Digest: Unilever v. Tan

Unilever v. Tan
G.R. No. 179367, January 29, 2014

Facts:

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied for the issuance of search warrants for the search of a warehouse and of an office allegedly owned by Michael Tan a.k.a. Paul D. Tan. The application alleged that the respondent had in his possession counterfeit shampoo products which were being sold, retailed, distributed, dealt with or intended to be disposed of, in violation of Section 168, in relation with Section 170, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.

Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, granted the application and issued Search Warrant. Armed with the search warrants, the NBI searched the premises and, in the course of the search, seized Unilever products.

State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad issued a resolution dismissing the criminal complaint on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to establish the respondent’s direct, personal, or actual participation in the offense charged. As the State Prosecutor found (and affirmed by the DOJ), the petitioner failed to prove the ownership of the warehouse where counterfeit shampoo products were found. This finding led to the conclusion that there was insufficient basis for an indictment for unfair competition as the petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the respondent was the owner or manufacturer of the counterfeit shampoo products found in the warehouse.

Issue:

Whether or not  CA gravely erred in sustaining the Acting Secretary of Justice’s finding that there was no probable cause to indict the respondent for unfair competition

 

Ruling:

Yes. The dismissal of the complaint, despite ample evidence to support a finding of probable cause, clearly constitutes grave error that warrants judicial intervention and correction. The general rule is that courts are precluded from reviewing findings of prosecutors. However, the policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in the determination of probable cause is not without exception. The Constitution itself allows (and even directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely abused. In other words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of probable cause, review the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice.

In the instant case, a careful analysis of the lower courts’ rulings and the records reveals that substantial facts and circumstances that could affect the result of the case have been overlooked. While the ownership of the warehouse on Camia Street, Marikina City, was not proven, sufficient evidence to prove the existence of probable cause nevertheless exists.

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the very offense charged.

Determination of probable cause merely requires probability of guilt or reasonable ground for belief. The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is probability of guilt. Its determination, too, does not call for the application of rules or standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.