at the rate last received by him without qualification and deduction; (b) back salaries from the proper date of his reinstatement on October 1, 1997 until August 15, 2001, at the rate prevailing on October 1, 1997 inclusive of increases in salary; (c) Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) from July 1990 to June 1995; (d) Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA) from October 1, 1997 to August 15, 2001; (e) Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) from July 1990 to December 1992 and for the year 1999; (f) Meal Allowance in the amount of ₱34,860.00; and (g) Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy for October 1, 1997 to August 15, 2001.

 

XII. DISABILITIES AND INHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Under Existing Laws

170) Marubeni Corporation v. Lirag (330 SCRA 419, 2000)

 

Facts:

Petitioner is a foreign corporation organized in Japan. It has a subsidiary in the Philippines with Ryoichi Tanaka, Ryohei Kimura and Shoichi One as its officers. Respondent file with the RTC Makati for specific performance and damages claiming the petitioner owed him the sum of P6,000,000 based on the 6% consultancy fee for the petioners projects. The agreement was reduced to a written document because petitioner and respondents because of mutual trust having a close business and personal relationship.

 

Petitioners denied the alleged agreement saying that Ryohei Kimura has no authority to enter into an agreement in behalf of Marubeni. In the pre-trial, no amicable settlement was reached. But the RTC decided in favor of respondent. The CA affirmed RTC which relied on the doctrine of admission by silence. Tanaka’s letter shows that an agreement of consultancy was made.

 

Issue:

Whether or not, there was an oral agreement of consultancy that makes respondents entitled for commission?

Held:
No. In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; a mere allegation is not evidence. He must establish his cause by a preponderance of evidence, which respondent failed to establish in the instant case. Assuming for the sake of argument that an oral consultancy agreement has been perfected between the parties, respondent Lirag could not still claim fees on the project that has not been awarded to Marubeni.

If respondent's contentions were to be taken as truth, he would be entitled to 6% consulting fee based on the total cost of the projects obtained, or on success basis.   However, even respondent admitted that the Bureau of Post project was not awarded to Marubeni, but to Sanritsu.  Marubeni did not even join the bidding for the Bureau of Post project.

Respondent could not claim from Sanritsu because of the absence of any agreement between him and the latter. Contrary to the trial court's finding that petitioners led respondent to believe that they hired respondent's services as consultant, the evidence proved otherwise. Petitioner Shoichi One, one of the officers of Marubeni Phils., testified that at the onset, Marubeni Phils. informed respondent that it had no authority to commit to anything, as it all depended on the decision of the principal headquarters in Tokyo, Japan.

With regard to the Court of Appeal's ratiocination that petitioner Tanaka's response dated October 13, 1988 to the demand letter of September 26, 1988, amounted to an implied admission of the consultancy agreement, the records showed that, to the contrary, this fact strengthened petitioners' allegation that Marubeni Phils. lacked the requisite authority to enter into any binding agreement.

 

In the instant case, the parties did not reach the second stage as the headquarters in Tokyo, Japan did not see it fit to hire a consultant as they decided not to participate in the bidding. Hence, no consultancy agreement was perfected, whether oral or written. There was no absolute acceptance of respondent's offer of consultancy services.

 

In light of the foregoing, we rule that the preponderance of evidence established no consultancy agreement between petitioners and respondent from which the latter could anchor his claim for a six percent (6%) consultancy fee on a project that was not awarded to petitioners.

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals 42 is hereby SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 89-3037 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City is hereby DISMISSED.

 

XII. DISABILITIES AND INHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Under Existing Laws

171) Peligrino v. People (362 SCRA 683, 2001)

 

Facts:

Peligrino is an Examiner II of the Bureau of Internal Revenue assigned to the Special Project Committee tasked to investigate the books of accounts for income and the business tax returns earned by the professionals, particularly medical practitioners. Petitioner assessed the account of Dr. Feliciano and found to have tax deficiency. Peligrino together with Atty. Buenaventura appeared in the office of Dr. Feliciano who informed the latter that his tax deficiency was P500,000 and former tried to negotiate to lower the amount to P200,000. Observing that his books of account was not even examined, he entertained the idea that it was extortion. Hence, he coordinated with the NBI for an entrapment. The said plan was set up on the schedule of visit of the two BIR officials. But the accused did not arrive on the scheduled dat. The complainant suggested that those will come surely on the following day which actually happened and only Peligrino arrived. The entrapment was executed and the accused were apprehended. The Sandigan Bayan convicted Peligrino but acquitted Buenventura for insufficient evidence.

 

Issue:

Whether or not, is guilty of violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft Law?

 

Held:
Yes. The court cited the elements of this offense were summed up in Mejia v. Pamaran, and we restate them here: (1) the offender is a public officer (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene. Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his official capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are present.

 

Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts -- (1) demanding or requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) demanding, requesting and receiving -- any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to intervene under the law. These modes of committing the offense are distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction. The lack of demand is immaterial. Like bribery, this crime is usually proved by evidence acquired during an entrapment, as the giver or briber is usually the only one who can provide direct evidence of the commission of this crime. Thus, entrapment is resorted to in order to apprehend a public officer while in the act of obtaining undue benefits. However, we have to distinguish between entrapment and instigation. In "instigation," officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure the accused into committing an offense, which the latter otherwise would not commit and has no intention of committing. In "entrapment," the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the crime. Frame-up as asserted by the accused, like alibi, is invariably viewed with disfavor because, as a line of defense in most criminal prosecutions of this nature, it is easily concocted, common or standard.

 

The court held that his testimony by itself was not sufficient evidence of the commission of the offense. But, taken together with the other pieces of corroborating evidence, it established a quantum of evidence strong enough to convict petitioner. While the case is weakened by the many suits filed for and against complainant, the court a quo did not say that he was not at all worthy of belief. Petitioner also failed to ascribe to the NBI agents any ill motive to deliberately implicate him.

 

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

 

172. JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 154098. July 27, 2005.

Prohibited Acts and Transactions under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

 

FACTS: The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or official functions. Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he immediately complied with the same. Notably, Mayor Miranda’s counter-affidavit also stated that he left the mayoralty post after “coercion” by the Philippine National Police.

Motion for reconsideration was denied in the Sandiganbayan's Resolution. Hence, the present petition assailing the Sandiganbayan's orders of preventive suspension.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner for 90 days.

RULING: No. The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or property. Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property.

To limit the use of "government" as an adjective that qualifies "funds" is baseless. The word "public" precedes "funds" and distinguishes the same from private funds. To qualify further "public funds" as "government" funds, as petitioner claims is the law's intent, is plainly superfluous. We are bound by the rule that a statute... should be construed reasonably with reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should not be given a meaning that is inconsistent with its scope and object. R.A. No. 3019, commonly known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, should be read to protect the State from fraud by its own officials.

Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled that petitioner's act fell within the catch-all provision " or for any offense involving fraud upon government. The term "fraud" is defined viz.:An instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp. when involving misrepresentation: an act of deluding the phrase "fraud upon government" means "any instance or act of trickery or deceit against the government." It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds.

Moreover, the firmly entrenched doctrine which was held by the Highest Tribunal in a long line of cases is that "under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity of the Information." 

Petitioner's claim that the Local Government Code, which he averred should apply to this case of an elective local official, has been violated. Administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local Government Code. Respondents point out that the shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code is intended to limit the period of suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the President, who may be motivated by partisan political considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body.

Nowhere in Garcia is it stated that the limits provided in the Local Government Code apply to the Ombudsman.

Section 63 of the Local Government Code does not govern preventive suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally created office and independent from the Executive branch of government. The Ombudsman's power of preventive... suspension is governed by Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989,"

The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman was indubitably within the limit provided by its enabling law. This enabling law has not been modified by the legislature.

The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these statutory protections are fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office and classification as an impeachable officer. This much was recognized by this Court in the earlier cited case of Garcia v. Mojica. Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay... in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

 

173. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (362 SCRA 721, 2001)

Prohibited Acts and Transactions under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

 

FACTS: Initially, the Court dismissed the petition in this case on technical grounds. But, upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated, and the respondents were required to comment on the petition.

In its Manifestation (In Lieu of Comment), the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) manifested that it would rely on the evaluation and exercise of the discretionary power conferred on Petitioner in the prosecution of the instant petition.

In its Manifestation and Motion of 16 February 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed the Court that it could not represent the OMBUDSMAN for the following reasons: (a) the Solicitor General is the Vice-Chairman of... petitioner COMMITTEE; (b) being an agency of the Government, the COMMITTEE is entitled to be represented by the OSG; and (c) the petition was signed by Associate Solicitor Salvador C. Guevarra, who is presently on detail with the PCGG, and by Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza of the PCGG, which is also a client of the OSG.

Initially, the Court dismissed the petition in this case on technical grounds. But, upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated, and the respondents were required to comment on the petition.

In its Manifestation (In Lieu of Comment), the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) manifested that it would rely on the evaluation and exercise of the discretionary power conferred on Petitioner in the prosecution of the instant petition.

In its Manifestation and Motion of 16 February 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed the Court that it could not represent the OMBUDSMAN for the following reasons: (a) the Solicitor General is the Vice-Chairman of petitioner COMMITTEE; (b) being an agency of the Government, the COMMITTEE is entitled to be represented by the OSG; and (c) the petition was signed by Associate Solicitor Salvador C. Guevarra, who is presently on detail with the PCGG, and by Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza of... the PCGG, which is also a client of the OSG.

On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman of the PCGG as Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one representative... each from the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation... as members.

On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing the COMMITTEE to "include in its investigation, inventory, and study all non-performing loans which shall embrace both behest and non-behest loans." It likewise provided for the following criteria which might be "utilized as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action is barred by prescription

RULING:  In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following shall be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription started to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. Looking at the provisions of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), the law provides for its own prescriptive period. "SECTION 11. Prescription of offenses. — All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in fifteen years."
However, since R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is provided in Act No. 3326, Section 2 15 as amended, which provides: "SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

"The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy." This implies that if the commission of the crime were known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof; i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts. In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.

As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." In this case, the prescriptive period was interrupted upon the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman on March 24, 1997, five (5) years from the time of discovery in 1992. The filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period.

174. Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan (455 SCRA 526, 2005)

Prohibited Acts and Transactions under the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Fil capital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

RULING: The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOLGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila.

The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”.

The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government. Thus, the Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.

 

175. Department of Health v. Philippine Pharmawealth (518 SCRA 240, 2007)

G.R. NO. 169304 : March 13, 2007

Prohibited Acts and Transactions under the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

FACTS:

Defense of state immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine. Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth‘s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the non- accreditation of respondent‘s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS). Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOH‘s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners‘ motion to dismiss the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will prosper.

RULING: The petition fails. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of ―illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.

 The petition is DENIED. CA decision affirmed.

176. Lumayna v Commission on Audit (601 SCRA 163, 2009)

Official Immunity not Absolute

FACTS: On 15 June 2001, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Local Budget Circular No. 74 (LBC No. 74), authorizing the grant of a maximum of 5% salary adjustment to personnel in the Local Government Units (LGUs) effective 1 July 2001, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9137 dated 8 June 2001. On 13 May 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan of Mayoyao, Ifugao enacted Resolution No. 41, s. 2002, approving the 2002 Annual Municipal Budget, and appropriating the amount of P1,590,376.00 thereof for the salaries and benefits of 17 newly created positions in the municipality. Upon review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Ifugao (Sangguniang Panlalawigan), the 2002 Annual Municipal Budget of Mayoyao, Ifugao was declared operative subject to the conditions that the creation of 17 new positions shall in no case be made retroactive and that the filling up of such positions be made strictly in accordance with the Civil Service rules and regulations.

On 8 July 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan approved Resolution No. 66, s. 2002, adopting a first class salary scheme for the municipality and implementing a 5% salary increase for its personnel in accordance with LBC No. 74. For this purpose, it enacted Resolution No. 94, s. 2002, re-aligning the amount of P1,936,524.96 from the 2002 municipal budget originally appropriated for the salaries and benefits of the 17 new positions. On 12 July 2002, DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 75 (LBC No. 75) providing guidelines on personal services limitation, pursuant to Section 325(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

On 16 December 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan through Resolution No. 144, s. 2002, approved the 2003 Annual Municipal Budget stated in Appropriation Ordinance No. 03. This was reviewed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and approved on 10 February 2003 via Resolution No. 2003-808. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, however, disallowed the 5% salary increase and the re-alignment of funds pursuant to Resolution No. 94, s. 2002, of the Sangguniang Bayan on the ground that the re-alignment is not sufficient in form to implement a salary increase. On 9 June 2003, the Sangguniang Bayan enacted Resolution No. 73, s. 2003, earnestly requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to reconsider its Resolution. Finding good faith on the part of the officials of the municipality, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in its Resolution No. 2004-1185 reconsidered its earlier position. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan allowed the adoption of a first class salary schedule and the 5% salary increase of the Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao. Meanwhile, the Regional Legal and Adjudication Office (RLAO) of the COA-Cordillera Administrative Region (COA-CAR) issued a Notice of Disallowance dated 16 May 2003 of the amount of P895,891.50, representing payments for salary increases of municipal personnel, for the period 15 February - 30 September 2002. According to COA-CAR, the grant of the increase was not in accordance with Sections 325 and 326 of the LGC; that the limitation on personal services had been exceeded; and that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution was not the appropriate manner of granting the increase. Petitioners requested a reconsideration, which was denied. Thus, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal before the Director, LAO-Local of COA but it was also denied. Hence, petitioners filed a Petition for Review before respondent COA assailing LAO-Local Decision No. 2003-104. However, on 29 December 2005, the COA denied the petition for lack of merit and affirming the disallowance in the amount of P895,891.50.

ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 29 is valid

RULING: Yes. On petition before the Court, it was held that Administrative Order No. 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits and enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior approval of the President, was a valid exercise of the President's power of control and authority over executive departments. As regards petitioners' contention that respondents should be held personally liable for the refund in question, the Court held, thus: Untenable is petitioners' contention that the herein respondents be held personally responsible for the refund in question. Absent a showing of bad faith or malice, public officers are not personally liable for damages resulting from the performance of official duties.Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties. Absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is likewise a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.

Furthermore, granting arguendo that the municipality's budget adopted the incorrect salary rates, this error or mistake was not in any way indicative of bad faith. Under prevailing jurisprudence, mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable, absent a clear showing that he was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. It does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. Rather, there must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent, or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud and contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. As we see it, the disbursement of the 5% salary increase was done in good faith. Accordingly, petitioners need not refund the disallowed disbursement in the amount of P895,891.50.

177. Calub v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115634             April 27, 2000

 

Official Immunity not Absolute

FACTS: On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber. Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts. Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.

RULING:  Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.

Given the circumstances in this case, the Court need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor General's line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it. 

178. Miralles v. Go

G.R. No. 139943       January 18, 2001

Criminal and Civil Cases Different from Administrative Matters

FACTS: On December 7, 1977, an administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM against petitioner Manuel Miralles for Grave Misconduct committed as follows: That on or about the 19th day of October 1977, in Quezon City Metro Manila, the above named respondent did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just motive, and with intent to kill Patrolman NILO RESURRECION, assault, attack and wound the said Pat. Resurrecion with the use of firearms, directing the shots against the vital parts of the body of the latter and one Ernesto Mercullo, thereby inflicting upon them gunshot wounds which directly caused the death of Nilo Resurrecion and Ernesto Merculio, acts of the said respondent punishable by law and rules. An investigation was conducted by Rogelio A. Ringpis, Hearing Officer No. 3 of NAPOLCOM, Manila. After hearing, Hearing Officer Rogelio Ringpis submitted to the Chairman of NAPOLCOM an Investigation Report finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Double Homicide) and recommending his dismissal from the service.

On September 10, 1980, the Adjudication Board No. 15 of the NAPOLCOM rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct and dismissing him from the service with prejudice to reinstatement. On April 20, 1981, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision but the same was denied by the Adjudication Board. On September 23, 1981, petitioner appealed the aforestated Decision to the Special Appellate Committee of the NAPOLCOM. On June 6, 1983, [SAC-Napolcom] issued a Resolution which reads as follows: On September 23, 1981, Pat. Manuel Miralles filed a Notice of Appeal from the Decision finding him guilty of Grave Misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with prejudice. By virtue thereof, the record of the case was elevated to this Committee. Since then, however, up to the present or a period of more than one (1) year and seven (7) months, no appeal brief, memorandum or any pleading ha[s] been filed. The Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for abandonment and lack of interest. On August 30, 1983, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation praying that the dismissal of the Notice of Appeal be set aside and asking for time within which to submit his Memorandum. On September 27, 1983, petitioner submitted a Memorandum to [SAC-Napolcom]. On April 26, 1984, [SAC-Napolcom] rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of the Adjudication Board.
On June 30, 1984, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision.On October 30, 1989, [SAC-Napolcom] issued a Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner from the service can be sustained on the basis of the evidence on record notwithstanding that the same overwhelmingly supports the dismissal of the instant administrative charge against the petitioner.

RULING: Yes. On the issue of the Dismissal of the case, Petitioner further contends that the Quezon City RTC's dismissal of the criminal case for homicide instituted against him was "conclusive of his innocence."

His argument is bereft of merit. An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Indeed, the quantum of proof in the latter is different, such that the verdict in one need not necessarily be the same as in the other. In a recent case, the Court explained this difference as follows:

"It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court's finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.'

Hence, the Petition is denied. The assailed Decision is affirmed.

179. Te v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126746               November 29, 2000

Criminal and Civil Cases Different from Administrative Matters

FACTS: Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.On July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage. After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence. The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. There are two petitions for certiorari that were consolidated. Petitioner Motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the public respondent committed a serious error in refusing to suspend the legal (criminal and administrative) proceedings despite the pendency of the Civil Case for declaration of nullity of marriage

RULING: Petition has no merit. The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable.  In Landicho vs. Relova, we held that: Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case: The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. The existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

180. Anonuevo Jr. v Court of Appeals (411 SCRA 621, 2003)

[G.R. No. 152998. September 23, 2003.]

Criminal and Civil Cases Different from Administrative Matters

 

FACTS: On October 15, 1999, Sgt. Rodrigo Almazan and Giovanni Gumalo, both of the Office of the Resident Ombudsman for Manila International Airport Authority-Ninoy Aquino International Airport/Duty Free Phils., Inc. filed a complaint against Simon Añonuevo, Jr., Acting Examiner, Vicente Estrella, Customs Operations Officer I, Nora Linda Cosme, Customs Operations Officer V, and Ricardo Concha, Acting Principal Customs Appraiser, all of the Bureau of Customs, NAIA, Pasay City for violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713. 1 They alleged that in the evening of October 12, 1999, Petitioners, while assigned at the NAIA customs lanes numbers 9 and 10, received money handed directly or inserted in the passport of arriving passengers of the Northwest Airlines flight from Detroit, USA, and the Canadian Airlines flight. They further alleged that Cosme and Concha received their share of the money collected by the petitioners. The Resident Ombudsman Team was able to record on video a segment of the incident using the surveillance camera of the Emergency Operations Center of the NAIA.

The Ombudsman placed the four officials under preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay, 2 considering that the evidence against them was strong. On March 29, 2001, the said officials filed their Joint Affidavit and an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Meanwhile, Cosme and Concha filed their respective Supplemental Counter-Affidavit and Supplemental Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension. Cosme pointed out that there was nothing in the video footage which would implicate her for any act of solicitation or acceptance of any money, whether directly or indirectly, while in the course of the performance of her duties. In the same way, Concha asserted that it was grossly malicious for the complainants to infer that, just because he was caught by the camera passing by the place where petitioners were standing, he received money from them.

On January 11, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order in which the respondent, customs operations officer V and Ricardo R Concha were exonerated and the instant case was dismissed as to them. Meanwhile, the Ombudsman denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in rendering the assailed Decision. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case on March 1, 2002,
The instant petition is DISMISSED outright for failure to comply with the following requirements: (a) Affidavit of service as required under Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (b) The assailed Decision dated September 19, 2001 and the February 1, 2002 Order were not certified by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the tribunal or agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 65 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the same rules.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same on April 16, 2002.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case warrants the dismissal of the administrative disciplinary case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence

 

RULING: No. Petitioners argue that the dismissal of the criminal case for indirect bribery against them warrants the dismissal of the instant administrative disciplinary case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

The argument is not well-taken. Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. 15 The quantum of evidence required in the latter is only substantial evidence, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt that is required in criminal cases. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

Notably, there was not even a trial on the merits of the criminal case. The trial court allowed the withdrawal of the Information filed by the City Prosecutor after conducting a reinvestigation and it found that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of probable cause for the crime of indirect bribery.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

181. Suduaco v Laguindanum (466 SCRA 428, 2005)

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601. August 11, 2005

Administrative Proceedings against Public Officers

FACTS: On March 4, 2002, complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco charged respondent Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kabacan-Carmen, North Cotabato with grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office and/or gross ignorance of the law. Here, the motor vehicle if the respondent judge being repaired by Toyota shop, wherein herein complainant is the manager and respondent refused to pay the cost of the repair and instead told that it will be the insurance that will pay the cost. Complainant claimed that respondent judge has a heated argument with the Service Department Manager and shouted that she was a judge. Respondent judge asked for a demand letter and upon presentation thereof, she paid the deductible franchise stated therein under protest. Respondent Judge left the shop without the car, later on she filed case for replevin.

The report of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. He observed that respondent's refusal to pay the deductible franchise was not intended to violate the law. No fault can be attributed on respondent for refusing to sign a blank form. Had respondent grossly humiliated or berated Garao, Yez or Saragoza, they would not have gone to her office, together with complainant and Linaza, to apologize.The OCA adopted the Investigating Justice's recommendation with modification that complainant Duduaco be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for filing this baseless harassment suit. The OCA opined that complainant's insistence on pursuing her unsubstantiated charges despite lack of personal knowledge wasted the time and resources not only of respondent but also of the Investigating Justice and this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Laquindanum is liable for gross ignorance of the law

RULING: No. The Court agrees with the OCA. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Administrative proceedings against judges are by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 

Respondent's refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that the demand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form, did not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She was only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for refund. The Court agree with OCA's recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith. 

During the formal investigation, she admitted that she was absent when the event transpired on June 23, 2001, which means that she has no personal and direct knowledge of the incident. Yet, in the verification portion of the complaint, she claimed that all the allegations therein were true and correct of her own knowledge and belief. Significantly, she also went to respondent's office and apologized. Human nature dictates that redress for a wrong done is ordinarily sought by the aggrieved with zeal. Yet, it appears that it was more than eight (8) months after the incident that complainant and Toyota-Davao filed this complaint against an alleged 'erring member of the bench. Verily, the delay militates against the veracity of their allegations. Moreover, complainant filed the instant administrative case after Toyota-Davao lost possession of the vehicle in favor of respondent and after she refused to settle the replevin suit she filed against them. More specifically, the instant complaint was filed only on March 4, 2002 or about eight (8) months after respondent filed the replevin case and secured the writ on July 4, 2001. As the Investigating Justice fittingly observed, 'the timing couldnt be worse. 

The filing of the instant administrative complaint was not done in good faith. In complainant's letter dated January 21, 2002, she informed this Court about a similar complaint filed before the Judicial and Bar Council 'for the purpose of objecting to (respondent's) application for appointment as Regional Trial Court in Midsayap, North Cotabato or elsewhere. Clearly, this administrative case was filed not for the purpose of obtaining justice to the aggrieved persons, however mistaken it may be, but for the sole purpose of degrading respondent's reputation and exposing her to public ridicule. This should not be countenanced.

This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. This Court could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any member of the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation. 

182. Amado v Suarin (467 SCRA 402, 2005)

[A.M. NO. P-05-2059 : August 19, 2005]

Administrative Proceedings against Public Officers

FACTS: In his complaint filed on October 3, 2003 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Atty. Audie C. Arnado charged Sheriff III Edilberto R. Suarin of Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)-Cebu City, Branch 8, with Serious Misconduct, Oppression, Harassment and Unethical Conduct relative to Civil Case No. R-37529 entitled Lourdes L. Rosaroso v. Sps. Audie and Caroline Arnado. Complainant alleged that Sheriff Suarin prematurely implemented the writ of execution and served notices to vacate by banging his gate, shouting and creating public scandal, and posting notices at the gate which caused him humiliation.

In his Comment, Sheriff Suarin alleged that he merely implemented the final decision of the trial court. He belied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that he always used the buzzer each time he served the notice in complainant's residence; that an employee of spouses Arnado would open the peep hole and inform him that the spouses are not around then instruct him to slip the notice in the opening underneath the gate. In March 30, 2003 Agenda Report, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Sheriff Suarin for lack of merit and that Atty. Arnado be directed to explain why he should not be administratively sanctioned for filing a frivolous complaint, which recommendation was adopted by this Court in its Resolution of June 7, 2004.

In his Comment, Atty. Arnado maintained that his complaint against Sheriff Suarin is not frivolous and was not filed to exact revenge but to bring to the attention of the Court the corrupt acts of judicial employees. He alleged that Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores of MTCC-Cebu City, Branch I, was paid P30,000.00 to render the judgment of eviction while Sheriff Suarin received P60,000.00 to implement the same. The latter allegedly implemented the writ without waiting for the trial court's resolution of their complaint to annul the sale and deed of donation. The OCA recommended that complainant, Atty. Arnado be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for filing a groundless suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Arnado be sanctioned administratively

RULING: The Court agreed with the findings of the OCA.

In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Administrative proceedings against judicial employees are by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, Atty. Arnado not only lacked personal knowledge of the charges but also failed to substantiate them. He claimed that Sheriff Suarin banged at his gate, shouted and posted notices at the gate but he failed to mention the details and the dates on which these infractions were alleged to have been committed. He presented no witnesses to prove his claim particularly his employees who had always informed the sheriff that he and his wife were away each time the notices were served.

Atty. Arnado must know that it was the ministerial duty of Sheriff Suarin to implement the writ of execution and that he was merely following a lawful order of the court. This complaint was filed less than a month after his complaint against Judge Rosales was dismissed. Atty. Arnado must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must be exercised in good faith.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends - the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated on June 21, 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust. Thus, a lawyer should not use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

XIII. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - In General - Administrative Proceedings against Public Officers

183) Reyes v. Mangino (450 SCRA 27, 2005)

 

Facts: Petitioner Reyes is one of the accused in a criminal case wherein Judge Mangino is the presiding judge. The two held a meeting in Manila wherein Reyes was assured by the Mangino that the case will be dismissed. Mangino and Reyes came in to an agreement to dismiss the case. Mangino instructed Reyes not to appear in court during the promulgation of judgment. However, during the promulgation of judgment, the decision found the petitioner guilty. Petitioner filed a complaint against the judge. In the investigation of the Executive Judge, Mangino denies that he was at the vicinity of Manila since he was at Tarlac to solemnize a marriage. However, upon investigation of the executive judge, it appears that the marriage that he claims to have solemnized was made at a different date. Thus, the Executive Judge recommended that Mangino be dismissed from service.

 

Issue: Whether or not Judge Mangino should be dismissed from service?

 

Held: No. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. Thus, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. In this case, the complainant could have easily gathered enough extrinsic evidence, such as testimonies of waiters, restaurant employees, or other disinterested witnesses, to prove the alleged meeting with the respondent Judge. But the complainant failed to do so. Where the charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence, the general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence.  The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.

 

184. Civil Service Commission v Asensi (447 SCRA 356, 2004)

Administrative Proceedings against Public Officers

FACTS: Respondent Nimfa Asensi was ordered dismissed by petitioner Civil Service Commission ("CSC") from her position as Revenue District Officer of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Lucena City. Her dismissal came after an investigation revealed that she had falsified entries in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) relative to her educational background.¹ Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the CSC Resolution ordering her dismissal.

On 9 July 2003, the CA promulgated a decision holding that the dismissal of respondent was not warranted, and setting aside the assailed resolution of the CSC. Acting upon the CSC’s motion for reconsideration, it denied by the CA.

The OSG received a copy of the 29 October 2003 Resolution on 7 November 2003. Having until 22 November 2003 to file a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, on 21 November 2003, the OSG filed a motion for extension until 22 December 2003 to file the petition for review. This Court granted the OSG’s motion in a Resolution dated 9 December 2003. Apparently, the CSC remained in the dark as to the legal moves made by its counsel, the OSG. On 25 November 2003, the CSC, filed a Manifestation To File Its Own Petition for Review. This Manifestation was signed by three lawyers from the Office of Legal Affairs of the CSC.

On 27 November 2003, the CSC, through its Office of Legal Affairs, filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the 9 July 2003 Decision of the CA, which it received on 30 July 2003. In a Resolution dated 13 January 2004, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, directed the respondent to file her comment thereon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CA in finding that respondent was not guilty of the charges against her is tenable

RULING: The Court agree with the respondent. There is little need to elaborate on the reasons, which are after all, elementary in procedural law. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse of discretion imputed to the CA was its finding that respondent was not guilty of the charges against her, a charge that if true, would only constitute an error in law. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari. Neither is certiorari warranted if there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedy to the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is a petition for review under Rule 45.

The OSG, counsel of record for the CSC, well understood the proper procedure for appeal, and undertook the initiatory step for a petition for review by filing a Motion for Extension of Time to file such petition. It is unclear if the CSC had known about the OSG’s Motion, though the answer to that question does not really matter to the disposition of this case. The Court granted the OSG’s Motion, allowing the OSG to file its Petition until 22 December 2003. The OSG, being the designated legal representative of the Government and its instrumentalities, has a long history of association with this Court and acquired in the process an awesome wealth of experience in appellate practice. Had the CSC relied on its counsel’s expertise, it would have been spared of the needless burden of salvaging its petition from outright dismissal and, of course, the inevitable ignominy which such dismissal entails.

Instead, the CSC, using its own lawyers, filed the wrong mode of review. The CSC’s assertion as to the capacity of its Office of Legal Affairs to appear before this Court is of dubious legal basis. A similar issue was raised, albeit pertaining to the legal officers of the BIR, in the Court’s resoultion in CIR v. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory. The BIR therein asserted that on the basis of Section 220 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, its legal officers were allowed to institute civil and criminal actions and proceedings in behalf of the government. The Court disagreed, saying that it is the Solicitor General who has the primary responsibility to appear for the government in appellate proceedings, it being the principal law officer and legal defender of the government. The Court also cited with approval, the exception enunciated in Orbos v. CSC which is that the government office may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative only if it is adversely affected by the contrary position taken by the OSG. Herein, there is no indication that the OSG has adopted a position contrary to that of the CSC; hence, appearance by the CSC on its own behalf would not be warranted.

Yet, even if the CSC Office of Legal Affairs were allowed to represent the CSC in this petition, still the dismissal of the case would still be warranted in view of the erroneous mode by which the assailed CA decision was elevated. The OSG which had been given until 22 December 2003 to file the petition for review, did not file any such petition, interposing instead the Manifestation and Motion. This Manifestation did not stay the period for filing the petition for review. Thus, such period has already elapsed for good. On account of the lapse of the period, there is no need for us to pass upon the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion.

 

Requisites for Recovery of Damages Arising from Acts of Public Officers

185. Garcia v. Pajaro (384 SCRA 122, 2002)

 

The city treasurer of Dagupan has the authority to institute disciplinary actions against subordinate officers or employees. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain one’s side, whether written or verbal. The constitutional mandate is satisfied when a petitioner complaining about an action or a ruling is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration.

 

Facts: "Evidence for the petitioner tends to show that petitioner SEBASTIAN GARCIA, 61, married, employee at the City Treasurer’s Office, Dagupan City and resident of Lucao, Dagupan City, has been employee thereat since June 15, 1974 as Revenue Collector appointed to that position by then City Mayor Cipriano Manaois. He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro from June 1, 1990 to March 15, 1992 and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal Charge filed against him. He resumed work on March 16, 1992 as Local Treasury Officer III. When he was suspended, his position was Local Treasury Officer and Revenue Officer with a salary of P6,800.00 a month. When he resumed work, his salary was already P7,615.00 monthly. From June 1, 1990 up to March 15, 1992, he had been reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant, investigator and judge and there was no complaint against him from the Office of the City Mayor. He did not believe in the Order; he did not submit himself for investigation. He was not paid his salary because of the suspension order which caused his sleepless nights, his two (2) children stopped schooling, he has to beg from his relatives. He has a wife with four (4) children in college, one in Commerce, another taking up Dentistry. During the 1990 earthquake, there was calamity loan granted to employees but he could not avail of it because the City Treasurer would not approve the loan. He is asking P1,000,000.00 for his mental anguish and sufferings. From July to October, 1987 the City Treasurer refused to give him his COLA, differential, cash gift, salary and mid-year bonus amounting to P6,800.00 up to the present. His salary now is P13,715.00 as Treasury Officer III. Contrary to the charges of the City Treasurer, he has been doing his duties and obligations; that for the acts of charging him in the Department of Finance and for charging him for neglect of duties, he felt deeply hurt and is asking P250,000.00 for that; his agreement with his counsel is P25% of what will be awarded to him.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

 

Issue: Is the respondent personally liable for the damages suffered by the petitioner

 

Ruling:  the extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.

 

XIII. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Civil Liability

186) Ever Emporium, Inc. v. Maceda (440 SCA 298, 2004)

 

Facts: To give favor to his former law professor handling the case, Atty. Morante requested Atty. Crisolog-Lara to assign the case in their branch which was granted by Judge Maceda. However, Maceda scolded Morante for knowing the Crisologo-Lara knew about the grant. So, Morante conditioned Lara to make the situation sort of misunderstanding but the latter told him that he only said the truth. Then, Morante attempted to give money to Lara to settle the concern which was refuse. This situation resulted to an untoward communication among Morante, Lara and Maceda.

 

Atty. Villaflor, counsel of petitioner filed a complaint against respondents with gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and serious or grave misconduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.

 

The case commenced an action for Annulment of Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Las Pias City against Allied Banking Corporation, Sheriff Antolin L. Obsequio, Jr., and the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City on February 4, 2000. The complaint allaeged, Judge Maceda, by taking undue interest in the case and by agreeing and consenting to the illegal and anomalous request of Atty. Morante, has clearly violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and his oath as a magistrate of law. Instead of being viewed as the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and inclination to obey the law, he has, in effect, projected himself in collusion with his branch clerk of court, as a depository of arbitrary power. The case was investigated by the CA Associate Justice Morales but later on assigned to Justice Guaria III. The investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground on the ground of reasonable doubt because there was no witness on the assignment of the case and the heated words of Maceda. 

 

Issue: Whether or not respondents can be subjected to civil liability, criminal or administrative actions?

 

Held: No. The court agrees agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, a contrary rule would result in an intolerable burden on the administration of justice, because judges cannot be made to be absolute insurers of the correctness of their own rulings. There is no showing that the respondent judge in this case was motivated by ill will or bad faith in issuing the questioned orders.

The administrative complaints against respondents Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda and Atty. Edgar Allan C. Morante are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 

XIII. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Civil Liability -Liability of Members of the Judiciary for Official Acts

187) Ora v. Almajar (473 SCRA 17, 2005)

 

Facts: Ora filed an administrative case for gross ignorance of the law against Judge Almajar since the latter issued a warrant of arrest when the former did not appear for the scheduled preliminary investigation.

 

Issue: Whether or not Almajar is guilty for gross ignorance of the law.

 

Held: No, because to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. The acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. For to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders would be intolerable.

 

In the case at bar, there was no allegation whatsoever that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, malice or corruption when he issued the premature warrant of arrest. Be that as it may, however, we hold him administratively liable for his unfamiliarity with the rules on the conduct of preliminary investigations. We have always exhorted judges to be conversant with basic legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to follow developments in the law and to apply them. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in the law. Thus, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be faithful to the law and be the embodiment of professional competence.

