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Digest: Administrative Law Cases

Digest: Gaspar v. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 774, 1990)

Facts: Gaspar was the Chief of the Security Section of the Parks Development Office of the City of Manila when Executive Order No. 81-01 was issued by the Governor of the Metro Manila Commission on May 24, 1981. The Executive Order established a comprehensive position classification and pay plan for MMC officers and employees, and contained a provision reclassifying Gaspar's position of Chief, Security Section, to Administrative Officer II. On April 25, 1983, Gaspar was appointed to that position of Administrative Officer II, effective on October 1, 1982.

Zenaida F. Lanting, then Senior Accounting Clerk in the same Parks Development Office, filed with the Merit Systems Board a protest against Gaspar's appointment as Administrative Officer II, contending that she was better qualified for, and should have been named to, the office.

After due proceedings, the Merit Systems Board (MSB) revoked Gaspar's appointment and directed Lanting's appointment to the office of Administrative Officer II, in a decision rendered on November 28, 1984. Gaspar appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) .

After initially sustaining Gaspar (in Resolution No. 85-177, May 21, 1985), the CSC ultimately affirmed the judgment of the MSB by Resolution numbered 85-291 promulgated on July 19, 1985 and, as the MSB had done, directed "the appointment of ... Lanting to the position of Administrative Officer II in the Parks Development Office.

Ruling: The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that both the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing authority.

The doctrine has since been subsequently applied, in Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989, and Maximo Gabriel v. Hon. Eufemio Domingo, et al., etc., G.R. No. 87420, September 17, 1990. 2

The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests of the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the Head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied. The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard.

In the case at bar, therefore, the respondent Commission acted beyond the scope of its authority and with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the petitioner's appointment and directing the appointment in his stead of the private respondent.

Qualifications Prescribed by Law for Certain Officer
Digest: Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections (337 SCRA 574, 2000)
G.R. No. 137329. August 9, 2000

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has registered as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or newcomer" when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally construed to give effect to the popular mandate.

Facts: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran for mayor.

Issue: Whether respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement.

Ruling: Yes. Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:

"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community." Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain." Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."

Facts Showing Change of Residence

In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v. Comelec, this Court ruled that private respondent therein, now Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of the Third District of Cagayan, had duly proven his change of residence from Gattaran, Cagayan (part of the First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (part of the Third District in which he sought election as congressman). He proved it with the following facts: (1) in July 1990, he leased and lived in a residential apartment in Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (2) in July 1995, he leased another residential apartment in Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (3) the January 18, 1998 Certificate of Marriage between Aguinaldo and his second wife, Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the Certificate of Live Birth of his second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to him and his family showed that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at least one year immediately preceding the May 1998 elections. The Court also stated that it was not "of much importance that in his [Aguinaldo's] certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran.

In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.

Meaning of Appointment
Digest: Borromeo v. Mariano (41 Phil 322, 1921)
G.R. No. 16808. January 3, 1921.

Facts: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge. he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.

Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, secs. 65, 66, 148.) One Judge of First Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the ninth. (Sec. 154.) The oath of office of the judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to which the affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty in a district other than their own for the purpose of trying land registration cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to which particular attention is addressed by the Attorney-General, is, "but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district." A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-General only if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious misconduct or inefficiency in office. (Sec. 173.)

Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of section 155 of the Administrative Code, the provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They are not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions of judges of first instance of definite districts until they resign, retire, or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.

Issue: Whether or not judge borromeo of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other district than that for which he is commissioned.

Ruling: The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the office. (22 R. C. L., 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to another district. No other person could be placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be made to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc., 1373.) In our judgment, the language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, interpreted with reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district an appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing him from his district.

Elements of a Valid Appointment
Digest: Velicaria-Gerafil v. Office of the President (758 SCRA 414, 2015)
G.R. No. 203372. June 16, 2015

The concurrence of all the elements of a valid appointment should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.

Facts: Prior to the May 2010 elections, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments including the petitioners in several government offices. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for a ban on midnight appointments. For purposes of the 2010 elections, March 10, 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban. An exception is provided under such provision which allows temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban. The officers and employees who were affected by EO 2 were informed that they were terminated from service effective the next day. Several petitions were filed seeking to declare the executive order as unconstitutional and for the declaration of their appointment as legal.


Issue: Whether or not petitioners' appointments are valid.


Ruling: No. The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step.


Power to Appoint is Discretionary
Digest: Civil Service Commission v. de la Cruz (437 SCRA 403, 2004)
G.R. NO. 158737 : August 31, 2004

Facts: Respondent Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office, DOTC, presently holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division.

