PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE,vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., G.R. No. 158239. (Digest)

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, Petitioner, vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., Respondents. G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012

BERSAMIN, J. 

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case. 

FACTS: 

Marquez Alma Jose sold for consideration of ₱160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land. They agreed that Javellana would pay ₱80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of ₱80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System; and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorneyin-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose, and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration. After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendor’s undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the RTC Malolos, Bulacan. Javellana averred that upon the execution of the deed of conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of ₱80,000.00 and had taken possession of the parcels of land; that he had paid the balance of the purchase price to Juvenal on different dates upon Juvenal’s representation that Margarita had needed funds for the expenses of registration and payment of real estate tax; and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the parcels of land; and that he had told her then that the parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had been sold to him. Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998. However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss, Javellana moved for reconsideration. On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order. He also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the orders dismissing his. On August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it only committed, at most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged orders. On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the dismissal of the case and remanding the records to the RTC "for further proceedings in accordance with law." On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that it decided to give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension of time to file his appellant’s brief; that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.

 ISSUES: 

Whether or not the appeal was made on time 

RULING: 

Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary period. Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: 

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, theappellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. 

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists. The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit: 

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. 

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. 

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to "actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure." Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. 

Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not Consequently, we rule that Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

Source:

DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW, retrieved April 24, 2020, from https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/7dcde495/files/uploaded/Civil%20Procedure_MwNwIo5Rs6cBBO1gwlro.pdf