188) Liability of Ministerial Officers for Official Acts

189) Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia (393 SCRA 639, 2002)

 

Facts: Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4^th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

 

Issue:    

Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.

Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.

Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

 

Ruling:

1. The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice.
2. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus, Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.

 

XIII.B.3

Liability of Ministerial Officers for Official Acts

189) Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia (393 SCRA 639, 2002)

 

Facts: Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4^th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

 

Issue:    

Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.

Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.

Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

 

Ruling:

3. The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice.
4. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus, Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.

 

XIII. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Civil Liability

190) Reyes v. Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. (424 SCRA 135, 2004)

 

Facts: RBSMI had a history of major violations/exceptions dating back to 1995, underwent periodic examination by the BSP. This resulted to a sanction to RBSMI to correct the major exceptions noted within 30 days from receipt of the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of P2,538,483.00 as fines and penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves against deposit liabilities. More than a year after, however, the RBSMI asked for a reconsideration of MB Resolution No. 724 insofar as the imposition of fine amounting to P2,538,483.00. On January 21, 1999, the MB adopted Resolution No. 71, authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty percent (60%) of the penalty pending resolution of the dispute on the findings on reserve deficiency. Subsequently, on April 7, 1999, the MB approved the interim reversal of the entire amount of the penalty pending the outcome of the study on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the penalty.

The above incidents, particularly the alleged brokering by Reyes and the petitioners unsupported recommendation to impose a penalty of P2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency, prompted the respondent to file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with unprofessionalism.

Issue: Whether Reyes conducted himself in an unprofessional manner in doing the acts imputed to him?

 

Held: The Court rules in the negative. the acts of Reyes do not constitute brokering. Case law defines a broker as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own name but in the name of those who employed him.. .. a broker is one whose occupation is to bring the parties together, in matters of trade, commerce or navigation. According to Bouviers Law Dictionary, brokerage refers to the trade or occupation of a broker; the commissions paid to a broker for his services, while brokers are those who are engaged for others on the negotiation of contracts relative to property, with the custody of which they have no concern.19 Thus, the word brokering clearly indicates the performance of certain acts for monetary consideration or compensation. To give it another definition such as that imputed by RBSMI to the acts of Reyes is to distort the accepted jurisprudential meaning of the term.

RBSMI miserably failed to establish that Reyes had breached the standard of professional conduct required of a public servant. It appears to the Court that in keeping with the standards of professionalism and heeding the mandate of his position, he made the telephone introductions for no other purpose but to pave the way for a possible consolidation or merger of RBSMI with interested banks.

it cannot be overemphasized that the BSP is an independent body corporate bestowed under its charter with fiscal and administrative autonomy. As such, its officials should be granted a certain degree of flexibility in the performance of their duties and provided insulation from interference and vexatious suits, especially when moves of the kind are resorted to as counterfoil to the exercise of their regulatory mandate. Elsewise, the institutional independence and autonomy of the BSP as the central mandatory authority would be rendered illusory.

The Court RESOLVES to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioners Deputy Governor Alberto V. Reyes and Director Wilfredo B. Domo-ong. The Decision dated March 14, 2003 is SET ASIDE and another entered, DISMISSING the administrative complaint and EXONERATING all the petitioners. The Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the respondent Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. is DENIED.

 

XIII. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Civil Liability -Liability of Superior Officer for Acts of Subordinates

191) Nicolas v. Desierto (447 SCRA 154, 2004)

 

Facts: Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EEIB) apprehended a shipment which contained a cargo containing 'parts for rock crusher'. Petitioner Nicolas, Commissioner of EIIB, issued a Notice of Withdrawal for the release of the said shipment upon recommendation of Arriola, the Chief of EIIB’s Special Operations group. However, the documents presented in support of the release of the shipment were fake. A complaint was filed against Nicolas and the others involved for not verifying the authenticity of the documents relating to payment of custom duties. Nicolas contended that he had no knowledge that the documents for the payment of cargo duties were fake.

 

Issue:

 

Held: Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latter's own negligence. While Arriola might have been negligent in accepting the spurious documents, such fact does not automatically imply that Nicolas was also. As a matter of course, the latter relied on the former's recommendation. Petitioner is not mandated or even expected to verify personally from the Bureau of Customs or from wherever else it originated each receipt or document that appears on its face to have been regularly issued or executed.

 

It has also been held in Aries vs. Sandiganbayan that heads of office could rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates. The ratio, which is applicable here, was explained as follows: "We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems -- dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence -- is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority."

 

XIII. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Civil Liability - Liability of Unexplained Wealth

192) Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Assoc. (475 SCRA 218, 2005)

 

Facts: Petitioner and private respondents entered into three agreements which covered infrastructure projects for hospitals. The agreements contained a common provision wherein professional fees would be 7.5% of the project fund allocation. Petitioner withheld payment of the professional fees since there were various deficiencies. Petitioner continued to withhold payment, thus, the respondents filed with the CIAC a request for adjudication of their claim for payment. The claim for payment was granted by CIAC. Thus, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, however, the CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioners then raised the issue to the Supreme Court. It is only in their memorandum filed with the Supreme Court that they raised for the first time that the agreements are void from the beginning for failure to include therein a certification of availability of funds which is required under existing law.

 

Issue: Whether the agreements are void for failure to include a certification of availability of funds?

 

Held: Yes. The formalities expressly required by the Auditing Code of the Philippines and The Administrative Code of 1987 not having been complied with, the subject three Agreements are null and void from the very beginning.  E.O. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987) provides too that no funds shall be disbursed without first securing the certification of a government agency's chief accountant or head of the accounting unit as to the availability of funds. The issuance of such certification is thus a condition sine qua non to entering into any contract or incurring any obligation that may be chargeable against the authorized allotment in any department, office or agency. Unless the certification is issued, the contract cannot be considered final or binding. However, in the interest of substantial justice and equity, the Court finds that private respondents are entitled to be compensated for the services they actually performed for the benefit of petitioner on a quantum meruit basis.

 

 

 

Liability of Unexplained Wealth

 

193) Republic v. Sandiganbayan (506 SCRA 190, 2003)

 

Facts: On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379¹ in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,² 2,³ 14⁴ and 14-A.⁵

In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks:

(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;

(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;

(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;

(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and

(5) Maler Foundation accounts.

 

Issue:  whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.

 

Ruling: We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous records of this case.

Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x"

The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are:

(1) the offender is a public officer or employee;

(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and

(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.

It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant.

The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second element.

The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer's salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining whether a prima facie presumption has been established in this case.

Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government officials.

 

XIII. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Civil Liability

194) Republic v. Sandiganbayan (416 SCRA 133, 2003)

 

Facts: Ramas was among those AFP officials with unexplained wealth. PCGG files a case against Ramas. But it failure to present evidence prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case for lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan ruled that The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino which involve the same issues; no previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano; the evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him; there was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

Issue: Whether or not PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379?

 

Held: The court hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction. The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas’ case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. The court hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

 

The petition for certiorari is dismissed. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are affirmed.

 

XIII. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Civil Liability - Liability of Unexplained Wealth

195) Garcia v. Sandiganbayan (460 SCRA 600(2005)

 

Facts: A complaint was filed against petitioner, Major Garcia, for unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials. His wife and their three sons were also impleaded for being used as dummies in disposing of his ill-gotten wealth. The case filed was based on the investigation that showed that petitioner acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income. Petitioner argues that a petition for forfeiture is an independent civil action over which the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.

 

Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379

 

Held:  Yes. The decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan squarely rules on the issues raised by petitioner concerning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. After reviewing the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First Instance of the city or province where the public officer or employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379. Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486, original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the said court. P.D. No. 1606 was later issued expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of said court. Such civil actions removed from the jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379.

 

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 abolished the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable by a penalty not higher than prision correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not being of a serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. 1860 and eventually by P.D. No. 1861.

 

It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the respondent officer or employee’s incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court—to address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service.

 

 

196. Peralta v. Desierto (473 SCRA 322, 2005)

Liability of Public Officer who signs or initials documents

FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a motor shop operating under the name of Shalom Motor Works. They claimed that sometime in August 2000, respondent Garcia, the head of the Motor Pool Division of the municipality of Navotas, engaged the services of their motor shop for the fixing and repair of the municipality's service vehicles. The terms and conditions for the repair is that the repair shall be based on the job estimate provided by the petitioners as approved by the municipality.

 

The service vehicles owned by the municipal government alleged to have been repaired by Shalom Motor Works. Petitioners professed that they were not able to receive full payment for every repaired vehicle. Allegedly, they were forced by respondent Garcia to receive and encash the checks issued by the municipal government in the name of Shalom Motor Works, but in reality, were not really issued to the said motor shop, since petitioners were not receiving the full amount indicated therein, as they were forced to surrender the proceeds thereof after encashing the checks to respondent Garcia, and thereafter be content with whatever will be given to them as a token or 'vale as a partial payment.

 

Because of fear of not being able to collect their receivables from the municipality, petitioners contended that they were also forced to sign blank Purchase Orders forms provided for by respondent Garcia. They learned later that one of the Purchase Order forms they signed contained an amount in excess of what they have quoted, and the same bears the signature of respondents Enriquez (Mun. Treasurer), Goco (Supply Officer), and Tiangco (Mun. Mayor).

 

Petitioners further averred that in May 2001, when they personally made a follow up of their receivables from respondent Mayor, they were informed by the latter that he was about to sign a check containing a Purchase Order supposedly addressed to Shalom Motor Works. But to petitioners dismay, they found out that the said job order which is for the overhauling of a fire truck was not done by their motor shop, but in the Purchase Order, it was made to appear that it was Shalom Motor Works who did the repair because the Cash Invoice attached to that particular Purchase Order made use of a receipt purportedly issued by the said motor shop. Petitioners also lament the fact that three (3) of their sub-contractors were pirated by the municipal government to do the repair and fixing of the municipality's service vehicles, and they were allegedly using falsified Cash Invoices of Shalom Motor works to secure payment from the local Treasury.

 

In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent Tiangco admits that the municipality of Navotas had entered into a contract with Shalom Motor Works for the repair of some of its service vehicles, but denied that the payment of the repair cost were based on the job estimate furnished by the petitioners. He also insist that the total obligation of the municipality to the said motor shop is only (Php 89,340.40), and not (Php 181,265.00) as what the petitioners were trying to impress to this Office. In support thereof, Disbursement Vouchers covering the municipality's obligation were presented.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the evidence presented by petitioners was not enough to establish the liability of respondents under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, establishing probable cause to warrant the filing of the case of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019

 

RULING: No. Petitioners contend that the OMB, in a whimsical and capricious manner, failed to appreciate properly the evidence presented before it. Contrary to its findings, they have allegedly amply satisfied the elements required to hold respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

 

The Court cannot ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the OMB's conclusion that petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate their allegations. The OMB found that the documents they had submitted did not establish a probable cause or engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed, and that respondents were probably guilty of it; its finding was a judgment call. Petitioners have not shown arbitrariness, despotism or capriciousness in its action. That judgment may or may not have been erroneous, but it has not been shown to be tainted with grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

 

The most important elements of the offense charged are (1) causing undue injury to the government or a private party (2) by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a party; (3) with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. To show undue injury, petitioners cite the alleged failure of the Municipality to pay its remaining debts. Beyond their empty statements, however, they have presented no evidence whatsoever in support of their claim. If they truly had at least eight service contracts with the Municipality of Navotas for the repair of its vehicles, they should have been able to produce copies of some official documents evidencing their claim.

Normally, contracting with government agencies and instrumentalities should not be done verbally, much less without any paper trail at all. In this case, the documents evidencing job Contracts with petitioners were proffered by respondents. These Contracts numbered only three, and all have undisputedly been fully paid for, as evidenced by the checks duly issued to and received by petitioners.

 

The proof of forgery presented by petitioners is not impeccable either. The date '3-20-81 appearing on the Cash Invoice, which merely indicates the issuance to the business entity of an authority to print receipts or invoices, is not conclusive as to the date of the establishment of the business. In any event, the allegedly fake Invoice, the sample Official Receipt (submitted to show a different date of printing), the Authority to Print Receipts/Invoices, and the Affidavit of Denial executed by petitioners are not sufficient to convince us of their contention: that the OMB was capricious in refusing to give credence to the charge that there was forgery, and that the forgery was perpetrated by respondent public officials.

 

 

XIII.C.1

Criminal Liability: Revised Penal Code

197) Blanquisco v. Austero-Bolilan (425 SCRA 470, 2004)

 

Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint dated April 17, 2002, spouses Arturo B. Blanquisco and Corazon Manalang-Blanquisco prayed that respondent, Atty. Asuncion Austero-Bolilan, Chief of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Fifth Judicial Region, be dismissed from her position and disbarred from practicing the profession of law for grave abuse of authority, oppression, dishonesty, falsification of public document and violation of her lawyer's oath.

 

Issue: Whether Atty. Austero-Bolilan is liable.

 

Ruling:

Respondent invokes the case of Arias to support her contention that, even if she signed the certification without exhaustively checking the accuracy thereof, she should not be held liable because she had the right to rely on the work of her subordinates. Arias involves a different set of facts relating to allegations of a large-scale conspiracy involving several heads of offices and/or their deputies. Our ruling there that heads of offices can rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter into negotiations is only applicable if the facts are similar to the Arias case. They are not.

 

This she did not do. Simple neglect signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. A clerk of court, being an essential officer in the judicial system, is expected to be assiduous in performing his or her official duties. Negligence in the performance thereof warrants disciplinary action.

Lastly, while it is true that respondent should not perhaps be blamed for the erroneous act of the Register of Deeds of Albay in canceling the notice of lis pendens based alone on the certification she issued (inasmuch as any such cancellation required a court order under the Rules of Court), the fact remains that there was negligence on her part in issuing the subject certification.

 

XIII. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS - Criminal Liability

198) Chan v. Sandiganbayan (466 SCRA 190, 2005)

 

Facts: Petitioner is the cashier of NBI. Upon her leave, a certain Bas was designated by the regional directors to take  her post as cashier. When the Commission on audit made the report of her accountabilities, it was found out the Petitioner has a shortage of her remittance. A case was charged against her for malversation of Public funds. Petitioners moved for a re-audit but was denied. The court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds?

 

Held: Yes. Upon cross examination, petitioner admitted that she actually allowed Bas to borrow money from her collection. This has be the practice in their office tagging also the director having acquiesced with the practice.

The court held that the grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an accountable officer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public funds by other persons, which is punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice is to give a license to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use of public funds.

There is no law or regulation allowing accountable officers to extend loans to anyone against "vales" or chits given in exchange by the borrowers. On the other hand, the General Auditing Office (now the Commission on Audit) time and again, through repeated office memoranda and rulings had warned against the acceptance of "vales" or chits by any disbursing officer because such transactions are really forms of loans (Memorandum Circular No. 570, June 24, 1968, General Auditing Office). (Underscoring supplied)‚

The alleged acquiescence of petitioner's superior, even if true, is not a valid defense. As Ilogon v. Sandiganbayan teaches:

The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from his criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the) immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the disbursements". (Underscoring supplied)

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts or Neglect of Officer 

199) Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez (281 SCRA 1, 1993)

 

Facts: A complaint for falsification of a public document, use of falsified documents, robbery and the violation of R.A. No. 3019 was filed against Enriquez, Deputy Sheiff of an RTC branch. The complaint was filed by the company lawyer of Compania Maritima, Inc. It was alleged that Enriquez forged the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale awarded to Patriarca by stating that the bid price was paid on May 12, 1986 but in truth and in fact, the payment was only made on May 23, 1986.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

 

Held: Yes. Respondent is guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. If indeed the public auction was held on 12 May 1986 and Patriarca was the highest bidder therein, he did not at such time have the cash, corresponding to his submitted bid, for delivery to the respondent and eventually, the judgment creditor. Accordingly, pursuant to his own Notice, which of course is binding on him, Patriarca could not be awarded the bid. The latter's inability to produce cash is equivalent to a bidder's refusal to pay under Section 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in which case, as provided therein, the sheriff "may again sell the property to the highest bidder and shall not be responsible for any loss occasioned thereby." Moreover, the sheriff may thereafter reject any subsequent bid of such person. Since Patriarca had no available cash to pay for the bid, the respondent could neither deliver the subject articles nor execute and deliver to the former a certificate of sale as provided for in Section 25, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that he did conduct the public auction on 12 May 1986, the respondent, in view of the non-payment of the purchase price, violated said Section 25. Furthermore, he falsified his Sheriff's Certificate of Sale upon entering therein the fact that Patriarca "thereupon did pay" to him the bid price of P1,325,000.00 which was credited to the partial satisfaction of the writ of execution. Assuming that Patriarca truly paid the purchase price, there could be no possible explanation for the belated Sheriff's Partial Report dated 23 May 1986. He not only deliberately violated the integrity of official acts of an employee of the court, but also undermined the faith and trust of the public in the Judiciary. He has transgressed the constitutional command that as a public office is a public trust, all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.  In Jereos vs. Reblando, the Court laid down the rule that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, such as the court of which the herein respondent is the assigned sheriff, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized with propriety and decorum, but above all else must be beyond suspicion. Respondent is dismissed from service, effective immediately.

 

200. Casibang v. Aquino (92 SCRA 642, 1979)

TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

FACTS: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter-protest which petitioner answered on December 10, 1971. However, respondent Yu withdrew his counter-protest after waiving the opening and revision of the ballot boxes specified therein.

Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.

 

ISSUE: Who between protestant — herein petitioner — and protestee — herein respondent Yu — was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the position.

 

RULING: The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government."

 

That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a condidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, and We rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it .did not intend, to shielf or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot."

 

That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision".

 

That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution".

 

That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the 'term' to the office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the 'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite".

 

 

 

200. Casibang v. Aquino (92 SCRA 642, 1979)

TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

 

FACTS: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter-protest which petitioner answered on December 10, 1971. However, respondent Yu withdrew his counter-protest after waiving the opening and revision of the ballot boxes specified therein.

Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.

ISSUE: Who between protestant — herein petitioner — and protestee — herein respondent Yu — was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the position.

RULING: The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government."

 

That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a condidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, and We rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it .did not intend, to shielf or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot."

 

That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision".

 

That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution".

 

That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the 'term' to the office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the 'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite".

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

202) Alano v. Sahi. 727 SCRA 171, 2014

 

Facts: Respondent Sahi is the is employed in the Municipal Trial Court as a Court Interpreter. Judge Alano is the presiding judge of the court where Sahi is employed. Respondent was administratively charged for her inefficiency to discharge her duties after repetitive reminders. Judge Alano alleged that respondent Sahi never prepared any court calendar or minutes. Sahi defended saying the action was actually a retaliation against her for charging him administrative cases.

 

Issue: Whether or not Respondent Sahi is guilty of inefficiency to discharge her duty?

 

Held: Yes. The court agreed that Sahi is administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance official duties. Respondent was ordered to report back at the Office of the Clerk of Court but she did it only few days. She fails to explain about her absence. Some of the expected task from her like preparation of calendar shows her inattention to details which attest her inefficiency. In contrast, complainants have adequately shown that respondent Sahi’s unsatisfactory performance ratings were warranted in view of the error-filled output she had consistently produced and her indifferent attitude towards her work. While it is true that respondent Sahi is merely human and may commit mistakes, there is simply no excuse for making the same mistakes repeatedly despite her superior constantly calling her attention to correct them. Granting that respondent Sahi was not good at using computers in the beginning, she should have taken steps to learn and hone her computer skills which were essential to her work. No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Public officers must be accountable to the people at all times and serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility and efficiency. Any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice. As public officers, they are bound to discharge their duties with care, caution, and attention which prudent men usually exercise in the management of their affairs; and that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work in the judiciary, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. During the pendency of the present administrative matter, respondent Sahi suffered a stroke and resigned from office in January 2011. Her claim for separation benefits and accrued leave credits though cannot be processed and released for lack of requirements. Nonetheless, respondent Sahi’s resignation does not render this case moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction. Respondent Sahi’s actuations fell short of these exacting standards for court personnel.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts or Neglect of Officer - By Resignation

203) Padilla v. Civil Service Commission (403 SCRA 116, 2003)

 

Facts: Padilla was promoted from being Clerk II to Labor Development Assistant. She assumed her position without waiting for CSC’s approval of her appointment. The Regional Director disapproved Padilla’s appointment since she was not able to meet the eligibility requirement. After some time, Padilla resigned from service. 2 months after her resignation, she took the Career Service Examination and passed it. She then reapplied, and was appointed as Casual Research Assistant. She occupied the position of Casual Technical for 4 years. The positions such as casual technical were abolished when the Salary Standardization Act took effect. She was then offered a the permanent position of Clerk II but she declined such offer. Petitioner was then appointed as a casual clerk, and held the position until her appointment had expired. The CSC dismissed the allegation that petitioner was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was removed from service.

Held: No. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondents CSC and DOLE, adequately proved that petitioner voluntarily resigned and was never removed from the service. Petitioner used to occupy the permanent position of Clerk II before the disapproval of her appointment for Labor Development Assistant, a higher permanent position. Thereafter, she voluntarily resigned and later came back to occupy casual positions only despite passing the eligibility requirement for a permanent position. Like removal for just cause, voluntary resignation results in the abdication of all present and future rights accorded to an employee and in the severance of all work-related ties between the employer and the employee. When she returned to work for respondent DOLE, the same was not a continuation of her previous service but the start of a new work slate. Petitioner could not therefore demand from respondent DOLE her reinstatement to a permanent position under Section 24 (d) of PD 807 inasmuch as she was never unjustly removed. After finishing her contract as a Casual Technical, respondent DOLE offered to petitioner the permanent position of Clerk II (the only available permanent position then) for which the Selection Board deemed her qualified. However, she declined the offer and instead opted to accept another casual position as Casual Clerk III. Respondent DOLE therefore gave her the opportunity to re-assume a permanent position but petitioner was apparently bent on acquiring a position equal to a Labor Development Assistant, a position she could not obtain by right due to her earlier resignation. On the ground of estoppel, petitioner is barred from asserting her right to a permanent position.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

204. Republic v. Singun (548 SCRA 361, 2008)

Meaning of Resignation

FACTS: Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is represented by the Department of Trade and Industry, Regional Office No. 2 (DTI-RO2). Respondent was the former Chief Trade and Industry Development Specialist of DTI-RO2, Cagayan Province.He wrote Regional Director Jose Hipolito asking to apply for an 8½ month leave of absence starting 16 November 1999 until 31 July 2000. Respondent also signified his intention to retire from the service on 1 August 2000. On 4 November 1999, respondent filed his application for leave of absence and early retirement but this was denied by the Director.

He filed the same the second time and this was endorsed by Director Hipolito to Assistant Secretary Maglaya for his comment, but without waiting for the latter, Singun again filed the application but for a shorter period and signified his intention to resign from service at the close of office hours on January 14, 2000. Director Hipolito alleged that he approved Singun’s application and accepted his resignation on the same day in the form of a memorandum. In a letter dated November 23, 1999, he also notified Atty. Soria, the Regional Director of the CSC Regional Office No. 2 about it. On January 14, 2000, the DTI RO2 received a memorandum No. 2 issued by DTI Undersecretary Ordonez, detailing respondent to the office of the Undersecretary for Regional Operations effective January 17, 2000. Respondent wrote a letter to DTI RO2 stating that he was reconsidering his earlier resignation and that he decided to wait until he could avail of early retirement.

Director Hipolito asked Atty Soria on wheter Singun was considered resigned on January 14, 2000. He answered in the affirmative because of his voluntary written notice rearding the relinquishment of his position and the effectivity date of the resignation and because of Director Hipolito’s acceptance of the resignation. Director Hipolito informed Usec. Ordonez about it in explaining that the detail order was without effect. The former mentioned that during his leave of absence, Singun accepted employment with the Philippine Banking Corporation. Singun later informed USEC Ordonez that he applied for resignation under duress by Director Hipolito as a condition for the approval of his leave. The CA affimed the CSC.

ISSUES:  1. Whether or not respondent validly resigned from DTI-RO2 effective 14 January 2000;

                2. Whether the detail order issued by Undersecretary Ordoñez effectively withdrew respondent’s resignation.

RULING: 1. The Final Act of a Resignation’s Acceptance is the Notice of Acceptance. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.

Petitioner maintains that respondent’s resignation was complete because all the elements of a complete and operative resignation were present. On the other hand, respondent claims that his resignation was not complete because there was no valid acceptance of his offer to resign since he was not duly informed of its acceptance.

In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office.³⁰ Resignation to be effective must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor.³¹ A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238³² of the Revised Penal Code.³³ The final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance.³⁴ The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor.³⁵

In this case, the Court of Appeals and the CSC declared that there was nothing in the records to show that respondent was duly informed of the acceptance of his resignation. There was no indication that respondent received a copy of his 12 November 1999 application for leave of absence and resignation as accepted by Director Hipolito. Neither was there any indication that respondent received Director Hipolito’s 12 November 1999 Memorandum informing him of the acceptance of his resignation. Therefore, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent’s resignation was incomplete and inoperative because respondent was not notified of the acceptance of his resignation.1avvphi1

Petitioner’s contention that respondent knew that his resignation was accepted because respondent had notice that his application for leave of absence was approved does not deserve any merit. As respondent explained, there is a specific form used for an application of leave of absence and the approval of his application for leave of absence does not necessarily mean the acceptance of his resignation.

On respondent’s alleged employment with the PRBC, the Court notes that if respondent was employed by PRBC, it was undertaken during his approved leave of absence. It does not have any connection with the acceptance of his resignation. We agree with the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals that this does not amount to abandonment. If respondent was indeed employed by PRBC during his approved leave of absence and he violated Civil Service rules, then the proper case should be filed against him.

2. Resignation may be Withdrawn before its Acceptance. Until the resignation is accepted, the tender or offer to resign is revocable. And the resignation is not effective where it was withdrawn before it was accepted. In this case, since respondent’s resignation was not finally and conclusively accepted as he was not duly notified of its acceptance, respondent could validly withdraw his resignation. There was no need for Director Hipolito to accept the withdrawal of resignation since there was no valid acceptance of the application of resignation in the first place. Undersecretary Ordoñez also validly issued the detail order as respondent had not effectively resigned from DTI-RO2.

What Constitutes Resignation

205) Fortune Garments v. Castro (478 SCRA 125, 2005)

Facts: Assailed before the Court on Petition for Review on Certiorariis the Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56153 granting the petition of Elena J. Castro and nullifying the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Then 58-year old Elena J. Castro was employed as a sewer by the Fortuny Garments Corporation sometime in 1985. Petitioner Johnny Co was then its president. Elena was paid her salaries and other emoluments for the period up to December 21, 1996.

On December 16, 1996, Elena's daughter gave birth by caesarian operation. Since nobody would take care of her daughter, she then went on leave of absence.

When Elena reported to work on December 23, 1996, Elsa Co, co-manager of the company and wife of petitioner, told her that she had to stop working because "she was already old." Elena insisted that she could still work and perform her duties despite her age. She was told, this time, that she was already dismissed because of her failure to report for work for several days after her leave of absence. Nevertheless, Elena reported for work during the first week of January 1997, only to be informed again that she had already been dismissed.

Elena forthwith filed a complaint against the corporation and Johnny Co, for illegal dismissal and payment of monetary benefits inclusive of unpaid overtime pay.

For his part, the petitioner averred that the complainant was not dismissed but that she resigned voluntarily, as evidenced by a cash voucher dated January 30, 1996.

By way of reply, the complainant alleged that sometime in 1995, she and her co-workers were made to sign blank vouchers, allegedly as proof that their employer had paid their Social Security Service (SSS) premiums. She insisted that she could not have resigned on January 30, 1996 because she was still working for the corporation up to December 23, 1996 when she was illegally dismissed.  She did not receive a centavo from the petitioner by way of separation pay, salary, allowance, bonus or overtime pay.

On December 21, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering the dismissal of the complaint, holding that Elena had voluntarily resigned.

 

Issue: Whether Elena is deemed resigned

 

Ruling: No. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and has no other choice but to dissociate from employment. Resignation is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, and must be made with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. A resignation must be unconditional and with the intent to operate as such.

Moreover, the intention to relinquish an office must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. The act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered to determine whether in fact, he or she intended to relinquish such employment. If the employer introduces evidence purportedly executed by an employee as proof of voluntary resignation and the employee specifically denies the authenticity and due execution of said document, the employer is burdened to prove the due execution and genuineness of such document.

In the present case, no less than the petitioner adduced documentary evidence consisting of payrolls showing that the respondent reported for work and received her salary/wages up to December 21, 1996, or shortly before she went on leave of absence after her daughter gave birth on December 23, 1996. Based on the petitioner's documentary evidence itself, the respondent did not resign

 

Abandonment of Office

206) Santiago v. Augustin. 46 Phil. 14, 1924

 

Facts: Petitioner is elected member of the Municipal Board of the City and was chosen as president of said board. Sometime later, the governor general designated him as acting mayor. The senate question the authority of the designation and eventually disapproved the designation. When petitioner returns to his office as member of the Municipal Board, his was disqualified by the Insular Auditor. A preliminary injunction against petitioner was issued by the court. Consequently, the governor general designated the respondent. After the preliminary injunction was lifted, respondent refuse to leave his office since respondent contends that petitioner has abandoned his post when he accepted the designation of being an acting mayor. Petitioner contends that he is entitled for a post in the Municipal Board.

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled for a post in the Municipal Board?

 

Held: Section 2448 of the Administrative Code provides that." No city officer (of the City of Manila) shall hold more than one office unless expressly so provided by law" Relying on this legal provision, the respondent reinforces it by the well-settled rule of the common law that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding.  A public office may also become vacant by abandonment. But in order to constitute an abandonment of the office, it must be total, and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. Temporary absence is not sufficient. Instead, there must be an intention, actual or imputed, to abandon the office.

The court cited that with reference to Mr. Santiago, the Governor-General performed two distinct acts: (1) He designated Mr. Santiago Acting Mayor of the City of Manila; and (2) he tried to appoint Mr. Santiago Mayor of the City of Manila, but that appointment was not complete due to the failure of confirmation by the Philippine Senate.

 

Mr. Santiago took the oath of office and qualified for the position of Acting Mayor of the City of Manila. He indicated to the Municipal Board his intention to fill the new office temporarily and then return to his position as member of the Municipal board. Mr. Santiago never took the oath of office as Mayor of the Manila. He never qualified for the office of Mayor. He never accepted the office of Mayor. He did not at any time disclose an intention to abandon the office of member of the Municipal Board. There was no resignation, express or implied, from the latter office.

The opinion of the Insular Auditor is ex parte and not binding on the courts. The appointment of Mr. Agustin by the Governor-General is conditional and only continues until a pronouncement by the courts as to the legality of Mr. Santiago’s incumbency can be had, and presumably this must be considered such pronouncement.

 

It is the judgment of the court that the petitioner is entitled to the office of member of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, and that the respondent shall be ousted altogether excluded therefrom.

 

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts or Neglect of Officer - By Resignation

207) Canonizado v. Aguirre (351 SCRA 659, 2001)

 

Facts:  Canonizado was appointed to the position of Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) during the pendency of the case assailing a provision of the law to be unconstitutional since it violated the right to security of tenure. However, by accepting the said position, Canonizado is deemed to abandoned his claim to be reinstated to the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) since the two positions are incompatible. A decision of this case was already declared that Section 8 of RA 8551 violated the right to security of tenure of Petitioner Canonizado, thus, reinstatement of petitioners was ordered. 

Issue: Whether or not Canonazido abandoned his claim for reinstatement as NAPOLCOM Commisioner.

Held: No. Canonizado was compelled to leave his position as Commissioner, not by an erroneous decision, but by an unconstitutional provision of law. Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.  In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment.  There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment.  Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice.  There are, therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and second, an overt or “external” act by which the intention is carried into effect.

Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by nonuser or acquiescence.  Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonment where such nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform.  Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of the office. Where, while desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire or intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute which is afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and the officer may recover the office.  Prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position during the pendency of his petition would be to unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which under no circumstance can be attributed to him. However, before Canonizado can re-assume his post as Commissioner, he should first resign as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

208. Veteran Security Agency v Gonzalvo Jr. (478 SCRA 298, 2000)

When there is Abandoment of Office

 

FACTS: VSAI hired respondent as a security guard, with initial assignment at Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) collection unit at the Philippines Overseas Employment Agency building in Ortigas, Pasig City from July 1991 to October 1992. His next tour of duty was at the Citytrust Bank from 20 November 1992 to 31 December 1992. He was detailed at the National Power Corporation in Plaridel, Bulacan from January 1993 to January 1994. In February 1994 to April 1995, he was deployed at UST. On24 April 1995, respondent brought his complaint against VSAI before the SSS for non-remittance of SSS contributions. As a result, petitioners formally remitted his contributions to the SSS. In May 1995, respondent was transferred to the main office in Pasig City. On 26 August 1998, VSAI again failed to remit to the SSS his contributions and loan payments prompting respondent to file another complaint against VSAI before the SSS for non-remittance of contributions and loan payments. As a result, the OWWA Detachment Commander intimated to respondent that VSAI was annoyed by the fact that he had commenced the said action against it.

VSAI hired (3) additional guards for the OWWA parking lot located at San Luis Street, Pasay City. In a meeting in December 1998, OWWA's Chief of Services and Property Division announced that the lease contract for said parking lot was to expire on 07 January 1999 and the 3 newly-hired guards posted there would have to report to VSAI's office. On 30 December 1998, respondent, who was then manning the OWWA main office, was made to swap postings with one of these 3 guards manning the OWWA parking lot. This came as a surprise to respondent because such swapping would be to his disadvantage as he would have to give up his post at the OWWA main office where he was serving for almost (3) years to give way to one of the newly-hired security guards who would soon be displaced from the OWWA parking lot as a result of the expiration of the lease contract for said property. On 7 January 1999, upon the expiration of the lease contract on the parking lot, the services of the guards temporarily assigned there were withdrawn, including that of respondent. When respondent reported for work at the OWWA Detachment Commander, he was told that he would have to be assigned somewhere else because his spouse was also assigned as a lady guard at the OWWA. This came as an utter surprise to the respondent who was single at that time.

VSAI informed respondent that his redeployment would be at the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). When respondent reported to the DOLE Detachment Commander, he was required to renew his Barangay, police and NBI) clearances and to undergo neurological examination. Respondent requested petitioners to assign him at either the OWWA Office in Intramuros, Manila or at the OWWA Collection Unit located in Pasig City, so he need not reapply and renew his employment requirements, but was denied. From then on, respondent was placed on a "floating status" sans pay. On 14 April 1999, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner VSAI and its President, Alfredo Vargas, Jr., for overtime pay, premium for holiday and rest day, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, thirteenth (13^th) month pay and non-remittance of SSS contribution starting January 1999. Respondent alleged that he was terminated by VSAI to hit back at him for his filing of (2) complaints against the company for non-remittances of his contributions and loan payments with the SSS. On 29 September 1999, respondent filed an additional complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for separation pay and attorney's fees. On 08 February 2000, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. The CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. VSAI's MR was denied by the CA.

 

ISSUE:  Whether or not respondent had abandoned his job.

 

RULING: No. Constructive dismissal exist when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain on the part of the employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment. On the other hand, abandonment, as a just and valid cause for termination, requires a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his work, coupled with a clear absence of any intention of returning to his or her work. Abandonment is incompatible with constructive dismissal. There is absence of abandonment, in this case, as there was no deliberate intent on the part of the respondent to abandon his employment with VSAI. A strong indication of the intention of respondent to resume work is that on several dates, after his last assignment on January 1999, he reported to the VSAI's office regularly for reassignment, but was not given any. He then lost no time in filing the illegal dismissal case. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to have abandoned his work and the filing of the complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment. Significantly, respondent, in his position paper, prayed for a regular assignment or in the alternative VSAI should be ordered to pay salaries until the time he is gainfully employed. Respondent's entreaty to be given a regular posting is antithetical to a charge of abandonment.