Respondent was promotionally appointed to the said position on November 28, 1994, duly attested by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). But prior thereto, he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office (ATO).


Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) her protest against the promotional appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, claiming among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said position.


then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia rendered a decision finding the protest without merit.


dissatisfied, Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Secretary to the CSC-NCR.


On November 18, 1997, the CSC-NCR rendered its decision upholding the protest of Calamba and recalling the approval of respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer.


ATO Director Gilo wrote the CSC-NCR asking for the suspension of the order recalling respondent's appointment, citing several reasons in support thereof.


Strangely, in a letter dated January 13, 1998, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo granted Director Gilo's request and affirmed the approval of respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer.


Motion for Reconsideration. Granted


respondent filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals granted the petition by setting aside CSC Resolution Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451 and approving respondent's appointment as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office.


Issue(s): Whether or not respondnet is qualified.

              Whether or not power to appoint is discretionary.


Ruling: 1. Yes. Contrary to petitioner's contention, respondent has sufficiently complied with the required experience standards. the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his appointment.

2.  Yes. In Rapisora v. Civil Service Commission, this Court held that the rule that appointees must possess the prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so strictly interpreted as to curtail an agency's discretionary power to appoint, as long as the appointee possesses other qualifications required by law. The appellate court was therefore correct in setting aside the assailed CSC resolutions and considering the respondent's total work experience as sufficient to meet the supervisory standards under the second clause, thereby finding respondent qualified for appointment to the contested position.


It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority. In Salles v. Francisco, et al., we had occasion to rule that, in the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority.


In the appointment of division chiefs, as in this case, the power to appoint rests on the head of the department. Sufficient if not plenary discretion should be granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the offices concerned. They are in a position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the office vacated. Not only is the appointing authority the officer primarily responsible for the administration of the office, he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the position.


"Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied."

Necessity of Written Appointment
Digest: SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority (769 SCRA 310, 2015)
G.R. No. 203655, September 07, 2015


Facts: Once again, respondent-movants Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) and Arnel Paciano D. Casanova, Esq. (Casanova) urge this Court to reconsider its August 13, 2014 Decision1 in the case at bar. In their Motion for Leave to file Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit the Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration (With Motion for the Court en banc to Take Cognizance of this Case and/to Set the Case for Oral Argument Before the Court en banc),2 respondent-movants remain adamant in claiming that the assailed rulings of the Court would cause unwarranted and irremediable injury to the government, specifically to its major beneficiaries, the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).3


Issue: Whether or not Oral Appointment is null and void.


Ruling: Respondent-movants' interpretation of the antiquated 1953 doctrine in Ykalina is highly distorted. In the said case, the Court, finding for respondent Ananias Oricio (Oricio), sustained his appointment in spite of having been merely verbally made. As held:

While the appointment of an officer is usually evidenced by a Commission, as a general rule it is not essential to the validity of an appointment that a commission issue, and an appointment may be made by an oral announcement of his determination by the appointing power.31 (emphasis added, citation omitted)

Based on the Court's reasoning, the presidential order that "may either be in a written memorandum or merely verbal " adverted to in Ykalina should therefore be understood as limited specifically to those pertaining to appointments. Current jurisprudence, however, no longer recognizes the validity of oral appointments and, in fact, requires the transmission and receipt of the necessary appointment papers for their completion.32

To further distinguish Ykalina with the extant case, it was observed in the former that Oricio's verbal appointment was established in evidence by a communication duly signed by the then Acting Executive Secretary "by order of the President." Applied in modern day scenarios, the limited application of the Ykalina doctrine should only govern those that were similarly verbally given by the president but were, nevertheless, attested to by the Executive Secretary. This is in hew with Section 27 (10) of Book III, Title III, Chapter 9-B of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which empowers the Executive Secretary to attest executive orders and other presidential issuances "by authority of the President." These "executive orders and presidential issuances," in turn, relate to the enumeration under Book III, Title I, Chapter 2 of EO 292.


Here, it is well to recall that the President did not issue any said executive order or presidential issuance in intimating to the BCDA that he wishes for the competitive challenge to be cancelled. There was no document offered that was signed by either the Chief Executive or the Executive Secretary, for the President, to that effect. The situation, therefore, does not involve a presidential order or instruction within the contemplation of Sec. 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, and, consequently, does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc. Given the glaring differences in context, the doctrine in Ykalina cannot find application herein, and cannot operate to divest the Court's division of its jurisdiction over the instant case.


