Digest: Akbayan Youth v. Commission on Elections (355 SCRA 318, 2001)

Facts: Petitioners―representing the youth sector―seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the 14 May 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the 27 December 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only is submitted but was then denied by the COMELEC under Resolution No. 3584 on 8 February 2001.

Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.

Section 8 (System of Continuing Registration of Voters) of R.A. No. 8189 The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 provides:

The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

 

Issue:

Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated 8 February 2001.

 Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed 27 December 2000 deadline and the 14 May 2001 general elections.

 

Ruling:

1. It is well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. A two-day special registration for new voters would give rise to time constraints due to additional pre-election matters. Accordingly, COMELEC acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
2. The Supreme Court cannot control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. The remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.

 

Source and credit to: Finding Dara.wordpress