Moreover, the burden of proving that respondent has abandoned his job rests with VSAI. However, VSAI failed miserably to discharge the burden. VSAI adduced in evidence three memos allegedly sent via registered mail to respondent, but as the NLRC and the CA ruled, the evidentiary value of these documents is of dubious authenticity as the memos had not been properly identified and were only attached belatedly to the petition. Moreover, we note that there was no registry return card for these memos so there is no way of telling who received these memos, if they were received at all by respondent. What is more, the three memos appear to be exact copies of each other except for the signatories and the dates and the way the addressees were written. 

 

In Superstar Security Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, we held that placing an employee on temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal provided that such temporary inactivity should continue only for a period of six (6) months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be held liable for constructive dismissal under Article 286 of the Labor Code which reads: Art. 286. When employment not deemed terminated. The bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty.

 

Abandonment and Resignation Distinguished

209) Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos (253 SCRA 559, 1996)

 

Facts: After Fidel Ramos was declared President, defeated candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiago filed an election protest with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). Subsequently, while the case is pending, she ran for the office of Senator and, having been declared elected, assumed office as Senator.

 

Issue: Whether Santiago's election protest deemed abandoned with her election and assumption of office as Senator?

 

Ruling: Yes. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-to crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or the first P 100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an election be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Transfer to Another Office

210) Gloria v. Court of Appeals

340 SCRA 442, 2000

 

Facts:

 

Petitioner is the Secretary of DECS. Respondent was appointed as Schools Division Superintendent in Quezon City by President Cory Aquino. After 5 years, petitioner recommended that respondent be reassigned to Marikina Institute of Science and Technology wherein the President approved such recommendation. Refused the said reassignment, which according to the respondent it is violation of his right to security of tenure.

 

Issue: Whether or not the reassignment is violative of petitioners right to security of tenure.

 

Held:

 

Yes. "Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals.

 

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.

 

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Transfer to Another Office

211) Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. Court of Appeals (412 SCRA 203, 2003)

 

Facts: Respondents are various employees of petitioner who were transferred and relocated as a result of the Relocation and Restructuring Program. Petitioners also stated that the employees who would agree to the transfers would be considered promoted. Respondents refused to be transferred or relocated since they were transferred to distant places and would separate them from their families. Petitioner then considered their refusal and explanation as insubordination, thus, they were dismissed from service. Respondents aver that their transfer is tantamount to a promotion, thus, they have the right to accept or decline.

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s refusal is tantamount to insubordination.

 

Held: No. An employee cannot be promoted, even if merely as a result of a transfer, without his consent.  A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to `lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done without the employees' consent.

 

There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a promotion is in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse. Hence, the exercise by the private respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as insubordination, or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer.  As such, there was no valid cause for the private respondents' dismissal.

 

 

212. Padolina v. Fernandez ( 340 SCRA 442, 2000)

Demotion

FACTS: Fernandez was PAG-ASA’s Finance and Management Division Chief who was reassigned to Taguig, pursuant to SO 129. Fernandez protested this as being tantamount to constructive dismissal. Padolina refused to set SO 129 aside, and was upheld by the CSC. DOST Special Order returned certain employees to their original assignments, but excluded others, including Fernandez. An investigation found Fernandez guilty of insubordination and was ordered to accept the reassignment. The CA on appeal declared SO 129 void for violating security of tenure. The Supreme Court affirmed. Hence, the Motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether respondent's reassignment from her position as PAGASA Finance and Management Chief to the Finance and Management Services Director's Office (DOST) constituted a valid personnel action.

RULING: No. Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionality-guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals.4 [Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138.]

Section 24 (g) of Presidential Decree No. 807 authorizes reinstatement by providing that "am employee may be reassigned from on organizational unit to another in the same Department but such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary." It is necessary, therefore, that in the determination of a reassignment's validity, there must be a finding of whether the reassignment of petitioner caused her a diminution in one of the following: rank, status, or salary, as the Court of Appeals did. From the statutory provisions, it is clear therefore that a diminution in just one of the three mentioned categories is enough to invalidate such a reassignment.

Upon an examination of the questioned SO 129, as well as the rationale given in regard thereto5 [Annex "O" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 89-90.], we find the same violative of respondent's security of tenure and thus, invalid. While we may fully subscribed to the laudable intentions of the petitioners in issuing said special order in that it was to "improve the external and internal services delivery of the Agency in a transparent, efficient, effective, and reliable manner" it should not, however, countenance the peremptory setting aside of statutory requisites. The objectives and purposes of personnel actions, however commendable, should in every case be in compliance with the law.

In this regard, while we may not fully agree with all of the appellate court's cited instances of diminution in rank, status or salary, nonetheless, we find that some of such instances are valid and must, therefore, be upheld. Examining SO 129, we readily discover, for instance, that the questioned order contains no definite date or duration of assignment. In fact, in No. 4 of the Implementing Guidelines of SO 129, it is stated therein that "the return of the various Branch/Division/Section Chiefs and other personnel concerned to their respective Units shall be the subject of a separate DOST Special Order"6 [Ibid., p. 90.], which means that the respondent's duration of service in the office of the DOST-FMS Director shall be for an indefinite date, dependent as it is, on time when the DOST issues a new special order which may or may not even include respondent, as in fact she was not one of those returned to their original units per DOST Special Order which may or may not include respondent, as in fact was not one of those returned to their original units per DOST Special Order No. 557.7 [Annex "H" of Petition, Rollo, p. 54.] Such a situation is indeed tantamount to a floating assignment that results in s diminution in rank. As held in Bentain v. Court of Appeals,8 [209 SCRA 644;649 91992).] a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary, is, in effect, a constructive removal from the service."

Moreover, it likewise appears that, as found by the appellate court, respondent was deprived of the emoluments attaching to her former position like RATA and similar allowances which signifies a diminution in compensation that is proscribed by the rule on reassignment.

Finally, respondent's status has been likewise affected as her reassignment to the DOST-FMS Director's Office reduced her to a mere subordinate without authority to supervise anyone, in effect, demoting her in rank and status.

Demotion

213) R.P. Dinaglasan Construction, Inc. v. Atienza (433 SCRA 263, 2004)

Facts: Petitioner R.P. Dinglasan Construction, Inc. provided janitorial services to Pilipinas Shell Refinery Corporation (Shell Corporation) in Batangas City.Private respondents Mariano Atienza and Santiago Asi served as petitioners janitors assigned with Shell Corporation since 1962 and 1973, respectively.

Private respondents claim that on July 7, 1994, petitioner called for a meeting and informed private respondents and three (3) other employees that their employment with Shell Corporation would be terminated effective July 15, 1994.They were told that petitioner lost the bidding for janitorial services with Shell. Petitioner notified respondents that they may reapply as helpers and redeployed in other companies where petitioner had subsisting contracts but they would receive only a minimum wage. Private respondents refused as the offer would be a form of demotion --- they would lose their seniority status and would not be guaranteed to work at regular hours.

Issue: Whether or not the offer is a form of demotion

Ruling: To constitute abandonment of work, two (2) requisites must concur: first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by overt acts. Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence or failure to report for work, after notice to return, is not enough to amount to abandonment.

In the case at bar, the evidence of private respondents negates petitioners theory that they abandoned their work. Firstly, private respondents reported back to petitioners office a number of times expressing their desire to continue working for petitioner without demotion in rank or diminution of salary.This fact was established by the corroborating testimony of barangay councilman Valentin Clerigo who, together with the barangay captain, accompanied private respondents to petitioners office at least ten (10) times to negotiate their redeployment on more acceptable terms. Secondly, in seeking reinstatement, private respondents also sought the intervention of the DOLE to arbitrate the labor issue between the parties. Thirdly, private respondents submitted the barangay clearances and x-ray results required from them by petitioner for their reinstatement as witnessed by the barangay officials. Lastly, the records would bear that private respondents lost no time and sought their reinstatement by filing an illegal dismissal case against petitioner, which act is clearly inconsistent with a desire to sever employer-employee relations and abandon their work. All these overt acts on the part of private respondents negate petitioners claim of abandonment of work and prove beyond doubt their steadfast desire to continue their employment with petitioner and be reinstated to their former position. Moreover, petitioner failed to explain why it waited for 14 months from the time private respondents allegedly did not return to work before it dismissed them for being AWOL.

We hold that private respondents were constructively dismissed by petitioner.  Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely as the offer of employment involves a demotion in rank and diminution of pay. In the case at bar, petitioner committed constructive dismissal when it offered to reassign private respondents to another company but with no guaranteed working hours and payment of only the minimum wage.The terms of the redeployment thus became unacceptable for private respondents and foreclosed any choice but to reject petitioners offer, involving as it does a demotion in status and diminution in pay.Thereafter, for six (6) months, private respondents were in a floating status.Interestingly, it was only after private respondents filed a complaint with the DOLE that petitioner backtracked in its position and offered to reinstate private respondents to their former job in Shell Corporation with no diminution in salary. Eventually, however, petitioner unilaterally withdrew its offer of reinstatement, refused to meet with the private respondents and instead decided to dismiss them from service.

 

 

Constructive Removal or Dismissal

214) Chiang Kai Shek College v. Court of Appeals

437 SCRA 171, 2004

 

Facts: Private respondent Belo, a school teacher, came back to work after her leave but was denied because the school has already fixed its loading for that school year. She was not reinstated as a teacher. She filed complaitn before the labor arbiter, decision was favored to the petitioner on the ground that petitioner was not dismissed. Since she only appeared late when the loading was being prepared. Private respondent appealed it to the NLRC which reversed the arbiter’s decision and held that it Belo was actually constructively dismissed by failure of the school to consider her return and deprive of her rights as permanent employee.

Issue: Whether or not Ms. Belo was constructively dismissed when she was not reinstated as a teacher after her 1-year approved leave?

Ruling: Yes. Ms. Belo was constructively dismissed when the petitioners, in implementing their policies, effectively barred her from teaching for the school year 1993-1994. The three policies are (1) the non-assurance of a teaching load to a teacher who took a leave of absence; (2) the hiring of non-permanent teachers in April to whom teaching loads were already assigned when Ms. Belo signified in May 1993 her intention to teach; and (3) the non-applicability to children of teachers on leave of the free tuition fee benefits extended to children of teachers in service. Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation from work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.

When the petitioners retroactively applied the modified written policy to Ms. Belo, they considered her already a teacher not in service. The NLRC was correct when it reasoned as follows: "[I]f the school policy is to extend 'free tuition fees' to children of teachers in school, then respondents [petitioners herein] have considered [Ms. Belo] 'already not in school or summarily dismissed or separated the very moment the latter applied for leave.' Otherwise, [her] children should have been granted the 'on-going' privileges and benefits on free tuition fees, among others." Ms. Belo was definitely singled out in the implementation of a future policy. This is grossly unfair and unjust. The petitioners did not take heed of the principle enshrined in our labor laws that policies should be adequately known to the employees and uniformly implemented to the body of employees as a whole and not in isolation. The continued employment of Ms. Belo was also rendered unlikely by the insistence of the petitioners in implementing the alleged policy that a teacher who goes on leave for one year is not assured of a teaching load. While this alleged policy was mentioned in Mr. Chien's letter of 9 June 1992, it was not included in the school's written statement of policies dated 13 March 1992. Hence, it was then a non-existent policy. When a non-existent policy is implemented and, in this case, only to Ms. Belo, it constitutes a clear case of discrimination.

The court held that the Labor Arbiter's conclusions are baseless, bereft of any rational basis, unsupported by evidence on record, and glaringly erroneous. The decisions of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are the ones in harmony with the evidence on record. Hence, it is convinced that Ms. Belo was unceremoniously and constructively dismissed by the petitioners without just cause and without observing the twin requirements of due process, i.e., due notice and hearing, in violation of the tenets of equity and fair play. Ms. Belo is, therefore, entitled to reinstatement and back wages in accordance with the questioned Court of Appeals' and NLRC decisions

 

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Constructive Removal or Dismissal

215) Pastor v. City of Pasig (382 SCRA 232, 2002)

Facts: Petitioner Pastor was reassigned to the Office of the Municipal Administrator while investigation of reports was pending regarding her issuance of Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections. Years passed and no investigation was conducted, thus, she asked for reinstatement but she was reassigned to different offices of Pasig.

Issue: Whether reassignment of petitioner is a constructive removal from the service?

Held: Yes. It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service. In this case, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioner's reassignment to different offices in the local government of Pasig City is indefinite. Petitioner has been on virtual floating assignments which cannot but amount to a diminution of her rank, hence impermissible under the law. As already noted, her reassignment began in 1992 with her detail to the Office of the (now) City Administrator pending investigation of reports that she had issued Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections. However, no investigation appears to have ever been conducted on the said charge. To justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City Mayor claimed that the same was "due to petitioner's long years of experience in finance" which especially fitted her for studies regarding the city's revenues. For all intents and purposes, her reassignment, lasting nearly ten years now, is a removal without cause as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. Petitioner should now be returned to her original position for her indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her removal without cause from the position to which she has been permanently appointed.

216. De Guzman Jr. v Commission on Elections (336 SCRA 188, 2000)

Civil Service Officers and Employees Entitled to Security of Tenure

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996". De Guzman vs. Comelec
SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district.

Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to different stations by the COMELEC. 
Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 violates the Constitutional guarantee on security of tenure of civil servants

RULING: The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that... empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency.

The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee.

What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a... perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.

Untenable is petitioners' contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the... criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees

Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The... title of RA 8189 is "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the... reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,... language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.

This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. De Guzman vs. Comelec.

 

Civil Service Officers and Employees Entitled to Security of Tenure

217) Daza v. Lugo (553 SCRA 532, 2008)

 

Facts: Records show that former Governor Madeleine P. Mendoza-Ong of Northern Samar issued an appointment dated March 7, 2001 in favor of respondent Ronan P. Lugo as Sanitation Inspector I under permanent status. The appointment was approved on March 20, 2001 by the CSC Provincial Field Office of Catarman, Northern Samar.

On August 10, 2001, petitioner Raul A. Daza, the newly elected Governor of Northern Samar, issued Memorandum No. 352-01 directing the Department Heads to evaluate the performance of probationary employees (including respondent) under their respective supervisions to determine whether they were qualified to acquire permanent status.

 

petitioner issued a Memorandum informing respondent that his probationary service was terminated due to his unsatisfactory conduct.

 

Respondent appealed petitioner's termination order to the CSC, Regional Office VIII (CSCRO VIII).

 

Issue: Whether CA erred in stating that it was respondent's immediate supervisor who failed to evaluate and submit respondent's Performance Evaluation Report.

 

Ruling: The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's arguments.

The Constitution provides that "[N]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law."  Sec. 26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book V, Title I-A of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 states:

All such persons (appointees who meet all the requirements of the position) must serve a probationary period of six months following their original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation in order to acquire permanent civil service status. A probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any time before the expiration of the probationary period; Provided, That such action is appealable to the Commission.

Thus, the services of respondent as a probationary employee may only be terminated for a just cause, that is, unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity.

In this case, petitioner's Memorandum No. 352-01 directed to "[a]ll Concerned Office/Department Heads/OICs" on the subject of "evaluation of concerned staff under probationary status" clearly states: ". . . [A]s immediate supervisor, you are directed to evaluate those concerned [probationary] employees using our performance evaluation rating system and to submit a report to the undersigned on or before the end of August 2001."

Hence, the CA correctly stated:

[It is] crystal clear that the above-quoted memorandum [No. 352-01] did not in any manner direct all employees under probationary status, including petitioner, to submit their own Performance Evaluation Report. It would also be absurd for these employees to evaluate their own selves. Thus, if these employees, including petitioner, failed to submit a Performance Evaluation Report to their immediate supervisors, the same cannot be taken against them. Evidently, it was [Lugo's] immediate supervisor who failed to evaluate and submit [Lugo's] Performance Evaluation Report as required by the subject memorandum. On this point is the CSC Regional Officer's findings and conclusion, which We take leave to quote with approval, to wit -

"If indeed the manifestations of xxx Gov. Daza that the immediate supervisor of xxx Lugo failed to submit the required Performance Evaluation Report, is true, the statement therefore, that Lugo had committed 'unsatisfactory conduct' is without basis. For how can one claim unsatisfactory conduct when there was no submitted report detailing the same, which would serve as basis for such finding."

Grounds for Removal or Suspension under the Constitution

218) Cabañero v. Cañon

365 SCRA 425, 2001

 

Facts: Complainant Cabañero is the mother of the accused in a criminal case which is presided over by respondent Judge Cañon. Cabanero filed a complaint and  alleged she was implicated as a co-accused by the respondent for asking leading questions. Respondent judge explained that complainant was a principal by inducement and that the arrest of the complainant was based on his findings. While the administrative complaint was still pending, respondent died.

 

Issue: Whether or not death of the respondent warrants the dismissal of the complaint.

 

Ruling:  No. The cessation from office of respondent judge due to death does not per se warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service.  Since the instant administrative complaint was filed before respondent’s death on April 24, 2000, the Court retains authority to pursue the administrative complaint against him.

Regarding the charge of partiality, we have set the parameters in disqualifying a judge as follows: (1) that there be adequate evidence to prove the charge; (2) that there be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and (3) that to be disqualified, the bias and prejudice must have stemmed from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.

There is nothing in the complaint that sustains the charge of bias and partiality. Mere suspicion that the judge is biased in a case will not suffice.

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Grounds for Removal or Suspension under the Constitution

219) Cuevas v. Bacal (347 SCRA 338, 2000)

 

Facts: Respondent Bacal who holds a rank of CESO III was appointed as Regional Director of PAO. She was then appointed as Acting Chief Public Attorney and was confirmed by President Ramos. Petitioner Demaisip was appointed as Chief Public Defender which was previously called Chief Public Attorney. Respondent was then appointed as Regional Director of Public Defender’s Office. Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto that questioned her replacement. The CA ruled in her favor, thus, petitioner seeks its reversal.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent has a claim of security of tenure in the said position.

 

Held: No. It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. Respondent Josefina G. Bacal is a CESO III and that the position of Regional Director of the PAO, to which she was transferred, corresponds to her CES Rank Level III and Salary Grade. This was her position before her "appointment" to the position of Chief Public Attorney of the PAO, which requires a CES Rank Level I for appointment thereto. Respondent Bacal therefore has no ground to complain. She may have been considered for promotion to Rank I to make her appointment as Chief Public Attorney permanent. The fact, however, is that this did not materialize as petitioner Carina J. Demaisip was appointed in her place. If respondent was paid a salary equivalent to Salary Grade  while she was holding that office, it was only because, under the law, if a CESO is assigned to a position with a higher salary grade than that corresponding to his/her rank, he/she will be allowed the salary of the CES position. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

 

As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position.

 

 

The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of RA 8189.

220. General v. Roco (350 SCRA 538, 2001)

Grounds for Removal or Suspension under the Constitution

FACTS: Respondent Roco was appointed by then President Ramos in 1996 as Regional Director of the LTO in Region V, a position equivalent to CES Rank level V and later reappointed by then President Estrada to the same position in 1999. At the time Roco’s appointment in 1996 and 1999, he was not a CES eligible. However, during the incumbency in 1999, he was conferred CES eligibility by the CESB.

On September 7, 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who is not a CES eligible was appointed by President Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO in Region V, the same position being occupied by Roco. Pursuant thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Coloma as OIC issued a Memorandum directing General to assume the said office immediately and for Roco to report to the Office of the Secretary for further instructions.

Roco filed before the CA a petition for Quo Warranto which was affirmed by the latter and ordered the nullification of General’s appointment. From this decision, General filed a petition for review against Roco. The latter contends that CES eligibility is enough to acquire security of tenure which grants him the right to hold the position disputed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Career Service Executive (CES) Eligibility is enough and the appointment to a CES Rank is not necessary to acquire security of tenure

RULING: No. Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292), provides: (1) Permanent status. – A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.

In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a permanent appointment is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board, thus: Career Executive Service Eligibility. Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board through a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation is done of the examinee's performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations. For the Appointment to CES Rank, it states that upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES rank is made by the President upon the recommendation of the Board. This process completes the official's membership in the CES and most importantly, confers on him security of tenure in the CES.

In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies

In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank, which is – CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to other positions in the career executive service.

Grounds for Disciplinary Action under the Local Government Code

221) Pablico v. Villapando (385 SCRA 601, 2002)

Facts: An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan against then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution for entering into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted to appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed the decision. Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor in place of Villapando.

The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered Pablico to vacate the office.

 

Issue: Whether or not local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

 

Ruling: Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
                                                               x x x     x x x
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.

It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law.  Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that “[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.”

Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.”  The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.

As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations.  No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code.  Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity.

 

Grounds for Disciplinary Action under the Civil Service Law

222) Romagos v. Metro Cebu Water District

533 SCRA 50, 2007

 

Facts: Petitioner is the clerk processor of Metro Cebu Water District. After a number of incident reports against petitioner, respondent then dismissed petitioner for being unfit to work due to her mental condition. Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission and Court of Appeals however all ruled in favor of Metro Cebu Water District. Now this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is justifiably dropped from rolls due to her mental condition?

Held: No. The court partially agrees with the petitioner. Respondent sufficiently established that petitioner suffers from a mental disorder. There is overwhelming evidence of this condition. The 1989 and 1991 medica1 certifications issued by Dr. Costas and Dr. Obra establish that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from Major Depression. The 1999 medical certification of Dr. Obra proves that, at the time of her separation from the service, petitioner was undergoing psychiatric treatment. The incident reports submitted by respondent's employees uniformly indicate that petitioner is mentally disturbed. However, respondent fails to sufficiently proved that petitioner's menta1 condition has rendered her incapacitated to work as to justify her being dropped from the rolls.CA gravely erred in affirming the dismissa1 of petitioner. While there is no question that at the time she was dropped from the rolls, petitioner was suffering from a protracted mental disorder, the same did not render her incapable of performing her work. There was therefore an incomplete cause or justification to drop her from the rolls.Respondent cannot impugn the August 20, 1999 medical certification of Dr. Obra merely because said document is not favorable to it.

Moreover, respondent itself relied on the 1989 and 1991 medical certifications in declaring petitioner mental1y unfit to work. The CSCRO, CSC and CA also cited said medical certifications. There is no reason forr them not to assign equal probative value to the August 20, 1999 medical certification of Dr. Obra. In sum, the CA gravely erred in affirming the dismissa1 of petitioner. While there is no question that at the time she was dropped from the rolls, petitioner was suffering from a protracted mental disorder, the same did nrt render her incapable of performing her work. There was therefore an incomplete cause or justification to drop her from the rolls.

The dropping from the rolls of petitioner Vilma A. Romagos is declared illegal and respondent Metro Cebu Water District is directed to reinstate petitioner to her previous position and pay her backwages.

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Grounds for Disciplinary Action under the Civil Service Law

223) Garcia v. Pajaro (170 SCAD 292, 2002)

Facts:  Petitioner Garcia, an employee at the City Treasurer’s Office as Revenue Collector, was suspended  by Pajaro, City Treasurer, because a formal charge was filed against him since Garcia was unsatisfactory in his performance for several semesters. During his time of suspension, he continued to work and ignored the suspension order and did not submit himself for investigation. Garcia contends that Pajaro has no legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action against him.

Issue: Whether or not Pajaro has the legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action against

Held: Yes. Under the old and the present Local Government Codes, appointive officers and employees of local government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, regulations and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees, as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.

 

The Administrative Code of 1987, -- specifically Book V on the civil service -- is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the government. This Code enumerates the grounds for disciplining them. They may be removed or dismissed summarily "(1) [w]hen the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable." Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in the strict judicial sense.

The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987to heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department, the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.

Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85, which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate to them. In this case, Respondent Pajaro was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Order against petitioner, because the latter was charged with gross neglect of duty, refusal to perform official duties and functions, and insubordination -- grounds that allowed the issuance of such Order, as provided by Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Clearly, the city treasurer acted within the scope of his power when he commenced the investigation and issued the assailed Order.

224. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (325 SCRA 196, 2010)

Grounds for Disciplinary Action under the Civil Service Law

FACTS: The COMELEC, acting as a National Canvassing Board for the May 8, 1995 elections, while canvassing the returns in the senatorial race, found a discrepancy between the Provincial Certificate of Canvas for Ilocos Norte and its supporting Statement of Votes per precinct or municipality for the province, such that the votes for candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Franklin M. Drilon, Ramon V. Mitra, as appearing in the Provincial Certificate of Canvass were more than the votes tallied as appearing in the Statement of Votes, On the basis of such discrepancy, the COMELEC motu proprio ordered an investigation and referred the matter to its Law Department. 

Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., himself a senatorial candidate in the May 8, 1995 elections, filed his own complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department, docketed as E.O. Case No. 95-294 against Atty. Dominador Mico, Atty. Dionisio Caoili and Dr. Ofelia T. Pastor, Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Norte, Marvelyn Ramiro, Election Assistant for the COMELEC for San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and member of the support staff of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, and Flor Mercado, Elementary School Principal of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Ilocos Norte and also a member of the support staff of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. 

Petitioner charged respondents with violation of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. The respondents filed their respective counter- affidavits.  Subsequently, the parties filed their respective Memoranda. In Minute Resolution No. 96-1497 dated May 14, 1996, the COMELEC en banc resolved to file criminal as well as administrative charges against respondent for violation of Section 27 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, ¹⁰ to which petitioner filed his comment.

On August 13, 1996, the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 96-2333 where it was resolved to dismiss the complaint "for lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause" and, in the administrative case, "to reprimand respondents with stern warning that a repetition of the same act in the future shall be dealt with accordingly." The SOLGEN filed a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment) where he prayed for the nullification and setting aside of COMELEC's Minute Resolution No. 96-2333 dated August 13, 1996.

ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing its earlier resolution by dismissing the complaint against private respondents for violation of Section 27 (B) of RA No. 6646 on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.

RULING: Yes. A rule in statutory construction is that the word "or" is disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated unless the context requires a different interpretation. In criminal and penal statues, like Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646, the word "and" cannot be read "or," and conversely, as the rule of strict construction apply, except when the spirit and reason of the law require it. From a reading of Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646 in its entire context, we cannot but conclude that giving a non-disjunctive meaning to the word "or" is not warranted.

Under the provision, two acts, not one, are penalized: first, the tampering, increasing or decreasing of votes received by a candidate in any election; and second, the refusal, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. The second part of the provision cannot be conjoined with the first part and regarded as a mere element of one crime, as is the interpretation of the COMELEC. Such cannot be the intent of the framers of the law, and it is with grave abuse of discretion that the COMELEC gave Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 of interpretation it did.

Petitioner in paragraph 5 of his complaint-affidavit categorically charged respondents with having "tamper[ed], increase[ed] the votes received by a candidate in any election." The fact that the votes of candidates Enrile, Drilon and Mitra as appearing in the Certificate of Canvass were considerably more than that appearing in the Statement of Votes is not denied by respondents. Instead, they put forward the defenses of honest mistake, simple error, good faith, and the mere performance of ministerial duties.

What is extant from the records is the admission of respondent Mico that early on he already noted the discrepancy in the votes for certain senators which did not tally with the corresponding entries and the statement of votes to which he promptly called the attention of the other members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Yet, absolutely nothing had been done by the members of the board to correct the glaring disparities in the results of the Senatorial votes in Ilocos Norte. This means that, even if we assume for the sake of argument, that Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646 penalizes only one act, still, the COMELEC's dismissal of the case against the respondents is totally erroneous amounting to grave abuse of discretion.

 

Grounds for Disciplinary Action under the Civil Service Law

225) Lameyra v. Pangilinan (322 SCRA 117, 2000)

 

Facts: Petitioner received a letter from the mayor informing him that he is dropped from the roll of employees of the local government unit.  Petitioner claims that he was terminated without prior written notice of the charges and without investigation and hearing. 

 

Issue: Whether or not the dropping from the roll is valid.

 

Ruling: Although it is clear from the Civil Service Memorandum Circular that no prior notice is required to drop from the rolls an employee who has been continuously absent without leave for at least thirty days, petitioner contests the finding that he was absent at all.  He claims that he reported for work but was prevented form signing the log book.  In view of the circumstances prevailing in this case, the Civil Service Commission should have considered the new evidence annexed by petitioner to his motion for reconsideration.

 

Grounds for Disciplinary Action under the Civil Service Law

226) Nera v. Garcia

106 Phil. 1031, 1960

 

Facts: Petitioner Nera is employed as a clerk in the Maternity and Children’s Hospital. He also became manager and cashier of the Maternity Employer’s Cooperative Association, Inc. Petitioner holds the fund of the association. Petitioner was charged for allegedly misappropriating certain amounts of money which belongs to the association. Balcos, filed an administrative complaint case against Nera. Nera was then suspended as clerk of the said hospital, as approved by respondent Garcia, Secretary of Health.  Petitioner was given preventive suspension. Petitioner now wants to lift the suspension.

 

Issue: Whether or not the suspension should be lifted.

 

Ruling: No. Suspension is not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and he given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive Suspension is applicable if the charge against such officer, or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or to believe that the performance of duty, or if there are strong reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Misconduct in Office

227) Raquiza v. Castañeda (82 SCRA 235, 1978)

 

Facts: An administrative complaint was filed against respondent Judge Castañeda. The complaint charges Judge Castañeda of violation of the Anti-Graft Law, rendering a decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal, extortion by means of oppression, and bribery. However, when complainant testified in Court, it was found that her testimony was purely hearsay since she had no personal knowledge of the bribery that was alleged since it such information was only relayed to her.

 

Issue: Whether or not the Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct?

 

Held: No. The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature. The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. Parenthetically, under Count I and II, 'misconduct' also implies 'a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment' (Buenaventura v. Hon. Mariano V. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71). It results that even if respondent were not correct in his legal conclusions, his judicial actuations cannot be regarded as grave misconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears. And undersigned finds, as above discussed, that complainant's evidence is wanting in this respect.

 

 

228. Beltran v. Rafer (467 SCRA 272, 2005)

Misconduct in Office Related to, and Connected with, Performance of Official Duties

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Jaime D. Rafer ("respondent Judge") of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Talisay-Laurel, Batangas for Grave Misconduct. In her Complaint dated 31 July 2003, complainant Violeta N. Beltran ("complainant") alleged that respondent Judge issued to her four checks amounting to P672,000. When presented for encashment, the checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds or closure of account. Complainant claimed that respondent Judge issued the checks as reimbursement for the downpayment complainant paid to respondent Judge in the aborted sale of the latter's apartment to complainant. Complainant disclosed that she had also filed a criminal complaint against respondent Judge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and that the case is pending with Branch 25 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila.

In his Comment dated 5 January 2004, respondent Judge did not deny issuing the checks subject of the complaint or the fact of the dishonor of the checks. To explain the events leading to the issuance of the checks, respondent Judge alleged that: (1) the contract of conditional sale between him and complainant over his four-door apartment in Pandacan, Manila was for P2,000,000, with P250,000 as downpayment; (2) the apartment was mortgaged to the Luzon Development Bank and he intended to use the proceeds of the sale to stop the bank from foreclosing its mortgage over the apartment; (3) a certain Raquel Carpio and "Aling Loria" ("realtors") brokered the sale between him and complainant; and (4) after making inquiries to find out why, after paying the downpayment, complainant stopped giving further payments, respondent Judge learned that complainant entrusted the subsequent payments to the realtors who pocketed the money. To explain why he nevertheless issued the checks to complainant, respondent Judge alleged:

It may be asked: Why did I issue the checks representing refund of the money of the complainant instead of forfeiting the same for their (sic) failure to comply with our Agreement? My answer is: At the time I issued the checks, the title of the apartment was not yet consolidated in the name of the [Luzon Development Bank]. I was then entertaining the idea that I could still sell the same to other buyer (sic) and since the complainant, a Public School Teacher like my wife, and her husband, a seaman who spent months and years away from his family, had worked hard to earn said money, I volunteered to refund their money although under our contract I can forfeit the same to temper, if not compensate, the loss I suffered, I felt I was morally obliged to return their money. Hence, I issued the questioned checks on the conditions that they will defer encashment of the same until I sold said apartment to the other buyer. Actually, the actual amount involved was only about P400,000.00 and of this amount I received only P250,000.00 but I issued checks in the total amount of P650,000.00, adding P250,000.00 as interest, while riding on the positive idea that I could sell the apartment at a price higher than we had agreed upon.

Respondent Judge added that "to end this problem," he has conveyed to complainant parcels of land in Labo, Camarines Norte. Hence, according to him, this case should be considered "closed and terminated."

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge is liable for misconduct.

RULING: No. The OCA correctly noted that the private commercial transaction between complainant and respondent Judge giving rise to this complaint precludes a finding of misconduct against the latter. Misconduct in office is one that affects the officer's performance of his duties as an officer and not one that affects his character as a private individual. Furthermore, there is no showing here of the corrupt motive or intention to violate the law required to sustain such a charge.

Instead, respondent Judge is liable for impropriety. This Court has repeatedly held that no position exacts a greater demand on the moral uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. This is because the judge' is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. ±lαωlιbrαrÿ

Thus, the judge's behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach. As Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates, "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities."

Here, respondent Judge admits having issued checks, in a commercial transaction, drawn against his account which on the due date of the checks did not have sufficient funds to cover the value of the checks. By doing so, he acted with obvious impropriety in disregard of the strict standards of conduct of his high office. Respondent Judge ought to know that there are laws penalizing what he did.

Misconduct in Office: Related to, and Connected with, Performance of Official Duties

Service Commission should have considered the new evidence annexed by petitioner to his motion for reconsideration.

 

 

Misconduct in Office: Related to, and Connected with, Performance of Official Duties

229) Ong v. Rosales (325 SCRA 689, 2000)

 

Facts: Complainant Victor D. Ong avers that in connection with the aforecited civil case, a compromise agreement 2 was entered into in his behalf by his counsel, Atty. Abraham G. Espejo, and Atty. Gilbert M. Fabella, attorney-in-fact of plaintiff Anunciacion Jayin. Judge Rosales prepared an Order 3 approving the compromise agreement and signed the same on January 17, 1997, a copy of which was received by the complainant’s messenger. Complainant thought that everything was settled. Later, he received word from Atty. Fabella requesting two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) pesos as additional compensation. Subsequently, he received notice from Judge Rosales that the court had not approved the compromise agreement and his order approving the compromise agreement was not effective.

Complainant avers that Judge Rosales and Atty. Fabella conspired with each other to the complainant’s prejudice. Complainant inquires why Judge Rosales had allowed Atty. Fabella to repeatedly postpone the hearing of the case. He avers that Judge Rosales abused his authority and made a sham out of court proceedings by rendering inoperative an order that he had signed. Furthermore, complainant wants to know why respondent judge insisted he did not issue the order when the same had his signature. Lastly, complainant claims that respondent judge’s actions can only erode the faith in the judicial system of laymen like him. He requests for an investigation of Judge Rosales and then appropriate sanction, if the latter is guilty. He also seeks investigation of Atty. Fabella by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty.

 

Ruling: the Office of the Court Administrator found negligence on the part of the respondent judge for the premature and highly irregular release of the questioned order, and recommended that the judge be reprimanded.

Judges, by the very delicate nature of their functions, should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. 6 By his own admission, respondent judge failed to live up to this standard. He explained in his comment that the Order dated January 17, 1997 was removed from his desk by someone from among his staff and was released by one of his clerks to the defendant’s representative who happened to be in the office. The respondent judge, however, hastily absolved his clerk of any wrongdoing when he said that he was convinced that no member of his staff acted with malice.

 

Misconduct in Office: Related to, and Connected with, Performance of Official Duties

230) Soller v. Sandiganbayan

357 SCRA 677, 2001

 

Facts: A complaint was filed against petitioners wherein one of the petitioners is the mayor, for misleading the investigation regarding the death of his spouse by altering the wound and making an autopsy report that is contrary to the truth. The wound was allegedly cause by the petitioner’s son; thus, complainant avers that in order for the petitioner’s son to escape culpability, petitioners made the said alteration of the autopsy report.