Revocation of Appointment
Digest: The General Manager, PPA v. Monserate (381 SCRA 200, 2002)
G.R. No. 129616.April 17, 2002

Facts: ulieta Monserate, respondent, started her government service in 1977 as Bookkeeper II in the Port Management Office, PPA, Iloilo City. Barely a year later, she was promoted to the position of Cashier II and then as Finance Officer (SG-16) in 1980.

In the early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a reorganization, respondent applied for the permanent position of Manager II (SG-19) of the Resource Management Division, same office. The Comparative Data Sheet accomplished by the PPA Reorganization Task Force shows the ranking of the six (6) aspirants to the said position.

Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of the PPA, appointedrespondent to the position of Manager II (Resource Management Division). On even date, respondent assumed office and discharged the functions thereof. On July 8, 1988, the CSC, through Guillermo R. Silva (Assistant Director of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA) approved her appointment.

Petitioner Ramon Anino, who ranked second to respondent per the Comparative Data Sheet earlier quoted, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting against respondent's appointment. 

The PPA Appeals Board, in a Resolution, sustained the protest and rendered ineffective respondent's appointment based on "(1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3; (2) CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B; and (3) Civil Service Eligibility." These grounds were not explained or discussed in the Resolution.

On January 16, 1989, respondent filed with the CSC an appeal formally protesting against petitioner Anino's appointment and at the same time questioning the propriety of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board. This appeal remained pending with the CSC for more than six (6) years despite respondent's requests for early resolution. CSC dismissed her appeal. MR Denied.

CA nullified the twin resolutions of the CSC.

Thereupon, Ramon Anino and the PPA General Manager filed on August 14, 1997 the present petition

Issue: Whether or not an appointment once approved can no longer be revoked

Ruling: From all indications, it is indubitable that substantial and procedural irregularities attended respondent's demotion from the position of Manager II, Resource Management Division, to the lower position of Administrative Officer. Indeed, her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and due process. In Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission, this Court emphasized that "once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing."

Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the revocation of respondent's appointment by demoting her. Respondent's security of tenure guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, par. (3)] should not be placed at the mercy of abusive exercise of the appointing power.

Ad Interim Appointments
Digest: Aytona v. Castillo (4 SCRA 1, 1962)
G.R. No. L-19313. January 19, 1962


Facts: On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo  as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.


Issue: Whether or not the midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.


Ruling: No. Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December 30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a "care-taker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions1 irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.


Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he has benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. Where, however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the appointment2 and where the names are to be submitted by successor, who may not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such "double care" which was required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the contention that these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.

Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.


Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation3 and if any circumstances justify revocation, those described herein should fit the exception.



Temporary or Acting Appointments
Digest: Erasmo v. Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (388 SCRA 112, 2002)
G.R. No. 139251. August 29, 2002

Facts: Petitioner started working with respondent Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) in 1982 as a consultant on the Project Evaluation Department, and held various positions therein, including Manager of Project Evaluation Department (April 1, 1982 to December 31, 1985), Manager of Accounts Management (January 1, 1986 to April 1987), Assistant Vice-President of Accounts Management (May 1987 to July 1988), Manager II of Guaranty and Credit Insurance Department (August 1988 to March 15, 1992), and Officer-in-Charge of Technical Service/Guaranty and Credit Insurance Group (TS/GCIG) (March 16 to June 14, 1992), until finally, she was promoted to Vice-President of TS/GCIG on June 15, 1992. The nature of her appointment was "promotion" and her employment status was "temporary," since the position is a Career Executive Service Office (CESO) and petitioner lacks the required CES eligibility.

On February 24, 1993 petitioner was administratively charged with: (1) neglect of duty, (2) incompetence in the performance of official duties, (3) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (4) directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of her office.

petitioner appealed the status of her temporary appointment to the Civil Service Commission. CSC holding that a CES eligibility is required to a CES position, and even if one possesses such eligibility, still the appointment cannot be considered permanent unless an appointment to the rank has been granted by the President of the Philippines.

Respondent, through its President, Fernando M. Miranda, Jr., wrote petitioner, informing her that "by operation of law, your appointment shall be deemed terminated and shall automatically cease to have further force and effect at the close of office hours on the expiration of your appointment." She was also advised that the pendency of the administrative case against her precludes any renewal of her appointment.

Issue:  whether or not petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position of Vice-President of TS/GCIG of respondent HIGC.

Ruling: In the recent case of Matibag v. Benipayo, we reiterated the long standing ruling that a person who is issued a temporary appointment does not enjoy security of tenure, thus:

"As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. As held in Achacoso v. Macaraig:

‘It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a moment’s notice," conformably to established jurisprudence …’

‘The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place, or as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated …’" 

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