Conflicts of Law: Choice of Law (Digest)

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Conflicts of Law

TOPIC: Choice of Law

MLP

• Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000.  
• Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963. 
• PCI Bank v. Escolin, G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. March 29, 1974. 
• Obergefell vs. Hodges, 14-556 (June 26, 2015), 576 US  5 
• Tayag Renato vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., G.R. No. 23145, November 29, 1968  
• United Airlines Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124110, 20 April 2001
• Pakistan International Airlines vs. Ople, 190 SCRA 1990, G.R. No. 61594, September 28, 1990  
• Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis et al. vs. Edward Bellis, L-23678, June 6, 1967  Asiavest Merchant Bankers vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110263, 20 July 200  Garcia vs. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 02 October 2001 
• Sps. Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals and Transworld Airlines, Inc. G.R. No. 104235, 18 November 1993  

PAULA T. LLORENTE, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, Respondents. [G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000.]PARDO, J.: 

Facts:

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy. Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a parish priest.

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home

Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization was issued.

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.  He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. Lorenzo returned to the United States and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. The divorce decree became final.

In the meantime upon return to the Philippines, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.  From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children.

RTC: divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is likewise void. Hence, Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

Issue (s):

Whether or not the divorce of Llorente with his former wife Paula, marriage to Alicia and execution of the will is valid?

Ruling:

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 41 that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.

 Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." (Emphasis ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
vs.
G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963LABRADOR, J.:

Facts:

This is an appeal from a decision approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen.

It is in accordance with the provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christ

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.

In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable.

Issue(s):

Whether or not the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California.

Ruling:

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

x x x           x x x           x x x

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.

x x x           x x x           x x x

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

Xxxx

The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
vs.THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, made a will in 1952.
Unfortunately, she passed away in 1957 while she was domiciled in Iloilo City.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie, however, also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.

In 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled in the Philippines).
While the probate proceeding on the will of Linnie was pending, Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles, filed a motion before the probate court so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. The latter was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive.

Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he would like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. The said motion was approved by Judge Venicio Escolin.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition.

Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected.

Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE:

WON Texas Law should apply.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court since both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas.

The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court further emphasized that Texas law is the applicable law at the time of Linnie’s death.

Obergefell v. Hodges

Facts:

Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

Issue (s):

(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?

(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Ruling:

Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.

TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC.G.R. No. L-23145.November 29, 1968FERNANDO, J.:

Facts:

County Trust Company of New York, United States of America is the domiciliary administration of the decedent, Idonah Slade Perkins who owned 33,002 shares of stocks in the appellant, domestic corporation, Benguet Consolidated Inc. located in the Philippines. A dispute arose between the appellee, Tayag who is the appointed ancillary of Perkins in the Philippines and the domiciliary administration as to who is entitled to the possession of the certificate of shares, however, County Trust Company refuses to transfer the said certificate to Tayag despite the order of the court. Hence, the appellee was compelled to petition the court for the appellant to declare the subject certificates as lost to which appellant allegeed that no new certificate can be issued and the same cannot be rendered as lost in accordance with their by-laws.

Issue(s):

Whether or not the certificate of shares of stock can be declared lost.

Ruling:

          Yes. Administration whether principal or ancillary certainly extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted.

It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property located in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent’s last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administration appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the Philippines. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of the deceased’s liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.

Since there is refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administration in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administration in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary administration could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.

Assuming that a contrariety exist between the provision of the laws and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.

A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of state according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator, more than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 124110.April 20, 2001

KAPUNAN, J.:

 

Facts:

Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila. three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minors on, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles. All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.

Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Anice to changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words: “Check-in-required.”

They were then set to leave but were denied boarding because the flight was overbooked. 

The cause of the non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines Flight No. 1108 makes up the bone of contention of this controversy

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Fontanillas. The appellate court found that there was an admission on the part of United Airlines that the Fontanillas did in fact observe the check-in requirement. It ruled further that even assuming there was a failure to observe the check-in requirement, United Airlines failed to comply with the procedure laid down in cases where a passenger is denied boarding. The appellate court likewise gave credence to the claim of Aniceto Fontanilla that the employees of United Airlines were discourteous and arbitrary and, worse, discriminatory. In light of such treatment, the Fontanillas were entitled to moral damages.