 

Issue: Whether or not the offenses charged may be considered as committed "in relation to their office".

 

Held: No. The requirement that an offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that "the offense cannot exist without the office "or" that the office must be a constituent element of the crime" as defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code. A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as enumerated in Section 444 of the Local Government Code will readily show that the preparation of police and autopsy reports and the presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of criminal cases are not among such duties and functions, and the broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis for construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall under his functions as Municipal Mayor. What is obvious is that petitioners’ spouses probably acted as the parents of the alleged assailant and if at all, were motivated by personal reasons rather than official duty.

 

 

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People -Misconduct in Office - Related to, and Connected with, Performance of Official Duties

231) Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan (338 SCRA 485, 2000)

 

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Alarilla with the crime of grave threats. The motion for investigation was deferred until the prosecution amended the information so as to indicate “office-related” character of the crime charged. Petitioner alleged that the crime charged was not “office-related” since another case arising from the same act was already dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, thus, the same should also apply. A perusal of the amended information shows that petitioner was performing his official duty when he attended the said public hearing where he aimed a pistol and threatened to kill a person named Simeon G. Legaspi.

 

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case since the acts attributed to the accused herein were performed by him in the occasion of either the performance of his duties or of his assertion of his authority to do so.

 

Held: Yes. To fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the crime charged must be either one of those mentioned in paragraph (a) abovementioned or one committed by a public officer in relation to his office. The Court has held that an offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the accused’s office when such office is an element of the crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused.

 

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

 

232. Mariano v Roxas (385 SCRA 500, 2002)

Misconduct in Office Related to, and Connected with, Performance of Official Duties

 

FACTS: Mariano filed an administrative case against Roxas alleging that Roxas has not paid her debt and that Roxas committed dishonesty and forgery. The Court examined the alleged forged receipts. The Court concluded that the evidence showed to the naked eye that there are differences from her genuine signatures, hence, supporting Mrs. Mariano’s and Mrs. Caraga’s statements that those signatures are forged and not those of Mrs. Mariano.

Lorna Caraga testified that the receipts are not genuine. She testified that she is familiar with the signature of complainant who was her officemate for a period of five (5) years in the RTC Branch 130 of Caloocan City. In many occasions, complainants signed documents in his presence.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s act of forging those receipts constitutes a conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service

 

RULING: Respondent’s act of forging those receipts to avoid her contractual obligation affects not only her integrity as a public servant but more importantly, the integrity of the Judiciary where she is connected. As a court employee, respondent should bear in mind that the court is regarded by the public with respect. For this reason, the conduct of every court personnel should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility and must at all times be characterized by, among other things, uprightness, propriety and decorum. Respondent failed to meet this exacting standard. Her actuation, although arising from a private transaction, has tarnished the image of her public office.

Respondent’s offense constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, not misconduct as held by the CA. As an administrative offense, misconduct must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duty, which circumstance is absent in this case.

Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave administrative offense punishable by suspension of six (6) months and 1 day to one (1) year if committed for the first time, as in this case. Considering that the value involved in the forged receipts is minimal, this Court deems that the penalty of six (6) months suspension is in order.

With respect to respondent’s act of revoking the authority of complainant to collect her (respondent’s) benefits in payment of her debt, we agree with the CA that the same is tantamount to a willful failure to pay just debt. Such offense, under the same CSC Circular, is classified as a light administrative offense which carries a penalty of reprimand if committed for the first time, as in this case. In addition, respondent should pay complainant her indebtedness.

It may not be amiss to state that respondent, like any other member of the Judiciary, is expected to be a model of fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions. Any conduct that would be a bane to the public trust and confidence reposed on the Judiciary shall not be countenanced.

 

 

 

Misconduct in Office: Related to, and Connected with, Performance of Official Duties

 

233) Gubatanga v. Bodoy (790 SCRA 205, 2016)

 

Facts:  The case stemmed from the Affidavit Complain filed by COC Gubatanga charging Bodoy with grave misconduct and falsification of commercial document for unauthorized withdrawal in the amount of Php60,000.00 on 19 March 2008.

 

Issue: Whether or not Bodoy is guilty of grave misconduct but of dishonesty

          Whether or not administrative proceeding will proceed even before if there is judgement in criminal complaint.

 

Ruling:

1. Yes. It is without doubt that Bodoy is guilty of dishonesty.

This Court will not tolerate dishonesty. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest employee, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law.¹¹ It has been consistently stressed that even minor employees mirror the image of the courts they serve; thus, they are required to preserve the judiciary's good name and standing as a true temple of justice.¹²

Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects a person's character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue and integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary

2. Yes. the instant administrative complaint can proceed even before there is judgment in the criminal case involving the same matter. In administrative proceedings, such as this case, the quantum of proof required to establish the administrative liability of respondent is substantial evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

 

Misconduct in Office Committed During a Prior Term

234) People v. Toledano

332 SCRA 210, 2000

 

Facts: Respondent Judge Telano dismissed the information filed against private respondent Rolando Bunao on the ground that the administrative case filed against private respondent Bunao with the Office of the Ombudsman had been dismissed.

 

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the administrative filed against respondent is ground to dismiss the information filed against respondent.

 

Ruling: No. It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission.  Besides, the reliance made by respondent judge on the re-election of private respondent as Kagawad in the May 1992 election so as to warrant the dismissal of the information filed against him, citing Aguinaldo vs. Santos is misplaced. The ruling in said case which forbids the removal from office of a public official for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, finds no application to criminal cases, pending against said public officer.

 

Finally, Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which repealed B.P. Blg. 337 reenacted in its Section 89 the legal provision of Section 41 of B.P. Blg. 337 under which private respondent Bunao was charged and penalizes the same act previously penalized under the repealed law, such that the act committed before the reenactment continuous to be a crime.  Hence, prosecution will proceed under the provisions of Section 89 in relation to Section 514 of R.A. 7160.

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People -  Misconduct in Office - Not Work Related or Committed in the Course of Performance of Duty

235) Bernardo v. Civil Service Commission (429 SCRA 285, 2004)

 

Facts: Bernardo, an employee of Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), was charged with gross neglect and grave misconduct by LBP, through its president. The basis of the allegation was that Bernardo was elected and accepted the position of treasurer of a corporation called Markay Trading and Manpower Services, Inc. without the permission and authority required by the Civil Services rules and regulations. Bernardo with utter bad faith attested and declared under oath in an official document that the said corporation of which he was the duly elected Treasurer has a deposit with the Land Bank of the Philippines, when in truth and in fact, such statements were false. Petitioner contends that CSC has no jurisdiction since it was not committed with the performance of his duty as a government employee.

 

Issue: Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction over the offense of grave misconduct since it was not connected with the performance of his duty as a government employee.

 

Held: The petitioner’s claim that since the acts imputed as constituting the offense of grave misconduct were not connected with the performance of his duty as an LBP employee or as a government employee for that matter, the LBP and the CSC had no jurisdiction over the complaint against him, was correctly brushed aside by the respondent CA. We have held that the causes which warrant the dismissal of a civil servant need not necessarily be work-related or committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,26 we ratiocinated that:

 

… [I]f a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. (Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960].)

 

The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government. (Bautista v. Negado, 108 Phil. 283 [1960].)

 

236. Nera v. Garcia (106 Phil. 1031, 1960)

Acts of Government or of the People-  Misconduct in Office - Not Work Related or Committed in the Course of Performance of Duty

FACTS: Nera served as clerk in the Maternity and Children’s Hospital, a government institution under the supervision of the Bureau of Hospitals and the DOH. He also served as manager and cashier of the Maternity Employer’s Cooperative Association, Inc. Having hold of the positions, the fund of the association is supposedly under his control. On May 11, 1956, he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with malversation for allegedly misappropriating a certain amount of money which belongs to the association.

After a few months, a certain Simplicio Balcos, filed an administrative complaint case against Nera. Nera was suspended as clerk of the said hospital, as approved by respondent Garcia, Secretary of Health. The petitioner asked PCAC to intervene on his behalf. PCAC recommended respondents to lift the suspension of the petitioner. Respondents did not grant the lifting of suspension. The petitioner asked for reconsideration but was still denied. The CFI ruled in favour of the petitioner. As a result, respondents filed an appeal to the decision of the CFI. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus to restrain respondents from proceeding with the administrative case until the termination of the criminal case and annul the suspension and to compel respondents to lift the suspension.

 

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was illegally suspended thus, he must be reinstated in office and pay back his salary

 

RULING: There are two relevant laws outlined by the Supreme Court in this case. First is the Sec. 694 of the Admin Code, entitled Removal or Suspension which states that suspension is applicable “if the change against such subordinate or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty.” According to the Court, because of the use of comma, dishonesty and oppression need not be committed in performance of duty. The other law involved is the Sec. 34 of the Civil Service Act whch is entitled “Preventive Suspension.”

It may not be amiss to state here that the alleged misappropriation involved in the criminal case is not entirely disconnected with the office of the petitioner. True, the Maternity Employee's Cooperative Association that own the funds said to have been misappropriated is a private entity. However, as its name implies, it is an association composed of the employees of the Maternity and Children's Hospital where petitioner was serving as an employee. Moreover, if petitioner was designated to and occupied the position of manager and cashier of said association, it was because he was an employee of the Maternity and Children's Hospital. The connection though indirect, and, in the opinion of some, rather remote, exists and is there.

The trial court cites the cases of Mondano vs. Silvosa and Lacson vs. Roque, and others to support its holding that an official may not be suspended for irregularities not committed in connection with his office. These cases, however, involve elective officials who stand on ground different from that of an appointive officer or employee, and whose suspension pending investigation is governed by other laws. Furthermore, an elective officer, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible only to the community that elected him. Ordinarily, he is not amenable to rules of official conduct governing appointive officials, and so, may not be forthwith and summarily suspended, unless his conduct and acts of irregularity have some connection with his office. Furthermore, an elective official has a definite term of office, relatively of short duration; naturally, since suspension from his office definitely affects and shortens this term of office, said suspension should not be ordered and done unless necessary to prevent further damage or injury to the office and to the people dealing with said officer.

 

Misconduct in Office: Not Work Related or Committed in the Course of Performance of Duty

236) Nera v. Garcia

106 Phil. 1031, 1960

 

Facts: Petitioner Nera is employed as a clerk in the Maternity and Children’s Hospital. He also became manager and cashier of the Maternity Employer’s Cooperative Association, Inc. Petitioner holds the fund of the association. Petitioner was charged for allegedly misappropriating certain amounts of money which belongs to the association. Balcos, filed an administrative complaint case against Nera. Nera was then suspended as clerk of the said hospital, as approved by respondent Garcia, Secretary of Health.  Petitioner was given preventive suspension. Petitioner now wants to life the suspension.

 

Issue: Whether or not the suspension is proper.

 

Held: No.  Section 694 of the Revised Penal Code placed a comma after the words "grave misconduct," so that the phrase "in the performance or neglect", as it did under Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, now qualifies only the last word "neglect", thereby making clear the person charged is guilty merely to neglect, the same must be in the performance of his duty; but that when he is charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct these need have no relation to the performance of duty. Thus is readily understandable. Suspension is not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and he given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive Suspension is applicable if the charge against such officer, or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or to believe that the performance of duty, or if there are strong reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

 

 

 

Proved by Substantial Evidence

237) Grefalde v. Sandiganbayan (348 SCRA 367, 2000)

 

Facts:  Petitioners are four of the fifty six (56) persons indicted for graft charges affecting transactions of the Negros Oriental Highways and Engineering District ("NOHED") in 1977 and 1978. For violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or Republic Act No. 3019 ("R.A. 3019") 3 , petitioners Rufina Grefalde and Lindy Enriquez were charged before the Sandiganbayan in fifty five (55) Informations; petitioner F. Lawrence Suelto, Jr., in seventeen (17) Informations in Criminal Case;and petitioner Manuel Diaz in three (3) Informations.

 

All four petitioners are employees of the MPWH assigned at NOHED, Dumaguete City in 1977 to 1978. Petitioner Grefalde was the district accountant; petitioner Enriquez was the property custodian; petitioner Suelto a project engineer, and petitioner Diaz was a laborer/checker under the supervision of petitioner Enriquez.

 

 

Issue: Whether or not the evidence is sufficient to show that petitioners were part of the conspiracy.

 

Ruling:  No. There was insufficient evidence to show that petitioenrs Enriquez, Suelto and Diaz were part of the conspiracy. Although a conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, it must, like the crime itself, be proven beyond reasonable doubt.  Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval is not enough without a showing that the participation was intentional and with a view of furthering a common criminal design or purpose.  In the instant case, the prosecution had nothing to implicate Enriquez, Suelto and Diaz with but their signatures on the documents  , which served as attestations that materials which met the desired specifications were received in the jobsites, and their daily time records (DTRs), which showed that at the time the questioned deliveries were supposed to have arrived they were not in the jobsites but in their respective offices. The prosecution used the DTRs to prove that Enriquez, Suelto and Diaz did not actually witness the deliveries, contrary to their testimonies.

 

The Court holds that the evidence against the three remaining petitioners is too weak and specious to support the grave charge of conspiracy. The DTRs are too unreliable an indicator of the whereabouts of employees at certain times within the working day. The signatures, by themselves, while they may have contributed to or facilitated the consummation of the crime, do not represent direct or competent proof of connivance. In the case of Enriquez, the NOHED property custodian who also set his signature on the spurious vouchers, there is paucity of proof that from the nature of his functions he could detect patently irregular vouchers or irregularly issued supporting documents. As stated by this Court in Macadangdang v. Sandiganbayan.  Simply because a person in a chain of processing officers happens to sign or initial a voucher as it is going the rounds, it does not necessarily follow that said person becomes part of a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. It is all too easy to be swept into a long prison term simply because the guilt of some conspirators is overwhelming and somehow it attached to all who happen to be charged in one indictment.

 

Misconduct in Office: Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer

 

238) Zacarias v. National Police Commission

4143 SCRA 387, 2003

 

Facts: Chief Inspector Ruben assigned petitioner to be on duty at the Anti-Kidnapping Task Force. Detainees were able to escape during the watch of petitioner. The Police Inspector General found that the escape of the detainees was due to the laxity of petitioner. Petitioner  was administratively charged with neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of his duties. Petitionre was dismissed from his duties by the NAPOLCOM upon recommendation by the Inspector General’s recommendation.

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer.

 

Ruling: Yes. Conduct unbecoming of a police officer refers to any behavior or action of a PNP member, irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously compromises his character and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior with any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which is dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization."Petitioner contends that the charges of neglect of duty and inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties against him cannot be classified under any of the three cases enumerated above. Hence, the Chief of the PNP and the NAB cannot dismiss him summarily from the service. Webster defines "unbecoming" conduct as "improper" performance. Such term "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method."16cräläwvirtualibräry Obviously, the charges of neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties fall within the scope of conduct unbecoming a police officer. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:

 

"Even assuming that the charge against petitioner is not serious within the contemplation of paragraph (a) of Section 42 above quoted, or that he is not a recidivist within the context of paragraph (b), he could nonetheless fall within the ambit of paragraph (c) thereof, in that, because of his laxity and inefficiency in the performance of his duties, he is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer." (Underscoring supplied)

 

Thus, the summary dismissal of petitioner from the service is in order. And, under Section 8 of Memorandum Circular No. 92-006, such dismissal from the service is immediately executory

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People -Nepotism

239) Civil Service Commission v. Cortes (723 SCRA 609, 2014)

 

Facts: Respondent Cortes was appointed to the position of Information Officer V. Her appointment was approved when the Commission En Banc of the Commission of Human Rights issued a resolution approving the said appointment. Father of respondent abstained from  voting. The Civil Service Commission conducted an investigation regarding the appointment of Cortes. The CSC ruled that the appointment was not valid since it was covered by the rule on nepotism since his father being a Commissioner is considered an appointing authority despite being a member of the Commission En Banc.

 

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Respondent Cortes is covered by the prohibition against nepotism.

 

Held:  Yes. The appointment of Respondent Cortes is covered by the prohibition against nepotism. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.

 

By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In the present case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law. In her defense, respondent Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing authority referred to in Section 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the individual Commissioners who compose it. The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel.

 

In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.

 

240. Biteng v. Department of Interior and Local Government (451 SCRA 520, 2005)

Acts of Government or of the People –Grounds for Disciplinary Action under the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

 

FACTS: Alejandrino C. Valera, On June 28, 1989, the Regional Director of the DILG (Cordillera Admin Region), appointed Alex A. Biteng, as Municipal Government Operations Officer. Under his appointment, he was recommended by his sister, Evangeline B. Trinidad, the Chief of the Administrative Services Division of the Region. Ruby Esperanza V. Valera, Personnel Officer III of the Region, certified that 'all requirements and supporting papers pursuant to Memo. Circular No. 6, 1985 had been complied with and found to be in order. On May 25, 1990, Biteng submitted to the DILG his 'Personal Data Sheet' in support of his application for appointment as Local Government Operations Officer V in the Admin Region of the DILG. In Answer' to Question No. 23, in his PDS if he was related, within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to the recommending authority, he placed an X on the box for the answer No. On June 4, 1990, the RD approved the appointment of Biteng, as Local Government Operations Officer. On the face of the appointment, the recommending officer was Evangeline B. Trinidad, the sister of the petitioner.

"On July 20, 1994, the CSC received a letter coming from DILG-CAR BELOW THE POVERTY LINE EMPLOYEES complaining against Marino B. Trinidad, the PLGOO, DILG-Bangued, Abra, and Evangeline B. Trinidad, the Chief of the Administrative Services Division of the Cordillera Administrative Region of the Local Government Department, for Nepotism and irregularities in the issuance of appointments to Antonio B. Trinidad, Melchor T. Adame and Rolando A. Briones. The Special Audit Team of the Personnel Inspection and Audit Division of the CSC conducted its investigation, during the period from August 10 to 12, 1994. In the course of its audit, the Team decided to include the appointments of Alex A. Biteng and Abraham A. Biteng, as subjects of their investigation. 

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in declaring petitioner guilty of dishonesty for failure to disclose in his Personal Data Sheet (CS Form 212) his relationship to his sister who signed as recommending officer when such signature was not meant to be such.

 

RULING: No. The Court agree with the CA that petitioner is guilty of dishonesty. He was duty-bound to disclose his sibling relationship, not only in his sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, but also in all other documents required for employment under the law and civil service rules.

"Dishonesty is 'intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. '" Stressing that a false statement in a Personal Data Sheet "amounts to dishonesty," the Court recently echoed this definition in Ratti v. Mendoza-de Castro: "The accomplishment of false statements in a Personal Data Sheet, being a requirement under Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the making of untruthful statements therein is, therefore, ultimately connected with such employment. As such, making a false statement therein amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document."

Petitioner admits that he twice answered "No" to Item 23 of his two Personal Data Sheets, an item that required him to disclose his relationship with the recommending or appointing authority. He asserts that while Trinidad is indeed his sister, he never solicited her assistance, help or recommendation; and that his appointments were based on his own merits, as he had passed all the qualifying examinations. He also did not seek his sister's assistance in securing the position is immaterial, the issue being his failure to disclose the relationship as required by civil service rules. Neither does passing all the requisite examinations validate his actions, since the prohibition on nepotism applies without regard to the qualifications of the appointee. He also maintains that he was unaware of the functions of his sister at the time he accomplished his first Personal Data Sheet on February 18, 1989. He was allegedly later surprised to find her signature on his appointment papers dated June 28, 1989. Propriety and candor dictated that he should have, at the time, immediately informed the CSC or his superiors of such fact.

More important, since he already knew that his sister as the recommending authority had signed his June 28, 1989 appointment papers, he should have already been placed on alert when he set out to accomplish his second Personal Data Sheet dated May 25, 1990. Petitioner should have taken extra precaution and inquired into the circumstances of his new appointment in order to prevent a repeat of his previous inadvertence. Thus, he cannot now claim that when he denied his relationship with his sister in his May 25, 1990 Personal Data Sheet, he was in good faith. Good faith requires honesty of intention. He should have been free from any knowledge of circumstances that ought to have prompted him to undertake an inquiry.

 

Grounds for Disciplinary Action under the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

241) Manibago-Santos v. Francisco (794 SCRA 161, 2016)

 

Facts: Atty. Santos received a letter of Intent to Redeem Subject Property⁶ dated March 28, 2012 from Overlook Resort Inc. and its President, Raymond C. Ricardo, in relation to its extrajudicial foreclosure case.

Planters Development Bank (Plantersbank) was adjudged highest bidder during the auction held earlier on January 10, 2012.⁸ Thus, Atty. Santos wrote the bank's Senior Vice President, Ma. Agnes J. Angeles, to inform her of the mortgagors' intent to redeem the foreclosed property.⁹ In accordance with the rules, she requested the bank to submit a statement of account of all the expenses it incurred relative to the foreclosure sale

Atty. Santos received a letter from Atty. Alexander L. Paulino, legal counsel for Plantersbank, stating the redemption price  for the foreclosed property. Attached to the letter were statements of accounts and receipts in support of this amount, including a receipt signed by Sheriff Francisco, who was then Sheriff-in-Charge.

 

Atty. Santos required Sheriff Francisco to explain why he did not submit an estimate of expenses and liquidation in relation to the P8,000.00 he received. Sheriff Francisco admitted receiving a check for P8,000.00 from Jeson Talbo Ganalongo of Plantersbank.He explained that he received the check when the auction had already been concluded, as a token of appreciation.

 

Issue: Whether or not Sheriff Francisco is guilty for violating R.A 6713.

 

Ruling: Yes. This Court has considered the solicitation and acceptance of monetary considerations by sheriffs as conduct unbecoming of a court employee, grave misconduct, and dishonesty. In Astorga v. Villanueva, we discussed the need to put an end to the deplorable behavior of soliciting litigants:

The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest in performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not receive tips or other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the judiciary. "The Court has always stressed that all members of the judiciary should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals, in order that the integrity and good name of the courts of justice shall be preserved." Court personnel cannot take advantage of the vulnerability of party-litigants.

 

. . . .

Indeed, "[a]s a court employee, [one] should be more circumspect in [one's] behavior and should [steer] clear of any situation casting the slightest of doubt on [one's] conduct."chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Both respondent and Plantersbank allege that no solicitation took place and that Plantersbank insisted on giving respondent the amount as a token of appreciation and gratitude.

Still, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that "sheriffs are not authorized to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties." This opens doubt on monetary considerations being made for wrongful and unethical purposes, creates cracks in our justice system, and proves "inimical to the best interests of the service."

 

Disciplinary Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission

242) Corsiga v. Defensor

391 SCRA 267, 2002

 

Facts:  Private Respondent Ortizo, a NIA employee, while petitioner is the Regional Manager of the NIA where he is employed in. Petitioenr issued ROM No. 52 reassigning private respondent to Aganan-Sta. Barbara River Irrigation System. However, respondent contends that it does not apply to him, and was requesting for exemption. Petitioner denied such request. Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for prohibition and injunction. Petitioner then moved to dismiss such petition for lack of jurisdiction.

 

Issue: Whether or not Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.

 

Ruling: No. The Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over all employees of Government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. As such, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The National Irrigation Administration, created under Presidential Decree No. 1702, is a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. Thus, being an employee of the NIA, private respondent is covered by the Civil Service Commission.

 

Section 13 Rule VII of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (the Adm. Code of 1987) provides how appeal can be taken from a decision of a department or agency head. It states that such decision shall be brought to the Merit System Protection Board (now the CSC En Banc per CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 dated June 29, 1993). It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure in Rule XII, Section 6 of the same rules, that decisions of lower level officials be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service Commission. Decisions of the Civil Service Commission, in turn, may be elevated to the Court of Appeals. Under this set up, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over personnel actions and, thus, committed an error in taking jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462. The trial court should have dismissed the case on motion of petitioner and let private respondent question ROM No. 52 before the NIA Administrator, and then the Civil Service Commission. As held in Mantala vs. Salvador, cases involving personnel actions, reassignment included, affecting civil service employees, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Disciplinary Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission

243) Anonymous Complaint against P.T. Yared (461 SCRA 347, 2005)

 

Facts: An anonymous complaint was filed against respondent Yared, Sheriff III, for grave misconduct for collecting excessive fees. An undated receipt showed that the service fee was more than what was proper according to the complainant. Respondent contends that he rented a motorcycle and went back and forth on the said town to serve the summons since he was unfamiliar with the terrain.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty for grave misconduct for collecting excessive fees.

 

Held:

 

At the outset, the Court stresses that an anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown author. However, a complaint of such sort does not always justify its outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for such complaint may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence. As this Court ruled in Anonymous Complaint Against Gibson A. Araula:

 

Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous complaints, cases are accepted in which the charge could be fully borne by public records of indubitable integrity, thus, needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest.

 

Yes, any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and would diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary cannot be countenanced; as such, anonymous complaints of this nature should be accordingly acted upon by this Court. It is clear then that a sheriff, in the performance of his duties, is not precluded from collecting additional sums from a requesting party. He is, however, mandated by the Rules to follow certain steps: First, the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; Second, he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses; Third, the approved amount shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff; Fourth, the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; and Fifth, the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ.

 

There is no evidence on record that the respondent followed this procedure. As aptly stated by Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño in her evaluation. While the Investigating Judge opined that the amounts asked by respondent may be considered reasonable under the circumstances, the fact that the required procedure was not followed cannot be ignored. This Court has also ruled that a sheriff’s repeated demands for sums of money to defray expenses without court approval constitutes grave misconduct. Sheriffs cannot receive gratuities and voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. The respondent’s failure to faithfully comply with the provisions of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court constitutes dereliction of duty and negligence, which warrants the imposition of disciplinary measures.

 

244) Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals (475 SCRA 276, 2005)

Disciplinary Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission

 

FACTS: On December 22, 1995, a Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming was filed by the stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC) against SPO1 Rimando Gannapao before the PNP, Inspectorate Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

Pursuant to NAPOLCOM Memo. Circular No. 96-010 dated July 21 1996, a Summary Hearing was conducted by the Office of the Legal Service of the National Headquarters PNP against respondent for the alleged moonlighting. The investigation was dismissed upon the recommendation of Atty. Joselito Casugbu who found the complaint to be one of pure harassment. On November 26, 1997, the PNP Chief Recaredo A. Sarmiento II rendered a Decision imposing the three (3) months suspension of respondent.

On February 6, 1998, respondent filed an 'Urgent Motion for Reconsideration' which was denied by the PNP Director General Santiago in a Resolution dated April 14, 1998. Respondent appealed the PNP Resolution to the National Appellate Board (NAB), National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). The appeal was dismissed in a Resolution dated December 29, 1999. On February 10, 2000, respondent filed a Petition for Appeal with the DILG. The appeal was denied and the penalty of three (3) months suspension of petitioner was affirmed in a Resolution dated July 18, 2000. Thereafter, respondent appealed to the CSC praying the setting aside of the penalty of three (3) months suspension and/or for the Commission to conduct a hearing or a reinvestigation alleging lack of due process.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of Respondent Gannapao.

 

RULING: No. Petitioner attacks the CA for issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction despite the Commission's finding that private respondent was guilty of misconduct. The OSG adds that the injunctive relief violates the Administrative Code and the CSC rules stating that administrative disciplinary penalties shall be immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal.

We hold that neither the Administrative Code nor the CSC rules deprive courts of their power to grant restraining orders or preliminary injunctions to stay the execution of CSC decisions pending appeal. Moreover, a court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, when proper, is expressly authorized by Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:"Sec. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction.  A preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. If the action or proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court or any member thereof."

Furthermore, Section 82 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 19-99 recognizes the authority of the CA and the Supreme Court to issue restraining orders or injunctions."Section 82. Effect of Pendency of Petition for Review/Certiorari with the Court. The filing and pendency of a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an injunction.

Having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC, the CA clearly has the discretion to issue an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction to secure the rights of private respondent pending appeal of his dismissal. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the exercise of judgment by the courts in injunctive matters should not be interfered with. Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise defined, grave abuse is the exercise of power in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty, or a refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

 

Disciplinary Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission

244) Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals

475 SCRA 276, 2005

 

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, to seek the reversal of the CA’s decision in granting respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner contends that CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the motion of the respondent.

 

Issue: Whether or not the CA commited grave abuse of discretion.

 

Ruling: No. In the present controversy, however, the assailed Order does not state the basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA made no findings of fact or law indicating that any of the elements essential for the grant of an injunctive writ existed. After merely stating that it took "into consideration the allegations and the arguments set forth" in the Urgent Motion filed by Gannapao, the CA immediately concluded afterwards that respondent was entitled to the relief demanded. In this connection, the Court reiterates its pronouncement in Garcia v. Burgos: "It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages." Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and fair play, this Court scrutinized the records of the case and, indeed, found sufficient grounds for the grant of the injunctive Writ. Prior to the finality of the CSC Decision dismissing him, private respondent has a clear and unmistakable right to his current position in the police service. Unquestionably, the right to employment, oftentimes the lowly employee’s only noble source of bread and butter, is entitled to protection by the State.20 Moreover, the immediate implementation of the not yet final penalty of dismissal from the service would surely cause private respondent (and his family) irreparable damage. As pleaded in his Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, his salary and benefits as a policeman are his family’s only source of income.

 

 

 

 

 

Disciplinary Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission

245) University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission (356 SCRA 57, 2000)

 

Facts:

• "Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB) who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government'' official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP).
• "When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave of absence for another year, but was denied by Dr. Eulogio Castillo, the then Director of the Agricultural Credit Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLB. In the same letter, Dr. Castillo advised Dr. De Torres to report for duty at UPLB not later than September 15, 1989; while the then UPLB Chancellor Raul P. de Guzman apprised him on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and warned of the possibility of being considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) if he failed to return and report for duty as directed.
• "Dr. De Torres wrote UPLB that he had 'no alternative but x x x to pursue the matter in continuing his commitment to CIRDAP.' In response thereto, Chancellor de Guzman warned De Torres, in a Letter dated November 20, 1989, that in case of the latter's failure to report 'within 30 days from today,' UPLB would be forced to drop him from the rolls of personnel. Despite the warning, Dr. De Torres did not report to work.
• "On January 3, 1994 or after almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the incumbent Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was reporting back to duty at ACCI-UPLB effective January 3, 1994 x x x. However, Chancellor Villareal notified Dr. De Torres that 'when an employee reports back for duty, he should have been from an approved leave …' Likewise, Director Leodegacio M. Ilag, of ACCI-UPLB, in a Letter dated February 10, 1994, informed De Torres that in the absence of any approved application for leave of absence, he [was] considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB.
• " Dr. De Torres wrote Chancellor Villareal seeking reconsideration [of] the two aforementioned decisions x x x. On July 4, 1994, Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB [did] not show that he ha[d] been officially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty x x x.
• "Mesdames Juanita Baskinas and Winifreda Medina, members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres x x x.
• Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 that ruled that Dr. De Torres is considered to have been dropped from the service as of September 1, 1989. Hence, his re-employment requires the issuance of appointment subject to the requirements of Civil Service Law and Rules
• petitioners argue that (1) the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Petitioner De Torres is not needed, because he was not formally dropped from the rolls of the University of the Philippines

 

Issue: Whether or not CSC has the power to dictate the dismissal of Dr. Torres despite AWOL

 

Ruling: No.

UP's actuations, in spite of Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, are consistent with the exercise of its academic freedom. We have held time and again that "the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Clearly, this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong: "As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure." Similarly, Vicente G. Sinco, a former UP president and delegate to the 1973 Constitutional Convention, stressed that the Constitution "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor."

We are not unaware that academic freedom has been traditionally associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press. But, as explained by Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna during the deliberations on Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, "[s]ince academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."

Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done so without trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission,  the Court stressed that "[t]he CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls.

 

Appeal by “party adversely affected by the decision”

 

246) National Appellate Board of NAPOLCOM v. Mamuag

466 SCRA 624, 2005

 

Facts: Judge Angeles filed an administrative complaint against respondent Mamuag, and other police officers wherein Judge Angeles sought the dismissal of respondents because of serious irregularities in handling his criminal complaint. The PNP Chief ruled in giving suspension to respondents, the National Appellate Board also dismissed the petition of respondents. The Court of Appeals rendered void the resolution made by the PNP Chief. It was discussed that Judge Angeles was not the proper party to file a motion for reconsideration since in an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness. No private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense committed is against the government.

 

Issue: Whether or not Judge Angeles is the proper party to file an appeal.

 

Ruling: No. It is the Philippine National Police which would be adversely affected and thus would be the proper party to appeal such a judgment. Corollary to this, where the original judgment is adverse to the petitioners, it is they who could properly appeal the same. In either case, the complainant Judge Angeles certainly has no legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the original decision handed down by the PNP Chief.RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize "either party" to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty. However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent.

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People -Cessation from Office of Respondent

247) Baquerfo v. Sanchez (455 SCRA 13, 2005)

 

Facts: Petitioner Baquerfo and Respondent Sanchez are coworkers in the Regional Trial Court. Baquerfo accused Sanchez for stealing desk fans and an electric stove. Thus, Baquerfo filed a complaint against Sanchez. After the investigation of the complaint has finished and the case was being readied to be transmitted, Sanchez resigned. The recommendation of the investigating judge is that the respondent be considered as “resigned with prejudice”.

 

Issue: Whether or not the respondent can evade the penalties of his action if he resigns.

 

Held: No. Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Respondent's resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.

 

Since the complaint was filed on June 17, 2003, long before respondent was deemed resigned on October 17, 2004, jurisdiction had already attached and was not lost by respondent's resignation from office during the pendency of the case. Thus, the Court retains the authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative responsibility when a court employee is facing administrative sanction. It is not even among the penalties which may be imposed on the erring public official.

 

248. Quimbo v. Gervacio (466 SCRA 277, 2005)

Preventive Suspension

FACTS: Petitioner Prudencio C. Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administratively charged for harassment and oppression by Elmo V. Padaon (Padaon), a general foreman. During the pendency of the case, he was placed under preventive suspension without pay. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Quimbo guilty of oppression and recommended that he be suspended from office for a period of eight (8) months without pay. This was approved by the Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals (CA) found Quimbo guilty of simple misconduct only and penalized him with suspension from office for a period of two (2) months without pay. Quimbo filed a Motion for Modification/Reconsideration calling attention to the fact that he had been on preventive suspension from March 18, 1998 to June 1, 1998 and praying that the order under reconsideration be modified ―to take into account the period of his PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of 2 MONTHS and 17 DAYS WITHOUT PAY as part of the final penalty imposed. The Ombudsman clarified that ―preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in an investigation; and that if after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated upon is found guilty warranting the imposition of penalty, then he shall accordingly be penalized. Such was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension pending the investigation is a penalty.

RULING: No. Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. As stated in Sec. 24, preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides that the period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty. Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty. To rule otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between, and purposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty.

 

 

Preventive Suspension

249) Baculi v. Office of the President (820 SCRA 1, 2017)

 

Facts: Under consideration are the consolidated appeals docketed as G.R. No. 188681 and G.R. No. 201130. The appeals relate to the right of a public officer who had been invalidly dismissed from the service to recover his salaries, benefits and other emoluments corresponding to the period beyond the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation until the time of his valid dismissal from the service.

 

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in granting backwages

 

Ruling:

We affirm the CA.

By law, Baculi should have been automatically reinstated at the end of the 90-day period of his preventive suspension because his case was not finally decided within the said period.

