G.R. No. L-32162 September 28, 1984 THE PASAY CITY GOVERNMENTvs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, MAKASIAR, J., (Digested)

G.R. No. L-32162 September 28, 1984THE PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
MAKASIAR, J.,

Civil Procedure: Rule 10

Facts:

·         Respondent-appellee V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates represented by Vicente David Isip entered into a contract with the City of Pasay represented by the then Mayor Pablo Cuneta. The contract entitled "Contract and Agreement" was for the construction of a new Pasay City Hall.

·         In the demands for payment .the petitioner-appellants failed to remit to the respondent-appellee. Subsequently, respondent appellee filed an action for specific performance with damages against herein petitioners-appellants before the respondent Court.

·         Appellants filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint and for bin of particulars. Denied by the Court.

·         Appellants filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint and for bin of particulars. Denied by the Court.

·         The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement. On February 25, 1969, the Municipal Board of Pasay enacted an ordinance which approved the Compromise Agreement

Issue:

Whether or not the Court erred in entertaining the supplemental pleading filed by the respondent-appellee.

Held:

Yes, Having established that the compromise agreement was final and immediately executory, and in fact was already enforced, the respondent Court was in error when it still entertained the supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the respondent Court had no more jurisdiction over the subject matter. When a decision has become final and executory, the court no longer has the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, and its only power thereof is to order its execution

After the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment and cannot vacate the same.

Moreover, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter Here, the respondent-appellee originally asked for specific performance which was later settled through a compromise agreement. After this, the respondent-appellee asked for rescission of both the contract and agreement and the compromise agreement using a supplemental complaint. It is clear that the supplemental complaint We have before Us is not only to "supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading but is also meant as an entirely new "substitute" to the latter. A supplemental complaint must be consistent with and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the original complaint and a new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such complaint