Digest: Albania v. Commission on Elections (826 SCRA 191, 2017)
Facts: In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, respondent Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O. Typoco were both candidates for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Typoco was proclaimed as the winner. Respondent questioned Typoco's proclamation by filing with the COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest error. The Petition was decided in respondent's favor on March 5, 2010 and the latter assumed the position of Governor of Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010 term.
Respondent ran again in the 2010 and 2013 National
and Local Elections where he won and served as Governor of Camarines Norte
respectively.
On October 16, 2015, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy as Governor of Camarines Norte in the May 9, 2016 National and Local elections.
On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered voter
of Poblacion Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, filed a petition for
respondent's disqualification from running as Governor based on Rule 25 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 on two grounds: (1) he violated the
three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC); and (2)
respondent's suspension from office for one year without pay, together with its
accessory penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of
authority in the Ombudsman's Order.
Respondent
argued that since the petition was primarily based on his alleged violation of
the three-term limit rule, the same should have been filed as a petition to
deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Rule 23 of COMELEC
Resolution 9523, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the
ground cited affected a candidate's eligibility.
COMELEC
Second Division dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. It ruled
that a violation of the three-term limit rule and suspension from office as a
result of an administrative case are not grounds for disqualification of a
candidate under the law; that the alleged violation of three-term limit rule is
a ground for ineligibility which constituted false material representation
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC erred in its decision violation of the three-term limit rule and suspension from office as a result of an administrative case are not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under the law
Ruling:
1. Notably, however, a reading of the grounds enumerated
under the above-quoted provisions for a candidate's disqualification does not
include the two grounds relied upon by petitioner. Thus, the COMELEC Second
Division was correct when it found that the petition was not based on any of
the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
provisions.
Respondent's
suspension from office is indeed not a ground for a petition for
disqualification as Section 40(b) clearly speaks of removal from office as a
result of an administrative offense that would disqualify a candidate from
running for any elective local position. In fact, the penalty of suspension
cannot be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he
meets the qualifications for the office as provided under Section 66(b) of R.A.
No. 7160.
2. While the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a ground for a petition for disqualification, however, the COMELEC Second Division found that it is an ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, hence considered the petition as such.
The Constitution has vested in the COMELEC broad power involving not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but also the resolution and determination of election controversies.[15] It also granted the COMELEC the power and authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the primary objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of election cases.[16] Concomitant to such powers is the authority of the COMELEC to determine the true nature of the cases filed before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading filed, obviously aware that in determining the nature of the complaint or petition, its averments, rather than its title/caption, are the proper gauges.[17]
Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, such petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, as provided under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, as the COMELEC found, the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period, and dismissed the petition for being filed out time. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed such dismissal.
We agree.
The three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election because he is ineligible.
We are not convinced.
We held that two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive term
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms.
The word "term" in a legal sense
means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the
period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer's
term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the
law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public
officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was
elected or appointed
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