We have to point out that preventive suspension is of two kinds. The first is the preventive suspension pending investigation, and the second is the preventive suspension pending appeal where the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is either suspension or dismissal but after review the respondent official or employee is exonerated.²² The nature of preventive suspension pending investigation has been explained in the following manner:

x x x Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not violative of the Constitution because it is not a penalty. It is authorized by law whenever the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or whenever there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges that would warrant removal from the service. If the proper disciplinary authority does not finally decide the administrative case within a period of 90 days from the start of preventive suspension pending investigation, and the respondent is not a presidential appointee, the preventive. suspension is lifted and the respondent is "automatically reinstated in the service." In the case of presidential appointees, the preventive suspension pending investigation shall be "for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant."

Nonetheless, there shall be no indefinite suspension pending investigation, whether the respondent officials are presidential or nonpresidential appointees. The law abhors indefinite preventive suspension because the indefiniteness violates the constitutional guarantees under the due process and equal protection clauses,²⁸ as well as the right of public officers and employees to security of tenure. The abhorrence of indefinite suspensions impelled the Court in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan to delineate rules on preventive suspensions pending investigation, viz.:

To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows:

1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuance thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act.

2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807; and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant.

It cannot be validly argued that in the case of presidential appointees the preventive suspension pending investigation can be indefinite. The Court discredited such argument in Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, and directed the immediate reinstatement of a presidential appointee whose preventive suspension had lasted for nearly seven months.

Removal and Suspension Distinguished

250) Lacson v. Roques

(92 Phil. 456, 1952)

 

Facts: Petitioner Mayor Lacson made a radio broadcast where he criticized the Court’s decision in acquitting the accused in the criminal case that he instituted, and that he would fire Judge Montesa for being ignorant. Judge Montesa filed a complaint against petitioner for libel and contempt. The President then wrote a letter to petitioner stating that the latter is suspended from office upon receipt of the letter.

Issue: What is the difference between removal and suspension.

Ruling: The difference between the power to remove and the power to suspend is only one of degree. Suspension is a qualified expulsion, and whether termed suspension or expulsion, it constitutes either temporary or permanent disfranchisement. It is an ad interim stoppage or arrest of an official power and pay. (2 McQuillen's Municipal Corporations [Revised], section 585). In fact, when the "suspension is to continue until the final disposition" of a criminal prosecution, like the petitioner's suspension, it might become a virtual removal, considering that in the event of conviction by the trial court the case might drag as long as the remainder of the suspended officer's term of office, or longer.

 

We believe also that in the field of procedure no less than in that of substantive law the suspension under review is fatally defective. No administrative charges have been preferred against the petitioner and none seem to be contemplated. The sole grounds for the suspension, as recited in the President's order, are "the pendency of criminal case No. 20707 for libel," and "the present policy of the administration, requiring the suspension of any elective official who is being charged before the courts of any offense involving moral turpitude."

 

It seems self-evident that if, as must be conceded, temporary suspension is allowed merely so as to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses, the rule presupposes the existence of administrative charges and investigation being conducted or to be conducted. We are certain that no authority or good reason can be found in support of a proposition that the Chief Executive can suspend an officer facing criminal charges for the sole purpose of aiding the court in the administration of justice. Independent of the other branches of the Government, the courts can well take care of their own administration of the law.

 

An administrative policy or practice not predicated on constitutional or statutory authority can have no binding force and effect in matters not purely political or governmental. Where individual rights, honor and reputation are in jeopardy, it is only law or the Constitution which can give legality to executive actions. It has been shown that nothing in the Constitution, law or decision warrants the petitioner's suspension.

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Removal and Suspension Distinguished

251) De la Paz v. Adiong (465 SCRA 34, 2005)

 

Facts: Respondent Adiong was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in two (2) separate cases namely, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863, and A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857 which is this case. Respondent now asks the clarification of the Court if such penalty shall be served simultaneously or successively.

 

Issue:  Whether or not the penalty of suspension shall be served simultaneously or successively.

 

Held:  The penalty of suspension for six months shall be served successively.  These two cases arose from two different causes of action and, therefore, the penalties should both be served.  Moreover, in the en banc Resolution dated February 25, 1992, the Court categorically stated that in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served successively by the erring lawyer.

 

 

 

Penalties for Grave Offenses

253) Wooden v. Civil Service Commission (471 SCRA 512, 2005)

Facts:  Sometime in the School Year 1990-1991, petitioner, who was then a fourth year student in Bachelor of Secondary Education (BSED) at Saint Louis University (SLU), applied for graduation. His application was approved subject to completion of a two-course, six-unit deficiency in the summer term of 1991 or by May 1991. Later, he was appointed as Staff Coordinator of "Louisian Educator '91", the annual of the College of Education, SLU

 

petitioner joined the graduation rites of the College of Education, SLU. Thereafter, he enrolled and completed his two-course, six-unit deficiency in the summer term of 1991 or by May 1991.  On June 11, 1991, he was employed as Substitute Teacher at the SLU Laboratory High School. He was a member of the teaching staff until the end of school year 1991-1992, or April 30, 1992

 

petitioner filed his application for the Professional Board Examinations for Teachers (PBET), stating therein that he graduated in March 1991. His application was approved on September 20, 1991

 

upon petitioner's application for his transcript of records, SLU informed him that a reevaluation of his scholastic records revealed that he needed to complete a three-unit English subject.

 

petitioner took the scheduled PBET. Subsequently, petitioner enrolled in SLU, under protest, and completed the three-unit subject deficiency in the second semester of school year 1991-1992.⁹

On June 8, 1992, the results of the PBET were released. Petitioner passed the PBET with a rating of 76.38%

 

petitioner submitted his duly accomplished Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in connection with his appointment as Teacher I of Guinzadan National High School, Bauko, Mountain Province. He indicated in Item No. 17 of the PDS that he finished his BSED from SLU with inclusive dates of attendance from 1987 to 1991; and in Item No. 18, he indicated the PBET date of examination as 1992

 

On September 25, 1997, the CSC - Cordillera Administrative Region filed against petitioner a Formal Charge for Dishonesty and Falsification, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-69

 

petitioner was declared guilty of dishonesty thru falsification of public document and dismissed from service with the accessory penalties thereof. 

 

Issue: Whether or not RESPONDENTS ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH THE ACCESSORY PENALTY OF PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION.

 

Ruling: Yes.

Petitioner is charged with dishonesty thru falsification of his PDS. Dishonesty is defined as "intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion.^"  It is also understood to imply a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray"

Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the petitioner, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.

 

Petitioner passed the examination. There was no damage inflicted on the Government.

Further, while it has been held that making a false statement in a PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document, this Court likewise has held that laws and rules should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction but in light of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to afford justice to all.

Petitioner should not be faulted when he wrote "1987-1991" in his PDS under "Inclusive Dates of Attendance" since he did attend the school during the given period and in fact graduated on March 24, 1991. It is an honest mistake of fact induced by no fault of his own and excuses him from the legal consequences of his act. Ignorantia facti excusat. To stress, petitioner was asked mainly about the inclusive dates of his attendance in SLU. The official transcript of records was issued on August 8, 1994.  Understandably, it does not show the circumstances that led petitioner in giving the subject answers in his application for PBET and PDS. The transcript of records should not be made the basis for holding petitioner liable for dishonesty.

 

252) Office of Court Administrator v. Yan (457 SCRA 389, 2005)

Penalties for Grave Offenses

FACTS: In his letter dated November 19, 1997 addressed to former Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, Judge Fernando R. Gomez, Jr. of the MCT, Brooke's Point, Palawan, requested an audit of all collections and deposits of Sylvia R. Yan, Stenographic Reporter, respondent, while she was the OIC of the said court.

Judge Gomez, Jr. reported that he issued two memoranda to respondent ordering her to turn over to Clerk of Court Remedios Base the bank book for Judiciary Fund and receipts for cash bailbonds.  However, respondent failed to do so.

Upon receipt of Judge Gomez letter, the OCA immediately sent a checklist of audit requirements to Respondent Sylvia R. Yan who acted as OIC and to Remedios Base, Clerk of Court. Only Remedios Base,Clerk of Court, submitted the audit requirements to the OCA. On May 8, 1998, the OCA wired respondent to surrender the necessary documents.

Eventually, respondent appeared before the OCA and submitted the official cashbooks and the official receipts of all collections pertaining to the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Fiduciary Fund.  She explained that she failed to submit the required documents on time because she was sick.  When asked why there was delay in the submission of monthly reports of collections and deposits during her term as OIC, she explained that although she was the designated OIC, there were other court personnel who collected money from the parties concerned.  Oftentimes, her co-workers borrowed the money and that she had a hard time collecting the amounts.  When asked about the Fiduciary Fund, respondent cried and admitted that she spent it.

The Fiscal Monitoring Division of the OCA conducted an audit of the JDF, Clerk of Court General Fund, and Fiduciary Fund of the said court during the period that respondent acted as OIC.  The audit shows that with respect to the JDF, respondent incurred a shortage amounting to P3,371.00. As to the Clerk of Court General Fund, the audit shows that respondent did not maintain a cashbook nor prepare reports of collections and deposits.  The collections amounting to P2,576.00 were not remitted.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Yan is guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct

RULING: Yes. Moreover, as aptly observed by the Court Administrator, respondent's continued refusal to heed no less than six (6) Resolutions from the Court aggravated her liability.  It should be stressed that a Resolution requiring comment on an administrative complaint against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from this Court, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.⁵ Any disregard or cavalier attitude towards this Court's lawful directives will not be tolerated because failure to comply with those directives constitutes gross misconduct.

For having misappropriated P261,062.38 and lending her collections to her co-employees, respondent committed dishonesty.  Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."Also, for defying this Court's Resolutions, she is liable for gross misconduct.  Gross misconduct is a flagrant, shameful and inexcusable unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause.

Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Resolution No. 99-1936, which took effect on September 27, 1999), provides:— Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service. A.       The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

1.              Dishonesty — 1st Offense — Dismissal

2.              Gross Neglect of Duty — 1st Offense — Dismissal

3.              Grave Misconduct — 1st Offense —    Dismissal"

 

Hence, respondent Sylvia R. Yan is declared guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service.  She is ordered to restitute to this Court the sum of P261,062.38.  All her withheld salaries, leave credits, allowances and benefits are ordered forfeited, the same to be applied to her accountabilities, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality in the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

 

Penalties for Grave Offenses

253) Wooden v. Civil Service Commission

471 SCRA 512, 2005

 

Facts:  Petitioner was alleged to have made misrepresentation in his Personal Data Sheet in connection with his appointment as Teacher I, since he wrote the inclusive date of his college education was 1987-1991. Petitioner graduated in 1991, however, petitioner still attended school in 1992 since he has a deficiency for the second semester of school year 1991-1992. Thus, he took the three-unit subject deficiency under protest.  Now, the Civil Service Commission – Cordillera Administrative Region filed a case against petitioner for dishonesty, and was later declared guilty which resulted to his dismissal along with accessory penalties.

 

Sometime in the School Year 1990-1991, petitioner, who was then a fourth year student in Bachelor of Secondary Education (BSED) at Saint Louis University (SLU), applied for graduation. His application was approved subject to completion of a two-course, six-unit deficiency in the summer term of 1991 or by May 1991. Later, he was appointed as Staff Coordinator of "Louisian Educator '91", the annual of the College of Education, SLU

 

Issue: Whether or not respondents erred in imposing the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification.

 

Ruling: Yes.  Petitioner should not be faulted when he wrote "1987-1991" in his PDS under "Inclusive Dates of Attendance" since he did attend the school during the given period and in fact graduated on March 24, 1991. It is an honest mistake of fact induced by no fault of his own and excuses him from the legal consequences of his act. Ignorantia facti excusat. To stress, petitioner was asked mainly about the inclusive dates of his attendance in SLU. The official transcript of records was issued on August 8, 1994.  Understandably, it does not show the circumstances that led petitioner in giving the subject answers in his application for PBET and PDS. The transcript of records should not be made the basis for holding petitioner liable for dishonesty. Petitioner Yan is charged with dishonesty thru falsification of his PDS. Dishonesty is defined as "intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion."  It is also understood to imply a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray"

Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the petitioner, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.

Further, while it has been held that making a false statement in a PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document, this Court likewise has held that laws and rules should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction but in light of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to afford justice to all.

 

Penalties for Grave Offenses

254) Concerned Employee v. Generoso

467 SCRA 614, 2005

 

Facts: An anonymous administrative complaint was filed against respondent which alleged that respondent falsified his income tax return by declaring two qualified children when in truth he only has one. At present, respondent already has three children, however, the petitioner avers that the falsification happened at an earlier time when the respondent only had one child. Respondent later on admitted such allegation since he only did it because his salary at that time won’t be enough.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty.

 

Ruling: Yes. By intentionally declaring incorrect information with the end view of gaining some benefit for himself, he caused damage to the Court which ultimately caused damage to the government. Undoubtedly, his act constitutes Dishonesty and, at the same time, Falsification of Official Document because of the presence of all the elements of the said offense in the instant case. Dishonesty and falsification are malevolent acts that have no place in the judiciary, it cannot be gainsaid.

 

Under Section 52 (A) (1) and (6), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and falsification of official document are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense.

 

This Court has not hesitated to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of grave offenses. In recent cases, this Court has held that the use of a false certificate in order to facilitate promotion constitutes an act of dishonesty under Civil Service Rules, and dismissed the erring employee on that ground; a clerk who was found to have falsified her daily time records was dismissed from the service, albeit it was her first offense; and a utility worker who stated in his personal data sheet that he did not have any pending administrative/criminal case was likewise dismissed, with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding unused leave credits. Given the depravity and wantonness of respondent's acts, there is absolutely no reason why he should be treated differently. By the way, his administrative liability is without prejudice to criminal liability.

 

 

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People -  Penalties for Grave Offenses

255) Aquino – Simbulan v. Bartolome (588 SCRA 359, 2009)

 

Facts: Petitioner Judge Simbulan filed a complaint alleging that respondent Judge and Lerey who are both already retired from government service committed grave errors and discrepancies in processing the surety bond for the accused Mercado in a certain criminal case.

 

Issue: What kind of penalty is given for grave offenses?

 

Held: Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the acts of respondent Judge and Lerey may be classified as gross neglect of duty, which is punishable by dismissal under Rule IV, Section 52 A(2) thereof. Neglect of duty denotes the failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him. Gross neglect is such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare.

 

In Ulat-Marrero v. Torio, Jr., the Court has categorized as a grave offense of gross neglect of duty, the failure of a court process server to serve summons which resulted in the delayed resolution of a case. As corollarily applied to the present case, where respondents released the accused on temporary liberty despite the absence of the required supporting documents for bail, the former are likewise liable for gross neglect of duty.

 

Were it not for the fact that both respondents, Judge Bartolome and Lerey, have retired on October 11, 2006 and August 26, 2003, respectively, the Court would have dismissed them from the service. Instead, it orders respondents to pay a fine to be deducted from their retirement benefits.

 

256) Fernandez v. Gatan (430 SCRA 19, 2004)

Penalties for Grave Offenses

FACTS: On November 6, 2000, the Office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court received the Letter-Complaint of Mr. Jacinto R. Fernandez dated October 27, 2000 accusing Marietta M. Gatan, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela, of violating Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), for discourtesy and failure to issue official receipts for payments received in behalf of the court.

According to complainant's mother, Mrs. Angeles R. Fernandez on October 25, 2000, she went to the RTC Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela to secure her court clearance. Thereat, respondent Marietta Gatan assisted her, handing over the clearance. Respondent demanded one hundred fifty (P150.00) pesos as payment. After paying the amount, Mrs. Fernandez asked for an official receipt to prove payment of the clearance fee. Respondent, however, told her that the receipt would no longer be necessary. Upon her return to her residence, Mrs. Fernandez narrated, complainant advised her to return and obtain from the respondent a receipt for the clearance fee. She heeded the advice. Unfortunately, instead of respondent issuing a receipt, she yelled at her saying "Ang kulit mo. Sa dinami-dami ng kumukuha ng certification ikaw pa lang ang bumalik dito. Yan ang pera mo kunin mo, kunin mo." Later on, respondent made amends to Mrs. Fernandez.

Feeling that her mother was humiliated and aggrieved on account of the incident, complainant conducted his own investigation. According to him, he got confirmation even from the officemates of the respondent that she has been collecting P150.00 from every person who seeks court clearance through her. He pointed to a certain Mr. Conrad Pua who paid the amount for a clearance but was not issued an official receipt by the respondent. He added there are some well-known persons in their community who also had the same experience.

On December 21, 2000, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the complaint of Jacinto Fernandez, Jr. to Judge Mirasol, then Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela, for investigation and report. Judge Mirasol took the statements of the complainant and Mrs. Fernandez. He also took the statement of Mr. Pua who confirmed having been charged by the respondent without issuing a receipt for a court clearance. Respondent submitted her counter-affidavit in which she disputed almost all the allegations of Mrs. Fernandez.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Gatan is guilty of grave misconduct.

 

RULING: Yes. Clearly, the respondent is guilty of grave misconduct. Grave misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer or employee which threatens the very existence of the system of administration of justice. An act that manifests the serious lack of integrity, uprightness and honesty demanded of an employee in the judiciary, and for which a respondent, in such a case, does not deserve to stay a minute longer.

The Supreme Court cannot countenance any conduct, act or omission, which diminishes or even just tends to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. The Court has reiterated time and again the rule that the conduct of every employee of the judiciary must be at all times characterized with propriety and decorum, and above all else, it must be above and beyond suspicion. The conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.

This being the first offense of the respondent, suspension from office for six (6) months appears to be the proper penalty.

 

Penalties for Grave Offenses

256) Fernandez v. Gatan

430 SCRA 19, 2004

 

Facts: Petitioner filed a case against respondent for violating the Anti-Gract and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner’s mother was asked to pay by the respondent when respondent assisted her, however, after paying, she asked for a receipt but the respondent was not able to provide any. On the next day, she asked respondent for a receipt, however, respondent yelled at her and told her to take her money back. The Court found that the payment of 150 is needed as clearance fee, however, respondent failed to issue a receipt.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of grave misconduct.

 

Ruling: Yes. Grave misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer or employee which threatens the very existence of the system of administration of justice. An act that manifests the serious lack of integrity, uprightness and honesty demanded of an employee in the judiciary, and for which a respondent, in such a case, does not deserve to stay a minute longer.

 

The Supreme Court cannot countenance any conduct, act or omission, which diminishes or even just tends to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. The Court has reiterated time and again the rule that the conduct of every employee of the judiciary must be at all times characterized with propriety and decorum, and above all else, it must be above and beyond suspicion. The conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.

 

This being the first offense of the respondent, suspension from office for six (6) months appears to be the proper penalty.

 

 

 

 

 

 

257) Escaño v. Manaois (809 SCRA 16, 2016)

Facts: an administrative case was filed against respondent Adrian P. Manaois (Manaois) initiated by complainant Ma. Rosario R. Escaño (Escaño) in her Complaint-Affidavit dated February 25, 2015 for grossly disrespectful behavior, discourtesy in the course of official duties, gross insubordination, knowingly making false statements against co-employees, being notoriously undesirable, neglect in the performance. of duty, failure to act promptly on letters and requests, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

 

Issue: Whether or not Manaois is guilty of simple neglect of duty, discourtesy in the course of official duties, frequent unauthorized absences, and being notoriously undesirable

 

Ruling: We agree with the findings of the hearing committee that Manaois is guilty of simple neglect of duty, discourtesy in the course of official duties, frequent unauthorized absences, and being notoriously undesirable.

Simple Neglect of Duty

Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give one's attention to a task expected of him.^[62] Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel commands court personnel to perform their official duties properly and dilligently at all times. Since the image of the courts, as the administrators and dispensers of justice, is not only reflected in their decisions, resolutions or orders but also mirrored in the conduct of court personnel, it is incumbent upon every court personnel to observe the highest degree of efficiency and competency in his or her assigned tasks. The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions

 

Frequent Unauthorized Absences. We agree with the recommendations of the hearing committee. Manaois' unauthorized absences and loafing during office hours are impermissible. Due to the nature and functions of their office, officials and employees of the judiciary must be role models in the faithful observance of the constitutional canon that public office is a public trust. Inherent in this mandate is the observance of the prescribed office hours and efficient use of every moment for public service, if only to recompense the government, and ultimately, the people who shoulder the cost of maintaining the judiciary. Thus, to inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees are, at all times, behooved to strictly observe official time

 

Notorious Undesirability.  In determining whether an employee is notoriously undesirable, the CSC prescribes a two-fold test: (1) whether it is common knowledge or generally known as universally believed to be true or manifest to the world that the employee committed the acts imputed against him; and (2) whether he had contracted the habit for any of the enumerated misdemeanors.^[84] We are satisfied that Manaois' general reputation within the HRD as someone who is quarrelsome and difficult to work with, in addition to his history of rude and discourteous conduct towards his supervisors, adequately show that he is notoriously undesirable. Manaois' actions have been substantiated and corroborated by the testimonies of the witnesses presented during the investigation.

An employee who cannot get along with his co-employees and superiors can upset and strain the working environment and is therefore detrimental to institution.^[85] Such instance calls for us to exercise our prerogative to take the necessary action to correct the situation and protect the judiciary.

 

Section 50 of the same Rules provides that if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating. In this case, the most serious charge for which we find Manaois guilty of is the grave offense of being notoriously undesirable, which is punishable by dismissal from service. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

258) Soriano v. Dizon

480 SCRA 1, 2006

 

Facts: Complainant Soriano filed a disbarment complaint against respondent Dizon for an incident which resulted in Soriano being shot in his neck by respondent Dizon. Pending trial, respondent committed numerous dishonest behavior and concocted lies in order to show that he was innocent.

 

Issue: Whether or not, respondent should be disbarred/

 

Ruling:  Yes. The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

 

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.

 

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

 

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

 

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not the mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Penalties for Grave Offenses

259) Perez v. Catindig (752 SCRA 185, 2015)

 

Facts: Dr. Perez filed a disbarment case against Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Dr. Perez filed the said case since she received an anonymous letter saying that her husband Atty. Catindig is having an affair with Atty. Baydo. The Investigating Commisioner found out that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that he still has a subsisting marriage, thus, it was recommended that he be disbarred for such grossly immoral conduct. However, the charge against Atty. Baydo should be dismissed for lack of evidence.

 

Issue: Whether or not the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.

 

Held: After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

 

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

 

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

 

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

 

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

 

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

 

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

 

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

 

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. Thus, Atty. Catindig is disbarred, while, Atty. Baydo’s charge is dismissed for lack of evidence.

 

 

 

 

 

260. CSC & Department of Science and Technology v. Arandia (721 SCRA 79, 2014)

Penalties for Grave Offenses

FACTS: In March 2000, Eriberta Nepomuceno, Regional Director of DOST-V, filed an administrative complaint for gross insubordination, gross neglect of duty, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of public service, grave misconduct and gross inefficiency in the performance of duty against the respondent with the CSC Regional Office No. V (CSCRO-V), Legazpi City. Nepomuceno alleged that the respondent refused to sign, without justifiable cause, documents for the payment of certain miscellaneous and travelling expenses, phone bills, and the release of salaries and allowances of Nepomuceno and other employees of DOST-V.

In her answer to the complaint, the respondent justified her refusal to sign and attributed it to the failure of Nepomuceno and the other concerned employees to submit sufficient supporting documents for their claims for reimbursement and the release of their salaries and allowances.

On March 22, 2002, a Formal Charge was issued against the respondent for the offenses of grave misconduct, gross insubordination and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Director Cecilia R. Nieto of CSCRO-V found respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service only and imposed on her the penalty of suspension for six months and one day. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but Director Nieto denied the motion in a subsequent order dated June 8, 2006. She then appealed her case to the CSC National Office.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s liability for insubordination

 

RULING: Yes. Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer.

In this case, the respondent committed insubordination when she failed to promptly act on the June 16, 2000 memorandum issued by her superior, Regional Director Nepomuceno, reminding her of her duties to immediately turn-over documents to and exchange room assignments with the new Administrative Officer-Designate, Engr. Lucena. The subject memorandum was a lawful order issued to enforce Special Order No. 23, s. of 2000 reassigning the respondent from Administrative to Planning Officer, and which warranted the respondent’s obedience and compliance.

The reiteration of the directives in the June 16, 2000 memorandum in several succeeding memoranda issued by Nepomuceno (dated June 19, 2000, June 23, 2000 and June 26, 2000), all the more demonstrates the respondent’s inaction and non-compliance with her superior’s orders. The records show that it was only on June 28, 2000 that the respondent complied with the document tum-over through a letter addressed to Engr. Lucena containing a list of personnel files, human resource management and general administration documents under her accountability.

We see in the respondent's initial inaction her deliberate choice not to act on the subject memoranda; she waited until the resolution of her motion for reconsideration of her reassignment (that she filed on June 27, 2000) before she actually complied. The service would function very inefficiently if these types of dilatory actions would be allowed.

As for the memorandum on the use of the office telephone, we find, as the CA did, the charge against the respondent unmeritorious. Though the subject memorandum was issued on March 6, 2000, the respondent's office received it only on March 7, 2000 at around 10 o'clock in the moming. Thus, respondent could not have committed a violation for the telephone calls she made earlier that day.

Insubordination is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months. Since we merely found the respondent guilty of insubordination in not promptly complying with the memoranda for the turn-over of documents, we find the suspension of one month and one day as sufficient penalty for her offense.

Considering, however, that respondent is no longer with DOST-V and is now working abroad, we can no longer impose on her the penalty of suspension from service. In lieu thereof, we impose on the respondent the penalty of a fine of one month salary, which amount is to be deducted from her retirement benefits or from whatever benefits, if any, that she is still entitled to receive after her resignation. If there is none, the respondent is ordered to pay the fine directly to and within the period to be directed by the CSC.

The Court find that Marilyn G. Arandia GUILTY of INSUBORDINATION and impose on her the penalty of a FINE equivalent to her one month salary.

 

Penalties for Less Grave Offenses

261) Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa (363 SCRA 480, 2001)

Facts: The case at bar stems from a complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) by ATTY. VERNETTE UMALI-PACO, Chief Executive Officer and General Manager of petitioner PRA against her subordinate, respondent THELMA RUPA, PRA Human Resource Management Officer III, for four (4) offenses: Insubordination, Gross Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Service and Neglect of Duty.

 

The CSC found respondent guilty of the grave offense of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service solely for neglecting to promptly process the requests of the two (2) Indian retirees. She was meted the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay. The CSC absolved the respondent from the other charges.

 

The respondent moved for reconsideration. She contended that her neglect in the performance of her duties was not grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In the alternative, she argued that her suspension from service for one year without pay is excessive and harsh. Thus, she prayed that her suspension be reduced to one month.

The CSC denied her motion. It upheld the penalty meted out to her, i.e., one year suspension without pay, as it is in accordance with the Schedule of Penalties provided under Section 22 (t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.⁴

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals modified the appealed CSC Resolution. It found the respondent guilty of the less grave offense of simple neglect of duty and imposed on her the lesser penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay

 

Issue: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.

 

Ruling: The CSC found that the respondent's act constitutes the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, while the Court of Appeals held it to be only a case of Simple Neglect of Duty, a less grave offense under the Civil Service Rules.

 

Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Jurisprudence, however, is instructive on this point. The Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice,⁶ failure to safe keep public records and property, making false entries in public documents and falsification of court orders.

 

Gross Neglect of Duty, on the other hand, denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. The Court has categorized the following as constitutive of the grave offense of Gross Neglect of Duty: negligence in the prosecution of cases and malicious delay in the administration of justice by a police officer, act of provincial warden in retaining a prisoner in his custody without authority and just cause instead of sending him to the Muntinlupa penitentiary, failure to transcribe stenographic notes of 18 cases which dated as far back as 1972, failure of a judge to decide a case within a period fixed by law, and exerting undue influence by a deputy clerk of court on a judge in the disposition of cases pending before the court.

 

Simple Neglect of Duty, however, signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. The Court has decided the following, inter alia, as constituting the less grave offense of Simple Neglect of Duty: delay in the transmittal of court records,delay in responding to written queries, and delay of more than one (1) year and seven (7) months in furnishing a party with a copy of the court's decision.¹⁷ As can be gleaned from the foregoing cases, mere delay in the performance of one's function has been consistently considered as a less grave offense of simple neglect of duty, punishable by suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

 

Following the foregoing jurisprudence, we find that the respondent was properly adjudged guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty. The respondent's offense is not of the same gravity or odiousness as in the aforecited cases as would amount to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service or Gross Neglect of Duty.

 

 

262) Racasa v. Calada-Calizo         

381 SCRA 151, 2002

 

Facts: Complainant filed an administrative complaint against respondent Calada-Calizo, a court stenographer. Respondent went to the law firm of Racasa and misrepresented herself as a representative of a publication but later on revealed the truth that she is a court employee and would speed up the transcription of stenographic notes on the adoption case by the petitioner. However, respondent failed to transcribe the said stenographic notes.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty and simple misconduct.

 

Ruling: Yes. The Court likewise finds respondent guilty of neglect of duty for her failure to timely transcribe her stenographic notes of the November 26, 1999 hearing. Administrative Circular No. 24-90, promulgated on July 12, 1990 by this Court, directs stenographers to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the record of the case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes are taken, in effect giving stenographers twenty (20) days from the taking of the notes to deliver their transcription to the clerk of court. 3 Respondent failed to deliver her TSN on or before December 16, 1999. Her claim that she had already finished the TSN before going on leave from January 24 to February 1, 2000 to attend to the burial of her father-in-law is belied by the affidavit,  dated September 8, 2000, of Atty. Ma. Agnes Alibanto-Sadsad, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 140, Makati City, stating that respondent failed to submit the TSN even prior to her leave despite follow-ups from her and complainants and that, on January 24, 2000, she (Branch Clerk of Court Alibanto-Sadsad) discovered that respondent had not finished the transcription of her notes. It is noteworthy that as respondents superior, Atty. Alibanto-Sadsads word carries weight against respondents self-serving claim that she finished the transcription on time. Indeed, despite receipt of a copy of Atty. Alibanta-Sadsads affidavit and the fact there was ample time to comply, respondent made no effort to refute allegations therein against her. Respondent also failed to live up to this standard of ethical conduct. She took an undue interest in the publication of a court notice, when she ought to know that the publication of notices is given by raffle precisely to preclude favoritism. She went to the extent of misrepresenting herself to be a representative of the newspaper to which publication of the July 21, 1999 order of the court had been awarded. Respondent is guilty of misconduct which has been defined as a transgression of an established or definite rule of action.

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Penalties for Less Grave Offenses

 

263) Maersk-Filipino Crewing, Inc. v. Avestruz (752 SCRA 161, 2015)

 

Facts: Respondent Avestruz, a Chief Cook of a vessel, was verbally dismissed from service by Captain Woodward when an incident happened between them. The incident was that Captain Woodward asked Respondent to clean the garbage bin in the kitchen but the latter refused. Avestruz then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Captain Woodward contends that the respondent failed to follow his orders and that it is tantamount to insubordination.

 

Issue: Whether or not Respondent was illegally dismissed.

 

Held:  No. It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In order to discharge this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence, which is defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, and not based on mere surmises or conjectures. Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In this case, the contents of Captain Woodward's e-mails do not establish that Avestruz's conduct had been willful, or characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. It was incumbent upon the petitioners to present other substantial evidence to bolster their claim that Avestruz committed acts that constitute insubordination as would warrant his dismissal.

 

 

 

 

 

 

264. Office of Court Administrator v. Perlez (349 SCRA 417, 2001)

Penalties for Light Offenses

FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Judge Gloria B. Aglugub of the MTC, Branch 2, San Pedro, Laguna against the Clerk of Court, Imelda Perlez, for allegedly failing to submit the transcript of stenographic notes in certain cases and hiding the records of other cases resulting in the failure of Judge Aglugub to decide 19 cases  assigned to her within the prescribed time. For this reason, Judge Aglugub had to ask for an extension of time to decide the aforesaid cases.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Upon the recommendation of the Court Administrator, Clerk of Court Imelda S. Perlez was required to comment on the complaint against her. Meantime, Judge Aglugub was granted an extension of 90 days within which to decide the 19 cases.

In a manifestation, Ms. Perlez submitted copies of two orders issued by Judge Aglugub to stenographer Jennifer Lancion directing the latter to submit the transcripts of stenographic notes taken by her in Case No. 25456 on pain of arrest. However, according to Ms. Perlez, when these orders were issued, Stenographer Lancion was no longer reporting for work, and, therefore, she should not be blamed for Ms. Lancion’s failure to submit the transcripts of stenographic notes in question.

Both parties manifested that they were submitting the case for resolution without further hearing. Ms. Perlez reiterated her denial of the judge’s allegations. On the other hand, Judge Aglugub attached to her letter submitting the case for resolution orders and memoranda issued by her to respondent ordering her to produce the records of cases or to submit transcripts of stenographic notes. It appears that in the course of a periodic physical inventory, Judge Aglugub found the records of 87 criminal cases and 8 civil cases to be missing. This was the subject of her orders directing respondent to locate the records and submit them. On July 26, 1999, Judge Aglugub also issued an order to respondent requiring her to explain why she could not produce the records of a criminal case which Atty. Joaquin Misa wanted to examine. In another order, respondent Perlez was directed to explain why she failed to issue a writ of demolition in a civil case considering that the order for its issuance had been issued by the court as early as October 2, 1998.a1 1aw 1

 

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Perlez is guilty of insubordination and neglect of duty

 

RULING: Yes. The findings of the Court Administrator are well taken. Respondent Imelda S. Perlez is the administrative officer of the court. As such, she is charged with the control and supervision of all subordinate personnel of the court, including the stenographers. It is thus incumbent upon her to ensure that they perform their duties well.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In the case of stenographers, the Rules of Court requires that they submit the transcript of stenographic notes taken by them not later than 20 days from the time the notes were taken. 16 As administrative officer of the court, the duty of the Clerk of Court is to ensure that the stenographers comply with this rule. In her comment, respondent Perlez lays the blame on stenographer Jennifer Lancion for her failure to submit the transcripts of stenographic notes. But, as the Court Administrator observes in his report, respondent Perlez should have reported the matter to the judge and recommended the imposition of administrative sanctions against the erring stenographer. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. Respondent Perlez has shown passivity, if not indifference, to the failure of those under her supervision to perform their duties faithfully and well.

The Court Administrator recommends that respondent Imelda S. Perlez be found guilty of insubordination and that, in accordance with the Civil Service Law, she be suspended for one (1) month and one (1) day. Although the penalty is the same, respondent should only be considered guilty of simple neglect of duty, not of insubordination, as this appears to be her first offense consisting of her failure to exercise effective supervision over the stenographers.

Under the Civil Service Law and the Omnibus Rules implementing the same, 17 simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense, punishable by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. As this appears to be the first infraction committed by respondent and it has not been shown that her failure to submit the transcripts was willful or intentional, 18 we find the suspension of respondent Perlez for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay a sufficient penalty for her offense.

The incidents concerning missing court records 19 and respondent Imelda S. Perlez’s alleged failure to produce them and make them available to concerned parties or to the court are the subject of another complaint in A.M. No. P-99-1348 and, therefore, no findings concerning them are made in this case. The Court finds respondent guilty of simple neglect of duty and hereby suspends her for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay with warning that a repetition of the same acts or omissions will be dealt with more severely.

 

 

 

 

Penalties for Light Offenses

265) Paras v. Lofranco (355 SCRA 49, 2002)

Facts: an administrative complaint filed on March 12, 1997 by Atty. Roel O. Paras against respondent Myrna F. Lofranco, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Davao del Sur, for discourtesy and conduct unbecoming a court employee. Upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, 1 this matter was referred for investigation to the Executive Judge of the RTC, Digos, Davao del Sur who, in a report, dated September 25, 2000, recommended the suspension of respondent for fifteen (15) days with the warning that a stiffer penalty will be imposed in case of repetition of similar acts. Respondent MYRNA S. LOFRANCO was SUSPENDED for FIFTEEN (15) days with a warning of a stiffer penalty in case of repetition of similar acts.

