MARGIE BALERTA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R.
No. 205144.November 26, 2014
REYES, J.:
Facts: Petitioner was convicted for the crime of
estafa by the RTC. The petitioner challenged the
above ruling before the CA raising the factual issues of whether or not, as
claimed by BABMPC, she had (a) falsified the entries in the passbook, (b)
received collections for remittance to the bank, (c) misappropriated BABMPC’s
money, and (d) committed estafa.
CA
Affirms the RTC’s Decision.
on the matter of misappropriation, [the petitioner]
deplored the conduct of an internal audit in her absence but she merely denied
the shortage of money as shown by the result of the internal audit. [The
petitioner] did not cause an audit of her own to rebut the evidence against
her. She did not show any documentary evidence nor present any witness to
support her claims. It is axiomatic that denial is the weakest form of defense.
As held in People v. Magbanua, "[i]t is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which
has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.
Through the use of the two (2) passbooks, [the
petitioner] was able to dispose of the funds of the cooperative to the latter’s
disadvantage. Moreover, [the petitioner] did not refute the evidence of the
private offended party that she maintained two (2) passbooks. The certification
issued by the Assistant Manager of the rural bank showing that [the petitioner]
had declared as lost the old passbook was not contradicted by the defense at
all. In like manner, there was no evidence presented by the defense to
controvert the claim that the [petitioner] falsified the initials of the bank
employees every time she records an entry in the old passbook, either
withdrawal or deposit.
Issue: whether
or not the petitioner must be acquitted from the crime.
Whether or not the petitioner acquittal in crime is acquittal in civil liability.
Ruling: Yes.
1. First, the petitioner had no juridical possession over
the allegedly misappropriated funds. Chua-Burce is instructive anent what
constitutes mere material possession, on one hand, and juridical possession, on
the other, for the purpose of determining whether the first element of estafais
present in a particular case.
"Fundamental
is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense
must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this
is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt.
Second, At the outset, it is
significant to point out that neither the prosecution nor the defense had made
any formal offer of documentary evidence. The two passbooks, ledger, and three
demand letters, while mentioned by Timonera in his testimony, were notformally
offered as evidence.
While
this Court does not find Timonera’s testimony as incredible, by itself alone,
it is insufficient to discharge the burden of proof required for conviction in
criminal cases. The petitioner was indicted for allegedly misappropriating the
amount of 185,584.06. However, Timonera failed to state with certainty where in
the records held by the petitioner were the discrepancies shown.
The RTC and the CA faulted
the petitioner for not offering countervailing evidence, including an audit
conducted in her own behalf. Still, it does not justify a conviction tobe
handed on that ground because the "[c]ourts cannot magnify the weakness of
the defense and overlook the prosecution’s failure to discharge the onus
probandi."
"In a criminal case, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind."
2. The
acquittal of the accused from the crime charged does not necessarily negate the
existence of civil liability. However, in the instant case, the prosecution had
failed as well to present preponderant evidence from which the Court can determinately
conclude that the petitioner should pay BABMPC the amount of ₱185,584.06.
In the case of Manantan v.
Court of Appeals, we elucidated on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our
law as well as its different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
Thus:
x x x. First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of this instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to benot the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which
may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of.
This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in
Article 29 of the Civil Code, x x x.60 (Citation omitted and underscoring ours)
in the case now
under consideration, the Court acquits the petitioner notbecause she is found
absolutely innocent of the crime charged. The Court acquits merely because
reasonable doubt exists anent her guilt. Hence, the petitioner can still be
held civilly liable to BABMPC if preponderant evidence exist to prove the same.
Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court indicates
how preponderance of evidence shall be determined, viz:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.
— In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider
all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or
want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
(Underscoring ours)
0 Comments