Issue(s):

Whether the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

Ruling:

No.

The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.

In the case of Zalanea vs. Court of Appeals, this Court applied the doctrine of lex loci contractus. According to the doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of performance are the same.

Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG, respondents.
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990FELICIANO, J.:

Principle: The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.

Facts:

In 1978, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila, two separate contracts of employment, one with Farrales and the other with Mamasig. The contracts provided in pertinent portion as follows:

5. Duration of Employment 

This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties. 

6. Termination

xxx

Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.

xxx

10. Applicable Law
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.

xxx

After their training, Farrales and Mamasig commenced their services as flight attendants with base station in Manila.

Roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts, PIA sent Farrales and Mamasig separate letters, informing them that they will be terminated effective September 1, 1980.

Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).

PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there claimed that both Farrales and Mamasig were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.

The Regional Director held that the dismissal was illegal and ordered PIA to reinstate Farrales and Mamasig with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period of their employment contracts.

PIA appealed. Invoking paragraphs 5 and 6 of the contract of employment, PIA claimed that it is authorized to shorten the 3-year term at any time and for any cause satisfactory to itself. It argued that its relationship with Farrales and Mamasig was governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code.

Issue(s):

1.    Should the employment contract prevail over the general provisions of the Labor Code?

2.    Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?

Ruling:

1). A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected since a contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations.

The provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement between petitioner PIA and private respondents must be read together and when so read, the fixed period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. Paragraph 6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year period ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative one at the option of the employer PIA. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during the limited period of three (3) years, and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.

2.) The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.

 TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Facts:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust.

Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

His illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled if Philippine law were to apply.

Issue(s):

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children.

Ruling:

Appellants are not entitled to their legitimes. Under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased.

The doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.² So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.³ Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

In Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 110263       July 20, 2001

DELEON, JR., J.:

 

Facts:

The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.

It appears that sometime in 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled "Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines."

Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.

On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent which is also designated therein as the "2nd Defendant. 

Issue(s):

1.    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MALAYSIAN COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PNCC, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT (a) THE FOREIGN COURT HAD SERVED SUMMONS ON PNCC AT ITS MALAYSlA OFFICE, AND (b) PNCC ITSELF APPEARED BY COUNSEL IN THE CASE BEFORE THAT COURT.

2.    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT TO (SIC) THE MALAYSIAN COURT JUDGMENT.

Ruling:

1.    Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;13 however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b),¹ Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.

In the instant case, the evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise.

Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it - to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment, namely, (a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by the Malaysian Court over the person of private respondent due to alleged improper service of summons upon private respondent and the alleged lack of authority of its counsel to appear and represent private respondent in the suit; (b) the foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by evident collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact or law; and (c) not only were the requisites for enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that the Malaysian judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription that the "every decision must state the facts and law on which it is based

2.    In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must stand.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,, Petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

Facts:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha.

Recio married Grace J. Garcia at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church,Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997 of Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

Issue(s):

Whether the decree of divorce is valid

Ruling:

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.  A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.  In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.  A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.  Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.  Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993NOCON, J.

Facts:

Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145.

Issue(s):

Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA?

Ruling:

The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.

1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.

"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact."

"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law."

 Reference:

Obergefell v. Hodges. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved May 1, 2020, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556

Pakistan International Airlines vs Ople. (laborlawcasedigest) Retrieved May 1, 2020, from https://laborlawcasedigest.blogspot.com/2018/07/pakistan-international-airlines-vs-ople.html

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin

G.R. Nos. L-27936 and L-27937, 29 March 1974, 56 SCRA 266, (IBP-Zamboanga) Retrieved May 1, 2020, from https://ibpzn.com/philippine-commercial-and-industrial-bank-v-escolin/

Tayag vs Benguet Consolidated Inc
26 SCRA 242 [GR No. L-23145 November 27,1968]. Black N White. Retrieved May 1, 2020, from https://blacknwhitethoughtsblog.wordpress.com/2016/05/12/tayag-vs-benguet-consolidated-inc-26-scra-242/

Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals 288 SCRA 23 (1993). (ulandi.digests)

Retrieved May 1, 2020, from http://ulandi-digest.blogspot.com/2012/03/zalamea-vs-court-of-appeals-288-scra-23.html