 

Issue: whether or not the acts and/or utterances of respondent constitute discourtesy and/or conduct unbecoming a court employee

 

Ruling: Yes. It is the policy of the state to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. Public officials and employees are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability. They, as recipients of the public trust, should demonstrate courtesy, civility, and self-restraint in their official actuations to the public at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insulting behavior. Losing one’s temper by loudly uttering unsavory remarks and pointing a finger at a litigant or any other person for that matter exhibits a failure on the part of respondent to act with self-restraint and civility. High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in the government service; especially when done at the workplace and during working hours, such conduct shows discourtesy and disrespect not only towards the public but to the court as well.

The court is looked upon by people with high respect and is regarded a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed. Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity. The conduct and behavior required of every court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the public’s respect and confidence in the judicial service.

For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent guilty of discourtesy and conduct unbecoming to a court employee for which she should be reprimanded.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

266) Uy v. Magallanes, Jr.

380 SCRA 414, 2002

 

Fact: An administrative complaint was filed against respondent Magallanes, Jr., a process server. Respondent bought construction supplies from complainant Uy. Respondent promised that he can pay of the debt he incurred from the purchase, however, after demands, he was unable to pay. The Court Administrator found respondent's willful failure to pay just debts unbecoming of a public official and hence a ground for disciplinary action. He recommends that respondent be suspended from the service for three months and be ordered to pay his obligations with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

 

Issue: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for failure to pay his debts.

 

Ruling: Yes. Respondent should be held administratively liable for failure to pay his debts. His allegation that he has made partial payments is not supported by evidence. It is unnatural for respondent not to ask for receipts to evidence his partial payments.  It goes without saying that respondent is administratively liable. In Martinez vs. Muoz,  the Court held the Branch Clerk of Court administratively liable for his unjust refusal to pay his indebtedness, pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), specifically the provisions on the Civil Service Commission which covers the respondent as a court personnel. It applied Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle A (Civil Service Commission), Title I, Book V thereof which provides as follows:

 

"SECTION 46. Discipline: General Provisions. - (a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.

(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

x x x x x x

(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes to the government; x x x"

 

"Just debts" as defined under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules refer to those claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. In the case at bar, in light of respondent's admission of his indebtedness and his unjust refusal to pay it, his administrative liability under the Revised Administrative Code is settled. 4 The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at his private life but at his actuations unbecoming a public official. The same rule classifies willful failure to pay just debts as a light offense and prescribes the penalty of reprimand for the first offense, suspension for one to thirty days for the second offense, and dismissal for the third offense. Apparently, this is respondent's first offense which would merit only a reprimand and not suspension of three months as recommended by the Court Administrator. It is not denied, however, that respondent not only unjustly refused to pay but worse, bragged about his being a court employee to evade his obligation. Hence, he deserves a severe reprimand. Following the ruling in Martinez, however, we cannot order respondent to pay his indebtedness to complainant as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator because this Court is not a collection agency.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Penalties for Light Offenses???

267) People v. Enfermo (476 SCRA 515, 2005)

 

Facts:  Enfermo, the Disbursing Officer II, has the duty to assist the cashier in the preparation and the release of the checks covering the financial transaction of the National Research Council of the Philippines (NRCP). An investigation happened wherein double issuance of checks were covered by one disbursement voucher each. Enfermo was found guilty of malversation of public funds.

 

Issue: Whether or not Enfermo is guilty of malversation of public funds.

 

Held: Yes. In Maliwat v. CA, cited by the Court of Appeals, this Court said – The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.

 

If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that money sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.

 

268) Lacson v. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 298, 1999)

Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities – The Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are government officals with SG 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

 

 

 

Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities: The Ombudsman

269) Esquivel v. Ombudsman (389 SCRA 143, 2002)

Facts:  PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are both assigned with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID. In their respective complaint-affidavits,  filed charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel,  municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. Also included in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo Espiritu, SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp. Bienvenido C. Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police Force of dereliction of duty.

After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.

 

On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned resolution 11 recommending that both Mayor Esquivel and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The charges against the other respondents below were dismissed, either provisionally or with finality.

On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution.chanrob1

 

Issue Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the informations against petitioners?

 

Ruling: We find the present petition without merit.

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.  Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate 23 and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 24 Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 25 we held that:

 

Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities: The Ombudsman

270) Lopez v. Court of Appeals

389 SCRA 570, 2002

 

Facts: Private respondents was administratively charged for violation of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, for issuing a subpoena without authority. The Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to The Best Interest of The Service, and imposed the penalty of of six (60 months and one (1) day suspension without pay.

 

Issue: Whether or not the decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of six (60 months and one (1) day suspension without pay immediately executory pending appeal.

 

Ruling: No. It has been held that only orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one-month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.

 

 

 

 

 

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities - ii. The Ombudsman

271) Lastimosa v. Vasquez (243 SCRA 497, 1994)

 

Facts: Lastimosa, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, refused to file a criminal charge or attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo despite repeated orders from the Ombudsman. Lastimosa did not want to follow the orders of the Ombudsman because based on the preliminary investigation, only acts of lasciviousness had been committed.  This prompted the Ombudsman to file an administrative case against Lastimosa.

 

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to discipline the Provincial Prosecutor.

 

Held: Yes. Under §24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public official, the evidence against him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

 

In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar on the following grounds:

 

A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the records pertaining thereto against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] clearly leads to the conclusion that the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the charges involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service. Moreover, considering the unabashed attitude of respondents in openly announcing various false pretexts and alibis to justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman as their official position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and broadcast media, the probability is strong that public service more particularly in the prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office will be disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said cases even be tampered with if respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's Office during the pendency of these proceedings.

 

Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the preventive suspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the administrative complaint against them were done in the course of their official transaction with the Office of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the matters alleged in determine whether the evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the purpose of placing them under preventive suspension.

 

Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered. In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension.

 

272. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, Et al. vs. Hon Executive secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Gr no. 142801-802, July 10, 2001

 

FACTS:

 

On 1987, former Aquino issued Executive order no.127 which established Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau(EIIB) which is the agency of primary responsibility for anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland waters and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Eleven years later, President Estrada issued Executive Order no. 191 which deactivated the EIIB due to the overlapping functions among government agencies. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued executive order no. 223 which provides that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions. Aggrieved,  petitioners filed this petition alleging that the EO violated their right to security of tenure and tainted with bad faith as they were not actually intended to make the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force Aduana.

 

ISSUE:

 

Whether or not the reorganization is valid.

 

HELD:

Yes, the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith.

We hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. In the instructive words laid down by this Court in Dario v. Mison,  through Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento:

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes and whatever abolition is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.

Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. 

 

273) Canonizado v. Aguirre

323 SCRA 312, 2000

 

Facts:  Canonizado was appointed to the position of Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) during the pendency of the case assailing a provision of the law to be unconstitutional since it violated the right to security of tenure. However, by accepting the said position, Canonizado is deemed to abandoned his claim to be reinstated to the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) since the two positions are incompatible. A decision of this case was already declared that Section 8 of RA 8551 violated the right to security of tenure of Petitioner Canonizado, thus, reinstatement of petitioners was ordered. 

Issue: Whether or not Canonazido abandoned his claim for reinstatement as NAPOLCOM Commisioner.

Ruling: No. Canonizado was compelled to leave his position as Commissioner, not by an erroneous decision, but by an unconstitutional provision of law. Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.  In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment.  There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment.  Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice.  There are, therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and second, an overt or “external” act by which the intention is carried into effect.

Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by nonuser or acquiescence.  Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonment where such nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform.  Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of the office. Where, while desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire or intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute which is afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and the officer may recover the office.  Prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position during the pendency of his petition would be to unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which under no circumstance can be attributed to him. However, before Canonizado can re-assume his post as Commissioner, he should first resign as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP.

 

 

 

274.  Mayor Ricardo M. Angobung vs. COMELEC, GR no. 126576, March 5, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of Tunauini, Isabela. Private respondent de Alban, one of the candidate in the said election, filed with the Local Election Registrar a Petition for Recall against petitioner which was then approved. Consequently, Petitioner now comes before this court assailing the resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore invalid, on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was signed by just one person in violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall; and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the resolution violated the one-year bar on recall elections
2. Whether or not the resolution violated the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall

HELD:

1. No, the resolution did not violate the 1-year bar on recall elections. Private respondent is correct in saying that in the light of our pronouncement in Paras v. COMELEC, the recall election scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the instant case cannot be said to be barred by the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. In construing the meaning of the term, "regular local election" in Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year . . . immediately preceding a regular local election," we ruled that for the time bar to apply, the approaching regular local election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled, is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate. Thus, in the instant case where the time bar is being invoked by petitioner mayor in view of the approaching Barangay Elections in May 1997, there can be no application of the one-year bar, hence no invalidity may be ascribed to Resolution No. 96-2951 on this ground.

 

2. We, however, find petitioner's second ground to be impressed with merit. Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that "recall of any elective . . . municipal . . . official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected".  In the instant case, this court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to the applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying that law. Private respondent who is a lawyer, knows that Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a petition of 25% of the total number of registered voters. Notwithstanding such awareness, private respondent proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner. But the petition does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private respondent is truly earnest in her cause, and the very fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows that she claims responsibility for the seeming affront to petitioner's continuance in office. But the same cannot be said of all the other people whom private respondent claims to have sentiments similar to hers. While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected officials, the same power is accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his family, his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the public which may have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go around the law. We can not and must not, under any and all circumstances, countenance a circumvention of the explicit 25% minimum voter requirement in the initiation of the recall process.

 

276. Jose Emmanuel Carlos vs Hon. Adoracian Angeles, Gr no 142907, November 29, 2000

FACTS:

During the May 11, 1998 elections, Petitioner Carlos was elected as the mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Thereafter, Respondent filed an election protest with the RTC to challenge the results. The RTC ruled that the perpetuation of fraud had undoubtedly suppressed the true will of the electorate of Valenzuela and substituted it with the will of the protestee. Notwithstanding the plurality of valid votes in favor of the protestee, the trial court set aside the proclamation of protestee Jose Emmanuel Carlos by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and declared protestant Antonio M. Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not certiorari lies because the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in deciding the way it did Election Protest Case No. 14-V-98, declaring respondent Serapio as the duly "elected" mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

 

HELD:

As heretofore stated, in this jurisdiction, elections are won on the basis of a majority or plurality of votes cast and received by the candidates. "The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office.

We find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on the basis of its perception of the voice of the people of Valenzuela, even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his favor. In fact, without a single vote in his favor as the trial court discarded all the votes. Thus, the decision is not supported by the highest number of valid votes cast in his favor. This violated the right to due process of law of petitioner who was not heard on the issue of failure of election, an issue that was not raised by the protestant. "A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard." The trial court can not decide the election protest case outside the issues raised. If it does, as in this case, the trial court is ousted of its jurisdiction. Likewise, it is a basic principle that a decision with absolutely nothing to support it is void. "A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked." Here, the trial court indulged in speculations on its view of the voice of the people, and decided the case disregarding the evidence, but on its own intuition, ipse dixit. How was this voice communicated to the trial court? Certainly not by competent evidence adduced before the court as it should be, but by extra-sensory perception. This is invalid in law. Contrary to its own finding that petitioner obtained 83,600 valid votes against 66,602 valid votes for the respondent as second placer, or a plurality of 17,007 votes, the trial court declared the second placer as the winner. This is a blatant abuse of judicial discretion by any account. It is a raw exercise of judicial function in an arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting to evasion of the positive duty to act in accord with law.

280.  Tomas Banaga, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 134696, July 31, 2000

FACTS:

This case arose when private respondent, Florencio Bernabe, was declared as a Vice-Mayor of the City of Paranaque in the May 11, 1998 election. Petitioner filed with COMELEC a petition to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of election alleging that as it was tainted with widespread election anomalies which constitutes election fraud and that it was replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying voters being allowed to vote.The COMELEC dismissed the petition and held that the grounds relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code and concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a failure of election

HELD:

Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election two conditions must concur, namely (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election. Note that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.

We have painstakingly examined the petition filed by petitioner Banaga before the COMELEC. But we found that petitioner did not allege at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Neither did he aver that although there was voting, nobody was elected. On the contrary, he conceded that an election took place for the office of vice-mayor of Parañaque City, and that private respondent was, in fact, proclaimed elected to that post. While petitioner contends that the election was tainted with widespread anomalies, it must be noted that to warrant a declaration of failure of election the commission of fraud must be such that it prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation and transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts ought to have been alleged clearly by the petitioner below, but he did not.

Finally, petitioner claims that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed his petition motu propio. However, the fact that a verified petition has been filed does not mean that a hearing on the case should first be held before COMELEC can act on it. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. In their absence, the petition must be denied outright. Public respondent had no recourse but to dismiss petition. Nor may petitioner now complain of denial of due process, on this score, for his failure to properly file an election protest. The COMELEC can only rule on what was filed before it. It committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his petition "to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections" for being groundless, hence without merit.

284. Robert Z. Barbers vs. COMELEC, GR no. 165691, June 22, 2005

FACTS:

On May 10 2004, Robert Z. Barbers ("Barbers") and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the Philippines in the Synchronized National and Local Elections. Meanwhile, the COMELEC sitting en banc promulgated Resolution No. NBC 04-002 which proclaimed the first 11 duly elected Senators in the elections. The following month the COMELEC promulgated another Resolution which proclaimed Biazon as "the 12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with Article VI, Section IV of the Constitution of the Philippines. Consequently, Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines with the COMELEC and claimed that Biazon’s proclamation was void and asserted that the proclamation of Biazon was "illegal and premature being based on an incomplete canvass. However, the COMELEC denied the petition. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the petition.

HELD:

No, the court cannot take cognizance of this petition. Under Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, we ruled that: The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress).The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal ("SET") underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint.

300.  Republic Act 8189, Section 28

Sec. 28. Reactivation of Registration. - Any voter whose registration has been deactivated pursuant to the preceding Section may file with the Election Officer a sworn application for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating that the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist any time but not later than one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

The Election Officer shall submit said application to the Election Registration Board for appropriate action.

In case the application is approved, the Election Officer shall retrieve the registration record from the inactive file and include the same in the corresponding precinct book of voters. Local heads or representatives of political parties shall be properly notified on approved applications.

 

#288 Michael Mastura vs. COMELEC, GR no. 124521, January 29, 1998

FACTS:

During the May 8 1995 elections, Petitioner Mastura and Private respondent Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao. During the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. The COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division annulled the Certificate of Canvass of Matanog. Thereafter, Mastura filed an Urgent Motion to Defer Implementation argued that the 29 February 1996 Order was issued precipitately and prematurely considering that some other documents, particularly the Certificate of Canvass of Matanog which he considered necessary for the resolution of the issue, was yet to be produced and examined. The COMELEC Second Division denied the motion.Meanwhile, the new Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and recanvassed the votes. During the proceedings Mastura objected to the inclusion of fifty (50) out of the fifty-seven (57) elections returns on the ground that the COMELEC copy of the election returns was not reflective of the true results unless compared with the copy of the original Municipal Board of Canvassers. But the new Municipal Board of Canvassers believed otherwise; hence, it included in the canvass the fifty (50) election returns objected to by Mastura who thereafter walked out while the new Municipal Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing. As a result, private respondent Dilangalen was proclaimed the duly elected member of the House of Representatives, First District of Maguindanao.Aggrieved, Mastura filed this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC En Bance has jurisdiction in this case

HELD:

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself.

This was exactly what happened in the in the instant petition. Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog and, acting on the objection, COMELEC ordered the production and examination of the MTC Judge copy and the COMELEC copy of the election returns. Based on the comparison, the COMELEC Second Division found and concluded that indeed the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with. Consequently, it ordered its annulment and created a new set of Municipal and Provincial Boards of Canvassers to recanvass the votes. After the recanvassing, Dilangalen emerged as the winner and was thereafter proclaimed the duly elected member of the House of Representatives, First District of Maguindanao.

 

#292 Dioscoro Angelia vs. COMELEC, GR no. 135468, May 31 2000

FACTS:

During the 1998 elections,  Petitioner Angelia and private respondent Tan were candidates for the position of Sangguniang Bayan in Leyte. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Petitioner as part of the members of the SB. Consequently, private respondent filed a Qou warranto against petitioner with the RTC. Meanwhile, petitioner took his oath and assumed office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. And so private respondent withdrew his petition and then filed a petition for annulment of proclamation of petitioner with the COMELEC which in turn annulled the proclamation of petitioner as member of the Sangguniang Bayan and ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to make the necessary corrections in the election returns from Precinct Nos. 84-A/ 84-A-1 and Precinct No. 23-A and, thereafter, to proclaim the winning candidate or candidates on the basis of the amended results which proclaimed private respondent a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, this present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has been denied of due process

HELD:

            No, the petitioner has not been denied of due process. In Castromayor v. COMELEC, 12 the returns from a precinct were overlooked by the Municipal Board of Canvassers in computing the total number of votes obtained by the candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan, for which reason the COMELEC directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers to make the necessary corrections. We held that, as the case involved a manifest error, although the COMELEC erred in annulling the proclamation of petitioner without notice and hearing, the expedient course of action was for the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the necessary corrections on the certificate of canvass and proclaim the winning candidate or candidates on the basis thereof.


            In the present case, although the COMELEC annulled the proclamation. of petitioner, it merely directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers to "RECONVENE within five (5) days from receipt hereof and effect the corrections in the total number of votes received by the candidates in Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 (clustered) and Precinct No. 23-A and thereafter PROCLAIM the winning candidate/s for Municipal Kagawad based on the corrected results." It was the Municipal Board of Canvassers which the COMELEC ordered to actually effect the necessary corrections, if any, in the said election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim the winning candidate or candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan. In accordance with our ruling in Castromayor, the expedient action to take is to direct the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the necessary corrections, if any, in the election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim the winning candidate or candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan.

 

#296 Estrelita Juliano vs. COMELE, GR no. 167033, April 12 2006

FACTS:

            In an election in Cotabato City, which has a total of 577 clustered polling precincts among its 37 barangays, petitioner filed an ex parte petition to replace membership of the first CBOC and was granted. During this time the Board failed to finish the canvassing and was replaced with another CBOC that then conducted the canvassing. This canvassing was interrupted by another petition that prayed for the transfer of the canvassing from Awang, Maguindanao to the COMELEC Manila, which was promptly granted. A notice was then issued for the continuation of the canvassing. After the canvassing, Bedol Board proclaimed respondent Sema as the duly elected Mayor of Cotabato City. Consequently, petitioner filed a a consolidated petition to nullify canvass proceedings and/or proclamation undertaken by the CBOC on June 1, 2004, alleging that he was never notified of the new and advanced schedule of the resumption of canvassing in the Comelec Main Office, Manila, hence, the proceedings was illegal; The COMELEC 2nd Division held that petitioner should be deemed notified of the June 1, 2004 canvassing because during said proceedings, one of petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Javines, was present along with petitioner’s watchers. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.1avvphiwas elevated to the COMELEC En Banc which reversed and set aside the deicision. However, only three membersof the COMELEC En Banc voted in favor of granting the Motion for Reconsideration, three members dissented, and one member too, after due re-consultation of the results of the en banc voting which remains to be 3:3:1, pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lack of notice by the bedol board to petitioner and/or petitioner’s counsel on the resumption of canvass on june 1, 2004 to the transferred venue at the session hall of the main office of public respondent in intramuros, manila was cured by the presence of petitioner’s watcher and atty. ronald b. javines, who appeared as counsel for knp/pmp congressional candidate bai zeny g. dilangalen and knp/pnp [sic] senatorial candidate didagen p. dilangalen

HELD:

Yes, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically states that if the opinion of the Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be reheard. The Court notes, however, that the Order of the Comelec En Bancdated February 10, 2005 clearly stated that what was conducted was a mere "re-consultation." A "re-consultation" is definitely not the same as a "rehearing". A consultation is a "deliberation of persons on some subject;" hence, a re-consultation means a second deliberation of persons on some subject. Rehearing is defined as a "second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to court’s or administrative board’s attention any error, omission, or oversight in first consideration. A retrial of issues presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and opportunity for them to be heard" (Emphasis supplied). But as held in Samalio v. Court Of Appeals, A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their arguments; whereas, a re-consultation involves a re-evaluation of the issues and arguments already on hand only by the members of the tribunal, without the participation of the parties. 

In Belac v. Comelec, when the voting of the Comelec En Banc on therein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was equally divided, the Comelec En Banc first issued an order setting the case for hearing and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda before voting anew on therein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. This should have been the proper way for the Comelec En Banc to act on herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration when the first voting was equally divided. Its own Rules of Procedure calls for a rehearing where the parties would have the opportunity to strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the Comelec En Banc of the merit of their case. Thus, when the Comelec En Banc failed to give petitioner the rehearing required by the Comelec Rules of Procedure, said body acted with grave abuse of discretion.

 

 

 

Termination through Reorganization

273) Canonizado v. Aguirre (323 SCRA 312, 2000)

 

Facts: Dela Torres, Canonizado, Pureza and Adiong were appointed Commissioners of NAPOLCOM. They were appointed separately, in various years and their terms had not expired at the time the amendatory law to R.A. 6975 was passed. R.A. 8551 declared the terms of sitting commissioners as expired upon its effectivity.

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition.

 

Ruling: NO. Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v.n:

...As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for politieasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.

 

Under R.A. 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described a collegial body within the DILG whereas R.A. 8551 made it an agency attached to the department for policy and program coordination. This does not result in the creation of an entirely new office.

 

XIV. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS - Acts of Government or of the People - Recall of Local Effective Officials

275) Afiado v. Commission on Elections (340 SCRA 600, 2000)

 

Facts: Vice Mayor Navarro became the City Mayor by virtue of legal succession since the former Mayor’s certificate of candidacy was declared null and void.  Petitioners passed and adopted the Preparatory Recall Resolution No. 1 for the recall of Vice Mayor Navarro for being greedy and disrespectful.

 

Issue: Whether or not Mayor Navarro can be the subject of recall election by virtue of Resolution No. 1 of the Preparatory Recall Assembly which was passed when she was still the elected City Vice-Mayor.

 

Held:  No. The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City is a supervening event which rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and academic. A perusal of the said Resolution reveals that the person subject of the recall process is a specific elective official in relation to her specific office. The said resolution is replete with statements, which leave no doubt that the purpose of the assembly was to recall petitioner as Vice Mayor for her official acts as Vice Mayor. The title itself suggests that the recall is intended for the incumbent Vice Mayor of Santiago City. The third paragraph of the resolution recounted " the official acts of City Vice Mayor Navarro that brought forth the loss of confidence in her capacity and fitness to discharge the duties and to perform the functions of her public office." And because of such acts, the assembly "RESOLVED to invoke the rescission of the electoral mandate of the incumbent City Vice Mayor." Clearly, the intent of the PRA as expressed in the said Resolution is to remove the petitioner as Vice Mayor for they already lost their confidence in her by reason of her official acts as such. To recall, then, the petitioner when she is already the incumbent City Mayor is to deviate from the expressed will of the PRA. Having, thus, succeeded to the position of City Mayor, the petitioner was placed beyond the reach of the effects of the PRA Resolution.

 

The specific purpose of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was to remove Amelita S. Navarro as the elected Vice-Mayor of Santiago City since PRA Resolution No. 1 dated July 12, 1999 expressly states that "…it is hereby resolved to invoke the rescission of the electoral mandate of the incumbent City Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro for loss of confidence through a recall election to be set by the Commission on Election as provided for under Section 71 of the Local Government Code of 1991." However, the said PRA Resolution No. 1 is no longer applicable to her inasmuch as she has already vacated the office of Vice-Mayor on October 11, 1999 when she assumed the position of City Mayor of Santiago City.

 

Even if the Preparatory Recall Assembly were to reconvene to adopt another resolution for the recall of Amelita Navarro, this time as Mayor of Santiago City, the same would still not prosper in view of Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that "No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption of office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election." There is no more allowable time in the light of that law within which to hold recall elections for that purpose. The then Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro assumed office as Mayor of Santiago City on October 11, 1999. One year after her assumption of office as Mayor will be October 11, 2000 which is already within the one (1) year prohibited period immediately preceding the next regular election in May 2001.

 

 

Object of Suffrage and Election Laws

277) Rulloda v. Commission on Elections (385 SCRA 535, 2003)

Facts: Comelec denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.

 

Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request that she be allowed to run for elections.

 

Ruling: We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent got only 290 votes. Respondents did not deny this in their respective Comments.

In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election

 

It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.

 

Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.

 

To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.

 

ELECTION LAW

XVI. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS - Decide Election Contests

279) Javier v. Commission on Elections (144 SCRA 194, 1986)

 

Facts: Petitioner and Private Respondent are both running for the same electoral position. Several followers of petitioner were ambushed and killed. The incident intimidated the voters into supporting Private Respondent. Private Respondent was then proclaimed by the Second Division as the winner. Petitioner argued that the proclamation was void since it was not done by the COMELEC en banc.

 

Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.

 

Held: No. All contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is to insure a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices involved. In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc. The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under the general heading of "election cases." The term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included the quo warranto petition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved.

 

The purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.

 

 

 

Object of Suffrage and Election Laws

281) Reyes v. Commission on Elections (699 SCRA 622, 2013)

Facts:  Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

 

Issue(s):

1. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office

 

Ruling:

1. Ruling: Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative.
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude  that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

 

ELECTION LAW

XVI. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS - Decide Election Contests

283) Legarda v. De Castro (454 SCRA 242, 2005)

 

Facts: The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed the jurisdiction over the protest of Loren B. Legarda. De Castro alleged that the protest was not sufficient to contest protestee's victory in the vice-presidential elections.

 

Issue:  Whether or not Legarda’s protest regarding the vice-presidential elections is sufficient.

 

Held:  Yes. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to protestee's title to his office. In our view, the instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time.

 

Considering that the Court find the protest sufficient in form and substance, the Court stressed that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunal's rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

 

Decide All Questions Affecting Elections

285) Sahali v. Commission on Elections (324 SCRA 510, 2000)

 

Facts:  During the 2010 elections, Sadikul A. Sahali (Sadikul) and private respondent Rashidin H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four candidates who ran for the position of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman) ran for the position of Vice-Governor.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively.

Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the COMELEC. Matba contested the results in 39 out of 282 clustered precincts that functioned in the province of TawiTawi. Sadikul and Ruby filed their answer with counter protest.

The COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to conduct a technical examination of the said election paraphernalia by comparing the signature and thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters. Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for Reconsideration.

The COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order which denied the said motion for reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby.

Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition asserting that the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

 

Issue(s):

1. Whether or not Sadikul and Ruby's resort to the remedy of certiorari to assail an interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC first division proper.
2. Whether or not Sadikul and Ruby denied due process when the COMELEC granted the motion for technical examination filed by Matba and Usman without giving them the opportunity to oppose the said motion.

 

Ruling:

1. The power of the Supreme Court to review election cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof.
2. The Supreme Court cannot see how due process was denied to the petitioners in the issuance of the COMELEC First Divisions Order.

 

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, Supreme Court elucidated on the import of Section 7, Art IX of the Constitution in this wise: We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

 

Here, the Orders issued by the First Division of the COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders since they only disposed of an incident in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse for Sadikul and Ruby is to await the decision of the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by Matba and Usman, and should they be aggrieved thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.

 

It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election disputes, is not duty-bound to notify and direct a party therein to file an opposition to a motion filed by the other party. It is incumbent upon the party concerned, if he/she deems it necessary, to file an opposition to a motion within five days from receipt of a copy of the same without awaiting for the COMELEC's directive to do so.

 

Sadikul and Ruby were able to present their opposition to the said motion for technical examination in their manifestation and motion for reconsideration which they filed with the COMELEC First Division. Indeed, their objections to the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia were exhaustively discussed by the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution. Having filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Divisions Order, their claim of denial of due process is clearly unfounded.

 

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. DENIED.

 

ELECTION LAW

XVI. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS - Finality of Decision

287) Villota v. Commission on Elections( 362 SCRA 676, 2001)

 

Facts: Petitioner Villota was proclaimed as the Punong Barangay, in which he won over the respondent who was his opponent in the elections. An election protest was filed by respondent wherein the court ruled in favor of respondent being proclaimed as the Punong Barangay. Petitioner Villota filed an appeal, however, he erroneously paid the required appeal fees with the cashier of the Metropolitan Trial Court and not with the Cash Division as required in Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Petitioner was able to pay the said fee but such payment was done beyond the reglementary period. COMELEC issued an order dismissing petitioner’s appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. Because of this, COMELEC held that the decision is already final and executory.

 

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

 

Held: No. The Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent COMELEC in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period and in denying his motion for reconsideration. The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law. Section 3, Rule 22, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision, otherwise, the appeal is dismissible under Section 9, of the same ruIe.

 

Corollary thereto, pertinent portion of Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, provide:

 

Section 3, Appeal Fees. - The appellant in election cases shall pay an appeal fee as follows:

 

(a) x x x      x x x      x x x

 

(b) Election cases appealed from courts of limited jurisdiction...P500.00.

 

In every case, a legal research fee of P20.00 shall be paid by the appellant in accordance with Section 4, Republic Act No. 3870, as amended.

 

Section 4. Where and When to pay. - The fees prescribed in Sections x x x 3 hereof shall be paid to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the Commission within the period to file the notice of appeal.

 

 

 

Hearing of Election Cases

289) Baddiri v. Commission on Elections (459 SCRA 808, 2005)

 

Facts: Petitioner Baddiri, private respondents Alkhadar T. Loong and Nijar Hassan were candidates for Board Member, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District of the Province of Sulu.

 

during the proceedings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu, respondent Loong became aware of a manifest error of 2,000 excess votes in favor of petitioner Baddiri in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes for Local Positions for the Municipality of Patikul, Province of Sulu after tallying petitioner's votes based on the Statement of Votes. Baddiri was credited with 4,873 instead of 2,873 votes in said Certificate of Canvass.

 

To support Loong's stand, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu, executed an Affidavit on May 17, 2004, which stated, among others:

3. That, in the preparation of Certificate of Canvass as supported by Statements of Votes per Precincts for the said municipality, the Board committed an honest ERROR in the total votes garnered by candidate Edil[wasif] Bad[d]iri for member of Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu;

4. That, in the said Certificate of Canvass, the total votes indicated as garnered by said candidate is 4,783, but [in] the supporting five (5)-sheet Statements of Votes by Precincts, the total votes so garnered by said Edil[wasif] Bad[d]iri is only 2, 783.

On May 17, 2004, Loong filed a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu. On May 18, 2004, Baddiri filed an Opposition.

On May 19, 2004, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu granted the Petition for Correction of Manifest Error in its Ruling, thus:

. . .

The board rules to grant the petition to correct manifest error considering that there is no proclamation yet and that this is allowed by the rules.

On the basis of the corrected Certificate of Canvass from the Municipality of Patikul, Sulu, respondent Loong placed third with 20,660 votes; Nijar Hassan placed fourth with 20,558 votes; while petitioner Baddiri placed sixth with 19,578 votes and would not make it to the four-member Board of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District of the Province of Sulu

 

Petitioner filed an Appeal. Dismissed by the COMELEC.

 

Issue: Whether or not findings of the COMELEC is binding

 

Ruling: The factual finding of the COMELEC, which is supported by substantial evidence, is binding on the Court. The BOC may correct manifest errors committed under the circumstances enumerated in the law before proclamation of the winning candidate.

 

ELECTION LAW

XVI. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS - Rendition of Decision and Judicial Review

291) Salva v. Makalintal (340 SCRA 506, 2000)

 

Facts: Petitioners filed a class suit against Respondent for the issuance of an ordinance which aims to abolish Barangay San Rafael to be merged with Barangay Dacanlao, and for COMELEC to conduct a plebiscite. They prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin COMELEC from holding the said plebiscite. However, such was denied by the trial court. Thus, Petitioners filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.

 

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner for review should be granted.

 

Held: Yes. In the instant case, after the COMELEC ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held in the affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160. We agree with the Solicitor General that " [t]he issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws." (Citation omitted.) Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.  Zaldivar vs. Estenzo speaks of the power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary. In the present case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to enforce and administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia refers to this Court's power to review "administrative decisions," particularly referring to a COMELEC resolution declaring a certain certificate of candidacy null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution. In Macud vs. COMELEC, we reiterated that when a board of canvassers rejects an election return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved party may appeal to this Court. In both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.

 

 

Rendition of Decision and Judicial Review

293) Alvarez v. Commission on Elections (353 SCRA 434, 2001)

 

Election cases brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the date of submission for decision. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the tribunals manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.

 

Facts: Arsenio Alvarez was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Dona Aurora, Quezon City. He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the MTC ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It subsequently rendered its decision that private respondent won the election. She garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount.

On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that Sarmiento won over petitioner. Sarmiento filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. Both petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and private respondents Motion for Execution pending appeal were submitted for resolution. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal.

Petitioner brought before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when:

(1) it did not preferentially dispose of the case;

(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal; and

(3) it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving municipal and barangay officials shall be final, executory and not appealable.

Petitioner’s argument: the COMELEC violated its mandate on preferential disposition of election contests as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus Election Code that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of submission. He points out that the case was ordered submitted for resolution on November 15, 1999 but the COMELEC En Banc promulgated its resolution only on April 4, 2000, four months and four days after November 14, 1999.

 

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC violated its mandate on “preferential disposition of election contests”

 

Ruling: Petition is dismissed. The court is not unaware of the Constitutional provision cited by petitioner. The court agrees  with him that election cases must be resolved justly, expeditiously and inexpensively. The court is also not unaware of the requirement of Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code that election cases brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the date of submission for decision. The records show that petitioner contested the results of ten (10) election precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity, invalidity, legibility, misspelling, authenticity, and other irregularities in these ballots. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the tribunals manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.

Court finds NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION by the COMELEC. Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused its discretion when it failed to treat the case preferentially. Petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. It will be noted that the preferential disposition applies to cases before the courts and not those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show.

Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the first time. As private respondent pointed out, petitioner did not raise the issue before the COMELEC when the case was pending before it. In fact, private respondent points out that it was she who filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The active participation of a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later impugning the court or the body’s jurisdiction.

 

ELECTION LAW

XVI. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS -

Votes Required before Rendition of Decision

295) Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (344 SCRA 358, 2000)

 

Facts: Petitioner Ambil and Respondent Ramirez were candidates for the position of governor. Ambil obtained the highest number of votes while Ramirez obtained the second highest number of votes. Ramirez then filed an election protest challenging the results in numerous precincts. The case was then assigned to the COMELEC First Division. A proposed resolution was prepared and signed by Commissioner Guiani which was in favor of Respondent Ramirez. However, before the decision was to be promulgated, Commissioner Guiani retired. After Commissioner Guiani retired, the COMELEC First Division issued an order setting the date of the promulgation of the resolution prepared by Guiani. Petitioner contends that the COMELEC First Division should deliberate anew, on the case, and should not use the resolution prepared by Guiani.

 

Issue: Whether or not the assailed resolution prepared by Commissioner Guiani should be promulgated.

 

Held: No. The COMELEC Commissioners are not infallible. They can and do commit errors and in the case at bench they in fact gravely abused their discretion for they violated the elementary doctrine that for a judgment to be valid, it must be signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it. Thus, when a judge or a member of the collegiate court, who had signed or registered his vote, has vacated his office at the time of the promulgation of a decision or resolution, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled. The rationale for this rule is well-elucidated in the landmark case of Araneta v. Dinglasan, wherein this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, stated:

 

Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision. As above indicated, the true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding unless and until duly signed and promulgated. Applying the above rules, we hold that the questioned ponencia died with the ponente and consequently could not be promulgated thereafter. Applying the foregoing principle to the case at bench, when Commissioner Guiani retired on February 15, 2000, he ceased to be a commissioner of the COMELEC where he sat in judgment; and thus, also "retired" and terminated are all his authority to decide any case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon. Otherwise stated, he had lost entirely his power and legal authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement.

 

 

REQUIREMENTS BEFORE ELECTION A. Registration 1. Necessity of Registration

297) Akbayan Youth v. Commission on Elections (355 SCRA 318, 2001)

 

Facts: Petitioners―representing the youth sector―seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the 14 May 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the 27 December 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only is submitted but was then denied by the COMELEC under Resolution No. 3584 on 8 February 2001.

Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.

Section 8 (System of Continuing Registration of Voters) of R.A. No. 8189 The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 provides:

The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

 

Issue:

1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated 8 February 2001.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed 27 December 2000 deadline and the 14 May 2001 general elections.

 

Ruling:

1. It is well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. A two-day special registration for new voters would give rise to time constraints due to additional pre-election matters. Accordingly, COMELEC acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
2. The Supreme Court cannot control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. The remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.

 

ELECTION LAW

XVII. REQUIREMENTS BEFORE ELECTION  -

Registration

 

299) Republic Act No. 8189, Section 27

 

Sec. 27. Deactivation of Registration. - The board shall deactivate the registration and remove the registration records of the following persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters and place the same, properly marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the cause or causes of deactivation:

 

Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence as certified by the clerks of courts of the Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan;

 

Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law; Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;

 

Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent;

 

Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections as shown by their voting records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;

 

Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and

Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.

For this purpose, the clerks of court for the Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan shall furnish the Election Officer of the city or municipality concerned at the end of each month a certified list of persons who are disqualified under paragraph (a) hereof, with their addresses. The Commission may request a certified list of persons who have lost their Filipino Citizenship or declared as insane or incompetent with their addresses from other government agencies.

 

The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a certified list of those persons whose registration were deactivated and the reasons therefor, and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of political parties, the national central file, provincial file, and the voter concerned.

 

301) Gayo v. Verceles (452 SCRA 504, 2005)

 

Facts:  the respondent migrated to the United States of America (U.S.A.) with her family to look for greener pastures. Although her husband was granted American citizenship, she retained her citizenship as a Filipino. In 1993, she returned to the Philippines for good. The following year, she was appointed as Treasurer of the B.P. Verceles Foundation and regularly attended the meetings of its Board of Directors.

In 1995, the respondent registered herself as a voter of Precinct No. 16 in Tubao, La Union. As certified by the Assistant Revenue District Officer, Revenue District No. 3 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in San Fernando City, the respondent also filed her income tax returns for the taxable years 1996 and 1997.  Between the years 1993 to 1997, the respondent would travel to the U.S.A. to visit her children.

The respondent abandoned her status as lawful permanent resident of the U.S.A. effective November 5, 1997 for the purpose of filing her candidacy for Mayor of Tubao, La Union in the May 11, 1998 elections. On January 28, 1998, she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila.

 

respondent ran in the May 11, 1998 elections and was elected Mayor of Tubao, La Union.

Thereafter, during the May 14, 2001 elections, the petitioner ran for re-election and won. She was proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor on May 16, 2001

 

 the petitioner, also a candidate for Mayor during the May 2001 elections, filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC of Agoo, La Union. He prayed that (a) the respondent be declared disqualified to hold the position of Mayor of Tubao, La Union; (b) the respondent's proclamation as winner be declared null and void; and (c) the petitioner be proclaimed as the duly-elected mayor.

 

Issue: Whether or not the respondent reacquired her residency in the Philippines

 

Ruling: Yes. The term “residence,” as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return….that a new domicile is reacquired if the following conditions concur: (1)residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Applying case law to the present case, it can be said that the respondent effectively abandoned her residency in the Philippines by her acquisition of the status of a permanent U.S. resident.  Nonetheless, we find that the respondent reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding of the May 2001 elections.  The records show that she surrendered her green card to the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way back in 1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S. residency could not have been made clearer.  Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the Philippines for good in 1993, she continued living here and only went to the U.S.A. on periodic visits to her children who were residing there.  Moreover, she was elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and served as such for the duration of her term.  We find such acts sufficient to establish that the respondent intended to stay in the Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that she has once again made the Philippines her permanent residence.

 

ELECTION LAW

XVII. REQUIREMENTS BEFORE ELECTION  -

Registration

303) Uytensu v. Republic (95 Phl. 890, 1954)

 

Facts: Petitioner Uytensu, a Chinese national, was born of Chinese parents in the Philippines. He lived in the Philippines until he reached college wherein he attended one semester in Mapua Institute of Technology. Petitioner went to United States from 1947 to 1950, where he graduated from a university in California. He returned to the Philippines in 1950 and filed an application for naturalization. The case was set on July 12, 1951, however, petitioner returned to the United States to take a postgraduate course which he was able to finish in July 1951 but petitioner was only able to return to the Philippines in October 1951.

 

Issue: Whether or not the application for naturalization should be granted.

 

Held: No. Residence and domicile are not to be held synonymous. Residence is an act. Domicile is an act coupled with an intent. Domicile is a much broader term than residence. A man may have his domicile in one state and actually reside in another, or in a foreign country. If he has once had a residence in a particular place and removed to another, but with the intention of returning after a certain time, however long that may be, his domicile is at the former residence and his residence at the place of his temporary habitation. Residence and habitation are generally regarded as synonymous. A resident and an inhabitant mean the same thing. A person resident is defined to be one "dwelling and having his abode in any place," "an inhabitant," "one that resides in a place." The question of domicile is not involved in determining whether a person is a resident of a state or country. The compatability of domicile in one state with actual residence in another has been asserted and acted upon in the law of attachment by the Courts of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, Mississippi and Wisconsin.

 

Residence indicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation. It does not include as much as domicile, which requires intention combined with residence." ... "one may seek a place for purposes of pleasure, of business, or of health. If his intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent be to leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his residence."

 

Considering that petitioner had stayed in the United States, practically without interruption, from early in 1947 to late in 1951, or for almost five (5) years, over three years and a half of which preceded the filing of the application, it may be said that he resided — as distinguished from domiciled — in the United States at that time and for over a year subsequently thereto. In fact, under our laws, residence for six (6) months suffices to entitle a person to exercise the right of suffrage in a given municipality (section 98), Republic Act No. 180); residence for one (1) year, to run for a seat in the House of Representatives (sec. 7, Art. VI, of the Constitution); and residence for two (2) years, to run for the Senate (sec. 4, Art. VI, of the Constitution). In some states of the United States, a residence of several weeks or months is enough to establish a domicile for purposes of divorce. Although in these cases the word "residence" has been construed, generally, to mean "domicile" — that it to say, actual residence, coupled with the intention to stay permanently, at least at the time of the acquisition of said domicile — it would seem apparent from the foregoing that the length of petitioner's habitation in the United States amply justifies the conclusion that he was residing abroad when his application for naturalization was filed and for fifteen (15) months thereafter, and that this is precisely the situation sought to be forestalled by the law in enjoining the applicant to "reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship," unless this legal mandate — which did not exist under Act No. 2927, and was advisedly inserted, therefore, by section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 — were to be regarded as pure verbiage, devoid, not only, of any force or effect, but, also, of any intent or purpose, as it would, to our mind, turn out to be, were we to adopt petitioner's pretense.

 

In short, we are of the opinion that petitioner herein has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise made by him in his application, and, accordingly, is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor.

 

304. Mauyag Papandayan, Jr. vs. COMELEC, Gr no. 147909, April 16, 2002

 

FACTS:

 

In the May 14, 2001 elections, Respondent Balt, Petitioner’s opponent in the Mayoral election in the Municipality of Tubaran, sought to disqualify Petitioner Padalayan as a candidate for such position alleging that he was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC (Second Division) then declared petitioner to be disqualified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of candidates and all votes cast in his favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes. However, during the election, Petitioner won the said position. Consequently, he filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, on May 19, 2001, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC (First Division) in SPC No. 01-039 seeking the issuance of an order directing the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Tubaran to count and tally the ballots cast in his favor during the May 14, 2001 elections pursuant to COMELEC Resolution N. 4116, which in turn issued an order suspending the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Tubaran pending the resolution of this present petition. However, despite the said order, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran proceeded with the proclamation of petitioner on June 3, 2001. Thereafter, respondent filed a motion with the COMELEC (First Division), which then, set aside the proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution, dated January 30, 2002, sustaining the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner and dismissing SPC No. 01-039 for being moot and academic.

 

ISSUE:

 

Whether or not petitioner is eligible for the position of Mayor

 

HELD:

 

After reviewing the records, we find the foregoing allegations of petitioner to be correct. Hence, his petition should be granted. With due regard for the expertise of the COMELEC, we find the evidence to be insufficient to sustain its resolution. We agree with the Solicitor General, to the contrary, that petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of the Municipality of Bayang, he later transferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections. Section 39 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides, An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other language or dialect.

 

Further, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner was registered as a voter in Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate of candidacy although he later withdrew the same. In the May 8, 1999 registration of voters, he was again registered as a voter in Precinct No. 28-A of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran.

When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. To successfully challenge petitioner’s disqualification, respondent must clearly demonstrate that petitioner’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. Respondent failed to substantiate her claim that petitioner is ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.

 

 

305) Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections (691 SCRA 646, 2013)

 

Facts:  the Court promulgated convicting petitioner by final judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March 18, 2009.

On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial Court.

Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC on October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013 (May 2013 Elections). In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.

 

On October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial.

 

COMELEC resolved "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos

 

 

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over contest in contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate

 

Ruling: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court has already settled the question of 72 when the jurisdiction of COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.

 

ELECTION LAW

XVII. REQUIREMENTS BEFORE ELECTION  -

Registration

307) Republic Act No. 8189, Section 11

 

Sec. 11. Disqualification. - The following shall be disqualified from registering:

 

Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;

Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms laws or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; and

Insane or incompetent persons declared as such by competent authority unless subsequently declared by proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.

 

308) Sultan Usman Sarangani vs. COMELEC, Gr no. 135927, June 26, 2000

 

FACTS:

In 1997, Private respondents filed a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur with the COMELEC. Thereafter the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other oppositors,  filed an "Answer in Opposition" stating that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur. Due to the ocular inspection, the COMELEC found that "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct. Consequently, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor Hassan, in their respective capacity as former Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus urging us to nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

 

ISSUE:

 

Whether or not the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct

 

HELD:

 

No, On a preliminary matter, though not clear, it appears from the records that Padian Torogan is a barangay in Madalum, Lanao del Sur and it was erroneous for the COMELEC to consider Padian-Torogan as a ghost precinct. In any case, the court is not tasked to determine whether the so-called Padian Torogan is a barangay or a mere election precinct. The petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the one declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC although the assailed Order did not mention any specific precinct but simply declared "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed Order would be the election precinct in the said place.It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one precinct per barangay. In designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually refers to them by number. Nevertheless, the determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglungsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political units affected.The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorariparticularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELECs administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. No voter is disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.

 

 

309) Penera v. Commission on Elections (605 SCRA574, 2009)

Facts: On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).

Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

 

Issue: Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.

 

Ruling: Motorcades conducted after filing of the certificate of candidacy prior to the campaign period constitute premature campaigning. When the campaign period starts and a person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her acts, after the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, constitute premature campaigning, for which s/he may be disqualified.

 

ELECTION LAW

XVII. REQUIREMENTS BEFORE ELECTION  -

Certificates of Candidacy

311) Cipriano v. Commission on Elections(436 SCRA 45, 2004)

 

Facts: Petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy

 

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC may, on its own, cancel a Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that one lacks the qualifications prescribed by law.

 

Held: No. The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:

 

Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.

 

The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.

 

Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation therein is false.

 

312. Quezon v. Commission on Elections (545 SCRA 635, 2008)

Importance of a Valid Certificate of Candidacy

 

FACTS: Petitioner Quizon and private respondent Puno were congressional candidates during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. On April 17, 2007, Quizon filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy against Puno docketed as SPA-07-290. Quizon alleged that Puno is not qualified to run as candidate in Antipolo City for failure to meet the residency requirement prior to the day of election; and that Puno’s claim in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that he is a resident of 1906 Don Celso Tuazon, Valley Golf Brgy. De la Paz, Antipolo City for four years and six months before May 14, 2007 constitutes a material misrepresentation since he was in fact a resident of Quezon City.

On April 24, 2007, Quizon filed a Supplement to the petition claiming that Puno cannot validly be a candidate for a congressional seat in the First District of Antipolo City since he indicated in his COC that he was running in the First District of the Province of Rizal which is a different legislative district. Subsequently, concerned residents of the First District of Antipolo City wrote a letter dated April 27, 2007 seeking clarification from the COMELEC on the legal and political implications of the COC of Puno, who was seeking public office in the First District of the Province of Rizal but waging his political campaign in the City of Antipolo, which is a separate and distinct legislative district. They prayed that Puno’s COC be declared as invalid and that the same be cancelled.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC Second Division should grant or resolve the petition and supplemental petition for disqualification and cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed by Florante S. Quizon against Roberto V. Puno

RULING: Petitioner’s assertion is bereft of merit.

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that petitions to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy should be resolved, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. In construing this provision together with Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, this Court declared in Salcedo II v. COMELEC that the fifteen-day period in Section 78 is merely directory. Thus:

If the petition is filed within the statutory period and the candidate is subsequently declared by final judgment to be disqualified before the election, he shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. The fifteen-day period in section 78 for deciding the petition is merely directory.

It has long been settled in Codilla Sr. v. De Venecia that pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, a final judgment before the election is required for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." In the absence of any final judgment of disqualification against Puno, the votes cast in his favor cannot be considered stray.

As to the alleged irregularity in the filing of the certificate of candidacy, it is important to note that this Court has repeatedly held that provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory to give effect to the will of the people. In the instant case, Puno won by an overwhelming number of votes. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, as in this case.

Moreover, following Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, a subsequent disqualification of Puno will not entitle petitioner, the candidate who received the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. It has long been settled in our jurisprudence, as early as 1912, that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected. The second placer is just that, a second placer – he lost in the elections and was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters.

Finally, petitioner has other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. After a resolution on the petition for disqualification, a motion for reconsideration may be filed before the COMELEC En Banc as what was done by petitioner. Only then can petitioner come before this Court via a petition for certiorari. These rules of procedure are not without reason. They are meant to facilitate the orderly administration of justice and petitioner cannot take a judicial shortcut without violating the rule on hierarchy of courts.

 

 

313) Go v. Commission on Elections (357 SCRA 739, 2001)

 

Facts:  Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001.

 

On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor.

 

On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte.

 

Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte.

 

However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.

 

At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax⁴ to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001. On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal

 

On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner. Respondent Antoni filed a similar petition, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both.

 

Issue: Whether or not petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions

 

Ruling: The Supreme Court annulled the COMELEC resolution declaring a candidate disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. There is nothing in Section 73, B.P. Blg. 881 which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.

 

316. Monroy v. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 620, 1967)

 

Automatic Registration

 

FACTS: Petitioner Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his certifi­cate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the Commission on Elections.  Three days later, petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy.

The COMELEC approved the withdrawal. But on Septem­ber 21, 1961, respondent del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as munici­pal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candi­dacy in question. Court of First Instance of Rizal held in the suit for injunction instituted by petitioner that (a) the former had ceased to be mayor after his certificate of candidacy was filed respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office.

This judgment was affirmed in toto by the CA. Hence, this petition for certiorari argues that both the lower court and the CA no juris­diction to do - review a resolution of the COMELEC. Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming a lower court judg­ment requiring petitioner to pay respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages the salaries he was allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was still the municipal mayor after September 15, 1961

 

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.

 

Revenue Election Code provides that "Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certi­ficate of candidacy," makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for ano­ther office.

 

Only the moment and act of filing are con­sidered.  Once the certificate is filed, the seat is for­feited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The pre­sent case for injunction and quo warranto involves the for­feiture of the office of municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to that office by the vice mayor general rule that the right­ful incumbent of a public office may recover from an of­ficer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title" that applies in the present case.

 

The resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently acknowledge that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office with­out being lawful officers. The question of compensation involves different principles and concepts however.  Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive.

 

Finally, a de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.

 

 

Candidates in Case of Death, Disqualifications, or Withdrawal of Another

317) Luna v. Commission on Elections (522 SCRA 107, 2007)

Facts:  On 15 January 2004, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna.

 

On 20 April 2004, private respondents Tomas Layao, Solomon Lalugan III, Nelia Lazaga, Anthony Layao, Cipriano Lapez, Jr., Victoria Layao, Moderno Lapez, Rodrigo Pariñas, and Eugenio Caber Donato (private respondents) filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or disqualification of Luna. Private respondents alleged that Luna made a false material representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. Private respondents also claimed that Luna’s certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid. Private respondents alleged that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on election day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna

 

Issue: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger

 

Ruling: Where a candidate withdrew his/her certificate of candidacy and COMELEC found that the substitute complied with all the procedural requirements for valid substitution, the latter can validly substitute for the former. COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. If the candidate made a material misrepresentation as to his/her date of birth or age in his/her certificate of candidacy, his/her eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code. There can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. The certificate of candidacy was withdrawn before the COMELEC could declare that the candidate was not a valid for the said position. For if he was declared as such, substitution will be invalid

 

320. Hayudini v. Commission on Elections (613 SCRA 573, 2010)

Petition to deny Due Course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy

FACTS: Hayudini, on October 5, 2012, filed his COC for the position of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, Mustapha J. Omar filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini's COC. Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared in his COC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.

Afterwards, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before MCTC. Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini's petition on January 31, 2013. On that same day, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed Omar's earlier petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to his residency.

Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao RTC Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013, reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudini's name in Barangay Bintawlan's permanent list of voters. In view of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event on March 26, 2013. Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC decision to the Court of Appeals but was denied.
On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.

 

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Omar as the duly-elected mayor

 

RULING: The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the necessary ground to successfully have Hayudinis COC struck down. Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he or she is running. Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78. It is interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially excluded by the ERB as a voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirm in the disapproval of Hayudini's petition for registration. This is precisely the reason why he needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his COC that he is eligible for said office," Hayudini made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was not, in fact, registered as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.

 

 

 

Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy

321) Arnado v. Commission on Elections (767 SCRA 168, 2015)

Facts: Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225). He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re­ acquisition. rnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

 

Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.

 

Issue: Whether or not Arnado is disqualified because he continued to use his US passport.

 

Ruling: Yes. The use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Matters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with. A candidate cannot simply be allowed to correct the deficiency in his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation.

 

324. Mitra v. Commission on Elections (622 SCRA 744, 2010)

Material and False Representation in the Certificate

FACTS: The Court took note of the incremental moves Mitra undertook to establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following:(1) his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion ofhis house. Thus, we found that under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan. We also emphasized that the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC concerning his residence was indeed a misrepresentation. In sum, we concluded that the evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra indeed transfered his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mitra deliberately misrepresented his Aborlan residence in his COC

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.

The Court do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves he had made to carry it out. From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitras favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go below the level of anequipoise, i.e., when weighed, Mitras evidence of transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident. Under the situationprevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about his residence.

The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the character of Mitras feedmill residence. For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error one that goes beyond an ordinary error of judgment. By failing to take into account whether there had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material representation.In this case, it doubly erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.

The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of using subjective norms, as they now argue thatgiven his stature as a member of the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room in a feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.

We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the COMELECs use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion of his house. These incremental moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELECs highly subjective non-legal standards do. Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us, that the respondents have not presented a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC, while the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation

 

328. Oratea v. Commission on Elections (683 SCRA 105, 2012)

Disqualifications

 

FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida and Estela D. Antipolo were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida Hied his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.  The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution on 18 February 20)0 cancelling Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE: How to fill the vacancy resulting from Lonzanida's disqualification

RULING: A final judgment of disqualification before the elections is necessary before the voles east in favor of a candidate be considered stray

Anent the effect of a judgment of disqualification, Section 72 of the OEC is clear. It states; Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the voles cast foe him shall not he counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.

 

In Aratea vs. COMELEC (2012) and Maquiling vs. COMELEC (2013), the Supreme Court made a categorical pronouncement that an ineligible candidate is not considered a candidate at all. A void Certificate of Candidacy (COC) cannot produce any legal effect. All the votes for the ineligible candidate are stray votes.

 

Aratea/Maquiling ruling has clarified that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates is not a second placer. He is technically a first-placer since the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

 

As explained by the Highest Tribunal, the position vacated by the ineligible candidate for the position of mayor will no longer be surrendered to the vice mayor but to the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. Thus, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will no longer apply in this scenario. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. Sereno, elucidated the import of its latest pronouncements in Maquiling:

“Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

 

 

Disqualifications

329) Albania v. Commission on Elections (826 SCRA 191, 2017)

 

Facts: In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, respondent Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O. Typoco were both candidates for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Typoco was proclaimed as the winner. Respondent questioned Typoco's proclamation by filing with the COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest error. The Petition was decided in respondent's favor on March 5, 2010 and the latter assumed the position of Governor of Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010 term.

 

Respondent ran again in the 2010 and 2013 National and Local Elections where he won and served as Governor of Camarines Norte respectively.

On October 16, 2015, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy as Governor of Camarines Norte in the May 9, 2016 National and Local elections.

 

On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, filed a petition for respondent's disqualification from running as Governor based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 on two grounds: (1) he violated the three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC); and (2) respondent's suspension from office for one year without pay, together with its accessory penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority in the Ombudsman's Order.

Respondent argued that since the petition was primarily based on his alleged violation of the three-term limit rule, the same should have been filed as a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution 9523, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the ground cited affected a candidate's eligibility.

 

COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. It ruled that a violation of the three-term limit rule and suspension from office as a result of an administrative case are not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under the law; that the alleged violation of three-term limit rule is a ground for ineligibility which constituted false material representation

 

 

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC erred in its decision violation of the three-term limit rule and suspension from office as a result of an administrative case are not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under the law

 

Ruling:

1. Notably, however, a reading of the grounds enumerated under the above-quoted provisions for a candidate's disqualification does not include the two grounds relied upon by petitioner. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division was correct when it found that the petition was not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions.

Respondent's suspension from office is indeed not a ground for a petition for disqualification as Section 40(b) clearly speaks of removal from office as a result of an administrative offense that would disqualify a candidate from running for any elective local position. In fact, the penalty of suspension cannot be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for the office as provided under Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160.

2. While the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a ground for a petition for disqualification, however, the COMELEC Second Division found that it is an ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, hence considered the petition as such.

 

The Constitution has vested in the COMELEC broad power involving not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but also the resolution and determination of election controversies.[15] It also granted the COMELEC the power and authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the primary objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of election cases.[16] Concomitant to such powers is the authority of the COMELEC to determine the true nature of the cases filed before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading filed, obviously aware that in determining the nature of the complaint or petition, its averments, rather than its title/caption, are the proper gauges.[17]

 

Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, such petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, as provided under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, as the COMELEC found, the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period, and dismissed the petition for being filed out time. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed such dismissal.

 

We agree.

 

The three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution, to wit:

 

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

 

The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election because he is ineligible.

 

We are not convinced.

We held that two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive term

 

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms.

 

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed

 

332. Labao Jr. v Commission on Elections (797 SCRA 219, 2016)

Disqualifications

 

FACTS: G.R. No. 212615 is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leodegario A. Labao, Jr. (Labao, Jr.) to annul and set aside the May 21, 2014 and September 24, 2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA Case No. 13-294 (DC), entitled "Ludovico L. Martelino, Jr. v, Leodegario A. Labao, Jr.," disqualifying him as candidate for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Mambusao, Capiz as well as nullifying his proclamation as the duly elected Mayor thereof.

And, G.R. No. 212989 is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by Sharon Grace Martinez-Martelino (Sharon) to annul and set aside the aforementioned resolutions of the COMELEC but only as to the portion directing the application of the rules of succession (in case of a permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor) pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code; and (ii) to compel the COMELEC to proclaim her, instead, as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Mambusao, Capiz.

Both petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court, as amended.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

 

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.

This Court finds that the pieces of evidence on record do not sufficiently establish Labao, Jr.'s intention to evade being prosecuted for a criminal charge that will warrant a sweeping conclusion that Labao, Jr., at the time, was evading prosecution so as to disqualify him as a fugitive from justice from running for public office.38 Moreover, the dearth of evidence pointing to such intent hardly justifies the would-be disenfranchisement of 12,117 innocent voters of Mambusao, Capiz who voted for Labao, Jr.

Thus, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated May 21, 2014 should be struck down for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This Court's action finds anchor in Jalover v. Osmefia, where it was explained that:

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

 

This Court is hard-pressed to label Labao, Jr.'s actions as evasion of prosecution for him to be considered a fugitive from justice that would disqualify him to run as a candidate for Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz.

 

 

333)  LABO v. COMELEC. G.R. No. 86564 . August 1, 1989

 

FACTS: Ramon Labo asked the Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.

 

Issue: Whether or not Ramon Labo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as mayor of Baguio City.

 

Ruling: The Court ruled that the petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:

Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.

 

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. But having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity

that can be easily recovered after its renunciation.

 

It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

The Court held that petitioner Ramon J.  Labo, Jr. is not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same  to the  Vice-Mayor  of Baguio City, once this decision becomes  final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is lifted.

 

336. Lanot v. Commission on Elections (507 SCRA 114, 2006)

Campaign and Election Propaganda - Prohibited Acts

 

FACTS: On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot, Vener Obispo, Roberto Peralta, Reynaldo dela Paz, Edilberto Yamat, and Ram Alan Cruz filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. Anot, Obispo, and Eusebio were candidates for Pasig City Mayor. Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for Pasig City Councilor in the 10 May 2004 elections. Eusebio denied petitioners' allegations and branded the petition as a harassment case five days before the elections, the COMELEC First Division adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Ladra. On 9 May 2004, Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC First Division.

 

On election day itself, Chairman Abalos issued the first of the three questioned COMELEC issuances. In a memorandum, Chairman Abalos enjoined Director Ladra from implementing the COMELEC First Division's 5 May 2004 resolution due to Eusebio's motion for reconsideration. On 11 May 2004, the day after the elections, petitioners Lanot, Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion to suspend the counting and canvassing of votes and the proclamation of the winning mayoral candidate for Pasig City. The COMELEC En Banc partially denied the motion on the same day. Eusebio had 119,693 votes while Lanot had 108,941 votes. Eusebio was proclaimed as Pasig City Mayor on 23 May 2004 based on the 21 May 2004 Order. On 6 August 2004, Lanot filed a motion to annul Eusebio's proclamation and to order his proclamation instead.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Eusebio should be disqualified as a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.

 

RULING: No.

Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy.

Applying the facts - as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his certificate of candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.

Eusebio asserts that Section 11 of RA 8436 exculpates him from any liability for the questioned acts. Eusebio points out that Section 11 contains the following proviso:

Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period. Eusebio theorizes that since the questioned acts admittedly took place before the start of the campaign period, such acts are not "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate."

Ruling of the Regional Director recommends that the instant petition be granted. Consequently, pursuant to Section 68 (a) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code, respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO shall be disqualified to run for the position of Mayor, Pasig City for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Ruling of the COMELEC disqualification of respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO from being a candidate for mayor of Pasig City in the May 10, 2004 elections. Election Officers of District I and District II of Pasig City to delete and cancel the name of respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO from the certified list of candidates for the City Offices of Pasig City for the May 10, 2004 election the Commission En Banc hereby ORDERS to SUSPEND, UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS OF THE COMMISSION, the proclamation of respondent in the event he receives the winning number of votes. The Court resolved to declare Eusebio as Pasig City Mayor since respondent Vicente P. Eusebio did not commit any act which would disqualify him as a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.

 

 

ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND EXPENDITURE: Equal Access to Media Time and Space

337) Chavez v. Commission on Elections (437 SCRA 415, 2004)

Facts: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up showing petitioner promoting the products of said establishments. 

 

On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator.

 

On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32:

Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter, this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.

 

The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request.

 

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC, asking that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges the Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

 

Issue: Whether or not Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional

 

Ruling:

 

Police power

 

Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.

 

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals?

 

A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. 

 

Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

 

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning.

 

Non-impairment of contract

 

Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

 

Ex post facto law

 

Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person, whose name or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code.

 

Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case. 

 

Fair Elections Act

 

Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law.

 

Overbreadth 

 

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 

 

The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image.

 

There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth. 

 

340. Pilar v. Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 750, 1995)

Requisites for Recovery of Damages Arising from Acts of Public Officers

 

FACTS: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme Court.

 

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost” under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their candidacy for election.

 

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.

Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. 

In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that “the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

Moreover, the court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. Courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.

 

 

344. Sinaca v. Mula (315 SCRA 266, 1999)

Disputes as to Party Nominations

 

FACTS: In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing. (Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well as the Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.)

Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because: a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a substitute; and b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution.

 

The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However, when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member.

 

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.

 

 

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.

 

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the party's nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such.

 

The petition is granted. It declared Emmanuel Sinaca as having been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.

 

 

345) Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections (694 SCRA 486, 2013)

Facts:

• The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
• Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
• December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
• 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
• Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
• 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.
• Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. 

 

Issue: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

 

Ruling: No. In determining who may participate in party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters: a. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. c. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "welldefined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or 87 organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified

 

349) Javellana v. Executive Secretary (50 SCRA 103, 1973)

 

Facts: On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Then, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

Then Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”

The President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. He then announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. The Congress then scheduled to meet  in regular session and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

The petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”

Then the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying:

“… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”

On the same date, the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

 

The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter” and as “a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated,” was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced “the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including,” and that the latter “are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution” upon the ground: “that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies”; that the same “are without power to approve the proposed Constitution …”; “that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution”; and “that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.”

 

Issue(s):

 

1. Whether the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question?
2. Whether the Constitution has proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
3. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution has acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced – “permission” given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)
4. Whether petitioners are entitled to relief?
5. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force?

 

Ruling:

1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people’s will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with.” Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.
2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.”

Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.

3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.

Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.” 88

Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”

4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that “(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable.” 91

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents’ motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof;

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

 

 

357) Basher v. Commission on Elections (330 SCRA736, 2000)

Facts: Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher and Private Respondent AbulkairAmpatua were both candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Maidan, Lanao del Sur during the May 1997 barangay election. The election was declared a failure and a special one was set for June 1997. Again, the election failed and was reset to August 30, 1997.  According to the Comelec, the voting started only around 9:00 pm in August 30, 1997 because of the prevailing tension in the said locality. The Election Officer reported that she was allegedly advised by some religious leaders not to proceed with the election because "it might trigger bloodshed." She also claimed that the town mayor yelled and threatened her to declare a failure of election in Maidan. Subsequently, the armed followers of the mayor pointed their guns at her. The parties were then pacified at the PNP headquarters. With the arrival of additional troops, the election officer proceeded to Maidan to conduct the election starting at 9:00 p.m. until the early morning of the following day. The holding of the election at that particular time was allegedly announced "over the mosque. Private respondent was declared the winner. Petitioner then filed a Petition before the Comelec praying that the election be declared a failure. He alleged that no election was conducted in the place and at the time prescribed by law.  law.   It was also alleged that the election officer had directed the Board of Election Tellers to conduct the election and to fill up the election returns and certificates of canvass on the night of August 30, 1997 at the residence of the former mayor. The Comelec dismissed the petition hence the case at bar.

 

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying motu proprio and proprio and without due notice and hearing the petitions seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the precincts in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.

 

Ruling: An election officer has no authority to declare a failure of election. Only COMELEC itself has legal authority to exercise such power. An election officer alone, or even with the agreement of the candidates, cannot validly postpone or suspend the elections. An announcement “over the mosque” was made at around 8:30pm informing the public that the election will push through at 9:00pm at the incumbent Mayor’s residence. To require the voters to come to the polls on such short notice was highly impracticable. It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form, either actual or constructive, of the time, place and purpose thereof. The time for holding it must be authoritatively designated in advance. Moreover, he cannot conduct the elections from 9:00 p.m. until the wee hours of the following day for this in effect is postponing the elections beyond the time set by law (i.e., 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.).

 

361) Tan v. Commission on Elections (417 SCRA 532, 2003)

Facts: Abdusakur Tan and Abdulwahid Sahidulla were candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, while Munib Estino and Abraham Burahan were candidates for Congressman of the Second and First District of Sulu, respectively. The other candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor were Yusop Jikiri and Abdel Anni. The candidates for the position of members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the First District of Sulu were Den Rasher Salim, Talib Hayudini, Rizal Tingkahan and Barlie Nahudan, while those for the Second District were Abraham Daud, Lukman Omar, Onnih Ahmad and Basaron Burahan.

 

On May 17, 2001, Abdusakur Tan, Abdulwahid Sahidulla and Abraham Burahan (Abdusakur Tan, et al. for brevity) filed with the COMELEC (public respondent) a petition to "declare failure of elections in all the precincts in the Municipality of Luuk," Province of Sulu, which was docketed as SPA No. 01-257.¹ The petitioners prayed that:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Commission DECLARE a FAILURE of ELECTIONS in all the precincts in the Municipality of Luuk, Sulu where no voting was actually held, as the registered voters never did their votes.

 

The petitioners further pray that pending final resolution of this petition that an order be immediately issued directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Luuk, Sulu as well as the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu to suspend and desist from continuing with, the CANVASSING of the election returns and/or certificate of canvass.

 

Other relief consistent with law, justice and equity are also prayed for.²

The following day, the petitioners filed a petition to declare failure of elections and/or to annul the elections or the election results in the Municipalities of Parang and Indanan, Province of Sulu

 

Issue: Whether or not fraud and irregularities may be a ground for failure of elections

 

Ruling: When the alleged fraud and irregularities did not prevent or suspend the holding of the elections, there is no failure of elections.

 

365) Typoco, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (319 SCRA 498, 199)

Facts:  TYPOCO and private respondent Jesus Pimentel (PIMENTEL) were both candidates for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. TYPOCO together with Winifredo Oco (OCO), a candidate for the position of Congressman of the Lone District of Camarines Norte filed a Joint Appeal before the COMELEC. TYPOCO and OCO questioned therein the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Camarines Norte which included in the canvass of votes the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

 

On June 4, 1998, COMELEC (Second Division) issued an Order dismissing the Joint Appeal. Thereafter, TYPOCO filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating his motion to admit evidence to prove the manufacturing and/or spurious character of the questioned returns which were allegedly prepared in group by only one person and which will materially affect the results of the election for the position of Governor.

 

In the meantime, on June 10, 1998, TYPOCO and OCO filed with the COMELEC En Banc a separate petition for Annulment of Election or Election Results and/or Declaration of Failure of Elections in several precincts, docketed as SPA No. 98-413, subject of the instant petition. The petition alleged that massive fraud and irregularities attended the preparation of the election returns considering that upon technical examination, 305 election returns were found to have been prepared in group by one person.

 

Issue: Whether or not a failure of election may be declared.

 

Ruling: No. While fraud is a ground to declare a failure of election, the commission of fraud must be such that it prevented or suspended the holding of an election, including the preparation and transmission of the election returns. The proper remedy in assailing election returns as manufactured for being allegedly prepared by one person, is to seek a recount, which is a proper subject of an election protest.

 

369) Punzalan v. Commission on Elections (289 SCRA 702, 1998)

Facts: the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo Manalastas' 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalan's 8,612 votes. On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest.

One of the arguments is that ballot should be invalidated because BEI chairperson failed to affix his/her signature

 

Issue: Whether or not ballot should be invalidated for the failure of the BEI chairperson to affix his signature.

 

Ruling: Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166 requires the BEI chairperson to affix his/her signature at the back of the ballot. However, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same. As a rule, the failure of the BEI inspectors or any member of the board to comply with his/her mandated administrative responsibility, i.e. signing, authenticating and thumb marking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement.

 

As a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of the election all over the country, the appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents which involve questions of fact is best left to the determination of the COMELEC.

 

373) Bocobo v. Commission on Elections (191 SCRA 576, 1990)

 

Facts: Petitioner Daniel T. Bocobo and private respondent Luisito M. Reyes were candidates for Governor in the Province of Marinduque in the elections held on January 20, 1988. Reyes won with a margin of 3,145 over Bocobo, who in due time filed an election protest with the Commission on Elections.

After revision of the ballots in 25% of the contested precincts indicated by the protestant. Third Division dismissed the protest.

 

It appearing, therefore, that on revision of the ballots representing TWENTY-FIVE (25%) per centum of the contested precincts the result of the election would not be altered, no sufficient basis exists to order the continuation of the remaining unrevised ballots of the protested precincts as protestant cannot overcome Protestee’s lead.

 

The petitioner urges reversal of the Commission on Elections on the ground that it misinterpreted and misapplied the partial determination rule embodied in Rule 20, Section 7, of its own Rules of Procedure. He also maintains he was denied due process when certain ballots protested by him were admitted by the public respondent without giving him an opportunity to support his objections.

 

Issue:

1. Whether or not COMELEC is best to interpret its own rules.
2. Whether not not ballot is the best evidence.

 

Ruling:

1. The best authority to interpret the rules promulgated by COMELEC is COMELEC itself. The contention that COMELEC violated its own rule when it issued a show-cause order without making an initial evaluation of the ballots hence disregarding the two-step process required by COMELEC itself does not hold water. The interpretation of COMELEC of its own rules must prevail. According also to the records of the case, the third division did not fail to conduct an initial evaluation and examination of the ballots before it issued a show-cause order.
2. Ballots are the best evidence. Handwriting experts are not indispensible in examining and comparing handwritings for this can be done by the COMELEC. Evidence aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked. It is sufficient to look at the marked ballots. COMELEC is the best authority to determine the authenticity of the ballots.

 

377) Delos Reyes v. Commisson on Elections (517 SCRA 137, 2007)

Facts: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

 

Issue(s):

1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office

Ruling:

1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative.
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude  that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

 

 

 

385) Laurena, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (526 SCRA 230, 2007)

Facts: Domiciano R. Laurena, Jr. and Nestor L. Alvarez were candidates for mayor. In the canvass of votes, Laurena obtained 13,321 votes while Alvarez garnered 16,855 votes. With the 3,534 votes difference, Alvarez was proclaimed mayor. Laurena, claiming that massive electoral fraud and irregularities attended Alvarez's victory, filed an election protest³ impugning the results of the elections in all 175 precincts.

 

Second Division denied protestee's call for the dismissal of the case. It recognized that ballot revision is the most expeditious and the best means to determine the truth or falsity of protestant's allegations.

 

After the revision was completed, the physical count of votes showed Alvarez garnering a total of 16,539 votes and Laurena getting 12,785 votes, or a difference of 3,754. During the regular canvass, Alvarez garnered 16,855 while Laurena obtained 13,321, or a difference of 3,534 votes.

 

With the admission of the parties' respective formal offer of evidence and the submission of their memoranda, the Second Division issued the assailed Resolution¹⁴ dismissing the protest. Affirmed

 

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS OF SEPTEMBER 21, 2005 (BY THE COMELEC SECOND DIVISION) AND AUGUST 22, 2006 (BY THE COMELEC EN BANC)

 

Ruling: The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC is whether or not COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough for it must show that it was exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or hostility. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings, and decisions rendered by COMELEC on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by the Supreme Court. The appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC. The COMELEC being a specialized agency, is tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. It is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials; as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Votes cannot be nullified on the mere sweeping allegations that fraud and irregularity attended the election. The will of the voters is embodied in the ballots, and to ascertain and carry out such will, the ballots much be read and appreciated according to the rule that every ballot is presumed valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. Ample and credible evidence is necessary to prove such claim.

 

389) Salic v. Commission on Elections (425 SCRA 735, 2004)

Facts: Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del Sur at the 10 May 2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven (7) municipalities, including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and Kapai, which are situated in the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur. The conduct of special elections in the seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities was originally scheduled for 29 May 2010.

On 25 May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8946, resetting the special elections to 3 June 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC issued the herein assailed resolution which provided, among others, the constitution of Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and Clustering of Precincts in Section 12.

Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration concerning only Sections 4 and 12 thereof as it may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC did not act on Dumarpas motion.

 

A day before the scheduled special elections, on 2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the instant petition alleging that "both provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts (Section 12) and constitution of SBEIs [Special Board of Election Inspectors] (Section 4) affect the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely doom petitioner to certain defeat, if its implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court."

Parenthetically, at the time of the filing of this petition, Dumarpa was leading by a slim margin over his opponent Hussin Pangandaman in the canvassed votes for the areas which are part of the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Sur where there was no failure of elections.

A temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction was not issued. Thus, the special elections on 3 June 2010 proceeded as scheduled.

 

Issue: Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic

 

Ruling: COMELEC's power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election

COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, in the exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct of elections enshrined in the Constitution and statute. Thus, it brooks no argument that the COMELEC's broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall,carries with it all necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created - to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.

Dumarpas objections conveniently fail to take into account that COMELEC Resolution No. 8965, containing the assailed provisions on re-clustering of the precincts and the designation of special board of election inspectors, was issued precisely because of the total failure of elections in seven (7) Municipalities in the Province of Lanao del Sur, a total of fifteen (15) Municipalities where there was a failure of elections. Notably, the COMELEC's declaration of a failure of elections is not being questioned by Dumarpa. In fact, he confines his objections on the re-clustering of precincts, and only as regards the Municipality of Masiu.

Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another occurrence of a failure of elections in the fifteen (15) municipalities in the province of Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 8965. The COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best position to assess the actual condition prevailing in that area and to make judgment calls based thereon. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable.We cannot, however, engage in an academic criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.

 

393) Abes v. Commission on Elections (21 SCRA 1255, 1967)

Facts: Petitioners’ cry for relief, so their petition avers, is planted upon the constitutional mandate of free, orderly, and honest elections. 1 Specifically, they list a number of represented acts. Amongst these are: (1) blank official registration forms were taken from the office of the Quezon City Comelec Registrar several weeks before election day, November 14, 1967; (2) active campaigning within the polling places by Nacionalista leaders or sympathizers of Nacionalista candidates were allowed; (3) voters were permitted to vote on mere mimeographed notices of certain Nacionalista candidates; (4) voters were compelled to fill their official ballots on open tables, desks and in many precincts outside the polling places; (5) forms of petitions for inclusion proceedings were obtainable only in the offices of candidates of the Nacionalista Party; (6) thousands of voters were allowed to vote on the strength of inclusion orders issued indiscriminately by two City Judges on election day; (7) thousands of voters sympathetic to the Nacionalista candidates were allowed to vote beyond the hours for voting allowed by law; (8) thousands of voters’ I.D. registration cards of voters sympathetic to non-Nacionalista candidates were thrown and scattered in the Office of the Nacionalista candidate for Mayor; (9) voters’ I.D. cards were delivered by partisan leaders of respondents Nacionalista candidates, and those who did not signify their Reference for Nacionalista candidates were not given their I.D. cards, (10) the office of the corporation of which respondent Ismael Mathay, Jr. is the President was used as a place of registration which is "unauthorized" ; (11) most of the precinct books of voters were not sealed within the deadline fixed by law; and (12) the resulting effect of irregularities is that about 51% of the registered voters were disenfranchised.

Petitioners, candidates of the Liberal Party, the Nacionalista Reform Party and the Quezon City Citizens League for Good Government, first went to the Commission on Elections (Comelec). Upon the claim that more than 50% of the registered voters were not able to vote during the elections of November 14, 1967, they prayed for Comelec’s declaration that there was failure of election. They petitioned for suspension of the canvass and the proclamation of winning candidates. They sought nullification, too, of elections in Quezon City for city officials and asked that new elections be held. Comelec, in a minute resolution of November 23, 1967, denied the petition, ordered the board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but not to proclaim any winning candidate for city offices and gave petitioners time "to go to the Supreme Court for the proper remedy."cralaw virtua1aw libra

 

Issue: whether or not there had been terrorism, vote- buying and other irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest, pursuant to section 174 of the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from canvassing the election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for municipal offices.

 

Ruling: The board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election returns submitted to it in due form. It has been said, and properly, that its powers are "limited generally to the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained."

 

397) Sandoval v. Commission on Elections (323 SCRA 403, 2000)

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order. 

 

Issue: Whether or not   COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206

 

Ruling: we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. — For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections." 

 

401) Saño, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (611 SCRA 475, 2010)

 

 

Facts: Saño argued to suspende and annul a proclamation validly made due to, among others, that the election returns were (1) obviously manufactured; (2) tampered or falsified; [3]that there was massive fraud; and [4] illegal proceedings. In support thereto, petitioner attached the affidavits of his two (2) supporters, who attested that they saw open ballot boxes from Precinct Nos. 49A, 31A, and 58A

 

COMELEC issued its Resolution dated October 3, 2007 upholding the proclamation of Que, to wit:

 

x x x A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns. On the other hand, Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code enumerates the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy, viz:

1. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

2. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code;

3. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

4. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate.

It is likewise settled that the above enumeration of the grounds that [many] be properly raised in a pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive.

 

Petitioner insists that all five contested ERs were written by only one person, and these ERs were surreptitiously presented before the MBOC. Thus, he argues that the issues raised before the MBOC, namely, that the contested ERs were tampered with and/or falsified, obviously manufactured, and subject of massive fraud, are pre-proclamation controversies as defined in Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code and fall within the contemplation of Section 243(b) of said Code. As such, the contested ERs should have been excluded from the canvass. Consequently, the MBOC’s proclamation of Que violated Section 39 of Commonwealth Act No. 7859 and Section 20 of RA 7166.

 

On the other hand, Que argues that the allegations raised by petitioner on the contested ERs are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; that petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that the contested ERs were obviously manufactured, tampered with, or falsified; and that petitioner failed to follow the strict and mandatory procedure under Section 20 of RA 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 8969 for manifesting an appeal.

 

Issue: Whether or not contested ERs are  proper in a pre-proclamation controversy.

 

Ruling: A pre-proclamation controversy, as defined in BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the OEC of the Philippines, is: Any question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the BOC which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with COMELEC, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of the election returns. A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character. It is the policy of the law that pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The BOC will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when election returns are contested before the BOC. Compliance with this procedure is mandatory to permit the BOC to resolve the objections as quickly as possible.

 

405) Bandala v. Commission on Elections (424 SCRA 267, 2004)

 

Facts: Nancy Soriano Bandala, herein petitioner, and Alejandro G. Berenguel, herein respondent, were mayoralty candidates in Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental during the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.

 

During the canvass of the election returns conducted by the City Board of Canvassers of Oroquieta City, respondent objected to the inclusion of eighty (80) election returns on the following grounds: (1) that seventy-one (71) election returns were not secured with inner paper seals; (2) that seven (7) election returns do not indicate the party affiliation of the watchers-signatories; and (3) that two (2) election returns have missing pages which contain the list of the local city candidates.

In an Omnibus Ruling, the City Board of Canvassers overturned the objection of respondent and included in its canvass the contested election returns.  Petitioner was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Oroquieta City. COMELEC affirmed the BOD Resolution, holding that:

 

Lack of inner seal of an election return does not necessarily mean that the same is spurious and/or was tampered with. Such tampering, or its being spurious must appear on the face of the election return itself. It is the ministerial function of the board of canvassers to count the results as they appear in the returns which on their face do not reveal any irregularities or falsities. 

 

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion (1) in excluding 101 election returns based on a formal defect of lack of inner paper seals in the election returns; and (2) in nullifying her proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor of Oroquieta City.

 

Issue(s):

1. Whether the ground of lack of inner paper seals in the election returns be considered a proper issue in a pre-proclamation controversy?
2. Whether the COMELEC commit grave abuse in discretion in nullifying the proclamation of petitioner as mayor of Oroquieta City?

 

Ruling:

1. The definition of a pre-proclamation controversy under Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:

"SEC. 241. Definition. - A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns."

The issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy are enumerated in Section 243 of the same Code, thus:

"SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. - The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Section 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates."

The lack of inner paper seals in the election returns does not justify their exclusion from the canvassing. Indeed, it is not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy.

2. "Section 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. –

 

x x x

 

(i)                 The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election."

 

Suffice it to state that the above provision applies only where the objection deals with a pre-proclamation controversy, not where, as in the present case, it raises or deals with no such controversy. It bears reiterating that the lack of inner paper seals in the election returns is not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy.

 

 

 

409) Bandala v. Commission on Elections (424 SCRA 267, 2004)

 

 

Facts: Nancy Soriano Bandala, herein petitioner, and Alejandro G. Berenguel, herein respondent, were mayoralty candidates in Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental during the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.

 

During the canvass of the election returns conducted by the City Board of Canvassers of Oroquieta City, respondent objected to the inclusion of eighty (80) election returns on the following grounds: (1) that seventy-one (71) election returns were not secured with inner paper seals; (2) that seven (7) election returns do not indicate the party affiliation of the watchers-signatories; and (3) that two (2) election returns have missing pages which contain the list of the local city candidates.

In an Omnibus Ruling, the City Board of Canvassers overturned the objection of respondent and included in its canvass the contested election returns.  Petitioner was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Oroquieta City. COMELEC affirmed the BOD Resolution, holding that:

 

Lack of inner seal of an election return does not necessarily mean that the same is spurious and/or was tampered with. Such tampering, or its being spurious must appear on the face of the election return itself. It is the ministerial function of the board of canvassers to count the results as they appear in the returns which on their face do not reveal any irregularities or falsities. 

 

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion (1) in excluding 101 election returns based on a formal defect of lack of inner paper seals in the election returns; and (2) in nullifying her proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor of Oroquieta City.

 

Issue(s):

3. Whether the ground of lack of inner paper seals in the election returns be considered a proper issue in a pre-proclamation controversy?
4. Whether the COMELEC commit grave abuse in discretion in nullifying the proclamation of petitioner as mayor of Oroquieta City?

 

Ruling:

3. The definition of a pre-proclamation controversy under Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:

"SEC. 241. Definition. - A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns."

The issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy are enumerated in Section 243 of the same Code, thus:

"SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. - The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Section 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates."

The lack of inner paper seals in the election returns does not justify their exclusion from the canvassing. Indeed, it is not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy.

4. "Section 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. –

 

x x x

 

(ii)              The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election."

 

Suffice it to state that the above provision applies only where the objection deals with a pre-proclamation controversy, not where, as in the present case, it raises or deals with no such controversy. It bears reiterating that the lack of inner paper seals in the election returns is not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy.

413) Salih v. Commission on Elections (279 SCRA 19, 1997)

 

Facts: Upon petition filed by the Nacionalista Party on November 16, 1965, which was opposed by Salih Ututalum, as duly registered candidate for Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district for the Province of Sulu, in the national elections, the Commission on Elections a resolution ordering that elections shall be held for several precincts.

 

This is Ututalum’s alleged plurality over his closest opponent in said election, Indanan Anni, the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, which instituted said proceedings in the Commission. Anni claims, however, that Ututalum’s plurality over him is 246 votes only.

 

Ututalum commenced the present action against the Commission and Indanan Anni, to annul the resolution. The resolution complained of is predicated upon the powers of the Commission under Section 2 of Article X of the Constitution, pursuant to which the Commission "shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections." Respondents particularly stress the penultimate sentence of said section, to the effect that "all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government shall, when so required by the Commission, act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections." They maintain that this provision suffices to uphold the validity of the resolution in question.

 

Issue: Whether or not the Resolution is valid

 

Ruling: This pretense is untenable. The functions of the Commission under the Constitution are essentially executive ("enforcement") and administrative ("administration") in nature. Indeed, prior to the creation of the Commission, as a constitutional body, its functions were being discharged by the Executive Bureau, an office under the control of the then Department of the Interior, both of which had been created by statute, and were in turn under the control first of the Governor-General and later, under the Constitution, of the President of the Philippines. Our fundamental law has placed the agency charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections beyond the control of the Executive and beyond the power of Congress to abolish it (the agency), in addition to adopting other measures tending to give thereto a reasonable degree of independence. This notwithstanding, the nature of its powers has remained essentially the same namely, executive in character.

 

In short, the authority to pass the resolution complained of cannot be implied from the statement in the Constitution to the effect that the Commission shall seek to insure the holding of "free, orderly and honest elections", for these objectives merely qualify the power of the Commission to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Said resolution cannot be valid, therefore, unless the Revised Election Code or some other act of Congress vests in the Commission the authority to order the holding of elections in the aforementioned precincts on December 7, 1965.

 

Indeed, under this section, the power to "postpone" an election is vested exclusively in the President, although "upon recommendation" of the Commission.

 

417) Verceles v. Commission on Elections (214 SCRA 159, 1992)

 

Facts: petitioner Leandro Verceles, candidate for Governor of Catanduanes, seeks to annul Resolution No. 92-1485 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc of May 14, 1992, which enjoined the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers from ruling on objections to election returns relating to provincial offices, for being violative of the Omnibus Election Code and R.A. No. 7166.

 

These cases are consolidated as they involve pre-proclamation controversies, to wit: G.R. No. 105227 assailing the legality of the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes.

 

Issue: Whether or not the proclamation is valid.

 

Ruling: The instant case is a consolidation of three pre-proclamation controversies. During their pendency, no restraining order was issued. Hence, the winning candidates have already been proclaimed. The Court ruled that, pursuant to Section 16 of RA 7166, the pre-proclamation issues have been rendered moot and academic when the proclaimed elected officials commenced their terms.

 

"All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.

While the issue of failure of election in G.R. No. 105939 may proceed conformably with Our ruling in Jardiel v. COMELEC and Aves, 1 the same must, nevertheless, be dismissed as it does not appear from the petition that the number of votes affected by the annulment of election in four (4) precincts would materially alter the result of the elections.

 

421) Patoray v. Commission on Elections (274 SCRA 470, 1997)

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for mayor of Tamparan in the election of May 8, 1995. During the canvassing of votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC), private respondent objected to the inclusion of the election returns from Precinct Nos. 16, 17, 19 and 20-A on the grounds that the returns had been "prepared under duress, threats, coercion, and intimidation" and that they were "substituted, fraudulent and obviously manufactured returns.

 

MBC, after receiving the evidence of the parties, denied private respondent's objections and included the four (4) questioned election returns.

 

Issue: Whether COMELEC erred in ordering the exclusion of an election return.

 

Ruling: The COMELEC’s Second Division was correct in ordering the exclusion of an election return that contained a discrepancy between the taras and the written figures. According to Section 236 of the OEC, in cases of discrepancies in election returns, COMELEC, upon motion of the BOC or any candidate affected shall proceed summarily to determine whether the integrity of the ballot box had been preserved, and once satisfied thereof shall order the opening of the ballot box to recount the votes cast in the polling place to determine the true result of the count of votes of the candidate concerned. The COMELEC’S Second Division should have ordered a recount of the ballots and directed the proclamation of the winner accordingly instead of resorting to the Certificate of Votes. There was no showing of any discrepancy in the election return; rather, it is a case involving material defects. In excluding the election returns in question, the voters in such precinct will be disenfranchised. It is the BEI concerned that will effect the correction.

 

425) Dimaporo v. Commission on Elections (544 SCRA 381, 2008)

 

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Dimaporo and private respondent Vicente Belmonte were both candidates for Representative of the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Norte during the May 14, 2007 elections.

The said legislative district is composed of seven (7) towns and one (1) city, namely: the Municipalities of Linamon, Kauswagan, Bacolod, Maigo, Kolambugan, Tubod, Baroy and the City of Iligan.

 

On May 22, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) completed the canvass of the Certificates of Canvass (COCs) for the City of Iligan and four (4) of the municipalities, namely, Linamon, Kolambugan, Tubod and Baroy. Upon adjournment on May 22, 2007, the said PBOC issued a Certification showing respondent Belmonte in the lead, with 52,783 votes, followed by candidate Badelles with 39,315 votes, and petitioner Dimaporo in third place with only 35,150 votes,

 

COMELEC declared Belmonte as a winner.

 

Issue: Whether or not the proclamation by COMELEc is valid

 

Ruling: The proclamation of a congressional candidate by the COMELEC as winner before there is status quo ante order by Supreme Court is valid. Without the status quo ante order, the COMELEC may proceed with the proclamation with the candidate as if there was no petition filed in the said body. Once an elected candidate has his/her oath, the jurisdiction to try and hear the cases transfer to the HRET. The proper remedy would then be to file the proper election protest before the HRET.

 

429) Torres-Gomez v. Codilla, Jr. (668 SCRA 600, 2012)

Facts: Richard I. Gomez (Gomez) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the Liberal Party of the Philippines. On even date, private respondent Codilla Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the same position under Lakas Kampi CMD.

 

Buenaventura O. Juntilla (Juntilla), a registered voter of Leyte, filed a Verified Petition for Gomez's disqualification with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division on the ground that Gomez lacked the residency requirement for a Member of the Fiouse of Representatives. COMELEC First Division granted Juntilla's Petition and disqualified Gomez.

 

Issue: THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DISMISS THE ELECTION PROTEST DESPITE AN ADMITTEDLY DEFECTIVE VERIFICATION

 

Ruling: On the Allegedly Defective Verification. It has been consistently held that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.

On the Propriety of the Election Protest.  It bears stressing that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented; and the right to decide whether there exists that state of facts that confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters arising from the case legitimately before it. Accordingly, the HRET has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction - both as to parties and as to subject matter; and to decide all questions, whether of law or of fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction. Thus, the HRET had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine its authority and to take cognizance of the Election Protest filed before it.

Further, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the HRET on this score. An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities. Its purpose is to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. The foregoing considered, the issues raised hi Codilla's Election Protest are proper for such a petition, and is within the jurisdiction of the HRET.

 

433) Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections (572 SCRA 273, 2008)

Facts: Priscila R. Justimbaste (Priscila) filed with the Leyte Provincial Election Supervisor a petition to disqualify respondent Rustico B. Balderian (Rustico) as a candidate for mayor of Tabontabon, Leyte for falsification and misinterpretation in his application for candidacy. Rustico denied Priscila‘s allegations. Rustico won and was proclaimed as mayor. The Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition for disqualification. Priscila then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc which subsequently denied the same.

 

Issue: Whether or not Rustico committed material misrepresentation and falsification in his certificate of candidacy.

 

Ruling: Material misrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy refers to the falsity of a statement required to be entered therein, as enumerated in Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Concurrent with materiality is a deliberate intention to deceive the electorate as to one‘s qualifications. Priscila asserts that private Balderian committed material misrepresentation when he stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen and that his name is Rustico Besa Balderian, instead of Chu Teck Siao. At all events, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as “material misrepresentation” under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to “qualifications for elective office.” It need not be emphasized that there is no showing that there was intent to deceive the electorate as to private respondent‘s identity, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public was thereby deceived. Priscila is reminded that a petition for disqualification based on material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy is different from an election protest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate.

 

437) Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo (454 SCRA 142, 2005)

Facts: On June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) as the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained the highest votes, followed by the second-placer, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She then took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.

 

Refusing to concede defeat, Mr. FPJ, filed an election protest before the Electoral Tribunal. Both parties exchanged motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the controversy. Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant on December 14, 2004, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a "MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe. She claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections. 

 

 

Issue: Whether or not the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case?

 

Ruling:  The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2^nd and 3^rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2^nd or the 3^rdhighest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.

 

This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decision of the electoral tribunals.

 

Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.

Motion of movant/intervenor is DENIED for lack of merit.

 

 

441) Barroso v. Ampig, Jr. (328 SCRA 520, 2000)

Facts: Petitioner Claudius G. Barroso and private respondent Emerico V. Escobillo were candidates for mayor of the municipality of Tampakan, Cotabato. Petitioner won the election. Private respondent protested the result and filed with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) several cases against petitioner.

 

Issue: whether the election contest case, E.C. Case-No. 15-24, should be dismissed in view of private respondent’s failure to declare in his certification against forum shopping the existence of two pre-proclamation cases then pending with the Comelec.

 

Ruling: The certification against forum shopping is required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

 

 

445) Veloria v. Commission on Elections (211 SCRA 907, 1992)

Facts: The seven (7) petitioners, Ramon Veloria, Renato Espejo, Jesus Bandolin, Segundo Billote, Geronimo Enriquez, Rodolfo Madriaga and Sofronio Mangonon, as well as the seven (7) private respondents, Pedro Sales, Wilfredo Soriano, Erlinda Tambaoan, Emilio Angeles, Jr., Eleuterio Sison, Manuel Ferrer and Santos Sibayan were candidates for municipal mayor (Veloria and Sales), vice-mayor (Espejo and Soriano) and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Manaoag, Pangasinan, in the local elections of January 18, 1988.

 

After the canvass of the election returns, the private respondents were proclaimed duly elected to the positions they ran for. Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed Election Protest.

 

Several proceedings were had, and some issues were brought up to the Court of Appeals and this Court for determination.

 

After a thorough discussion of the issues, the following crystallized as the only issues to be presented for resolution by the Commission, namely: (1) the issue of whether or not a Motion for Reconsideration in electoral cases is a prohibited pleading; and (2) the parties agreed that in case the answer to the first issue is "yes," the notice of appeal was filed out of time and in case the answer is "no," the notice of appeal was filed on time.

 

On August 2, 1990, the COMELEC granted the petition for certiorari

 

Hence, this special civil action of Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, filed on August 31, 1990 by the petitioners (protestants below), pursuant to Rule 39, Section 1, COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE

 

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC Erred in Granting the petition.

 

Ruling: Yes. COMELEC does not have jurisdiction to grant writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. These suits can only be acted upon by the CA and SC because they have original jurisdiction to act on these and it is provided by the Constitution. Thus, such petition should have been coursed to the CA.

 

449) Navarosa v. Commission on Elections (411 SCRA 369, 2003)

Facts: Petitioner Charito Navarosa (petitioner Navarosa) and respondent Roger M. Esto (respondent Esto) were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 17 May 2001, the COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao proclaimed petitioner Navarosa as the duly elected mayor, with a winning margin of three (3) votes over respondent Esto

 

Claiming that irregularities marred the canvassing of ballots in several precincts, respondent Esto filed an election protest. Petitioner Navarosa, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities prejudiced her, filed a counter-protest in the same case. the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Esto

 

Petitioner Navarosa appealed the trial courts. Respondent Esto, on the other hand, filed with the trial court a motion for execution of the judgment pending petitioner Navarosas appeal. Petitioner Navarosa opposed respondent Estos motion. In the alternative, petitioner Navarosa offered to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal, should the trial court grant respondent Estos motion.

 

the COMELEC Second Division affirmed the trial courts Order granting execution pending appeal and nullified the stay of the execution. The Second Division also found that respondent Esto duly paid the COMELEC filing fee.

 

On 10 June 2003, the Court required the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of this petition.

 

Issue: whether or not the Trial court had power to order the stay of execution pending appeal.

 

Ruling: To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.[23] Petitioner Navarosa concedes respondent Estos compliance with the first and third requisites. What she contests is the trial courts finding that there are good reasons to order discretionary execution of its decision.

 

Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) and the other election laws do not specifically provide for execution pending appeal of judgment in election cases, unlike the Election Code of 1971 whose Section 218 made express reference to the Rules of Court on execution pending appeal The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971 does not mean that execution of judgment pending appeal is no longer available in election cases. In election contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials, which are cognizable by courts of limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are permissible pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

 

453) Domingo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (314 SCRA 311, 1999)

Facts: Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari are the En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC and the Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division, which dismissed, for lack of merit, the petition for disqualification filed by Domingo against herein private respondent, the incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong City.

In May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. (Benhur) were both mayoralty candidates of Mandaluyong City. After private respondent's proclamation, Domingo filed the instant petition for disqualification, on the ground that, during the campaign period, private respondent "prodded" his father, then incumbent Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr., to give "substantial allowances" to public school teachers appointed as chairpersons and members of the Boards of Election Inspector (BEIs) for Mandaluyong City.

Petitioner's allegations obtain from the “Pasyal-Aral" outing for Mandaluyong City public school teachers, then Mayor Abalos, Sr. announcing that the teachers appointed to the BEIs will each be given substantial allowances. Petitioner alleged that it was done so as to influence them into voting for him (Benhur) and ensuring his victory. Petitioner presented as evidence photographs and of the said activity, affidavits of 3 public school teachers, and videotapes showing Mayor Abalos Sr. announcing Benhur as the one responsible for such release.

Petitioner alleges that private respondent's act of "prodding" his father constitutes a violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; . . . shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. . . .

In dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, the COMELEC 1st Division admonished petitioner and his counsel for attempting to mislead the COMELEC by making false and untruthful statements in his petition.

On reconsideration, the COMELEC, En Banc, affirmed the findings and conclusions of its 1st Division.

 

Issue:

Whether or not Mayor Abalos Jr. violate Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?

 

Ruling: The complaint for election offense is a criminal case which involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate and, like any other criminal case, requires a conviction on proof beyond reasonable doubt.

 

457) People v. Reyes (63 SCAD 629; 247 SCRA 328, 1995)

Facts: Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego issued MICP Customs Personnel Order assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant.  The actual transfer of Ebio was made on January 14, 1992.

 

Ebio filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a letter-complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 and section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections.

 

Issue: Whether or not the Maniego is guilty for violating the omnibus election code.

 

Ruling: Yes. We start with the constitutional injunction that no officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.  This prohibition is reiterated in the Administrative Code of 1987.  Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 implements this constitutional prohibition.

It ought to be immediately obvious that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a government officer or employee during the election period. To be sure, the transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority. ¹¹ It is necessary to meet the exigencies of public service sometimes too difficult to perceive and predict. Without this inherent prerogative, the appointing authority may not be able to cope with emergencies to the detriment of public service. Clearly then, the transfer or detail of government officer or employee will not be penalized by Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 if done to promote efficiency in the government service. Hence, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2333 provides that the COMELEC has to pass upon the reason for the proposed transfer or detail, viz: "Any request for authority to make or cause any transfer or detail of any officer or employee in the civil service, including public school teachers, shall be submitted in writing to the Commission indicating therein the office and place to which the officer or employee is proposed to be transferred or detailed, and stating the reason therefor. 

461) Lacuna v. Abes (24 SCRA 780, 1968)

 

Facts: Appeal from a dismissal, after trial, of a petition for quo warranto (Civil Case No. 306 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan) challenging the eligibility of the herein respondent-appellee, Benjamin Abes, to the position of mayor of Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, to which he was duly proclaimed elected in the elections of 14 November 1967.

 

Mayor-elect Abes (appellee herein) had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, eight (8) months, and (1) day of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). After he had partially served his sentence, he was released from confinement on 7 April 1959 by virtue of a conditional pardon granted by the President of the Philippines, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison term and fine.

 

With the approach of the 1967 elections, Abes applied for registration as a voter under the new system of registration, but the Election Registration Board of the municipality of Peñaranda denied his application. The denial notwithstanding, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor, and, in the ensuing elections in November, he came out the winner over three other aspirants.

 

Issue: Whether or not he is eligible to run as mayor and be declared as winner.

 

Ruling: it must be remembered that appellee's conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification.

Since, under the criminal code, the second accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for to exercise of the right of suffrage, deemed imposed on appellee Abes, did not expire on 13 October 1961, or thereafter, he was, at the time of the election on 14 November 1967, not qualified to vote or be voted for, or to hold public office, if the effect of his subsequent absolute pardon is not to be considered. He is thus thrown back upon his second defense.

 

Thus, the decisive issue in the case becomes whether or not a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by both the criminal and electoral codes.

 

On this point, appellant Lacuna urges that the presidential prerogative of mercy is prospective in operation and, when granted to Abes on 7 December 1967, did not retroact to the time of the election; that Abes political and civil rights were lost through his conviction and were restored, not at the time of the erection, but only upon the grant of the plenary pardon; that, not being a qualified voter at the time of the election, Abes was not eligible to the office in question.

 

we conclude that the pardon granted to appellee Abes has removed his disqualification, and his election and assumption of office must be sustained.

 

465) Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Commission on Elections (280 SCRA 892, 1997)

 

Facts: Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1992 allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and activities. In order to be valid, the use and release of said amount would have to proceed upon strict compliance with the following mandatory requirements: (1) approval by the President of the Philippines; (2) release of the amount directly to the appropriate implementing agency; and (3) list of projects and activities.

 

respondent Cesar Sarino requested for authority to negotiate, enter into and sign Memoranda of Agreements with accredited Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to utilize them to projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. No. 7180. respondent Franlin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the above-mentioned request of Secretary Sarino.

 

respondent Tiburcio Relucio, on April 24, 1992, entered in the Memorandum of Agreement with an accredited NGO known as Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI).

 

Not long after its incorporation, that is, in 1987, the PYHSDFI suspended its operations because of lack of fund donations and the migration to the United States of many of its members. The foundation became active again in October, 1991.

 

In order to be eligible for financial assistance, the PYHSDFI, on December 12, 1991, applied with DILG for accreditation as NGO in Accordance with the guidelines prescribed in Memorandum Circular No. 90-07, dated January 31, 1990.

 

the PYHSDFI approved Board Resolution No. 7, series of 1992, requesting for allocation from the governments CDF in order to implement its various sports, health, and cultural activities in specific areas in Metro Manila.  Hence, the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 24, 1992 was entered into by PYHSDFI President Catindig and DILG-NCR Regional Director Relucio. In compliance with accreditation requirements of the DILG, the PYHSDFI.

 

Under the said Memorandum of Agreement, it was the express responsibility of the DILG to effect the release and transfer to PYHSDFI of the amount of Seventy Million Pesos from the aggregate allocation of the CDF for complete implementation of the foundations sports, health and cultural work program.

 

The total amount disbursed under the CDF was P330,470,688.00. public respondent Commission on Election (Comelec) received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informing of two x x x serious violations of election laws. thus:

1. The documented admission of Secretary of Budget Salvador Enriquez, in the October 5, 1993 hearing of the Commission on Appointments, that the amount of P70 million was released by his department, shortly before the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of a private entity, the so-called Philippine Youth, Health and Sports Development Foundation, headed by Mr. Rolando Puno, who had been repeatedly identified by columnist Teodoro Benigno as a key member of the Sulu Hotel Operation (SHO), which had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and practices in said election. x x x

2. The illegal diversion of P330 million by Malacaang from the Countryside Development Fund to Department of Interior and Local Government which disbursed this huge amount shortly before the May 11, 1992 election, as revealed by DILG Budget Officer Barata, in a hearing of Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Sen. Vicente Sotto III, held last November 22, 1993.

 

Issue: Whether or not the responsibility to gather evidence in a complaint before COMELEC is upon the complainant.

 

Ruling: Appointive government officials cannot be prosecuted for election offenses when the complainant was not able to present evidence to prove its complaint. The constitutional and statutory mandate for the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued. The task of COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. Therefore, it is still the task of the complainant to prove its allegations for the COMELEC to act on such complaint.

 

469) Commission on Elections v. Noynay (292 SCRA 254, 1998)

Facts: Pursuant to a minute resolution by the COMELEC on October 29, 1996, nine informations for violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code were filed with Branch 23 of the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar.

In an Order issued on August 25, 1997, public respondent, presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment.

All the accused are uniformly charged for Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Motions for reconsiderations filed by the COMELEC have been denied. Petitioners then filed the instant petition.

In its Manifestation, the Office of the Solicitor General, it is “adopting” the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent “are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.”

Public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.

In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly.  They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.

 

Issue:

 

Whether R.A. No. 7691 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.

 

Ruling:

 

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.

In Morales v. Court of Appeals, the court held that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor.  Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.

As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress.  Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.  Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court.  Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.  R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.  Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified.  That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.

It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.  It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.

Instant petition is GRANTED